The pragmatic constraints of ἈΛΛΆ in the synoptic Gospels by Craigmiles, Shawn I.
  
   
 
 
 
 
THE PRAGMATIC CONSTRAINTS 
OF 
ἈΛΛΆ 
IN THE 
SYNOPTIC GOSPELS 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
Presented to the Faculty of 
 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
 
Wilmore, Kentucky 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the  
 
Requirements for the Degree 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Dissertation Committee: 
 
Dr. Fredrick Long, Mentor 
 
Dr. Joseph Dongell, Reader 
 
Dr. Steven Runge, External Examiner 
 
 
By  
 
Shawn I. Craigmiles 
 
April 2016 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2016 
Shawn I. Craigmiles 
All Rights Reserved 
1 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................. 1 
PREFACE .......................................................................................................................... 6 
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 8 
But It Is Not That Complex, Is It? ............................................................................................................... 8 
Not Dialectical, but Metalinguistic Negation ............................................................................................ 10 
But What Have You Done About It? ......................................................................................................... 13 
Aims and Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 15 
Scope ............................................................................................................................................................. 17 
Why Only the Synoptic Gospels?  How are the Synoptic Gospels Related?............................................ 18 
Why Only the Synoptic Gospels? ........................................................................................................ 18 
How are the Synoptic Gospels Related? .............................................................................................. 19 
The Occurrences of Ἀλλά in the Synoptic Gospels .................................................................................. 22 
Overview of the Occurrences of ἀλλά, the Associated Patterns, and Descriptive Terminology ........... 23 
Parallel and Singular Occurrences of ἀλλά in the Synoptic Gospels ........................................................ 23 
Table 1:  Occurrences in Matthew ....................................................................................................... 24 
Table 2:  Occurrences in Mark ............................................................................................................. 25 
Table 3:  Occurrences in Luke ............................................................................................................. 26 
Definitions/Description of Terms ............................................................................................................. 27 
Negation .......................................................................................................................................... 27 
Ellipsis/Elliptical ............................................................................................................................. 28 
Constant Constituent ....................................................................................................................... 30 
Preceding Constituent ..................................................................................................................... 31 
Following Constituent ..................................................................................................................... 31 
Pragmatic Constraints ..................................................................................................................... 32 
Patterns Identified Within the Synoptic Gospels ...................................................................................... 33 
Patterns ................................................................................................................................................ 33 
Pattern 1—Supplied/Implied Constant Pattern—Constituent Correction ....................................... 34 
Pattern 2—No Constant Pattern—Negation and Affirmation of Whole Utterances ....................... 34 
Pattern 3—Supplied/Repeated Constant Pattern—Comparison and Contrast ................................ 34 
Pattern 4—Rhetorical/Discourse Pattern—Advancing An Alternative .......................................... 35 
Pattern 5—Conditional Negation Pattern—Unless/Except X Then Y … But X (So Not Y) .......... 35 
Pattern 6—Alternative Negation Pattern—Affirmation and Negation of Whole Utterances.......... 35 
Frequency Distribution of the Patterns Throughout the Synoptic Gospels .......................................... 39 
Procedure ..................................................................................................................................................... 40 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 .................................................................................................................... 42 
Survey of Secondary Literature Through the Middle of the Twentieth Century .................................. 42 
G.B. Winer ........................................................................................................................................... 42 
A. T. Robertson .................................................................................................................................... 47 
H.W. Smyth ......................................................................................................................................... 49 
H. Kruse and P. A. Vaccari: Dialectic Negation as a Semitic Idiom ................................................... 51 
WHY “DIALEKTISCHE” NEGATION? EXCURSUS ON G. W. F. HEGEL’S “DIALECTIC” ....................... 55 
The Typical Features of This Idiom: ............................................................................................... 59 
J. D. Denniston..................................................................................................................................... 61 
F. Blass, A. Debrunner, and R. Funk (BDF) ........................................................................................ 62 
M. Zerwick........................................................................................................................................... 63 
N. Turner .............................................................................................................................................. 65 
J. Jeremias ............................................................................................................................................ 65 
CHAPTER 2 .................................................................................................................... 67 
Survey of Secondary Literature From the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries ........... 67 
Sources Related Specifically to Κοινή Greek in the New Testament ....................................................... 69 
A.B. du Toit ......................................................................................................................................... 69 
J. Callow .............................................................................................................................................. 72 
D. Wallace and S. Porter ...................................................................................................................... 79 
J. Heckert ............................................................................................................................................. 80 
S. Levinsohn ........................................................................................................................................ 82 
U. Luz .................................................................................................................................................. 83 
N. Gupta ............................................................................................................................................... 87 
S. Runge ............................................................................................................................................... 87 
R. Brannan ........................................................................................................................................... 90 
Sources Related More Generally to Linguistics and Negation ................................................................. 92 
H.P. Grice: Cooperative Principle and Conversational Implicature..................................................... 92 
Modification of Grice’s Proposal for Conversational Implicature by L. Horn ............................... 95 
Alternative to Grice’s Proposal for Conversational Implicature: S. Sperber and D. Wilson .......... 97 
L. Horn: Descriptive and Metalinguistic Negation ............................................................................ 100 
Metalinguistic Negation ................................................................................................................ 101 
J. McCawley on the Form of a Construction Versus Its Function ............................................ 102 
Horn’s Metalinguistic Negation Proposal ................................................................................ 106 
S. Schwenter’s Interaction with Horn’s Proposal ..................................................................... 108 
A. Lehrer and K. Lehrer: The “Not Only” Proposal ................................................................ 109 
The PA/SN Adversative Particle Distinction ................................................................................ 115 
Correction and Contrast According to E. Lang ........................................................................ 118 
Contrast and Adversativity According to S. Schwenter ........................................................... 123 
E. Rudolph: Correction ...................................................................................................................... 124 
S. Repp: Gapping ............................................................................................................................... 127 
Gapping versus Stripping .............................................................................................................. 130 
K. Jasinskaja: Correction ................................................................................................................... 134 
M.A.K Halliday: Ellipsis and Continuous Information ..................................................................... 139 
Yan Huang: Pragmatics; Conversational and Conventional Implicature ........................................... 143 
CHAPTER 3 .................................................................................................................. 150 
Occurrences of ἀλλά Found in All of the Synoptic Gospels ................................................................... 150 
The Texts and Their Associated Patterns ............................................................................................... 152 
Matt 8:4//Mark 1:44//Luke 5:14 and Pattern 2—The “No Constant” Pattern ............................... 152 
Matt 8:4//Mark 1:44 ................................................................................................................. 152 
Matt 8:4//Mark 1:44//Luke 5:14 ............................................................................................... 154 
Matt 9:12//Mark 2:17//Luke 5:31 and Pattern 1C ......................................................................... 157 
3 
 
 
 
Matt 9:12//Mark 2:17//Luke 5:31 ............................................................................................. 157 
Matt 9:13//Mark 2:17//Luke 5:32 .................................................................................................. 164 
Matt 9:13b//Mark 2:17b ........................................................................................................... 164 
Luke 5:32 ................................................................................................................................. 166 
Matt 9:17//Mark 2:22//Luke 5:38 and Pattern 3—The “Supplied/Repeated Constant” Pattern .... 169 
Matt 9:17 .................................................................................................................................. 169 
Matt 9:17//Mark 2:22//Luke 5:37-38 ....................................................................................... 173 
Matt 9:24//Mark 5:39//Luke 8:52 .................................................................................................. 179 
Matt 9:24//Mark 5:39 ............................................................................................................... 179 
Luke 8:52 ................................................................................................................................. 183 
Matt 20:26//Mark 10:43//Luke 22:26 ............................................................................................ 186 
Matt 20:26//Mark 10:43 and Pattern 3—The Supplied/Repeated Constant Pattern ................. 186 
Matt 22:32b//Mark 12:27//Luke 20:38 .......................................................................................... 191 
Matt 24:6//Mark 13:7//Luke 21:9 .................................................................................................. 195 
Matt 24:6b//Mark 13:7b//Luke 21:9—X but not [yet] Y? ........................................................ 195 
Matt 26:39//Mark 14:36//Luke 22:42 ............................................................................................ 196 
Luke 22:42 ............................................................................................................................... 199 
Matt 26:39 ................................................................................................................................ 202 
CHAPTER 4 .................................................................................................................. 206 
Occurrences of ἀλλά Found in Two Gospels ........................................................................................... 206 
Matthew and Mark Only ........................................................................................................................ 206 
Matt 10:20//Mark 13:11 ..................................................................................................................... 206 
Matt 10:20 ..................................................................................................................................... 206 
Matt 10:20//Mark 13:11 ................................................................................................................ 212 
Matt 15:11//Mark 7:15 ....................................................................................................................... 215 
Matthew 15:11 .............................................................................................................................. 215 
Matthew 15:11//Mark 7:15 ........................................................................................................... 216 
EXCURSUS ON DIALECTICAL NEGATION, METALINGUISTIC NEGATION, AND HALAKHIC PURITY
 ................................................................................................................................................................ 221 
Matthew and Luke Only ......................................................................................................................... 231 
Matt 5:15//Luke 8:16 and 11:33......................................................................................................... 231 
Mark and Luke Only .............................................................................................................................. 238 
Mark 12:14//Luke 20:21 .................................................................................................................... 238 
CHAPTER 5 .................................................................................................................. 241 
Representative Occurrences of ἀλλά Found Only in Matthew .............................................................. 241 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 241 
Explanation of Observations in Matthew ............................................................................................... 242 
Pattern 1 ............................................................................................................................................. 242 
Sub-Pattern 1A1 ............................................................................................................................ 242 
Matthew 7:21 ........................................................................................................................... 243 
Matthew 19:11 ......................................................................................................................... 245 
Matthew 16:17 and 22:30 ......................................................................................................... 246 
Sub-Pattern 1B1 ............................................................................................................................ 247 
Matthew 5:17 ........................................................................................................................... 249 
Sub-Pattern 1B2 ............................................................................................................................ 252 
Matthew 19:6 ........................................................................................................................... 253 
Pattern 2 ............................................................................................................................................. 254 
Sub-Patterns 2C and 2D ................................................................................................................ 254 
Matthew 21:21 ......................................................................................................................... 254 
Matthew 27:24 ......................................................................................................................... 255 
Pattern 3 ............................................................................................................................................. 255 
4 
 
 
 
Sub-Pattern 3A .............................................................................................................................. 256 
Matthew 4:4 ............................................................................................................................. 256 
Matthew 6:13 ........................................................................................................................... 258 
Pattern 4 ............................................................................................................................................. 259 
Matt 11:8-9 ............................................................................................................................... 259 
CHAPTER 6 .................................................................................................................. 260 
Representative Occurrences of ἀλλά Found Only in Mark ................................................................... 260 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 260 
Explanation of Observations in Mark ..................................................................................................... 262 
Pattern 1 ............................................................................................................................................. 262 
Sub-Pattern 1A1 ............................................................................................................................ 263 
Mark 7:5 ................................................................................................................................... 263 
Mark 9:37 ................................................................................................................................. 264 
Sub-Pattern 1B1 ............................................................................................................................ 271 
Mark 7:19a ............................................................................................................................... 273 
Mark 12:25 ............................................................................................................................... 275 
Pattern 2 ............................................................................................................................................. 277 
Sub-Pattern 2A .............................................................................................................................. 277 
Mark 4:17 ................................................................................................................................. 277 
Mark 11:23 ............................................................................................................................... 279 
Mark 13:11a ............................................................................................................................. 282 
Mark 14:49 ............................................................................................................................... 285 
Pattern 4 ............................................................................................................................................. 288 
Mark 3:27 ................................................................................................................................. 288 
Mark 14:36 ............................................................................................................................... 290 
Pattern 5 ............................................................................................................................................. 293 
Mark 13:20 ............................................................................................................................... 293 
Pattern 6 ............................................................................................................................................. 296 
Mark 10:27 ............................................................................................................................... 296 
CHAPTER 7 .................................................................................................................. 299 
Representative Occurrences of ἀλλά Found Only in Luke .................................................................... 299 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 299 
Explanation of Observations in Luke ..................................................................................................... 302 
Pattern 1 ............................................................................................................................................. 302 
Sub-Pattern 1B1 ............................................................................................................................ 302 
Luke 8:27 ................................................................................................................................. 302 
Pattern 2 ............................................................................................................................................. 306 
Sub-Pattern 2A .............................................................................................................................. 306 
Luke 7:7 ................................................................................................................................... 306 
Luke 12:6-7 .............................................................................................................................. 307 
Luke 24:6 ................................................................................................................................. 310 
Pattern 4 ............................................................................................................................................. 311 
Luke 1:60 ................................................................................................................................. 311 
Luke 13:3//Luke 13:5 ............................................................................................................... 314 
CONCLUSION(S)......................................................................................................... 316 
Summary of Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 317 
Negation/Negative Content Items and Ἀλλά .......................................................................................... 317 
Constituent Correction Versus Whole Utterance Contrast ..................................................................... 318 
Dialectic Negation, Metalinguistic Negation, and “Not Only” ............................................................... 320 
Differences in the Frequency of the Patterns Throughout the Synoptic Gospels ................................... 321 
5 
 
 
 
Frequency Distribution of the Patterns Throughout the Synoptic Gospels ......................................... 322 
Frequency of Pattern 1, The Supplied/Implied Constant Pattern, in Matthew and Luke ....................... 325 
Frequency of Pattern 4, The Rhetorical/Discourse Pattern, in Matthew and Luke ................................. 326 
Final Insights and Future Inquiries ......................................................................................................... 327 
But Where Do We Go From Here? ........................................................................................................ 333 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 337 
APPENDIX 1 ................................................................................................................. 347 
All Occurrences of ἀλλά in the Synoptic Gospels .................................................................................. 347 
List 1: All Occurrences of ἀλλά in the Gospel of Matthew with Annotations ................................... 347 
List 2: All Occurrences of ἀλλά in the Gospel of Mark with Annotations ........................................ 352 
List 3: All Occurrences of ἀλλά in the Gospel of Luke with Annotations ......................................... 355 
APPENDIX 2 ................................................................................................................. 358 
Table 1: Analyses of components found in ἀλλά constructions in the Gospel of Matthew .................... 358 
Table 2: Analyses of components found in ἀλλά constructions in the Gospel of Mark ......................... 361 
Table 3: Analyses of components found in ἀλλά constructions in the Gospel of Luke .......................... 365 
APPENDIX 3 ................................................................................................................. 370 
General ἀλλά Construction Patterns Identified in Matthew ........................................................................ 370 
Pattern 1:  Supplied/Implied Constant Pattern--Implicit Constant Constituent--Ellipsis ............. 370 
Pattern 2:  No Constant Pattern--No Explicit or Implicit Constant Constituent .......................... 373 
Pattern 3:  Supplied/Repeated Constant Pattern--Explicit Repetition of Constant Constituent ... 374 
Pattern 4:  Rhetorical/Discourse Pattern--Ἀλλά In Initial Position in Rhetorical Objection ....... 375 
General ἀλλά Construction Patterns Identified in Mark .............................................................................. 377 
Pattern 1:  Supplied/Implied Constant Pattern--Implicit Constant Constituent--Ellipsis ............. 377 
Pattern 2:  No Constant Pattern--No Explicit or Implicit Constant Constituent .......................... 379 
Pattern 3:  Supplied/Repeated Constant Pattern--Explicit Repetition of Constant Constituent ... 380 
Pattern 4:  Rhetorical/Discourse Pattern--Ἀλλά In Initial Position in Rhetorical Objection ....... 381 
Pattern 5:  Conditional Negation Pattern.......................................................................................... 381 
Pattern 6:  Alternative Negation Pattern—A But Not B ................................................................... 381 
General ἀλλά Construction Patterns Identified in Luke .............................................................................. 382 
Pattern 1:  Supplied/Implied Constant Pattern--Implicit Constant Constituent--Ellipsis ............. 382 
Pattern 2:  No Constant Pattern--No Explicit or Implicit Constant Constituent .......................... 383 
Pattern 3:  Supplied/Repeated Constant Pattern--Explicit Repetition of Constant Constituent ... 383 
Pattern 4:  Rhetorical/Discourse Pattern--Ἀλλά In Initial Position in Rhetorical Objection ....... 384 
Pattern 6:  Alternative Negation Pattern—A But Not B ................................................................... 384 
APPENDIX 4 ................................................................................................................. 385 
Singular and Parallel Uses of ἀλλά Within the Synoptic Gospels ......................................................... 385 
Table 1:  Occurrences in Matthew .......................................................................................................... 385 
Table 2:  Occurrences in Mark ............................................................................................................... 386 
Table 3:  Occurrences in Luke ................................................................................................................ 387 
Table 4:  Summary Statistics .................................................................................................................. 388 
APPENDIX 5 ................................................................................................................. 389 
The Synoptic Problem ............................................................................................................................... 389 
6 
 
 
 
PREFACE 
In the January Term of 2014 I was able to participate in an advanced Greek course at 
Asbury Theological Seminary in which Dr. Fredrick Long introduced us to the theory and 
practice behind the pursuit known as discourse analysis.  In the course of our engagement with 
discourse analysis, we explored the significance of the arrangement of sentence elements by New 
Testament authors, and found that their arrangement may very well be in accordance with the 
“expected norms” generally observed within Κοινή Greek.  However, the arrangement of 
elements may also vary from those norms, based presumably, but not certainly, upon the desire 
of the respective authors to bring greater or lesser attention to sentence elements in pursuit of 
their own communication goals within their works. 
As I examined the elements generally found in sentences that included ἀλλά, I noted 
arrangements and constructions for which I had neither classification nor explanation.  As such, I 
was motivated to explore explanations for both the particular occurrences of the conjunction 
which I had observed, as well as for general patterns of arrangement which could account for 
multiple occurrences.  I quickly found that any sustained engagement with ἀλλά in the Synoptics 
also necessitated engagement with negation and/or negative content items as well as implied 
items, i.e., what is normally called ellipsis. 
As I proceeded, I noted differences in the way in which ἀλλά functioned with respect to 
(1) the negation of propositions occurring before it, and (2) the affirmation or advancement of 
propositions following it.  I could not readily explain how to determine what was being rejected, 
corrected, advanced, or contrasted, and so I began to look for pragmatic indicators, such as 
repetition, parallelism, and ellipsis, in order to ascertain what was being signaled by the inclusion 
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of particular constituents, their respective arrangements, and their accompanying constructions.  
This work documents the results of my investigation of these indicators and the conclusions I 
have drawn based upon my observations.    
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INTRODUCTION 
But It Is Not That Complex, Is It? 
The use of the Greek word ἀλλά may not, at first glance, seem to offer any particular 
problems for the translator or exegete.  It is often glossed simply as “but” or perhaps “but, 
rather” and translated in accordance with that understanding of its meaning.  In many instances, 
this approach would seem to serve the reader well, as in the following two examples.  For the 
convenience of the reader, I will include both the Greek text and a word-for-word English 
translation for each example. 
 Matt 5:17 
Μὴ νομίσητε ὅτι ἦλθον καταλῦσαι τὸν νόμον ἢ τοὺς προφήτας·  
Do not think that I came to destroy the Torah and the Prophets: 
οὐκ ἦλθον καταλῦσαι ἀλλὰ πληρῶσαι. 
I came not to destroy but to fulfill.  OR  I did not come to destroy but to fulfill. 
Mark 12:27 
οὐκ ἔστιν θεὸς νεκρῶν ἀλλὰ ζώντων· πολὺ πλανᾶσθε. 
He is not God of the dead [ones] but of the living [ones]: you are greatly mistaken. 
In these relatively straightforward examples, one word is being rejected, and another 
word is being offered as the replacement.  For Matt 5:17, an infinitive verb καταλῦσαι “to 
destroy” is being rejected and another infinitive πληρῶσαι “to fulfill” is being proffered as the 
replacement.  For Mark 12:27, a genitive plural substantive adjective νεκρῶν “of the dead [ones]” 
is being rejected and a genitive plural substantive participle ζώντων “of the living [ones]” is 
being proffered as the replacement.  The idea seems to be quite simple: “not X, but [rather] Y.” 
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However, there are other features worth noting in these examples, some of which should 
lead us to ask further questions pertaining to all that is being communicated by these utterances.  
One of these features is the ability of the writer to omit certain items that the reader/hearer is 
expected to supply.  This omission of elements is generally referred to as “ellipsis,” and is quite 
common in Κοινή Greek.  In fact, it is so common as reasonably to be expected that the explicit 
inclusion of the items normally implied is noteworthy.   
But let’s return to the implied items. In our example above from Matt 5:17, the reader is 
expected to carry forward the idea of Jesus’s coming, replacing the first, rejected purpose of his 
coming καταλῦσαι “to destroy” with the alternative purpose presented πληρῶσαι “to fulfill.”  
From the immediately preceding co-text, the reader is expected to hold in mind the objects of 
these infinitives, namely τὸν νόμον ἢ τοὺς προφήτας. We can represent what is being 
communicated in an expanded form, supplying the implied elements: 
*οὐκ  ἦλθον  καταλῦσαι  [τὸν νόμον ἢ τοὺς προφήτας]  
ἀλλὰ [ἦλθον]  πληρῶσαι  [τὸν νόμον ἢ τοὺς προφήτας]1 
Furthermore, the reader is expected to apply the negation only to the intent or purpose of 
Jesus’ coming, not the assertion that he did come.  In this respect, we see the negation of the 
constituent καταλῦσαι within the first clause, not a negation of the whole proposition that Jesus 
in fact came to do something.  In this work I will refer to such negation as “constituent 
correction” negation, which is sometimes also referred to as “narrow-scope” or “internal” 
                                                 
1 I have used an asterisk “*” to indicate that this reconstruction does not occur in our 
texts.  I will follow this convention throughout this work to indicate my reconstructions, 
expansion, and/or interpolations. 
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negation.2  Further, we see that the presupposition that Jesus existed and came is preserved in this 
instance.  Negation in which the presupposition is preserved, is presupposition-preserving 
negation (versus presupposition-denying negation).  Further questions arise, though, as to how 
we know this, given the position of the negation.   
Not Dialectical, but Metalinguistic Negation 
Even with such questions about ellipsis and the scope of negation put to the side, 
however, the reader of the Gospels quickly encounters other occurrences of ἀλλά that present 
difficulties of another sort.   
Matt 10:20 
οὐ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐστε οἱ λαλοῦντες  
For you will not be the ones speaking 
ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τὸ λαλοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν. 
but the Spirit of your Father [will be] the one who is speaking. 
Mark 9:37 
ὃς ἂν ἓν τῶν τοιούτων παιδίων δέξηται ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματί μου, ἐμὲ δέχεται·  
Whoever receives one of these children in my name, receives me: 
καὶ ὃς ἂν ἐμὲ δέχηται, οὐκ ἐμὲ δέχεται ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με. 
and whoever receives me, does not receive me but the one who sent me. 
Clearly, the pragmatic effects arising from the use of ἀλλά in Matt 10:20 and Mark 9:37 are 
different from those present in the previous verses (Matt 5:17 and Mark 12:27).  One cannot 
arrive at the full effect arising from the use of ἀλλά by simply considering the semantic value of 
                                                 
2 I will provide further details concerning the various types of negation and compare and 
constrast their respective characteristics later in this work.    
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ἀλλά.  One observes a partially contradictory relationship, if not a completely contrary one, 
between the negative and positive propositions in the respective conjuncts.  The usual 
explanation offered for such occurrences is that these are instances of a “Semitic idiom” in 
general,3 and “dialectical,” “relative,” or “Semitic” negation in particular.4   
My contention is that there are better ways, including the phenomenon known as 
metalinguistic (or metarepresentational) negation, to explain such occurrences on the basis of 
linguistic research on pragmatics and negation.  I will cover metalinguistic negation in much 
greater detail in the survey of secondary literature, particularly in the section devoted to the 
contributions of Laurence Horn.   
It will be useful here to provide at least a definition and brief description of 
metalinguistic negation.  Alyson Pitts provides the following helpful definitions based upon 
Horn’s presentation, distinguishing descriptive negation from metalinguistic negation: 
DESCRIPTIVE NEGATION (henceforth DN) is so named by virtue of describing how things 
are (not) in the world.  It is used as a standard truth-functional (presupposition-preserving) 
logical operator on the semantic content of propositions. 
 
                                                 
3 F. Blass and A. Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early 
Christian Literature, ed. Robert W. Funk, trans. Robert W. Funk (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1961), 233; Maximilian Zerwick, Biblical Greek: Illustrated by Examples, trans. 
Joseph Smith, 4th ed. (Roma: Editrice Pontificio Intituto Biblico, 1990), 150. 
4 P. A. Vaccari, “Antica e Nuova Interpretazione del Salmo 16 (Volg. 15),” Biblica 14 
(1933): 408–34; Arnulf Kuschke, “Das Idiom der »relativen Negation« im NT,” ZNW 43 (1951): 
263; Heinz Kruse, “Die ‘dialektische Negation’ als semitisches Idiom,” VT 4 (1954): 385–400; 
John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, Volume IV: Law and Love 
(New York: Yale University Press, 2009), 44, 72 n83, 386, 455 nn126–28. 
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METALINGUISTIC NEGATION (henceforth MN), by contrast, is discourse-oriented and 
focuses on linguistic and/or interpretive features of the utterance-level expression.5 
Horn’s own definition offers some insight into the potential usefulness of this perspective for 
explaining a select number of negations encountered in the Synoptics.  He sees it as “a device for 
objecting to a previous utterance on any grounds whatever, including the conventional or 
conversational implicata it potentially induces, its morphology, its style or register, or its 
phonetic realization.”6  It is the objection to “conventional or conversational implicata” that will 
be of particular interest to my investigation.   
In some cases, it is not the content of the proposition which is being objected to, but 
rather the sufficiency—the adequacy—of the proposition.  In such as case, the second utterance 
presents an affirmed proposition which entails the rejected one.  Two very simple examples 
should suffice to give the flavor of what I am advancing here.   
Example 1: It is not cool in here: it is freezing! 
Example 2: He did not insult Bill.  He insulted Bill and Jim. 
These two examples do not utilize a conjuction, but very easily could have.  Clearly, if the 
second affirmed utterance from Example 1 is true, then the negated proposition from the first 
utterance is true as well.  What is being objected to is not the fact that it is cool, but that this 
assertion is suffiently descriptive.  The second example, likewise, involves an objection, not to 
the fact that Bill was insulted, but that implication that only Bill was insulted.  I will engage 
further with this phenomenon and its application to some occurrences of ἀλλά later in this work. 
                                                 
5 Alyson Pitts, “Exploring a ‘Pragmatic Ambiguity’ of Negation,” Language 87 (2011): 
346–47.  I will follow Pitts’s convention, here, which is also followed by also scholars, of 
referring to metalingustic negation by the abbreviation MN. 
6 Laurence R. Horn, A Natural History of Negation, 1989; Repr. (Chicago; Palo Alto, 
CA: University of Chicago Press; CSLI Publications, 2001), 363. 
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But What Have You Done About It? 
In this work, I will present the results of my examination of the use of ἀλλά within the 
Synoptic Gospels, including the various constructions and arrangements of sentence elements 
associated with it.   I will also discuss the pragmatic effects arising from the interactions of ἀλλά 
with other constituents in various contexts. 
My interest in this research is fourfold.  First, I wanted to identify the most frequent 
constructions and arrangements of elements associated with the conjunction ἀλλά, especially in 
those instances involving either negation or some negative constituent.  Second, I wanted to 
examine those arrangements which vary from the most frequently observed arrangement (what 
may be called the “base form”) to see if they may be classified based upon the presence or 
absence of shared features.  Third, I wanted to consider the exegetical significance of the 
author’s choice either to follow the base or “unmarked” form or to vary from it.  Finally, I 
wanted to bring contemporary linguistic insights to bear in my analyses of the negation present 
accompanying many of the occurrences of ἀλλά, especially those instances of negation which are 
often referred to as “dialectical.” 
Stephen Levinsohn describes the most general form of the construction containing ἀλλά, 
which he refers to as a coordinative phrase, as being “οὐ/μή X ἀλλά Y.”7  This does, in fact, 
appear to reflect the most frequent arrangement of some of the significant elements within this 
construction.  However, there are other elements, perhaps better referred to hereafter as 
constituents, that should also be considered, as well as significant variations to this arrangement 
                                                 
7 Stephen H. Levinsohn, Discourse Features of New Testament Greek: A Coursebook on 
the Information Structure of New Testament Greek, 2nd ed. (Dallas: SIL, 2000), 38. 
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that I will attempt to identify within the course of this survey.  One of the additional constituents, 
that I have identified is the “constant.”  This is the constituent that appears, either explicitly or 
implicitly, on both “sides” of ἀλλά. Another way to express this is to consider the first utterance 
as one “conjunct” that is joined by a conjunction, in this case the particle ἀλλά, to another 
utterance, or second “conjunct.”  The constant may be found explicitly in both of these 
“conjuncts,” or explicitly in one and implicitly in the other.   
 One example, with the constituents labeled, will suffice to give the reader the sense of 
what I am positing here.  Consider for a moment Matt 16:23c: 
οὐ φρονεῖς τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀλλὰ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
You are not considering the things of God but the things of humans 
With the constituents labeled, the graphical analysis of this text is as follows: 
 
 Implicit (Elliptical) 
Negation Constant Preceding ἀλλά  [Constant] Following 
οὐ   φρονεῖς  τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ  ἀλλὰ   [φρονεῖς] τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
Not   Constant X  but [rather] [Constant] Y 
The preceding and following constituent, or X and Y as above, may be a noun phrase (hereafter 
NP) or determiner phrase (hereafter DP), a verb phrase (VP), a prepositional phrase (PP), etc., as 
may be seen in Appendix 2.  As such, the general formula presented by Levinsohn is a 
substantially correct, yet incomplete for what one observes in the Synoptics especially with 
respect to (1) the constant constituent present in many of the constructions and (2) the oft-
observed ellipsis of the constant constituent. 
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Aims and Methodology 
My aims in this research, then, have been (1) to identify each of the constructions in 
which ἀλλά appears within the Synoptics, beginning with the Gospel of Matthew; (2) to identify 
and examine the arrangement of the elements associated with ἀλλά within each construction; (3) 
to inductively determine the most common or “base” patterns for the arrangement of elements; 
(4) to classify the various constructions according to their respective arrangement of elements; 
and (5) to determine the functions performed by the various arrangements.  This final step has 
opened the way for me to propose exegetical explanations for why the author might have chosen 
one arrangement in a particular context while passing over other options, and why the author 
chose in some instances to deviate from the base patterns available.   Utilizing the insights 
gained from my treatment of Matthew, I likewise engaged both Mark and Luke, repeating in full 
steps 1, 2, 4, and 5, above respectively.8   
I did not, however, repeat step 3 in full: rather, I worked with the patterns identified in the 
course of my treatment of Matthew, and evaluated the explanatory value of these patterns 
relative to the occurrences of ἀλλά within Mark and Luke.  When the patterns noted in Matthew 
were unable to explain satisfactorily the occurrences examined in either Mark and Luke, then I 
proposed a new “pattern” or “sub-pattern” as appropriate.  As such, I completed step 3 in part for 
Mark and Luke, modifying or expanding the patterns and sub-patterns noted in Matthew as 
necessary.  The result of this expansion was my proposal of Patterns 5 and 6.  However, for the 
                                                 
8 This progression should not be taken by the reader as an endorsement of Matthean 
priority.  Rather, this progression is due to the fact that I began this research with Matthew; I 
then expanded the work to include the other Synoptics. 
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overwhelming majority of occurrences in Mark (41 of 45, or 91.9%) and in Luke (34 of 35, or 
97.1%), Patterns 1 through 4 were able to satisfactorily account for their arrangements.9   
The listing of all of the occurrences within the Synoptics is given in Appendix 1.  My 
analyses of the occurrences with respect to (1) the presence of preceding, following and constant 
constituents; (2) whether or not there is ellipsis; (3) whether or not they are part of a construction 
involving negation; and (4) which pattern and sub-pattern best describes them, are documented 
in Appendix 2.  Graphical representations of the patterns I have identified, with particularly 
relevant examples analyzed, may be found in Appendix 3.  In Appendix 4, the reader will find 
tables showing the occurrences in each of the Gospels, with parallels noted.  
As I engage representative occurrences of ἀλλά in Chapters 3 through 7, I will offer some 
commentary on the findings documented in these appendices.  My primary intention, however, is 
to apply the results of these detailed analyses and more general identification of pattern forms, 
with their associated functions, to the exegesis of particular representative occurrences.  For the 
sake of space, I will endeavor to constrain myself to providing concise explanations of the 
detailed observations, analyse, and pattern found there, with the expectation that the reader will 
consult these sources.  By doing so, I will be able to devote more space within the body of this 
work to the exploration of the potential exegetical significance of these occurrences.   
 
 
 
                                                 
9 For full details of the frequency distribution of the patterns across the Synoptics, please 
consult the chart I have provided later in this Introduction. 
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Scope 
The original scope of my research for this work was limited to every occurrence of the 
conjunction ἀλλά in the Gospel of Matthew.10  However, at the prompting and with the guidance 
of Dr. Long, I expanded my original work, which was limited to the occurrences of ἀλλά in the 
Gospel of Matthew, to include all occurrences within the Synoptic Gospels.  This decision for, 
and against, the inclusion of some books in this set calls for some explanation on my part.  In 
particular, I want to briefly address (1) my reasons for including only the Synoptic Gospels, 
while not including the most obvious omissions, namely the Gospel of John and Acts, from the 
sample set; and (2) the proposed relationship between the Synoptics which I will hold to, lightly, 
in this investigation. 
The questions represented in the heading for the next section are certainly not equal with 
respect to the ease with which they may be answered.  I will attempt to address them as 
thoroughly as necessary to allow the reader to understand my presuppositions and assumptions 
concerning the Synoptic Gospels, both individually, and in relation to one another.  In doing so, I 
                                                 
10 I had three primary reasons for choosing Matthew over the other gospels.  First, my 
studies in the Gospels thus far had been focused on Matthew.  Second, within Matthean studies, 
there had been ongoing discussions concerning the discourse and narrative sections of Matthew:  
my desire was to examine if there were any notable variations in the use of ἀλλά based upon the 
section of the Gospel in which it occurs.  Third, I was interested in ultimately comparing the use 
of the conjunction ἀλλά, as well as other conjunctions, across the Gospels within parallel 
passages.  My purpose in this final endeavor was to examine how different Gospel authors chose 
alternative means to express either the same events or sayings, or the relationships between the 
same. 
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will follow the guidance of H. Paul Grice (with whose work I will engage later in my survey of 
secondary sources) as expressed in his maxims of Quantity and Quality:11 namely,  
A. Quantity 
1. “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes 
of the exchange).” 
2. “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.” 
B. Quality: Supermaxim: “Try to make your contribution one that is true.” 
1. “Do not say what you believe to be false.” 
2. “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” 
For these next sections, Quantity Maxim 2 and Quality Maxim 2 are especially relevant, 
and I will endeavor to adhere to both.   
Why Only the Synoptic Gospels?  How are the Synoptic Gospels Related? 
Why Only the Synoptic Gospels? 
The choice to extend the work beyond its initial focus on Matthew was composed of 
other choices, one of which involved a decision as to which other book or books to include in the 
investigation.  The choice of the other Synoptics seemed relatively straightforward, especially 
considering the potential to examine (1) parallel uses of ἀλλά, (2) alternate arrangements of 
constituents, and (3) other conjuctions, particles, and/or phrases which might be substituted for 
ἀλλά by one or more of the other authors.   
As such, the potential to observe both parallels and alternate choices was the dominant 
criterion, edging out my desire to compare uses of ἀλλά within works from the same genre (thus 
the exclusion of John’s Gospel), or from the same author (thus my decision to include Luke’s 
                                                 
11 H. Paul Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in Studies in the Way of Words, 1967; 
Revision of William James Lecture. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 26–7. 
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Gospel, but not Acts).  For others with different research interests, such choices would be 
reasonable.   
In choosing the Synoptics, and thus grouping them together for consideration, I am not 
attempting to flatten, obscure, or harmonize their respective contributions, perspectives, and/or 
theologies.  Nor am I attempting to overtly or covertly support or undermine a particular view 
regarding the relationships between the Synoptics, and the hypothetical oral and/or written 
sources behind them.  The question of these relationships leads naturally to our next section, in 
which I will discuss in very brief compass the view that I will assume and hold to, lightly, 
throughout this work. 
How are the Synoptic Gospels Related? 
In my studies of the Synoptics in general, and the Gospel of Matthew in particular, I have 
encountered several excellent, comprehensive engagements of the so-called “Synoptic problem,” 
solutions to the problem, rebuttals to the solutions, and answers to the rebuttals.12  Some of the 
more recent endeavors which have appeared since the turn of the millennium, namely those of 
                                                 
12 For more detailed enumerations of the issues and discussions of the same, the reader is 
directed to the thorough treatments which have been offered in various works, including 
specialized monographs: Rudolf Bultmann, The History of the Synoptic Tradition, trans. John 
Marsh, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968); E. P. Sanders, The Tendencies of the Synoptic 
Tradition, 1969; Repr. (Eugene, Ore.: Wipf & Stock, 2000); William Reuben Farmer, The 
Synoptic Problem: A Critical Analysis, 2nd ed. (Western North Carolina Press, 1976); Robert H. 
Stein, Studying the Synoptic Gospels: Origin and Interpretation, 2nd rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2001). 
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Mark Goodacre,13 Francis Watson,14 Michael Bird,15 and R.K. MacEwen,16 deserve special 
mention here due to their careful examination of the issues, their helpful bibliographies, and the 
responses they have elicited from other scholars.17  Finally, an upcoming work edited by Stanley 
Porter and Bryan Dyer, The Synoptic Problem: Four Views,18 will bring together multiple 
perspectives on the important issues connected with the Synoptics and the in/ter/dependence of 
the same.  Further information regarding my perspective on the “Synoptic Problem” may be 
found in Appendix 5. 
My primary interests, stated from the perspective of sources, dependence on sources, 
redaction, and the interdependence of the gospels, are twofold.  First, I am interested in the uses 
of ἀλλά by the individual writers.  This allows me to observe directly how three different writers 
employed the conjunction in various, sometimes parallel, circumstances for the purposes of 
contrast, correction, and/or discourse marking.  Further, this allows me to build the patterns of 
                                                 
13 Mark S. Goodacre, The Case Against Q: Studies in Markan Priority and the Synoptic 
Problem (Harrisburg, Penn.: Trinity Press International, 2001). 
14 Francis Watson, Gospel Writing: A Canonical Perspective (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2013). 
15 Michael F. Bird, The Gospel of the Lord: How the Early Church Wrote the Story of 
Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014). 
16 R. K. MacEwen, Matthean Posteriority: An Exploration of Matthew’s Use of Mark and 
Luke as a Solution to the Synoptic Problem, LNTS 501 (London: T&T Clark, 2015). 
17 J. S. Kloppenborg, “On Dispensing with Q?: Goodacre on the Relation of Luke to 
Matthew,” NTS 49, no. 2 (2003): 210–36; Richard Bauckham, “Gospels before Normativization: 
A Critique of Francis Watson’s Gospel Writing,” JSNT 37, no. 2 (2014): 185–200; Heike 
Omerzu, “Beyond the Fourfold Gospel: A Critical Reading of Francis Watson’s Gospel Writing: 
A Canonical Perspective,” JSNT 37, no. 2 (2014): 201–9; Francis Watson, “A Response to 
Richard Bauckham and Heike Omerzu,” JSNT 37, no. 2 (2014): 210–18. 
18 Stanley E. Porter and Bryan R. Dyer, eds., The Synoptic Problem: Four Views (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016). 
21 
 
 
 
usage abductively, observe the frequency distributions for the various patterns in each gospel, 
and then compare each gospel’s frequency distribution with the others.   
Second, I am interested in redaction inasmuch as I take note of how Matthew and Luke 
either (1) follow Mark’s use of the conjunction without change, or (2) edit Mark’s material by (a) 
changing the conjunction used, (b) rearranging the words associated with ἀλλά, (c) eliminating 
the need for the conjunction by shifting to an alternate expression, such as a rhetorical question, 
or (d) eliminating the conjunction connecting the clauses, resulting in asyndeton.   
As a rule, I am neither looking for, nor commenting upon, instances which some might 
take to indicate either Matthew’s knowledge of and use of Luke’s gospel, or vice versa.  There is, 
however, one change which I feel is worthy of some further discussion, and it involves Matt 
26:39//Mark 14:36//Luke 22:42.  In both Matt 26:39 and Luke 22:42 the respective writers 
changed the initial ἀλλά which appeared in Mark’s material to πλήν.  I will comment more on 
these parallels in my coverage of Mark 14:36 in the chapter devoted to occurrences found only in 
Mark.  
22 
 
 
 
The Occurrences of Ἀλλά in the Synoptic Gospels 
In continuity with my original work, I have built upon the foundation composed of (1) the 
occurrences of ἀλλά which are found in the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, and (2) the 
patterns which I have identified based upon those occurrences.   
There are thirty-seven uses of the conjunction within Matthew, forty-five uses within 
Mark, and thirty-five uses within Luke.  I have conducted this search using both the Bibleworks 
and Logos software platforms.  Within Bibleworks my search was based upon the Bibleworks 
GNT morphology data set.  Within Logos, I utilized the Logos Greek Morphology data set in 
conjunction with the UBS4 text, as well as the GRAMCORD Greek Morphology data set in 
conjunction with the NA27 text.  I also referenced Nigel Turner, who provides total usage 
statistics for Matthew, Luke, and several other books of the NT.19  Finally, I consulted the print 
version of Moulton and Geden’s Concordance to the Greek New Testament to verify these 
occurrences.20 In Appendix 1 the reader will find full quotations of the verses in which these 
occurrences are found.  For the occurrences in Matthew, I have also included brief annotations 
based upon parallel uses in the other Gospels, as noted in Kurt Aland’s Synopsis.21    
                                                 
19 J. H. Moulton and Nigel Turner, A Grammar of New Testament Greek, vol. III: Syntax 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1963), 329, note 3. 
20 W. F. Moulton and A. S. Geden, Concordance to the Greek New Testament, ed. H. K. 
Moulton and I. Howard Marshall, 6th ed. (London: T&T Clark, 2002), 41.   
21 Kurt Aland, Synopsis of the Four Gospels (Bellingham, WA: Logos Bible Software, 
2009). 
23 
 
 
 
Overview of the Occurrences of ἀλλά, the Associated Patterns, and Descriptive Terminology 
In this section, I will (1) provide the complete listing of the occurrences of in the 
Synoptic Gospels, (2) list and define the specific terminology that I will be using to describe the 
various patterns and their constituents, and (3) list and describe the essential characteristics of 
each of the high-level patterns that I have identified.  The reader is also encouraged to consult 
Appendices 1 and 4 for more detailed information concerning these occurrences and Appendix 3 
for detailed graphical representations of these patterns.  
Parallel and Singular Occurrences of ἀλλά in the Synoptic Gospels 
The following three tables include all of the occurrences of ἀλλά in the Synoptics.  Each 
table, however, has a different perspective—a different frame of reference, as it were—for 
viewing the occurrences.  As such, Table 1 provides the details of from the perspective of the 
occurrences in Matthew, Table 2 from the perspective of those in Mark, and Table 3 from the 
perspective of those in Luke.  My hope is that these three frames of reference will allow the 
reader to profitably view the data from the perspective of the gospel that best suits her interest, 
and quickly find the parallels or lacunae in the other gospels.  
A brief word about the formatting within the following tables is in order: “cf.” and italics 
reference(s) indicate that there are parallel statements where ἀλλά either (1) does not appear, 
with another word (e.g., δέ, γάρ) or word combination (e.g., εἰ μή) being used to perform its 
function, or (2) does appear, but in a significantly altered arrangement from the occurrence in 
focus. 
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Table 1:  Occurrences in Matthew 
Matthean Occurrence Marcan Parallel Lucan Parallel 
4:4   
5:15 cf. 4:21 Rhetorical Question 8:16 and 11:33 
5:17   
5:39  cf. 6:27-29  
6:13  cf. 11:4 
6:18   
7:21   
8:4 1:44 5:14 
8:8  7:7 
9:12 2:17 5:31 
9:13 2:17 5:32 
9:17 2:22 5:38 
9:18 cf. 5:23 => ἵνα 
Subjunctive vs. Imperative 
 
9:24 5:39 8:52 
10:20 13:11  
10:34  12:51 
11:8  7:25 
11:9  7:26 
13:21 4:17 cf. 18:13 
15:11 7:15  
16:12   
16:17   
16:23 8:33  
17:12 9:12-13  
18:22   
18:30   
19:6 10:8  
19:11   
20:23 10:40  
20:26 10:43 22:26 
20:28 10:45 cf. 18:27 & v.l. in D 
21:21 cf. 11:23 Alternate Contrast  
22:30 12:25 cf. 20:36 γάρ 
22:32 12:27 20:38 
24:6 13:7 21:9 
26:39 14:36 22:42 
27:24   
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Table 2:  Occurrences in Mark 
Matthean Parallel Marcan Occurrence Lucan Parallel 
8:4 1:44 5:14 
 1:45 cf. 5:16 => δέ 
9:12 2:17 5:31 
9:13 2:17 5:32 
9:17 2:22 5:38 
cf.12:26 Rhetorical Question 3:26 cf. 11:18 Rhetorical Question 
cf.12:27 Rhetorical Question 3:27 cf. 11:21-22 
cf.12:32 => οὐκ...οὔτε...οὔτε 3:29  
13:21 4:17  
 4:22  
 5:19  
 5:26  
9:24 5:39 8:52 
 6:8-9  
 6:52  
cf. 15:2 => γάρ 7:5  
15:11 7:15  
 7:19  
 7:24-5  
16:23 8:33  
cf. 17:8 => εἰ μή 9:8  
cf. 17:12 => δέ 9:12-9:13  
 9:18~9:22  
 9:37  
19:6 10:8  
 10:27  
20:23 10:40  
20:26 10:43 22:26 
20:28 10:45 cf. 22:27 Rhetorical Question 
=> οὐχί...δέ 
cf. 21:21 Alternate Contrast 11:23  
cf. 21:26 => δέ 11:32 cf. 20:6 
cf. 22:16 No Contrast 12:14 20:21 
22:30 12:25  
22:32 12:27 20:38 
24:6 13:7 21:9 
cf. 10:19 => γάρ 13:11  
10:20 13:11  
cf. 24:22 => γάρ 13:20  
 13:24  
cf. 26:32 => δέ 14:28  
cf. 26:33 =>...ἐγώ οὐδέποτε... 14:29  ...ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐγώ.  
cf. 26:39 => πλήν οὐκ ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω... 14:36 ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τί ἐγὼ θέλω… cf. 22:42 => πλήν μὴ τὸ θέλημά 
μου...γινέσθω 
26:39 14:36 22:42 
cf. 26:56 => δέ 14:49  
cf. 28:7 => καί 16:7  
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Table 3:  Occurrences in Luke 
Matthean Parallel Marcan Parallel Lucan Occurrence 
  1:60 
8:4 1:44 5:14 
9:12 2:17 5:31 
9:13 2:17 5:32 
9:17 2:22 5:38 
  6:27 
cf. 8:8   7:6-7 
11:8  7:25 
11:9  7:26 
5:15  8:16 
  8:27 
9:24 5:39 8:52 
5:15  11:33 
cf. 23:23  11:42 
cf. 10:30 => δέ  12:6-7 
10:34  12:51 
  13:3 
  13:5 
  14:8-10 
  14:13 
  16:21 
  16:30 
  17:8 
  18:13 
cf. 22:16 No Contrast 12:14 20:21 
22:32 12:27 20:38 
24:6 13:7 21:9 
20:26 10:43 22:26 
  22:36 
26:39 14:36 22:42 
  22:53 
  23:15 
cf. 28:6 => γάρ  24:6 
  24:21 
  24:22 
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Definitions/Description of Terms 
Before presenting the patterns themselves, it will be helpful to define the terms that I 
have used within these patterns, and that I will be utilizing in my descriptions and explanations 
from this point forward.  Some of these terms will appear regularly within the graphical 
representations I will use in analyzing occurrences of ἀλλά.  The following graphical 
representation of Matt 5:17 includes a relatively simple example of the typical οὐ...ἀλλά 
construction.  It will serve to illustrate the most common constituents we will be encountering, 
and the terms that I will be using for each them.   
 
  Implicit (Elliptical) 
 Negation Constant Preceding  ἀλλά  Following 
οὐκ   ἦλθον   καταλῦσαι   ἀλλὰ   πληρῶσαι 
Negation22   
This is the negative particle or negative content term that is part of the “Negation… ἀλλά 
complex,” and I will generally refer to this structure as the “οὐ…ἀλλά construction.”  The 
negation usually occurs before any of the other constituents of the construction, and signals the 
“beginning,” or initial boundary, of the construction.  In our example above, the negative 
element is the negative particle οὐκ. 
 
 
                                                 
22 This use of the term refers to particular instance of a negative particle in a construction, 
as opposed to the general phenomenon of negation and the various subtypes associated with it. 
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Ellipsis/Elliptical 
The Cambridge Dictionary of Linguistics provides the following compact definition of 
ellipsis: 
The omission of words, phrases or clauses that are recoverable from the context.  
Sometimes they can be recovered directly from the text….  Sometimes they have to be 
recovered indirectly from the text plus other context….23 
A somewhat more technical description of ellipsis is provided by Mary Dalrymple, Stuart 
Shieber, and Fernando Pereira: 
We can provide and abstract and reasonably theory-neutral characterization of ellipsis 
phenomena and their interpretation as follows.  An elliptical construction involves two 
phrases (usually clauses) that are parallel in structure in some sense.  The antecedent or 
source clause is complete, whereas the target clause is missing (or contains only vestiges 
or) material found overtly in the source.24 
In the discussion on ellipsis/brachyology, BDF maintains the following: 
Ellipsis (brachylogy) in the broad sense applies to any idea which is not fully expressed 
grammatically and leaves it to the hearer or reader to supply the omission because it is self-
evident. (1) First of all, the figure ἀπὸ κοινοῦ…belongs to this category, i.e. the repetition 
of a grammatical element is left to be supplied. For example, the repetition of a preposition 
with the second of two nouns or pronouns connected by καί is a matter of preference...: 
ἀπὸ πάντων (ἀφ’) ὧν A 13: 38. The same is true of a verb in the protasis: 2 C 5: 13 εἴτε γὰρ 
ἐξέστημεν, θεῷ (scil. ἐξέστ.) εἴτε σωφρονοῦμεν, ὑμῖν (scil. σωφρ.). Some adjustment is 
                                                 
23 Keith Brown and Jim Miller, The Cambridge Dictionary of Linguistics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), “Ellipsis”, 150. 
24 Mary Dalrymple, Stuart M. Shieber, and Fernando C. N. Pereira, “Ellipsis and Higher-
Order Unification,” Linguistics and Philosophy, no. 4 (1991): 399–452; Mary Dalrymple, Stuart 
M. Shieber, and Fernando C. N. Pereira, “Ellipsis and Higher-Order Unification,” Cornell 
University Library Computation and Language E-Print Archive (1995): 2, 
http://arxiv.org/abs/cmp-lg/9503008.  Emphasis is the authors’.  Although I have not adopted 
their terminology for the “source” and “target” clauses, I do find it helpful.  I had held such a 
conception prior to encountering their work, and I usually represented the same by an “arched 
arrow” in my various graphical representations which included ellipsis. 
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permissible in this figure...: Mk 14:29 εἰ καὶ πάντες σκανδαλισθήσονται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐγω, scil. 
σκανδαλισθήσομαι, which in D and in Mt 26: 33 is actually added.25   
One very helpful piece of information to be gleaned from BDF’s discussion is the term, ἀπὸ 
κοινοῦ (“from the things shared in common”), which they use for those instances where a term is 
supplied, with the intention that it be repeated in an appropriate following position.  I will be 
noting this phenomenon throughout this work, as (1) it is quite commonly observed in NT Greek 
in general, and (2) it is frequently observed both in connection with οὐ...ἀλλά constructions, as 
well as related occurrences of ἀλλά.  
Note also BDF’s careful language in this description, especially with respect to this being 
the “broad sense” of “ellipsis.”  This is helpful, as the implied “narrow” sense is quickly 
provided under their discussion of “ellipsis proper of the formulaic (conventional) type”: 
By ellipsis in the strict sense is understood a case in which a term neither is present nor can 
be supplied from some related term. The following can be omitted in this category: 
whatever is obvious from the structure of the sentence, like the copula…; the subject if it 
is very general (‘thing’ or ‘men’) or is required by the assertion…; the substantive if it is 
made sufficiently evident by an attributive, especially feminines like ἡμέρα, ὥρα etc. …, or 
by the article with certain attributive genitives…. Such ellipses are conventional and 
partially corresponding usages are found in other languages.26 
When I use the term “ellipsis,” I am speaking of ellipsis/brachylogy in the “broad sense” 
provided by BDF above.  In particular, I will often treat specifically instances where implied 
elements are to be supplied by the reader ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, and for sake of simplicity I will be referring 
to these instances as “ellipsis.”  As such, I will use the general term “ellipsis,” as opposed to 
“brachyology,”27 to describe the case where a constituent is not explicitly mentioned, but it is 
                                                 
25 Blass and Debrunner, BDF, 253; §479: 1, 2. 
26 Ibid., 253–4. 
27 As will be seen in my survey of the secondary literature, I am aware of the distinction 
between these two terms held by some Greek scholars, most notably Winer and Smyth.  I do not 
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clear from the text, co-text, and/or context that it should be supplied, ἀπὸ κοινοῦ (from the things 
shared or held in common) in another location to complete the sense of the utterance in which it 
is missing. Usually, a constituent appears explicitly only before the ἀλλά, and is implied after 
ἀλλά, either before or after the Following Constituent.  Some scholars also use the term 
“reduced” to describe the state of the second conjuct when items have been ellipsed.28  Finally, I 
have consistently preferred to speak of material as “ellipsed” (with the corresponding noun form 
being ellipsis) versus “elided” (with the corresponding noun form being elision), although at 
least one scholar with whom I engage, Sophie Repp, does use the verb “elide” in association with 
“ellipsis.”29 
Constant Constituent 
This is the element of the ἀλλά construction that is present both before and after ἀλλά, 
whether explicitly or implicitly.  An example of the constant appearing explicitly before and 
implicitly after is found in Matt 5:17, where we see οὐκ ἦλθον καταλῦσαι ἀλλὰ πληρῶσαι (see 
also Appendices 1 and 2).  Here the constant constituent is ἦλθον, such that the effect is οὐκ ἦλθον 
καταλῦσαι ἀλλὰ [[ἦλθον]] πληρῶσαι.  Less frequently the constant constituent is repeated 
                                                 
lightly depart from the wisdom of those scholars, but I have elected to follow Robertson and 
BDF, and most modern linguistic sources, in using ellipsis in a “broader” sense.  Please see my 
later coverage of the works of these various scholars for their respective views on ellipsis. 
28 Horn, Natural History of Negation, 406; Elisabeth Rudolph, Contrast: Adversative and 
Concessive Relations and Their Expressions in English, German, Spanish, Portuguese on 
Sentence and Text Level, Research in Text Theory 23 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1996), 144. 
29 Sophie Repp, Negation in Gapping, Oxford Studies in Theoretical Linguistics 22 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 6. 
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explicitly both before and after ἀλλά, such as in Matt 9:17, where βάλλουσιν οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς 
appears explicitly in both the first utterance and the second utterance. 
Preceding Constituent 
The clause, phrase, or word that appears before ἀλλά, and about which some relationship 
to the Following Constituent is being expressed by the presence of ἀλλά.  The Preceding 
Constituent may immediately precede ἀλλά, or there may be intervening Constant or other 
material between it and ἀλλά.  In Matt 5:17, the Preceding Constituent is καταλῦσαι.  This 
corrected element is also sometimes referred to as the “corrigendum.”30 
Following Constituent 
The clause, phrase, or word which appears after ἀλλά, and about which some relationship 
to the Preceding Constituent is being expressed by the presence of ἀλλά.  The Following 
Constituent may immediately follow ἀλλά, or there may be intervening Constant or other 
material between it and ἀλλά.  From our example above, the Following Constituent is πληρῶσαι.  
This correcting element is sometimes referred to as the “corrigens.” 31 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Ewald Lang, The Semantics of Coordination, trans. John Pheby, Studies in Language 
Companion Series 9 (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1984), 146, 151, 241–2, 244, 248–9, 258, 
261; Horn, Natural History of Negation, 408. 
31 Lang, The Semantics of Coordination, 146, 151, 241–2, 244, 248–9, 258, 261; Horn, 
Natural History of Negation, 408. 
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Pragmatic Constraints 
Finally, some explanation of the use of “pragmatic constraints” in the title of this work is 
in order.  Yan Huang’s defines a pragmatic constraint as   
Any condition that pertains to a principle, process, or representation in a pragmatic theory.  
It can be taken as an integral part of a pragmatic theory or an external restriction on the 
application of a pragmatic principle.32 
Such a definition is helpful to situate pragmatic contraints within the larger domain of pragmatics 
in general.  But how does this relate to my particular line of inquiry concerning ἀλλά?  Chiefly 
with respect to the limitations arising from the use of the word itself, and words more or less 
functionally equivalent to it in other languages, as a conjunction.  Katarzyna Jaszczolt, in her 
discussion of pragmatic constraints, helpfully explains that  
Rules, processes, and representations in pragmatic theory can come with conditions, or 
restrictions.  Such restrictions, or constraints, pertain to the scope of application of a rule, 
the spread of a process, or the well-formedness of a representation.  They can be seen as 
external restrictions delimiting e.g. an application of a theory, or as an integral part of the 
theory….  Theory-external constraints can be exemplified by particular lexical items that 
provide certain restrictions on interpretation.  For example, it has been observed by Grice 
that there are certain words that do not contribute to the truth-conditional content of an 
expression.  Among such words are ‘but’, ‘moreover’, and ‘therefore’.  While Grice 
classified them as conventional implicatures, it was subsequently suggested (Blakemore 
1987) that they do not have conceptual content but instead are indicators of pragmatic 
inferences to be performed by the addressee.33 
From this perspective, the theory-external pragmatic constraints associated with the word “but” 
in English may also arise in connection with words having similar functions in other languages.  
                                                 
32 Yan Huang, The Oxford Dictionary of Pragmatics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 231. 
33 Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt, “Constraint, Pragmatic,” in Encyclopedia of Language and 
Linguistics, ed. Keith Brown, vol. 3, 14 vols., 2nd ed. (Oxford: Elsevier, 2005), 72–3. 
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It should come as no surprise, then, that pragmatic constraints potentially associated with ἀλλά in 
Κοινή Greek are of particular interest to my investigation. 
Patterns Identified Within the Synoptic Gospels 
I will now turn to a more detailed consideration of the patterns that I have previously 
mentioned.  I have arrived at these patterns inductively, based upon my observation of the 
arrangement of constituents within the constructions associated with the occurrences of ἀλλά.  
Some of the patterns are based upon only one or two instances, while others have several 
instances corresponding to their arrangement.     
Patterns 
It should be clear from the characteristics I have presented below that my primary organizing 
principles are (1) the presence or absence of a constant constituent, and (2) whether or not this 
constant constituent is explicitly repeated on both sides of the relationship marker.  My sub-
patterns are categorized based upon the arrangement of the constituent constituents of the 
construction, such as the constant appearing before the preceding constituent as opposed to after 
it, and/or whether the constant constituent is “split” around the preceding and/or following 
constituents.   
Following are the general characteristics and the frequency distribution for each of the 
general patterns that I have identified based upon the data within the Synoptic Gospels: please 
consult Appendix 3 to see the graphical representations of these patterns and their characteristics, 
as well as the key text examples that are arranged to show the observations that led to the 
determination of these patterns.    
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Pattern 1—Supplied/Implied Constant Pattern—Constituent Correction 
There is generally an explicit negation that marks the beginning of the construction.  There 
is also a Constant Constituent with ellipsis, as the Constant appears explicitly either before 
or after ἀλλά, and is implied on the other side.  The Constant almost always appears 
explicitly before ἀλλά, and implicitly after it.  This pattern is generally used to reject some 
constituent, portion, or characteristic of the first proposition, and to proffer as a 
replacement a similar element that is advanced in the second proposition.  Matthew 5:17, 
which I have used as an illustration above, is one clear example of a text with arrangement 
conforming to this pattern.  The most basic sub-pattern within this pattern is Sub-Pattern 
1B1, and corresponds to the general form labelled as “stripping” within linguistic studies. 
Pattern 2—No Constant Pattern—Negation and Affirmation of Whole Utterances 
There is no explicit Constant Constituent, and there may or may not be a negative particle, 
negative content term, or negative conjunction present.  Usually, however, there is some 
sort of negation, and there are two roughly parallel statements, commands, or requests 
related to each other by ἀλλά.  This is generally used to signal, not the rejection and 
replacement of a constituent of the first proposition, but the contrast between one utterance, 
which may or may not contain negation, and another utterance.  The negation or negative 
content item thus may be incorporated into the first conjunct, effectively resulting in a 
negative affirmation which is then joined to a positive affirmation.  The proposition, 
command, etc. within the first conjunct is thus not necessarily being completely rejected.   
Pattern 3—Supplied/Repeated Constant Pattern—Comparison and Contrast 
There is a Constant Constituent, and it appears explicitly (either in whole, or in part) both 
before and after ἀλλά.  Arguably this pattern could be seen as a sub-pattern of Pattern 1.  
Due to the rarity of its appearance in specific occurrences, I have given it its own 
classification.  As with Pattern 1, this pattern is used to correct some constituent, some 
portion or characteristic of the first proposition, and advance an alternative to that 
constituent in the second proposition.  What is most interesting is that, whereas the shared 
constituents between the two propositions are usually implicit in Pattern 1, they are explicit 
in this pattern.  It is possible that this explicit inclusion of repeated constituents that signals 
the markedness of this construction.  However, it may be that the absence of ellipsis signals 
the overall intent to contrast the first and second conjunct, not correct and replace a 
constituent within the first conjunct. 
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Pattern 4—Rhetorical/Discourse Pattern—Advancing An Alternative 
This use is different from the others in that the ἀλλά occurs before a rhetorical proposition 
or objection.  This proposition or objection may be in the form of a question for which the 
speaker provides his/her own answer.  The only examples of this usage within Matthew 
are Matt 11:8 and 11:9. There are a few noted in Mark, and several more within Luke. 
Within the Lucan occurrences, there are instances where we find an explicit objection (such 
as οὐχί) to the proposition(s) which the rhetorical objection follows.  Some clear examples 
are Luke 1:60; 12:51; 13:3; 13:5; and 16:30. My coverage of this usage will be very brief. 
Pattern 5—Conditional Negation Pattern—Unless/Except X Then Y … But X (So Not Y) 
This pattern is based upon the occurrence of ἀλλά in Mark 13:20, as none of the first four 
high level patterns were able to properly account for this arrangement of constituents and 
the conditional context in which they occur.  As is often noted, “extreme cases make poor 
law”: so it may be with an unusual occurrence being used to suggest a high level pattern.  
I will discuss this occurrence in my coverage of the Marcan material.  This pattern includes 
a conditional phrase with the following characteristics: (1) a conditional particle and 
negation used together idiomatically (εἰ μή); (2) explicitly repeated constituents; and (3) 
ellipsis. 
Pattern 6—Alternative Negation Pattern—Affirmation and Negation of Whole Utterances 
In this pattern, ἀλλά occurs with either οὐ (appearing as ἀλλ᾽ οὐ) or another negative 
term, such as οὔπω (appearing as ἀλλ᾽ οὔπω), immediately following.  This does not 
follow the usual Negation—A—ἀλλά—B arrangement: instead, it has an arrangement 
generally following A—ἀλλά—Negation--B.  This is my most questionable, or “dubious” 
category (consciously borrowing John Meier’s terminology), as it is based, not on the 
pattern of the constituents within the clauses and phrases related by ἀλλά, but on the 
juxtaposition of ἀλλά with a negative constituent immediately following it.  In at least 
one of the instances in which ἀλλά and οὐ* occur together, namely Mark 14:36, I view 
them as separate constituents that are not subordinated to an idiomatic expression. 
As I engage various texts in detail in the body of this work, I will call attention to which 
patterns the texts’ respective arrangements correspond, and show which functions these patterns 
generally perform.  This movement from the observation of the form, to the interpretation of the 
(likely) function is important.  I have identified these functions abductively, as I observed 
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particular instances, noted their forms, developed working hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between the forms and functions, and then tested these hypotheses as explanations 
for other instances. 
For example, have used Pattern 2 as a category to bring together those instances of ἀλλά 
that occur between two clauses sharing no explicit or implicit constant textual constituent.34  In 
general, these occurrences of ἀλλά are found joining pairs of statements or commands/requests, 
with or without either explicit negation of the first utterance or the presence of a negative content 
item.   
Under this general pattern, I have identified a sub-pattern that includes negation, Pattern 
2A.  This sub-pattern has the following general arrangement of constituents:  
Negation/Negative Content  Preceding Statement/Command/Request 
ἀλλά     Following Statement/Command/Request 
In form this pattern very closely resembles the most basic, unmarked, hypothetical construction 
that I have identified previously.  The major exception is that there is no discernible constant 
constituent or ellipsis.  This of course raises the question as to whether or not the “ideal” 
construction I have previously discussed should be seen as containing a constant constituent 
within it.  To express the difference graphically, the options are as follows: 
                                                 
34 As my classmates and Dr. Long noted during my class presentation of this material, 
some of these occurrences of ἀλλά are between clauses which share conceptual or thematic 
elements not reflected in a particular word or group of words.  My classifications, however, are 
based upon specific elements observable in the text, or at least on one side (before or after ἀλλά) 
within the construction.  The point of my classmates and Dr. Long stands, however, and is 
suggestive that another potential classification of patterns could have been based upon the 
presence or absence of concepts or themes in the elements on either side of ἀλλά.  Although I did 
not pursue that course, I am grateful for their feedback and engagement with this topic. 
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Negation Constant  Preceding ἀλλά (Constant) Following (Pattern 1) 
OR 
Negation   Preceding ἀλλά   Following (Pattern 2) 
The first form, which I have referred to as Pattern 1 or the Supplied/Implied Constant 
Pattern, corresponds most closely to the linguistic phenomenon known as stripping, and 
generally indicates a correction of a constituent from the first conjunct with a constituent 
presented in the second conjunct.  The second form, which I have generally referred to as Pattern 
2 or the No Constant Pattern, does not appear to be used for constituent correction.  Instead, it 
signals the contrast between the first conjunct, which may or may not contain negation and/or a 
negative content itme, and the second one, with the additional affirmation of and the emphasis 
upon the second conjunct, whereby the difference between the propositional contents or 
commands/requests found in the two conjuncts is made evident.  In some instances, the effect is 
that the propositional or imperatival content of the first conjunct is completely rejected, with the 
second conjunct functioning as the alternative that is to be accepted. 
It is not necessary for our purposes to decide which, if either, of these forms is the 
archetype.  It may be that both are the ideal, archetypical forms for different arrangements 
having completely different functions.  The better objective may in fact be the determination of 
which arrangement a writer chooses if his intention is (1) the rejection and replacement of a 
particular constituent which is part of an utterance, as opposed to (2) the rejection and 
replacement of the whole utterance.  Option (1) amounts to the corrective arrangement, while 
option (2) amounts to a contrastive arrangement.   
So in Patterns 1 and 3 some constituent of the first proposition is being rejected and 
replaced with a parallel constituent proffered in the second proposition.  In Pattern 2A, the major 
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emphasis is not on correction and replacement and is not limited to a single constituent of the 
first conjunct.  Rather, it is (1) the advancement of a whole proposition, which is usually negated, 
or a command, which may be in the form of a prohibition, and (2) the advancement of a 
completely different proposition or command, with the juxtaposition of the two signaling the 
hearer/reader that these two items are to be seen as being at least contrasted with each other, with 
the possibility that the relationship between them is adversative, or one of opposition.  I advance 
that this contrast is signaled pragmatically to the hearer/reader by both the presence of ἀλλά and 
the lack of (1) symmetry of the conjuncts, (2) parallelism of constituents, and/or (3) explicit or 
implicit (elliptical) repetition of terms.  Whether or not one agrees with my proposal regarding 
these pragmatic effects and my interpretation thereof, it should be evident within these examples 
that there is less correspondence between the preceding and following constituents in the Pattern 
2 occurrences, especially with respect to length, than is observed in Patterns 1 and 3.  
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Frequency Distribution of the Patterns Throughout the Synoptic Gospels 
 
 Matthew Mark Luke 
Pattern Designation Raw % Raw % Raw % 
Pattern 1 20 54.1% 14 31.1% 7 20.0% 
1A1 6 16.2% 5 11.1% 1 2.9% 
1B1 9 24.3% 7 15.6% 2 5.7% 
1B2 1 2.7% 1 2.2% 2 5.7% 
1C 3 8.1% 1 2.2% 2 5.7% 
1D 1 2.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Pattern 2 9 24.3% 16 35.6% 9 25.7% 
2A 6 16.2% 14 31.1% 9 25.7% 
2B 2 5.4% 1 2.2% 0 0.0% 
2C 1 2.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
2D 1 2.7% 1 2.2% 0 0.0% 
Pattern 3 6 16.2% 6 13.3% 6 17.1% 
3A 1 2.7% 1 2.2% 4 11.4% 
3B 2 5.4% 2 4.4% 0 0.0% 
3C 1 2.7% 2 4.4% 0 0.0% 
3D 2 5.4% 1 2.2% 1 2.9% 
3E 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 2.9% 
Pattern 4 2 5.4% 5 11.1% 12 34.3% 
Pattern 5 0 0.0% 1 2.2% 0 0.0% 
Pattern 6 0 0.0% 3 6.7% 1 2.9% 
Total Occurrences 37 100% 45 100% 35 100% 
Patterns 1, 2, and 3 each have a sub-pattern that occurs more frequently than the others, 
indicating that perhaps these are the base forms of their respective parent patterns.  Frequency 
alone cannot be the determining factor.35   
I have identified the terms used in my descriptions of the patterns, the defining 
characteristics of the patterns themselves, and the frequency distribution of the same throughout 
the Synoptics.  In the final section of the Introduction, I will briefly describe the procedure I will 
be following throughout this work.
                                                 
35 The paucity of occurrences corresponding to Patterns 5 and 6 hinder determination of 
the base form of the construction. 
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Procedure 
Before engaging these occurrences directly, I will consult several secondary sources and survey 
the various proposals that each offers regarding (1) the uses of ἀλλά, especially in circumstances 
involving negation, and (2) the phenomenon generally known as ellipsis or brachylogy.  Due to the 
limitations of this work, I will largely restrict my consideration of these sources to those written since 
the turn of the twentieth century, with the notable exception of G. B. Winer’s Grammar of the Idiom of 
the New Testament,36 with which some of the later grammars interact.  I should also note that my 
coverage of the grammar of NT Κοινή Greek is weighted toward more recent proposals which discuss 
the uses of ἀλλά.  As the reader will observe, some of these newer perspectives depart significantly from 
the general consensus observable in earlier sources.  My coverage of secondary sources to the general 
study of linguistics is weighted toward discussions of: (1) negation in general; (2) ellipsis (particularly 
ellipsis occurring with negation); and (3) descriptive negation versus metalinguistic, or 
metarepresentational, negation (particularly when expressed in the frame “not X…but (rather) Y…”).   
After surveying the secondary sources in Chapters 1 and 2, I will discuss the observations 
themselves, beginning in Chapter 3 with those occurrences of ἀλλά found in all of the Synoptics.  In 
Chapter 4, I will explore those occurrences found in only two of the Synoptics, beginning with those in 
Matthew and Mark, continuing with those in Matthew and Luke, and finishing with the singular 
occurrence found only in Mark and Luke.  In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, I will examine the occurrences of 
ἀλλά occurring in only one of the Synoptics, beginning with Matthew, then moving to Mark and, finally, 
                                                 
36 G.B. Winer, Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament, ed. Joseph Henry Thayer, Gottlieb 
Lünemann, and Edward Masson, 7th ed. (Andover, Mass.: Warren F. Draper, 1877). 
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to Luke.  Within these chapters, I will restrict myself to representative occurrences, and arrange my 
treatment by the pattern classification of the occurrences.  So within Chapter 5, I will address 
occurrences classified as Pattern 1, then Pattern 2, and so on, repeating this procedure in Chapter 6 for 
Mark, and in Chapter 7 for Luke.  Finally, I will present my overall conclusions for the Synoptic 
Gospels, as well as my remaining questions and suggestions for further research. 
I will now turn my attention to a survey of relevant secondary literature and the various scholars’ 
discussions of ἀλλά, negation, and/or ellipsis.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Survey of Secondary Literature Through the Middle of the Twentieth Century 
G.B. Winer 
G.B. Winer classifies conjunctions according to the eight “species of connection” that he 
recognizes.  Our interest lies in the connection type that he refers to as “antithesis,” which he asserts is 
“expressed sometimes by the simple adversatives (δέ, ἀλλά), sometimes by a concessive construction 
(μέντοι, ὅμως, ἀλλά γε).”37  He distinguishes between the “adversatives” δέ and ἀλλά first by a 
comparison with Latin conjunctions; then, by translation possibilities; and, finally, by their respective 
functions: 
The particles ἀλλά and δέ differ in general like sed and autem (vero)…. The former (the Neut. 
Plur. of ἄλλος with a different accent…), which may often be translated by yet, nevertheless, imo, 
expresses proper and strict opposition (cancelling a previous statement or indicating that it is to be 
disregarded); the latter…connects while it contrasts, i.e. adds another particular different from 
what precedes…. When a negation precedes, we find οὐκ...ἀλλά not…but, and also οὐ (μή) ... δέ 
not..but (but rather)….38 
In his survey of the various uses of ἀλλά, Winer helpfully observes it “is used when a train of thought is 
broken off or interrupted, whether by an objection…, or by a correction…, or by a question…, or by an 
encouragement, command, request…; for in all these instances something different is advanced 
subversive of what precedes.”39 
                                                 
37 G.B. Winer, Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament, ed. Joseph Henry Thayer, Gottlieb 
Lünemann, and Edward Masson, 7th ed. (Andover, MA: Warren F. Draper, 1877), 441. 
38 Ibid., 442. 
39 Ibid. 
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Winer also helpfully presents those conjunctions, particles, and/or combinations thereof to which 
ἀλλά should not be seen as equivalent or interchangeable.40 One such combination that will be of 
interest to us in our engagement of ἀλλά in the Synoptics is εἰ μή.  Winer addresses two Synoptic 
examples, one in Mark, and one in Matthew, noting “in Mark ix. 8 οὐκέτι οὐδένα εἶδον, ἀλλὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν 
μόνον means, they no longer saw any one (of those that they had previously seen, vs. 4), but (they saw) 
Jesus alone.  In Matt. xx. 23 … δοθήσεται, borrowed from δοῦναι, is to be repeated after ἀλλά, and the 
conjunction signifies but.”41 
Winer’s suggestion that a constituent occurring before ἀλλά, in this case the verb δοῦναι mutatis 
mutandis to the form δοθήσεται, is important for my argument.  Sometimes this omission of a word, 
phrase, etc. that is necessary to properly understand an utterance is termed “ellipsis,” although Winer 
would not, based upon his tight definition of the term, agree with my more general use of the term.  
First, Winer positively asserts,  
Ellipsis (not including Aposiopesis…) consists in the omission of a word the meaning of which 
must be supplied in thought (in order to complete the sentence).  The omission of such a word 
(whether out of convenience or an effort to be concise) is allowable only when, in what is uttered, 
an indubitable intimation of the omitted word is given…, either by means of the particular structure 
of the sentence or by virtue of a conventional usage.  In accordance with the three constituent parts 
of every simple sentence, such omissions may be arranged under the three main classes of Ellipses 
of the Subject, of the Predicate, and of the Copula.42 
At first glance, then, it would appear that Winer’s view of ellipsis and mine would be in substantial 
agreement.  This is not the case, however, as Winer proceeds to describe those occurrences that he does 
not consider be ellipsis, and to provide his readers with several illustrative examples.  His description is 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 451. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 581. 
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worthy of our consideration: “The case in which a word or phrase of a preceding clause must be 
repeated in a subsequent connected clause, either unchanged or altered to suit the construction…, cannot 
be called ellipsis, there being no actual omission of the word….”43 
It would appear that, in Winer’s view, if the word, phrase, or clause appears explicitly in the sentence, 
then even if it needs to be supplied implicitly elsewhere, such an instance is not, properly speaking, 
ellipsis.   
One of the examples that Winer cites as an occurrence not exhibiting ellipsis is Mark 14:29. He 
demonstrates how a word is to be supplied based on the text prior to the place where a word, phrase, or 
clause is missing.  His reconstruction of the text, with the missing word (and parallel text) supplied in 
parentheses is: “εἰ πάντες σκανδαλισθήσονται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐγω (σκανδαλισθήσομαι, cf. Matt. xxvi. 33).”44    
Winer comments on the combinations of the particles εἰ δὲ μή and εἰ δὲ μή γε, and the construction 
formed by οὐ μόνον δέ...ἀλλά καί, noting that after these “it is peculiarly common to supply a preceding 
word or phrase.”45 
Winer also addresses the proposal that the οὐ...ἀλλά construction is used to indicate “not so 
much X…as Y.”  He first notes 
It has frequently been laid down as a rule, that sentences which contain a single negation followed 
by ἀλλά (δέ), or in which οὐ (μή) forms an antithesis to a preceding affirmative sentence (Matt. ix. 
13 Sept.; Heb. xiii.9; Luke x.20), are not always (as e.g. Mark v.39 τὸ παιδίον οὐκ ἀπέθανεν ἀλλὰ 
καθεύδει, where the latter thought exactly overturns the first, Matt. ix.12; x.34; xv.11; 2 Cor xiii.7) 
to be understood as purely negative, but (in consequence of a construction which, though 
Hebraistic, occurs also in Greek prose) must be rendered: not so much…as…, or: not only…but 
also…. 
  
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 582. 
45 Ibid., 583. 
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 But in the passage from the N.T. referred to this head, when more closely considered, either  
a.  an unconditional negation is plainly intended, as may be gathered from a careful 
examination of the context … or,  
 b.  in other passages, the absolute negation is on rhetorical grounds employed instead 
of a conditional (relative), not for the purpose of really (logically) cancelling the 
first conception, but in order to direct undivided attention to the second, so that the 
first may comparatively disappear….46 
Winer discusses how this latter sense is present within, and aids in the correct interpretation of, 1 Thess 
4:8, which he translates as “rejecteth not man, but God.”  Winer explains, however, the rhetorical impact 
intended in the crafting of the writer:  
Of course he rejects the apostle also, who announces the divine truth; but the intention was to 
present to the mind with full force the fact, that it is properly God, as the real author of the truth 
announced who is rejected.  The force of the thought is immediately impaired if rendered: he 
rejects not so much man as God.  To give such a translation would be like diluting e.g. an asyndeton 
(the nature of which also is rhetorical) by subjoining a copula.  Therefore it appears to me that 
οὐκ...ἀλλά, when it logically means non tam…quam, is always a part of the rhetorical coloring of 
the composition, and for that reason is to be preserved in the translation (as is done by all good 
translators).  The speaker has chosen this negative designedly, and the expression is not to be 
judged of grammatically merely.  Whether, however, such is actually the case, is to be determined 
not according to the impressions of the interpreter, but by the context and the nature of the 
connected thoughts.  In this way the following passages are to be treated: Matt. x.20 (Schott) οὐχ 
ὑμεῖς ἐστε οἱ λαλοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν, Mark ix.37 (Schott) ὃς ἂν ἐμὲ δέξηται, 
οὐκ ἐμὲ δέχεται ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με....47  
I will be discussing both of these texts (Matt 10:20 and Mark 9:37) in greater detail later in this work.  
For our present discussion, however, I would like to address Winer’s assertions in greater detail.   
I agree substantially with the first portion of Winer’s assertion in point (b) above that “not for the 
purpose of really (logically) cancelling the first conception, but in order to direct undivided attention to 
the second….”    For the purpose of this discussion, I ask the reader to consider the hypothetical form of 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 495–7. 
47 Ibid., 497. 
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the οὐ...ἀλλά construction “…οὐ X...ἀλλά Y…” with the usual translation “…not X, but [rather] Y…”  
In my understanding, Winer’s assertion may be expanded to explain that the first constituent is being 
asserted positively, and the final constituent being strengthened, or emphasized, even more.  As a result, 
we do not have the complete rejection of the first constituent X: on the contrary, X is retained, and the 
following constituent Y, which the writer intends to focus upon, is added to this first constituent, even 
while being emphasized beyond it.   
This is quite similar to the effect we would expect if we saw οὐ μόνον...ἀλλὰ καί.  I am proposing 
that such an interpretation is, in specific, limited contexts, appropriate for οὐ...ἀλλά alone.  In this 
understanding, the reader moves beyond the simple rejection of X, and instead sees the combination of 
terms signaling “not simply/only X, but even more Y in addition to X.”  The evidence from some texts 
suggests that οὐ...ἀλλά can, based upon the context in which it is used, signal both [+alternative] and 
[+addition/accumulation], even without the explicit addition of μόνον…καί….  I believe that careful 
consideration of this use in Matt 10:20, together with the context in which it occurs, presents compelling 
evidence to advance such a claim.  I will also explore this claim, the evidence supporting it, and the 
criteria required to justify such a claim in greater detail in my later treatment of Mark 9:37. 
It should be clear that my proposal does not agree with the second portion of Winer’s assertion in 
point (b), namely: “…so that the first may comparatively disappear….”  This suggestion moves our 
understanding in the wrong direction.  The two ways to elevate Y, above, are to either (1) diminish or 
reject X, such that Y is the only element in focus, or (2) present both X and Y, with Y being emphasized 
by its position within the construction, without removing X from consideration.  It is this latter proposal 
that I am advancing, while it is the former to which Winer seems to hold. 
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A. T. Robertson 
A. T. Robertson includes ἀλλά in his listing of the “co-ordinating” conjunctions.  In describing 
the general function of these conjunctions, or particles, he notes: “The co-ordinating conjunctions form 
the most frequent means of connecting clauses into one paratactic sentence…. Καί, τε, δέ, οὐδέ, μηδέ, 
μέν and δέ, οὔτε, ἀλλά are the most frequent particles used for this purpose.”48 
In his detailed treatment of the particles, he includes ἀλλά in both the “copulative” and 
“adversative” conjunction classifications.  In agreement with several other sources, Robertson traces the 
origin of back to the neuter plural of ἄλλος, ἄλλα, such that it literally meant “other things.”  He 
remarks,  
In actual usage the adversative came to be the most frequent construction, but the original 
copulative held on to the N.T. period.  It is a mistake to infer that ἄλλος means ‘something 
different.’  In itself it is merely ‘another.’  Like δέ the thing introduced by ἀλλά is something new, 
but not essentially in contrast.49 
 Although granting that ἀλλά does not essentially indicate a contrast, Robertson says in his 
handling of the adversative conjunctions that “Just as ἀλλά (cf.2 Cor. 11:4) can be used in the sense of 
ἕτερος (when it means ‘different,’ not merely ‘second’), so ἀλλά can mean ‘another’ in contrast to the 
preceding.  With a negative, the antithesis is sharp….”50  Further, under his discussion of the disjunctive 
negative use of οὐ, he comments, “We frequently have ‘where one thing is denied that another may be 
established.’  Here there is sharp antithesis.  The simplest form is οὐ--δέ as in Jas. 2:11, or οὐ--ἀλλά as in 
Mt. 15:11; Mk 5:39; Lu. 8:52; Ac. 5:4; 1 Cor. 15:10; 2 Cor 3:3, etc.”51 
                                                 
48 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research, 
4th ed. (Nashville: Broadman, 1934), 428. 
49 Ibid., 1185. 
50 Ibid., 1187. 
51 Ibid., 1165–6. 
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With respect to Robertson’s comments on the subject of ellipsis, a few important points should 
be highlighted.  First, Robertson is, in the main, more flexible in his use of the term “ellipsis” as a 
general description for various phenomena of omission of sentence constituents and/or sentence 
contraction encountered in the Greek of the NT.  A term related to ellipsis, although not tightly defined, 
is “brachylogy”: however, it is also presented as a parallel to, if not a synonym with, “breviloquence.”52   
In fact, in discussing the phenomenon known as zeugma, Robertson first comments, “Zeugma, as 
we have seen, can very well come in here as a sort of ellipsis.”53  Shortly thereafter, however, he also 
asserts, “Various examples of ellipsis-like zeugma are also instances of brachylogy. No clear line of 
distinction appears. So in comparisons we sometimes have to fill out the sense.”54  He also questions 
Blass’s attempt to make an exclusive determination as to which of the two, ellipsis or brachylogy, is 
present: “Blass distinguishes brachylogy from ellipsis in that brachylogy affects the thought rather than 
the grammatical form, but both ideas are usually present.”55 
In his comments on the “elliptical sentence,” and the possibility that constituents of a sentence 
may be omitted, he maintains: 
Indeed, as seen in the case of οὐχί (Lu. 1:60) the sentence does not absolutely require the expression 
of either subject or predicate, though both are implied by the word used. This shortening or 
condensation of speech is common to all the Indo-Germanic languages.56 
Regarding sentences were only the predicate is present, Robertson proposes the following: 
The subject may be absent and the predicate will still constitute a sentence, i.e. express the complex 
idea intended. This follows naturally from the preceding paragraph. The predicate may imply the 
subject. The subject in Greek is involved in the verbal personal ending and often the context makes 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 1203. 
53 Ibid., 1201. 
54 Ibid., 1203. 
55 Ibid., 1204. 
56 Ibid., 391. 
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it clear what the subject really is. Indeed the Greek only expressed the personal subject as a rule 
where clearness, emphasis or contrast demanded it.57 
There is nothing particularly unexpected here.  What is important for the reader to see is that 
constituents of a sentence or a clause, need not be present explicitly.  In fact, they can and often are 
omitted, especially in those circumstances where they may easily be supplied by the reader based on 
indications within the text and co-text.  Furthermore, this omission of constituents may be referred to 
under the general heading of ellipsis, although strictly speaking, if Winer’s definition and exclusions are 
respected, the constituent or constituents that are missing should not be suggested or implied by the text 
or co-text.  Such a stance seems excessive and pedantic, and I consider Robertson’s more flexible use of 
the term as an improvement.   
H.W. Smyth 
H.W. Smyth describes ἀλλά as “a strongly adversative conjunction (stronger than δέ)” and  it 
“connects sentences and clauses, and corresponds pretty closely to but; at times ἀλλά need not or cannot 
be translated….”58  He is in agreement with Robertson’s assertion concerning the origins of the 
conjunction, indicating “ἀλλά was originally the same word as the accusative neuter plural ἄλλα other 
things used adverbially = on the other hand.”59  With respect to the range of its function, he advances the 
following: “ἀλλά marks opposition, contrast, protest, difference, objection, or limitation; and is thus 
used both where one notion entirely excludes another and where two notions are not mutually 
exclusive.”60   
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar, 1920; Repr. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1963), 632. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
50 
 
 
 
Smyth discusses several uses of ἀλλά with other particles present and the placement of ἀλλά (1) 
relative to preceding negative or positive statements, (2) at the beginning of an apodosis, or (3) at the 
beginning of whole sentences.  Of special interest to my research, however, is his description in §2776 
of the conjunction’s use when the preceding/antecedent statement is negative: in his remarks he remarks 
“In its simplest use, ἀλλά introduces a positive statement after a negative clause.”61 
With respect to the omission of sentence constituents and how they are to be supplied if missing, 
Smyth discusses both the omission of the subject62 and the predicate.63  With respect to the absence of 
the verb, he comments “In lively discourse the form of a verb signifying to do, speak, come, go, etc., 
may be omitted for brevity. The ellipsis is often unconscious and it is frequently uncertain what is to be 
supplied to complete the thought.”64  Shortly thereafter, he discusses other instances where there is 
greater clarity as to which verb is implied: “A verb that may easily be supplied from the context is often 
omitted.”  He directs the reader to the index, particularly to the heading “Brachylogy,” for further 
information.65  Smyth removes all doubt concerning his view on brachylogy by helpfully providing (1) a 
definition, (2) a description, and (3) a discussion of it in distinction from ellipsis: 
Brachylogy (βραχυλογίᾱ brevity of diction, abbreviated expression or construction) is a concise 
form of expression by which an element is not repeated or is omitted when its repetition or use 
would make the thought or the grammatical construction complete. The suppressed element must 
be supplied from some corresponding word in the context, in which case it often appears with 
some change of form or construction; or it must be taken from the connection of the thought. 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., 259–61. 
63 Ibid., 261–2. 
64 Ibid., 262. 
65 Ibid. 
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a. Brachylogy and ellipse cannot always be distinguished sharply. In ellipse the suppressed word 
is not to be supplied from a corresponding word in the context; and, in general, ellipse is less 
artificial and less dependent on the momentary and arbitrary will of the speaker or writer.66  
In this respect, Smyth seems to follow closer to Winer’s view of the distinction between ellipsis and 
brachylogy than to Robertson’s.  To be clear, the distinction is between omitted items which are not 
readily inferred by the reader (ellipsis), on the one hand, and those that are (brachylogy), on the other. 
H. Kruse and P. A. Vaccari: Dialectic Negation as a Semitic Idiom 
Heinz Kruse’s 1954 article discussing a particular sort of negation has been cited by various NT 
scholars when explaining texts such as Matt 10:20, Matt 15:11,67 Mark 2:17,68 Mark 9:37, Luke 10:20,69 
and Luke 18:14,70 to mention but a few.  Although I have noted several citations of his article, I have 
seen few quotations from it, and even fewer discussions, whether brief or extended, of either the 
contents of the article or Kruse’s argument.  One notable exception to this is the excellent treatment by 
A. B. du Toit,71 with which I will engage in the next chapter.  Given both this general paucity of 
                                                 
66 Ibid., 674–75. 
67 W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, Matthew 8-18: Volume 2 (London: Bloomsbury T&T 
Clark, 2004), 529 n 49. 
68 R. T. France, The Gospel of Mark: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2002), 135 n 28. 
69 I. Howard Marshall, Gospel of Luke: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 430. 
70 Tom Holmén, “Jesus’ ‘Magic’ from a Theodicean Perspective,” in Handbook for the Study of 
the Historical Jesus, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Tom Holmén, 4 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 4:3191 n69. 
71 Andreas B. du Toit, “Hyperbolical Contrasts: A Neglected Aspect of Paul’s Style,” in A South 
African Perspective on the New Testament.  Essays by South African New Testament Scholars Presented 
to Bruce Manning Metzger during Visit to South Africa in 1985, ed. J. H. Petzer and P. J. Martin 
(Leiden: Brill, 1986), 178–86; Andreas B. du Toit, “Hyperbolical Contrasts: A Neglected Aspect of 
Paul’s Style,” in Focusing on Paul: Persuasion and Theological Design in Romans and Galatians, ed. 
Cilliers Breytenbach and David S. du Toit (Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, 2007), 35–44. 
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treatment, however, and the weight that Kruse’s view has been given by some scholars, I have 
endeavored to engage Kruse’s evidence and arguments directly.72     
Kruse argues for seeing a particular type of negation, which he calls “dialektische negation,” as a 
Semitic idiom.  He provides the following general description of this “stilistische Erscheinung” (stylistic 
phenomenon): “Es handelt sich um die Gegenüberstellung zweier Aussagen, von denen die eine (meist 
steht sie an erster Stelle) verneint, die andere bejaht wird, um dem bejahten Glied einen besonderen 
Nachdruck zu verleihen.”73 
Kruse cites approvingly the work of A. Vaccari74 in which Vaccari discusses this “Semitic 
idiom” and asserts that the construction does not represent a “negazione assoluta” but only “relativa.”75  
However, Kruse also observes that Vaccari did not include Jer 7:22 in his examples despite the 
importance of this verse as evidence for those attempting to argue for the late composition of the 
“Priester-kodex” (Priestly Document), and the challenges mustered against viewing the negation there as 
in instance of this idiom.76 
With respect to Vaccari’s proposal, although the concept of a “relative” degree of negation may 
be helpful, such negation, along with “absolute” negation, needs to be more clearly defined.  Suffice it to 
                                                 
72 Since the article is in German, I have provided some excerpts from it, with my translations, to 
allow the reader to better understand Kruse’s contribution to the larger discussion, and to my 
investigation. 
73 Kruse, “dialektische Negation,” 386. My translation: “It deals with the juxtaposition of two 
statements, one of which (it usually stands in the first position) is negated, the other one is affirmed, in 
order to lend a particular emphasis to the affirmed part.” 
74 Vaccari, “Interpretazione del Salmo 16”; Kruse, “dialektische Negation,” 386. 
75 Vaccari, “Interpretazione del Salmo 16,” 431. 
76 Kruse, “dialektische Negation,” 386–7; E. König, “Der Jeremiaspruch 7, 21-23 nach seinem 
Sinn, seiner kultusgeschichtliehen Stellung und seinem geistgeschichtlichen Anlasz untersucht,” TSK 79 
(1906): 327–93. 
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say here that, while the whole conjunct may be completely negated, or particular constituents within the 
set of constituents composing that conjunct may be selectively negated (constituent negation), there is 
also a possibility that the negated conjunct may still hold in some way, but in some sort of combination 
with material from the second conjunct.   
However, Kruse looks unfavorably at the proposal that such instances of negation should be seen 
as the elliptical addition of “not only” to the first proposition.  Commenting on one such proposal, he 
states,  
Es ist ein nicht sehr glücklicher Griff, der Mangel an Einfühlung in den Geist der 
hebräischen Sprache verrät, wenn er diesen Gebrauch des אל als „έλλειπτικώς” für 'non 
solum' darstellt, als ob der Hebräer dabei die Vorstellung des abendländischen ‘nicht nur’ 
hätte…77 
Kruse’s engagement with Vaccari’s work demonstrates that both scholars recognized, first, the nearly 
formulaic way in which this construction may viewed, and, second, the effect that may be produced in 
certain contexts, based upon pragmatic considerations, namely, “not so much A as/but rather B” („nicht 
so sehr A als vielmehr B”).78  
Kruse builds his case for this latter view using the specific instance of Jer 7:22,79 interacting 
especially with E. König’s attempt to explain the negation present in this text.80  He then offers a list of 
several examples from the Hebrew Bible (including Hosea 6:6) and the GNT as examples for 
                                                 
77 Kruse, “dialektische Negation,” 388.  My translation: “When he labels/represents this use of 
אל as “έλλειπτικώς,” [(elliptical)] it is not a very good move, which reveals the lack of insight into the 
spirit of the Hebrew language, as if in doing so the Hebrew has the Western concept of “not only” [in 
mind]….” 
78 Ibid., 386, 390. 
79 Ibid., 386–8. 
80 Ibid., 25–6; E. König, Stilistik, Rhetorik, Poetik in Bezug auf die biblische Litteratur (Leipzig: 
Theodore Weicher, 1900), 74–6; König, “Der Jeremiaspruch 7, 21-23,” esp. 351–8. 
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consideration.  He also interacts with Exod 16:8, offering an explanation as to how a member of the 
original audience would have interpreted such an utterance: It is this explanation that is of special 
interest to me.  First, Kruse gives the German translation of the text in focus: “Nicht gegen uns richtet 
sich euer Murren, sondern gegen Jahwe!”81  He then poses the following questions, with his answers to 
each of them: 
 Now what is happening in the soul [mind] of the Hebrew, whenever he hears or speaks 
the first-mentioned proposition?  Which image is connected with this linguistic expression?  
It is clear: he does not think “έλλειπτικώς” [elliptically]: “Your grumbling is directed ‘not only’ 
against us, but rather (also) against the Lord.” In this context there can be no question about 
a “relative” use of the negation, and in this E. König is proven to be absolutely correct.  Rather, 
the Hebrew thinks how he speaks, namely: “Your grumbling is actually directed in a certain 
sense not against us.” It is clear to him, that, according to the outward appearance, the 
murmuring is probably directed against Moses; yes, the Israelites were of precisely the 
opinion and the intention to grumble against Moses and Aaron, and it might not even have 
occurred to them to grumble, if they had been aware, that they thus grumbled against the Lord. 
Now Moses as the speaker in no way intends to deny the evidence of the outward appearance 
(cf. the previous verse, where he says it explicitly); it would also have been pointless.  
He only intends to say: “You grumble against us, but this grumbling is essentially, 
fundamentally, not so much directed against us as against the Lord, of whom we are envoys.  
That it goes against us, one is able to disregard; it is not worth mentioning. The main thing, 
which this is about, is much more the issue, that your murmuring is directed against God. 82 
                                                 
81 Kruse, “dialektische Negation,” 389. 
82 Ibid., 389–90.  Kruse’s original wording: “Was geht nun in der Seele des Hebräers vor, 
wenn er etwa den erstgenannten Satz hört oder spricht? Welche Vorstellung verbindet sich mit 
diesem sprachlichen Ausdruck? Es ist klar: er denkt nicht „έλλειπτικώς” : „Euer Murren richtet sich 
'nicht nur' gegen uns, sondern (auch) gegen den Herrn.”  In diesem Sinn kann nicht von einem 
„relativen”  Gebrauch der Verneinung die Rede sein, und darin ist E. KÖNIG durchaus Recht zu 
geben. Der Hebräer denkt vielmehr, wie er spricht, das heisst: „Euer Murren richtet sich  
tatsächlich in einem gewissen Sinne nicht  gegen  uns.” Dabei ist ihm klar, dass, dem äusseren 
Anschein nach, das Murren sich sehr wohl  gegen  Moses  richtet;  ja,  die  Israeliten  hatten  ja  
gerade  die Meinung und Absicht, gegen Moses und Aaron zu murren, und es wäre ihnen 
vielleicht gar nicht eingefallen  zu murren, wenn ihnen bewusst  gewesen  wäre,  dass  sie  damit  
gegen  den  Herrn  murrten. Diese  Evidenz des äusseren Anscheins will nun Moses als Sprecher 
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Kruse’s position regarding the sense of such a negation, then, is fairly straightforward.  The 
issues causing me particular concerns are conveniently included in the final paragraph of the quoted 
material above.  First, Kruse asserts that the speaker, in this case Moses, intends to communicate 
something different than what he actually says.  He utilizes an idiom known both to himself, and to 
those hearing his speech.  This does not present any problems for us, except when we come to 
Kruse’s reconstruction of what was actually communicated.  It would seem that, while Kruse 
rejects the assertion that this idiom as functioning elliptically for “not only…but also,” he holds that 
it is functioning elliptically for “not simply…but even more so.”   
WHY “DIALEKTISCHE” NEGATION? EXCURSUS ON G. W. F. HEGEL’S “DIALECTIC” 
The question arises, however, as to why Kruse, and others following him, would choose this 
peculiar term, namely dialektische, to describe the species of negation that may be observed in certain 
texts.  The likely explanation is that there appears to be a preservation of at least some portion of the 
negated conjunct.  Such an assertion calls for some explanation.  I take the use of this term, as well as 
the presence of others, such as Synthese and Antithese, as indicators that Kruse has in mind the well-
known dialectic of G. W. F. Hegel, which has at times been represented as consisting of a thesis, its 
opposing antithesis, and the resulting synthesis.  Let me quickly note that such a representation of 
                                                 
keineswegs leugnen (vgl. den vorhergehenden Vers, wo er es geradezu ausspricht); es  wäre  auch  
vergeblich  gewesen.  Er  will  nur  sagen: „Ihr murrt gegen uns, aber dieses Murren ist eigentlich, 
im Grunde, nicht so sehr gegen uns als gegen den Herrn gerichtet, dessen Gesandte wir sind. 
Dass es gegen uns geht, kann man vernachlässigen; es ist nicht der Rede wert. Das Wichtige, 
worauf es hier ankommt, ist  vielmehr  die  Rücksicht,  unter  der  euer  Murren  gegen  Gott 
gerichtet ist.”  Emphasis original. 
56 
 
 
 
Hegel’s program is vigorously challenged by some scholars, such as W. Kaufmann, who asserts that, in 
fact, 
Fichte introduced into German philosophy the three-step of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, using 
these three terms.  Schelling took up this terminology; Hegel did not.  He never once used these 
three terms together to designate three stages in an argument or account in any of his books.  And 
they do not help us understand his Phenomenology, his Logic, or his philosophy of history; they 
impede any open-minded comprehension of what he does by forcing it into a schema which was 
available to him and which he deliberately spurned.  The mechanical formalism, in particular, with 
which critics since Kierkegaard have charged him, he derides expressly and at some length in the 
preface to the Phenomenology.83 
Certainly on a popular level, and to a lesser extent even on a scholarly level, Hegel’s dialectic is 
understood, and represented as consisting of, the three terms mentioned.  Further, analyses based on this 
understanding of Hegel’s dialectic have been applied by scholars other than Hegel himself to explain the 
advance of history in general, the progression and succession of economic systems, the history of 
religions, and a multitude of other particular phenomena far afield from those in the mind of the original 
author.   
But what of Hegel’s own presentation?  While it is simply not possible for me to present a full 
treatment of Hegel’s views on this subject, we may still be able to get some idea of his proposal based 
on his discussion of the German word aufheben, sometimes translated “to sublate.” This discussion 
occurs within the larger context of Hegel exploring the complex relationships between, and in fact, the 
unity of, “Being,” “Becoming,” and “Nothing.”  In the extended quotation following, Hegel discusses 
the term aufheben itself, using it to illustrate that at which he has been driving: 
To sublate, and the sublated (that which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most 
important notions in philosophy.  It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs 
                                                 
83 Walter Arnold Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, 1965; Repr. (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), 154. 
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throughout the whole of philosophy and especially distinguished from nothing.  What is sublated 
is not thereby reduced to nothing.  Nothing is immediate; what is sublated, on the other hand, is 
the result of mediation; it is a non-being but as a result which had its origin in a being.  It still has, 
therefore, in itself the determinateness from which it originates.  
 ‘To sublate’ has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, 
to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to.84  Even ‘to preserve’ 
includes a negative element, namely, that something is removed from its immediacy and so from 
an existence which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it.  Thus what is sublated is 
at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated. 
… Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity with its opposite; in this more 
particular signification as something reflected, it may fittingly be called a moment. 
It should be apparent that there are recognizable components, or sub-processes, active within this 
phenomenon of sublation as Hegel understands it.  At times these sub-processes have been expressed by 
the four Latin verbs as noted (and explained) by W. Leinfellner: 
The complexity of dialectical negation consisting traditionally of 'negare', 'elevare', 'conservare', 
and 'conciliare' can be explained by: (1) the typical character of alienation expresses the 'negare' 
function of the dialectical negation and (2) the synthesis, which is represented by the 'U' (or union 
operation between sets), symbolizes the function of the traditional 'conciliare' of the dialectic and 
imposes (3) on the synthetic universe U a hierarchical dialectical structure, which symbolizes the 
function of 'elevare'.  We indicate by 'synthetic universe' simply the fact that the dialectical 
movement and the dialectical process creates the hierarchical dialectic order by means of the set-
theoretical operations of our model.  Finally, (4) the typical function of 'conservare' of the Hegelian 
and materialistic dialectic hierarchy is imposed on the sets S of our universe of discourse U.85 
Clearly, Leinfellner’s engagement with the dialectic occurs within a very particular, very technical 
discussion within the discipline of economics.  However, it is helpful to note the elements that are in 
                                                 
84 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. Arnold V. Miller, 1969; 
Repr. London: Allen & Unwin. (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1998), 106–7.  Emphasis is included in 
the translation. 
85 Werner Leinfellner, “Marxian Paradigms versus Microeconomic Structures,” in Epistemology, 
Methodology, and the Social Sciences, ed. Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky, Boston Studies in 
the Philosophy of Science 71 (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 171–
2. 
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play for at least some of the recent scholarly discussions of Hegel’s proposal, and particularly of 
dialectical negation. 
It will not be helpful here to delve too deeply into the arguments regarding exact terminology, 
the complex philosophy behind the perspectives reflected in these arguments, or the later developments 
and expansions that employ such understandings and their respective accompanying notations 
(particularly the various strains of Marxist ideology).  What we may profitably note, however, is that, 
within the course of the dialectical process as applied to negation in an utterance, the resulting 
impression made by the utterance as a whole (the so-called “synthesis”) is thought to preserve 
something of what was asserted in the negated proposition (or, the “thesis”) in addition to the 
proposition that was being advanced (or, the “antithesis”).   
The negation, then, of the “thesis” is not its complete obliteration—in fact, the whole idea of the 
so-called “double negation” associated with the Hegelian dialectic, and the oft-asserted threesome of 
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, is that the negation of the thesis is in turn negated, with the result that 
something of both the thesis and antithesis are preserved.  It is important to note that some scholars see 
more emphasis being placed upon, or at least a greater priority given to, the antithesis in the synthesis. 
One final word from Hegel regarding the double negation and its results may be helpful.  In his 
discussion of the Law of the Excluded Middle and the maxims of Identity and Opposition, Hegel 
discusses contradiction: 
Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction 
is unthinkable.  The only correct thing in that statement is that contradiction is not the end of the 
matter, but cancels itself.  But contradiction, when cancelled, does not leave abstract identity; for 
that is itself only one side of the contrariety.  The proximate result of opposition (when realised as 
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contradiction) is the Ground, which contains identity as well as difference superseded and deposed 
to elements in the completer notion.86 
I stress again that our investigation will not be well served by delving too deeply into either the 
underlying philosophy, or the following developments that are associated with the Hegel’s dialectic.  My 
point in addressing it in this section is to help the reader understand why Kruse might have chosen this 
peculiar terminology for this type of negation based upon (1) what he observed occurring in some of the 
texts of the Hebrew Bible and Greek New Testament, and (2) a well-known philosophy, a similar 
phenomenon, and an associated label that lay close at hand: namely, dialektische.  
The Typical Features of This Idiom: 
Based upon his view of the dialectic phenomenon and the examples that he considers, Kruse 
offers what he sees as the three general characteristics of dialectic negation: 
1. a plain, self-evident or at least obvious truth, which, viewed ostensibly and outwardly, 
is denied absolutely, and which can be denied without any harm, since no one, because of its 
self-evident nature, is led into the error that it should be denied in every regard; 
2. the corresponding absolute affirmation of a contrasting proposition, whereby the 
conflicting negation still appears to be underscored, and in any case a contradiction is evoked; 
3. the synthesis, similar to a “distinguo,” which, however, does not appear in the 
language, but rather occurs in the soul of the hearer, in that he intuitively comprehends what 
we, analyzing, are able to express as follows: 
“The speaker cannot possibly have wanted to absolutely deny the whole proposition; thus, he 
has only denied it from a certain perspective, in order to more strongly affirm and emphasize 
another perspective, which is particularly important to him.” 87 
                                                 
86 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Logic of Hegel: Translated from the Encyclopaedia of 
the Philosophical Sciences, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), 223. 
87 Kruse, “dialektische Negation,” 390.  Kruse’s original wording:  
1.  eine evidente, selbstverständliche oder zum mindesten naheliegende Wahrheit, die 
scheinbar und äusserlich gesehen schlechthin geleugnet wird und die ohne Schaden geleugnet 
werden kann, weil niemand wegen ihrer Selbstverständlichkeit in den Irrtum geführt wird, sie solle  
unter jeder Rücksicht  geleugnet  werden; 
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There are several items of interest within these characteristics.  First, the proposition contained within 
the first conjunct should be so familiar or well-established as to effectively resist the negation which 
seems to apply.  Since it is so well-know and/or established, the hearer does not consider the absolute 
denial of it as a viable option, which leaves open denial from a certain perspective.  Second, the 
proposition of the second conjunct appears to be affirmed without reservation, such that an absolute 
denial of the first proposition, and an absolute affirmation of the second, cannot hold together.   
Finally, the interpretation, the Synthese, which emerges both (1) preserves something of the first 
proposition, though it be diminished, even while it (2) advances and emphasizes the proposition of the 
second conjunct.  Further, as in the excerpt we considered earlier,88 so also in the third point here Kruse 
offers a hypothetical thought process by which a hearer/reader interprets the negated utterance that they 
have encountered.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2.  die ebenso schlechthinnige Bejahung eines entgegengesetzten Sachverhalts, wodurch 
die entgegenstehende Negation noch unterstrichen zu werden scheint, und in jedem Fall ein 
Widerspruch heraufbeschworen  wird; 
3. die einem „distinguo" gleichkommende Synthese, die jedoch sprachlich nicht in 
Erscheinung tritt, sondern in der Seele des Zu- hörers vollzogen wird, indem er intuitiv erfasst, was 
wir zergliedernd etwa folgendermassen ausdrücken können:  
„Der Sprecher kann unmöglich den ganzen Sachverhalt schlechthin haben leugnen wollen; 
also hat er ihn nur unter einer bestimmten Rücksicht geleugnet, um eine andere Rücksicht um so  
stärker zu bejahen und zu betonen, auf die es ihm besonders ankommt.”” 
88 Ibid., 389–90. 
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J. D. Denniston 
J. D. Denniston provides extensive coverage of the use of ἀλλά in Classical Greek literature.  He 
also agrees with the previous assertions noted concerning the origin of the conjunction, and links this 
origin to its function.  He maintains,  
Its clear and unchallenged etymology (from the neuter plural of ἄλλος, with change of accent) is 
in complete accordance with its usage.  The primary sense of ‘otherness’, diversity, contrast, runs 
through all the shades of meaning, from the strongest to the weakest: from ‘but’, or even ‘no’, to 
‘further’, ‘again’.89 
Denniston affirms that the general use of the conjunction is as an “adversative connecting particle.”90  
However, there is flexibility with respect to the degree of “adversative force” exerted by the 
conjunction.  Denniston comments “The adversative force of ἀλλά is usually strong (eliminative or 
objecting): less frequently, the particle is employed as a weaker (balancing) adversative.”91  This 
description assumes his view of the adversatives as being “of two kinds: eliminative adversatives, used 
often where one of two contrasted members is negative, the true being substituted for the false (par 
excellence μὲν οὖν and normally ἀλλά), and balancing adversatives, where two truths of divergent 
tendency are presented (δέ, μήν, μέντοι, etc.).”92  
When Denniston refers to the “eliminative” function, then, he is referring to the “substituting of 
the true for the false.”  In his coverage of this use, which appears consonant with my findings regarding 
the particle’s general use in Matthew, he makes reference to the general conditions accompanying this 
use: “Here usually, in the nature of things, either (a) the ἀλλά clause (or sentence), or (b) the clause to 
                                                 
89 J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 1. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., xlix. 
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which it is opposed, is negative.”93  Finally, with respect to the sentence position relative to the clause, 
he comments, “As a strong adversative, ἀλλά naturally takes the first place in clause or sentence, while 
δέ, μέντοι and μήν take the second.”94 
F. Blass, A. Debrunner, and R. Funk (BDF) 
I now turn to the comments on ἀλλά that are presented in BDF. 95  It should be noted that the 
comments in this work focus less on the origin and etymology of the term and more upon its various 
functions and senses within actual constructions.  In its opening treatment of the particle in §448, BDF 
remarks, “(1) It appears most frequently as the contrary to a preceding οὐ. The construction οὐ μόνον... 
ἀλλὰ καί, also belongs here. (2) With an ουv also used as the contrary to a preceding positive clause (‘but 
not’): 1 C 10: 23 πάντα ἔξεστιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πάντα συμφέρει, also 5, Mt 24: 6.”96 
This is in general accord with my findings within Matthew, as well as the preceding comments 
by our other sources.  Furthermore, BDF asserts, “Οὐ ... ἀλλά, also means ‘not so much…as’ in which 
the first element is not entirely negated, but only “toned down”: Mk 9: 37 οὐκ ἐμὲ δέχεται ἀλλὰ τὸν 
ἀποστείλαντά με, Mt 10: 20, Jn 12: 44, A 5: 4 etc.”97   
 
 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 1. 
94 Ibid., 22. 
95 Blass and Debrunner, BDF.  Properly speaking, this work is older in its origins than the other 
grammars consulted thus far.  However, I have addressed it in this order based upon the translation of 
the tenth edition of the work into English by Robert Funk, and not by its original release by F. Blass in 
1896. 
96 Ibid., 232. 
97 Ibid., 233. 
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M. Zerwick 
BDF’s assertions are in substantial agreement with Maximilian Zerwick’s conclusions regarding 
the use of οὐ and ἀλλά together: 
In disjunctive propositions, it is a Semitic peculiarity to express one member negatively so as to 
lay more stress on the other, saying « not A but B » where the sense is « not so much A as B » or 
« B rather than A ». A well-known example is Hos 6,6, where the author himself indicates the 
sense of the idiom by the parallel second member: « I desire mercy and not sacrifice; and the 
knowledge of God more than holocausts ». In the NT cf. 1 Cor 1,17 οὐ γὰρ ἀπέστειλέν με Χριστὸς 
βαπτίζειν ἀλλὰ εὐαγγελίζεσθαι, Mt 10,20 οὐ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐστε οἱ λαλοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα; Jo 12,44 
ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμὲ οὐ πιστεύει εἰς ἐμὲ ἀλλὰ εἰς τὸν πέμψαντά με, cf. also Mk 9,37. Lk 10,20; Jo 
7,16. This idiom reflects the same mentality as that which uses « hate » to say « love less » (cf. Lk 
14,26 with Mt 10,37).98 
Zerwick appears to be leaning heavily on the detailed study done by H. Kruse (whom he cites) for some 
of these insights.99   
Zerwick’s discussion of the grammatical features of a particular text, in this case Matt 10:20, 
shows his exegetical application of this insight.  He draws a distinction between the “literal” meaning 
and the sense of the portion of Matt 10:20 preceding ἀλλά: “Lit. “for you are not the speakers but…”, it 
is not so much you who will be speaking but….”100  Zerwick did not, of course, use either of the terms 
“pragmatic” or “semantic” within his discussion, yet we are able to see that he allows the context to 
influence how he sees ἀλλά functioning within this construction in distinction from what the text says 
“literally.” 
                                                 
98 Zerwick, Biblical Greek, 150.   
99 Kruse, “dialektische Negation.” 
100 Maximilian Zerwick and Mary Grosvenor, A Grammatical Analysis of the Greek New 
Testament, Unabridged, 5th Revised. (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1996), 30.  Emphasis is 
Zerwick’s. 
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The proposal offered by both BDF and Zerwick—that this is one possible effect of the 
combination οὐ...ἀλλά in particular contexts—is not unreasonable.  They are correct in observing that, 
within this construction, the first conjunct is (relatively) less emphasized, and the second conjunct is 
being brought into focus.  I do not, however, agree that their “not so much...as” explanation is the best 
one for some of the occurrences for which they offer it.101  My disagreement with this explanation in 
particular instances does not negate my acceptance of the insights presented by these sources.  It is 
apparent from their respective comments that both BDF and Zerwick view ἀλλά as being flexible with 
respect to the pragmatic effects that may be observed in connection with it, based upon its co-text and 
context.  This does not eliminate the possible adversative sense that it can bring to a text: however, the 
exegete should note that the effect it produces may not be limited to a simple negation of one whole 
utterance and the presentation of completely different utterance: “not X … but Y.”   
I will present in more detail in the body of this work (see especially my treatment of Mark 9:37) 
that there are good reasons to conclude, in distinction from Zerwick and BDF, that the simple expression 
οὐ...ἀλλὰ is able, within certain contexts and based upon pragmatic effects, to convey the sense of οὐ 
μόνον...ἀλλὰ καί implicitly, without the explicit addition of μόνον...καί.  Further, I will show that these 
additional terms are sometimes explicitly included to avoid any ambiguity or misinterpretation of the 
negation of the first proposition.  In such cases, and others substantially similar to them, the better 
explanation for the pragmatic effects noted is the linguistic phenomenon known as metalinguistic, or 
metarepresentational, negation.  I will provide more details regarding this phenomenon in my treatment 
of the respective contributions of L. Horn and Y. Huang later in the next chapter. 
                                                 
101 I am thinking of Matt 10:20 and Mark 9:37 in particular.  I will be treating both of these texts 
in much greater detail within the body of this work. 
65 
 
 
 
For now, suffice it to say that our best course is to first seek an understanding of how the 
conjunction itself, and, if present, the whole complex of terms such as οὐ...ἀλλά and any associated 
terms, are able to function within the sentence.  Based upon this understanding, the exegete is able to 
determine what, from within the respective ranges of possible semantic meanings and pragmatic effects, 
the conjunction adds to the text.   
N. Turner 
Nigel Turner’s comments are largely in agreement with the sources already consulted, both with 
respect to the most common usage of the conjunction as well as the possible range of meaning and effect 
based upon context.  Regarding the particle ἀλλά, he remarks, “It is a stronger adversative particle than 
δέ but is often weakened in the clause where it most frequently occurs, that is, after a preceding οὐ or οὐ 
μόνον: thus in Mt 1020…the meaning is simply not so much…as.”102   
J. Jeremias 
In his section addressing the “Ways of Speaking Preferred by Jesus,”103 Joachim Jeremias 
addresses the use of antithetic parallelism in the Gospels.  He approvingly cites older works that posited 
that antithetic parallelism was one of the varieties of “Semitic” parallelism, and that the uses of 
antithetic parallelism we find in the Gospels are more likely to be closer to the authentic words uttered 
by Jesus.104  Commenting on the prevalence of the feature, Jeremias rightly comments that 
                                                 
102 Moulton and Turner, Grammar, III: Syntax:329–30. 
103 Joachim Jeremias, New Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus, trans. John Bowden 
(New York: Scribners, 1971), §2, 8–29. 
104 Ibid., 14, 18. 
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Antithetic parallelism occupies a considerable space in the sayings of Jesus.  Even if we leave 
aside antitheses (e.g. Mark 2.17a, 17b; 10:45) and restrict ourselves to cases of antithetic 
parallelism (though in some cases the differentiation of these two categories could be a matter of 
dispute), we are led to the conclusion that in the synoptic gospels, antithetic parallelism occurs 
well over a hundred times in the sayings of Jesus.105 
Jeremias does not explain here why antitheses should be left out of the consideration that he proposes.  
Further, he provides no further explanation as to why there might be a dispute about these two 
categories, namely antithesis vs. antithetic parallelism, or who might be engaging in such a dispute.  He 
does, however, provide a valuable, comprehensive listing of the instances of antithetical parallelism that 
he has identified.  Both his insights into this type of parallelism in general, as well as his comments on 
particular instances included in his listing, are helpful for our investigation.   
Finally, Jeremias also briefly discusses the various “technical devices” by which antithetical 
parallelism is signaled, including the “combination of an opposition with a negation.  Jeremias includes 
a supplemental listing of references that make use of this combination.106  Many of the particular 
references, or ranges of references, overlap with the occurrences of ἀλλά that I have engaged in this 
current research.  In my next chapter, my survey continues with more recent scholarship from the latter 
part of the last century up to the present. 
  
                                                 
105 Ibid., 14.   
106 Ibid., 16. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Survey of Secondary Literature From the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries 
I will continue my survey of literature by engaging with more recent scholarly treatments.  First, 
I will consider several works that are related specifically to ἀλλά and/or dialectical negation in the 
context of Κοινή Greek, including those of A.B. du Toit,107 John Callow,108 Jakob Heckert,109 Daniel 
Wallace,110 Stanley Porter,111 Ulrich Luz,112 Stephen Levinsohn,113 Nijay Gupta,114 Steven Runge,115 and 
Rick Brannan.116   
The inclusion of one of these works, namely that of Luz, demands some explanation, since I 
have generally foregone the inclusion of brief treatments from commentaries in this survey portion, 
                                                 
107 Du Toit, “Hyperbolical Contrasts”; Du Toit, “Hyperbolical Contrasts: A Neglected Aspect of 
Paul’s Style.” 
108 John C. Callow, “Constituent Order in Copula Clauses: A Partial Study,” in Linguistics and 
New Testament Interpretation: Essays on Discourse Analysis, ed. David Alan Black, Katharine G. L. 
Barnwell, and Stephen H. Levinsohn (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1992), 68–89. 
109 Jakob K. Heckert, Discourse Function of Conjoiners in the Pastoral Epistles (Dallas: SIL 
International, 1996). 
110 Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New 
Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996). 
111 Stanley E. Porter, Idioms of the Greek New Testament, 2nd ed., Biblical Languages: Greek 2 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999). 
112 Ulrich Luz, Matthew 8-20: A Commentary, ed. Helmut Koester, trans. James E. Crouch, 
Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001). 
113 Levinsohn, Discourse Features. 
114 Nijay Gupta, “The ‘Not...but’ (ou...alla) New Testament Rhetorical Pattern: Its Features and 
Purposes and the Dangers of Misinterpretation,” Ashland Theological Journal 42 (2010): 13–24. 
115 Steven E. Runge, Discourse Grammar of the Greek New Testament: A Practical Introduction 
for Teaching and Exegesis (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2010). 
116 Rick Brannan, “The Discourse Function of ἀλλά in Non-Negative Contexts,” in Discourse 
Studies and Biblical Interpretation: A Festschrift in Honor of Stephen H. Levinsohn, ed. Steven E. 
Runge (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2011), 263–87. 
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opting instead for their inclusion within the body of this work, where particular texts are considered.   
However, the relevance of Luz’s comments on dialectic negation in general, and on the οὐ...ἀλλά 
construction (he refers to “οὐκ-ἀλλά”) in particular,117 warrant their inclusion in this survey.  Regarding 
this latter construction, he asserts, in the context of his comments on Matt 9:13, that this construction 
“cannot express a dialectical negation,” noting that this applies to Mark 2:17 and Matt 15:11, as well.118  
If this assertion were true, and I clearly believe that it is not, then the ramifications for my investigation 
would be significant.  As such, I have devoted a section to his work: there I will address Luz’s 
perspective, and my opposition to it. 
After my treatment of these specialized works, I will engage other linguistic works that interact 
more broadly with the topics of negation, adversative relationships between clauses, adversative 
conjunctions, and ellipsis.  Notable among these works are the contributions of Laurence Horn,119 
Elisabeth Rudolph,120 Sophie Repp,121 Katja Jasinskaja,122 M.A.K. Halliday,123 and Yan Huang.124 
                                                 
117 Luz, Matthew 8-20, 35 n43. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Horn, Natural History of Negation. 
120 Rudolph, Contrast. 
121 Repp, Negation in Gapping. 
122 Katja Jasinskaja, “Correction by Adversative and Additive Markers,” Lingua 122 (2012): 
1899–1918; Katja Jasinskaja, “Corrective Elaboration,” Lingua 132 (2013): 51–66. 
123 M. A. K. Halliday, Halliday’s Introduction to Functional Grammar, ed. Christian M. I. M. 
Matthiessen (Routledge, 2014). 
124 Huang, Dictionary of Pragmatics; Yan Huang, Pragmatics, 2nd ed., Oxford Textbooks in 
Linguistics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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Sources Related Specifically to Κοινή Greek in the New Testament 
A.B. du Toit 
As I noted in my treatment of Kruse’s article in the previous chapter, A.B. du Toit has provided 
substantial, insightful interaction with Kruse’s presentation concerning dialectic negation.  Furthermore, 
he interacted directly with several of the works cited and/or engaged in Kruse’s article,125 providing 
helpful commentary on various scholars’ perspectives on dialectic negation.  Du Toit sees dialectical 
negation as one of the “two kinds of hyperbolical contrasts,” and asserts the following of both: “the 
meaning of the exaggerated element (which they all contain) should not be absolutized.  It should be 
understood dialectically, i.e., in its relation to the contrasted part of the saying.”126    
Du Toit asserts that dialectical negation “seems to be common to all Semitic languages.” He also 
acknowledges its presence in Greek writings (following Winer), and cites, seemingly favorably, Nestle’s 
speculation that “it will probably be found in all languages.”127  Even while conceding that the 
phenomenon is more widespread, du Toit holds that “it would be fair to say that it is a more strongly 
Semitic characteristic.”128 
Du Toit then provides an interaction with Exodus 16:8 that proceeds much along the same lines 
as Kruse’s presentation on this text,129 with which I have engaged in a previous section.  Du Toit 
advances the discussion past the sense of “not so much,” which he provides in his translation, by 
                                                 
125 F. Hommel, “A Rhetorical Figure in the Old Testament,” Expository Times 11, no. 10 (1900): 
439–41; König, “Der Jeremiaspruch 7, 21-23”; Vaccari, “Interpretazione del Salmo 16.” 
126 Du Toit, “Hyperbolical Contrasts,” 178–9.  Emphasis in the original. 
127 Ibid., 179. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Kruse, “dialektische Negation,” 389–90. 
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attempting to provide some explanation as to why this construction is employed.  In his view “it seeks to 
express, not an absolute contrast, but a comparison.”130  He is still left with the questions “But why, 
then, this hyperbolic formulation?  Why this choice of an apparent clash between surface structure and 
semantic deep structure?”131   
At this point, then, du Toit has helpfully moved past the “what” that occupies many of our 
previous authors (“…not so much A as B…”), and moved to the “why” behind an author’s choice to 
employ this construction.  His answer to these question is instructive: 
The motivation behind this stylistic device is the desire to drive home the overriding importance 
(greater desirability, superior quality, etc.) of B in comparison with A (or vice versa).  Sometimes 
A represents a status quo, a situation, a thought pattern which should, in the opinion of the author, 
be played down as effectively as possible.132 
Du Toit provides substantiation for this position with a quote from Winer, the contents of which I have 
also quoted in the previous section devoted to his work.133   I have inserted them below to provide 
context for du Toit’s remarks: 
in other passages, the absolute negation is on rhetorical grounds employed instead of a conditional 
(relative), not for the purpose of really (logically) cancelling the first conception, but in order to 
direct undivided attention to the second, so that the first may comparatively disappear….134   
Commenting on Winer’s position, du Toit asserts that “He could have added that the reason for applying 
this kind of rhetoric was the intention to persuade.  Rhetoric is here indeed an art of persuasion.”135   
                                                 
130 Du Toit, “Hyperbolical Contrasts,” 179. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid., 179–80. 
133 Du Toit quotes from an earlier (1855) German edition.  
134 Winer, Grammar of the Idiom, 496–7.  Emphasis in the original. 
135 Du Toit, “Hyperbolical Contrasts,” 180. 
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While I agree with both Winer and du Toit regarding the rhetorical import of the use of this 
construction, I continue to disagree with Winer’s, and by extension, du Toit’s, assertion that the 
proposition from the first proposition is being “played down” (du Toit) or, worse, being made to 
“comparatively disappear” (Winer).  I have presented my contrary position in some detail in the section 
devoted to Winer’s work, and I will not rehearse it here.  Suffice it to say that, in circumstances that are 
often identified as “dialectic(al) negation” (better, “metalinguistic negation”) it seems better to focus 
upon the promotion—the elevation, the emphasis—of the second conjunct, rather than upon the 
demotion of the first.  The importance of the first conjunct does not have to be diminished in order to 
elevate that of the second conjunct.  However, my disagreement with du Toit’s position in no way 
minimizes the importance of his general assertion regarding the rhetorical import of this construction. 
Du Toit continues his engagement with the phenomenon by discussing its presence in the NT, 
offering some sage advice for identifying such instances: 
In view of the Semitic background of many New Testament sayings, it is not surprising that we 
find there a substantial number of dialectical negations, especially in the Gospels.  But it is not 
always easy to determine whether what we have is this figure and not a real absolute contrast.  And 
we must be very careful not to relativize an utterance which was intended absolutely.  The golden 
rule remains that each passage is interpreted on its own within its unique context.”136 
All of these admonitions are valuable, but this last sentence is of particular relevance to my 
investigation, especially given my desire to show how ἀλλά functions pragmatically in certain contexts.  
Du Toit interacts with Luke 10:20 and Mark 9:37b, and his discussion of these texts is instructive.  His 
engagement with this latter text is especially suggestive, but for the sake of brevity I will reserve my 
interactions with his treatment for the section on Mark 9:37 in Chapter 7 of this work. 
 
                                                 
136 Ibid., 180–1. 
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J. Callow 
J. Callow’s essay on the arrangement of constituents within “copula clauses” is helpful for my 
investigation due to both the methodological clarity of Callow’s approach, as well as his recognition of 
and comments on the “οὐ...ἀλλά contrasts” that he observes.137  Callow’s investigation is primarily 
concerned with the “copula clauses” present in 1 Corinthians, and in it he explores both the “different 
constituent orders” as well as the “various factors affecting constituent order within the framework of 
the presentation.”138  
Callow defines a “copula clause” as “any clause in which the verb is some form of (verbs with 
the meaning “to be” or “to become”) and which has one or both of the two further elements of subject 
(S) and complement (C).”139  It is worth noting that he is considering only those copula clauses in which 
one of these verbs appears explicitly, and does not engage “verbless copula clauses,” or “copula-type 
clauses” in his investigation.140  He identifies six permutations of the three constituents, namely SCV, 
SVC, CVS, CSV, VSC, and VCS, and organizes his presentation based upon which of these patterns 
best describes the respective arrangement found in each the various copula clauses.141   
As may be expected, Callow’s work has limited overlap with mine since he (1) engages a 
different corpus (1 Corinthians vs. Synoptic Gospels), (2) restricts the scope of his investigation to 
certain types of clauses consisting of very particular components, and (3) seeks to explain the respective 
placements of the various constituents in relation to each other, not in relation to constituents that 
                                                 
137 Callow, “Constituent Order in Copula Clauses,” 77–8, 85, 87–8. 
138 Callow, “Constituent Order in Copula Clauses.”  Emphasis is Callow’s. 
139 Ibid., 68. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid., 69. 
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provide the structure of a construction.  That being said, some of the occurrences within his sample set 
are connected with, or are part of, οὐ...ἀλλά constructions, and it is these occurrences, together with 
Callow’s comments on them, which are of interest to us here.   
The first instances that Callow engages are portions of 1 Cor 2:5, 3:7, and 12:14.  In each of 
these the copulative verb is explicitly present, and in fact I would consider each of these verbs as being 
the constants (in these cases, included explicitly before ἀλλά, and to be understood elliptically after it) of 
the respective οὐ...ἀλλά constructions in which they occur.  Unfortunately, Callow’s treatment is 
focused upon the arrangement of the constituents in relation to each other, rather than how the οὐ...ἀλλά 
construction actually functions within the utterance.  My intention in saying this is not to critique either 
his methodology in general, nor his handling of these particular occurrences.  Rather, I am proposing 
that an examination of the οὐ...ἀλλά contrasts of which he makes note may prove more useful for 
explaining the arrangement of constituents that we encounter.   
Graphically representing the οὐ...ἀλλά/μή...ἀλλά constructions from the portions of text that 
Callow addresses should make clear what I am proposing. 
1 Cor 2:5 ἵνα ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν μὴ ᾖ ἐν σοφίᾳ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλ᾽ ἐν δυνάμει θεοῦ. 
ἵνα ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν…   
Negation Constant Preceding  ἀλλά [Constant] Following 
μὴ   ᾖ   ἐν σοφίᾳ ἀνθρώπων  ἀλλ᾽  [ᾖ]  ἐν δυνάμει θεου 
…in order that your faith may not be in the wisdom of men, but [rather] [may be] in the power of God. 
Note the parallelism between the prepositional phrase being rejected, namely ἐν σοφίᾳ ἀνθρώπων, and 
the prepositional phrase that is being proffered as its replacement, ἐν δυνάμει θεου.  This parallelism is 
one pragmatic signal to the hearer/reader that these are the constituents “in play.”  The very constituent 
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that is not explicitly repeated, ᾖ, is in fact the one constituent that is constant between the two conjuncts 
joined by ἀλλά. 
1 Cor 3:7 ὥστε οὔτε ὁ φυτεύων ἐστίν τι οὔτε ὁ ποτίζων ἀλλ᾽ ὁ αὐξάνων θεός. 
ὥστε…  
Negation  Preceding 1  Constant  
οὔτε    ὁ φυτεύων   ἐστίν τι  
Negation  Preceding 2  [Constant] 
οὔτε    ὁ ποτίζων   [ἐστίν τι] 
ἀλλά    Following App [Constant] 
ἀλλ᾽    ὁ αὐξάνων  θεός  [ἐστίν τι] 
Therefore neither the one planting is something,  
nor the one watering [is something],  
but [rather] the one causing to grow, [namely,] God, [is something]. 
Again we note the parallelism between the items being rejected as the subjects of the predicate, 
namely the articular substantival participles ὁ φυτεύων and ὁ ποτίζων, and the item being offered as the 
replacement subject, namely ὁ αὐξάνων.  I see θεός functioning appositionally here, leaving no doubt in 
the mind of the hearer/reader as to who the one “giving the increase” actually is. 
1 Cor 12:14 Καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἓν μέλος ἀλλὰ πολλά. 
Καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα…  
Negation Constant 1 P Constant 2 ἀλλά [C 1 ]  F  [C 2] 
οὐκ   ἔστιν   ἓν  μέλος   ἀλλὰ  [ἔστιν]  πολλά   [μέλη] 
For the body is not one member, but [is rather] many [members]. 
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The sole constituent being rejected here is ἓν, with the constant constituents, namely ἔστιν and 
μέλος, mutatis mutandis, being supplied ἀπὸ κοινοῦ (“from the things shared in common”).142  According 
to the classification system that I use within this work, I would see each of these instances of the 
οὐ...ἀλλά construction as examples of the “Supplied/Implied Constant” pattern, or Pattern 1.143  In 
general, this pattern is used to reject some constituent, some portion or characteristic of the first 
proposition/conjunct, and proffer as a replacement a similar constituent, which is advanced in the second 
proposition/conjunct. 
Callow also addresses 1 Cor 9:21, which he sees as another instance of a copula clause in which 
the verb precedes the complement, thus following the “SVC” pattern of arrangement.  He notes the 
following: 
The fact that the οὐ/μὴ ... ἀλλὰ contrasts place the negated complement after the verb is 
undoubtedly significant.  There are also eight examples in 1 Corinthians of the pattern VC in which 
the complement is negated.  It would be easy to simply say that when the complement is negated, 
it follows the verb.  However, while this is generally true, it is not universally and invariably true.  
Certain “counter-examples” need to be considered….144 
He then proceeds to engage text portions from 1 Cor 15:58 and 15:10, the latter of which includes an 
οὐ...ἀλλά construction and is thus of interest to us here.  The text portion is as follows: 
1 Cor 15:10 καὶ ἡ χάρις αὐτοῦ ἡ εἰς ἐμὲ οὐ κενὴ ἐγενήθη, ἀλλὰ περισσότερον αὐτῶν πάντων ἐκοπίασα 
He comments that 
…the complement κωνή [sic] is negated as part of a contrast, yet it precedes, not follows, the 
verb.145 
                                                 
142 For further explanation of this term, please see my previous coverage of Blass, Debrunner, 
and Funk within this literature survey, as I am indebted to their work for this term.   
143 Please consult Appendix 3 for the graphical representation of Pattern 1. 
144 Callow, “Constituent Order in Copula Clauses,” 78. 
145 Ibid. 
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He then considers two additional copula clauses (1 Cor 7:23 and 10:7), and poses the question “How are 
such contrasting examples to be explained?”  Before engaging Callow’s answer, I think it is important to 
point out two things concerning this portion, especially in relation to the previous examples advanced by 
Callow.   
First, the οὐ...ἀλλά construction in this text portion should be seen as functioning differently than 
those that I have previously addressed, namely 1 Cor 2:5, 3:7, and 12:14, as well as 1 Cor 9:21, which 
Callow also mentions.  In the examples covered above, we noted that particular constituents of the 
conjunct before ἀλλά were being rejected, with corresponding, parallel constituents being proffered for 
replacement in the conjunct following ἀλλά.  Further, there were constant constituents before ἀλλά that 
were implicitly repeated after it.  This is characteristic of the use of this construction for “correction,” or 
rejection and replacement of a particular constituent or constituents. 
However, we do not find this use in 1 Cor 15:10.  In this case, there is no no constant constituent 
present within the first conjunct which is then implied in the following conjunct.  There is, however a 
complete rejection of the negated (οὐ) propositional content (κενὴ ἐγενήθη) of the first conjunct, and the 
advancement of an utterance that is opposed to that propositional content conceptually (περισσότερον 
αὐτῶν πάντων ἐκοπίασα), all without the use of either explicit or implicit shared terms.  Within the 
classification system I advance in this work, this occurrence is best seen as an instance of the “No 
Constant” Pattern, or Pattern 2.  This pattern usually, but not always, has some element of negation, and 
there are two roughly symmetrical statements, prohibitions/commands, or requests joined to each other 
by ἀλλά.  The presence of this pattern generally signals, not the rejection and replacement of a 
constituent or constituents within the first conjunct, but rather the advancement of one utterance, the 
content of which may or may not be negated, followed by another utterance, which contrasts in some 
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way with the first.  The opposition may rise to the level of the complete rejection the propostional 
content of the first and the subsequent advancement of the propostional content of the second. 
The second thing that should be noted concerning this portion of text is, in fact, the rest of verse 
10, or 1 Cor 15:10b, as its contents should inform our reading of this portion.  The complete text, then, 
of 1 Cor 15:10 is as follows: 
1 Cor 15:10 
χάριτι δὲ θεοῦ εἰμι ὅ εἰμι,  
καὶ ἡ χάρις αὐτοῦ ἡ εἰς ἐμὲ   
 
οὐ κενὴ ἐγενήθη,   ἀλλὰ    περισσότερον αὐτῶν πάντων ἐκοπίασα,  
οὐκ ἐγὼ δὲ    ἀλλ᾽    ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ [ἡ] σὺν ἐμοί 
But by the grace of God, I am what I am, 
And his grace toward me  
did not come to nothing but    I toiled more abundantly than them all‒ 
but not [only] I [toiled]  but [even more so]  God’s grace toiled with me 
    
We actually encounter two οὐ...ἀλλά constructions here, with an understood constituent within the first 
construction, namely the understood subject of ἐκοπίασα, ἐγώ, being partially rejected by the second 
construction.  I say partially, as what is being rejected is that Paul alone toiled.   
He rejects such an exhaustive interpretation of the predicate, namely, “only I toiled…” without in 
fact rejecting the fact that he toiled.  He then provides the replacement for such an exhaustive 
interpretation, explicitly declaring that both he and, even more so, God’s grace that was with him, toiled.  
The text should not be seen as saying “I labored…but I didn’t.”  But how do we explain how it, and 
texts like it, should be viewed?  I will endeavor to provide an answer to this question, and present my 
approach to doing so, in greater detail within my respective treatments of Matt 4:4, 10:20 and 
(especially) Mark 9:37, to mention a few, later in this work. 
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But what of Callow’s explanation of these texts, and in particular of 1 Cor 15:10?  He offers the 
following: 
My own preference is to say that when the complement follows the verb, it can be described in 
general terms as “downplayed,” the opposite of “highlighted.”  In the case of contrast, this is 
already well established—the negative side of a contrast is almost invariably less significant, in 
the context, than the positive side.  In the three examples [1 Cor 2:5, 3:7, and 12:14] given earlier, 
this seems reasonably clear.  The negative side of the contrast is being rejected by the apostle as 
erroneous, unacceptable, and undesirable.146   
My engagement with these same texts above should have made clear that I do not believe that in these 
cases the first conjunct, or the negative side of the contrast as Callow describes it, is being completely 
rejected.  I have shown that the rejection is of particular constituents in the first conjunct, with similar, 
parallel constituents being proffered as replacements in the second conjunct.  I agree that something is 
being rejected, but it is not, in these cases, the whole conjunct. 
Regarding 1 Cor 15:10, Callow offers the following explanation: 
In 15:10, it seems reasonable to posit that what we have here is an emotionally-charged evaluative 
and personal statement from the apostle, and “I” statement comparing himself with other apostles.  
The factor of emphasis is, therefore, considered to be operative, and so κενή precedes the verb. 
Callow’s proposal is indeed reasonable, given the fact that Paul is communicating the fact that the 
extension of God’s grace toward him had not been “in vain,” or, perhaps better “come to nothing.”  The 
emphasis may rightly be seen as being placed on the vanity that did not result, which emphasis the 
placement of κενὴ before the copulative verb ἐγενήθη may in fact signal. 
In his treatment of V-initial copula clause, Callow also treats another οὐ...ἀλλά construction 
found in 1 Cor 11:8.  In working out an explanation of this pattern, Callow observes that several of the 
                                                 
146 Ibid. 
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instances of (seven of nine) are negative.  The text that he engages, namely that part that contains a 
copula clause, is as follows: 
1 Cor 11:8  οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀνὴρ ἐκ γυναικὸς ἀλλὰ γυνὴ ἐξ ἀνδρός 
He remarks, 
 This example is an obvious οὐ...ἀλλά contrast, so the pattern SVC would be expected.  The 
present hypothesis is saying that the order VSC is denying the claim, or assumption, that “man 
originated from woman” and is replacing it with the opposite statement. 
D. Wallace and S. Porter 
Wallace classifies conjunctions according to the following “semantic/functional” categories: 
substantival, adverbial, and logical.147  He proposes several further sub-categories under these larger 
heads, with three of them having particular relevance for our ongoing discussion.  Within the “logical” 
category mentioned above, Wallace presents the following sub-categories, contrastive conjunctions, 
correlative conjunctions, and emphatic conjunctions; further, he identifies uses of ἀλλά under each of 
them.148  Porter’s classification of the conjunction is similar; however, he only presents two functions of 
ἀλλά, the adversative and emphatic uses, and asserts that the “major usage is adversative.”149   
For his definition (description) of the contrastive conjunctions, which would map most closely to 
Porter’s “adversative” usage, Wallace asserts that “This use suggests a contrast or opposing thought to 
the idea to which it is connected. It is often translated but, rather, yet, though, or however.”150  Under 
correlative conjunctions, which he says may “express various relationships,” he notes the pairing of οὐ... 
                                                 
147 Wallace, Greek Grammar, 669–70. 
148 Ibid., 671–3. 
149 Porter, Idioms, 205. 
150 Wallace, Greek Grammar, 671. 
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ἀλλά.151  In his remarks on emphatic conjunctions, he comments that “This use appears in various forms 
and is determined by the context. It usually involves intensifying the normal sense of a conjunction. 
Examples are as follows: ἀλλά intensified is translated certainly….”152 
J. Heckert 
The next three scholars which I will consider, Heckert, Levinsohn, and Runge, each pursue a 
rather different course in their respective handling of ἀλλά.  With respect to Heckert’s work, it should be 
noted that his focus is on the use of conjoiners in the Pastoral Epistles: however, his general assessment 
of the function of ἀλλά informs the treatments of both Levinsohn and Runge, and provides potentially 
valuable insights for my investigation.  Heckert interacts with some of the same sources that I have 
already mentioned, namely Denniston and Smyth, but spends much of his survey of historical 
approaches to the use of ἀλλά in Classical Greek in dialog with the material found Liddell and Scott’s 
Lexicon.153   
Concerning the use of ἀλλά in the NT, Heckert interacts with Turner154 as well as the 1979 
edition of BDAG155 (or BAGD), noting the categories and usages presented there.156  From there he 
moves to an extended interaction with the works of the discourse linguists V. Poythress and R. Blass, 
                                                 
151 Ibid., 672. 
152 Ibid., 673. 
153 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, [1897] (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1940).  Hereafter, I will refer to this edition as LS in distinction from the later LSJ. 
154 Moulton and Turner, Grammar. 
155 Walter Bauer et al., A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early 
Christian Literature, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).  Hereafter, BDAG. 
156 Walter Bauer et al., A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early 
Christian Literature, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).  Hereafter, BAGD. 
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noting their respective contributions to the ongoing discussion.157   In his view, the work of such 
linguists serves to “improve on the traditional view that ἀλλά has two basic functions, viz. opposition 
and limitation, and an underlying notion of otherness.”158  
Most relevant to my investigation, however, is the conclusion that Heckert draws concerning the 
particle’s function relative to the material that precedes it: 
I therefore conclude that, although the proposition introduced by ἀλλά does strengthen the previous 
proposition in the context of negation, strengthening is not an inherent part of the function of ἀλλά.  
Rather it contrasts a previous assumption or expectation for the purpose of elimination, denial, or 
correction.  It could even be called a marker of global contrast, since the contrast is not one or 
more points within a proposition, that is, not Dooley’s (1993:45) single or double difference 
contrast, but between one proposition and a second one (Poythress 1984:321).159   
Heckert then addresses the occurrences of in the Pastoral Epistles, noting,  
in the majority of its occurrences, the conjunction ἀλλά is found in a context in which a negative 
marker (μή or οὐ) or compounds thereof precede it.  This may be considered the unmarked 
relationship.  Unless the context determines otherwise, it is the “rejected” proposition, the one 
preceding ἀλλά, that is to be replaced by the one which follows it.  In other words, ἀλλά contrasts 
the rejected proposition with the one which replaces it.160 
These assertions by Heckert are in substantial accord with my own conclusions regarding the use of the 
conjunction in Matthew.  It is important to note that Heckert addresses the various constructions in 
which ἀλλά is used, and finds that the function of ἀλλά varies dependent upon the context in which it 
occurs.  These functions, which he briefly describes in his conclusion, are (1) replacement, (2) denial of 
expectations raised by the preceding conjunct, (3) correction of an expectation initiated by the first 
proposition, and (4) correction in the context of an οὐ μόνον...ἀλλά καί construction.161 
                                                 
157 Heckert, Discourse Function of Conjoiners, 16–8. 
158 Ibid., 16. 
159 Ibid., 18. 
160 Ibid., 19. 
161 Ibid., 28. 
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S. Levinsohn 
Levinsohn addresses the use of ἀλλά in association with a negative marker, and specifically 
comments on how the negation and following conjunction function together: “When a clause negated by 
or is followed by the conjunction ἀλλά, then what is negated is often just the constituent that 
corresponds to the one introduced by ἀλλά.”162  I have attempted to show that this is the case in my 
analysis contained in Appendix 2, and the typical patterns which I have identified and presented in 
Appendix 3.  I will comment more on this in my detailed coverage of the occurrences that will shortly 
follow.  
Levinsohn distinguishes between the use of ἀλλά and δέ in similar contexts, asserting that ἀλλά 
allows the preceding proposition to retain some relevance, while δέ signals that the preceding negative 
proposition is to be removed from view, with the result that the following positive proposition is brought 
into focus.163  This nuance understanding of the difference between the two particles seems to be more 
an argument in support of the development characteristic that Levinsohn associates with δέ than a 
phenomenon to be linked to the observed usage of ἀλλά in various contexts.   
Further, this limitation of the function of ἀλλά does not seem warranted: the 
elimination/replacement effect is certainly within the range of possible effects involving ἀλλά, and 
should be determined by the context.  He asserts: 
When ἀλλά links a negative characteristic or proposition with a positive one, the negative part 
usually retains its relevance.  When δέ used, there is development from the negative to the positive 
part, and the negative part is usually discarded or replaced by the positive one.164 
                                                 
162 Levinsohn, Discourse Features, 48. 
163 Ibid., 114. 
164 Ibid., 115–6. 
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I believe that Levinsohn overstates our ability to determine, based on the presence of ἀλλά versus δέ, 
whether or not the first proposition is to be replaced or retain its relevance.  My reason for saying this is 
that both of these options (to retain or to discard/replace) exist when ἀλλά is present, and do not require 
the presence of δέ.  This is not to say that these options do not exist with δέ as well; however, given the 
overlap of pragmatic effects, the presence of one or the other does not correspond to one effect 
(continued relevance) or another effect (replacement).   
It is important that I make clear that I affirm what Levinsohn is saying about ἀλλά with respect 
to the retention of the relevance of the “negative part”: my difference with his view is his assertion that 
the use of δέ signals the opposite, with the reader concluding the presence of ἀλλά is only appropriate 
when the negative proposition continues to have relevance, with ἀλλά not being appropriate if the 
information in the first, negated conjunct does not continue to have relevance. Continued relevance is 
indeed one possible pragmatic effect associated with ἀλλά, but so is the total replacement of the negative 
proposition.   
U. Luz 
My treatment of U. Luz’s contribution will be in brief.  As I noted in the introductory remarks to 
this section, Luz demonstrates awareness of different types of negation: namely, dialectical negation and 
antithesis.  Interestingly, he sees both types as being present in the text of Matt 9:13: 
Matt 9:13 πορευθέντες δὲ μάθετε τί ἐστιν· ἔλεος θέλω καὶ οὐ θυσίαν·  
οὐ γὰρ ἦλθον καλέσαι δικαίους ἀλλ᾽ ἁμαρτωλούς. 
With respect to the quotation of Hosea 6:6 in Matt 9:13a, Luz offers the following: 
From the early days it has been debated how the antithesis between mercy and sacrifice is to be 
understood. Two opposing possibilities are offered. Either one understands καὶ οὐ as an absolute 
antithesis, in which case sacrifice is rejected by Jesus (and by Hosea). Those in the ancient church 
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who understood it this way were thinking that Hosea predicted the end of the cult in the new 
covenant. The modern advocates of this interpretation assume that for Matthew the ceremonial 
law is abolished.  It is more probable, however, that καὶ οὐ should be interpreted comparatively in 
the sense of a Hebraeorum idioma as a dialectical negation. Then it means: I desire mercy more 
than sacrifice. This was clearly the understanding of Hosea himself, the Targum, and contemporary 
Jewish exegesis.  It also best fits the thought of Matthew himself, who did not abolish the cultic 
law but made it inferior to the love command (5:18–19; 5:23–24; 23:23–28). He understands Hos 
6:6 in the sense of total obedience. If someone is not merciful toward the neighbor, all sacrifices 
avail nothing. The cultic command cannot be separated from love, nor can it be opposed to it. For 
Matthew it is God’s desire only under the sign of love. Jesus shows this by his practice.165 
It is worth noting that Luz employs the terms “antithesis” and “absolute antithesis” in contrast to 
“dialectical negation,” which would presumably correspond to a “relative” antithesis or opposition. 
For at least two of the scholars whose contributions I have previously surveyed, namely H. Kruse 
and M. Zerwick, Hosea 6:6 is a clear example of dialectical negation in the Hebrew Bible.  It comes as 
no surprise, then, that Luz also views this text in such a light.  What is surprising, however, is that Luz 
sees this whole construction in Matt 9:13a, which uses καὶ οὐ, as a possible instance of dialectical 
negation, but denies that possibility for the following construction in 9:13b, which contains an οὐ...ἀλλά.  
He posits,  
The concluding sentence, taken from Mark, confirms then the priority of the christological 
interpretation over the parenetic one.  Here the issue is not, as in the quotation of Hosea, that Jesus 
calls the sinners more than he calls the righteous; there is a real antithesis.166 
The reader will again note the distinction that Luz makes between “dialectical negation” and 
“antithesis,” or more particularly in this case, “real antithesis.”   
                                                 
165 Luz, Matthew 8-20, 33–4. 
166 Ibid., 34–5.  Emphasis in the original. 
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Luz observes he is taking a position contrary to that of Pesch, who appeals to “dialektische 
Negation” in the course of his commentary on Mark 2:17,167 and cites Kruse’s previously mentioned 
article168 approvingly.169  Luz, however, does not accept Pesch’s resulting interpretation.  Without 
explicitly engaging Kruse’s work, Luz challenges Pesch’s position, offering the following justification 
for his own position:  
In my judgment this interpretation is philologically hardly possible, even if it would solve many 
of the difficulties posed by the content of the statement.  Verse 13b is formulated parallel to v.12; 
it is not that the healthy need the physician less than others do but that they need the physician not 
at all.  Unlike καὶ οὐ, οὐκ-ἀλλά cannot express a dialectical negation.  This argument applies also 
to Mark 2:17 and to Matt 15:11….170 
I will restrict my comments to one part of these comments, namely Luz’s assertion that “Unlike καὶ οὐ, 
οὐκ-ἀλλά cannot express a dialectical negation.”  This assertion regarding οὐκ-ἀλλά is so sweeping, and 
so evidently contrary to the generally-held position regarding this construction, that, before checking the 
                                                 
167 Rudolf Pesch, Das Markusevangelium, HTKNT 2 (Freiburg im Breisgau; Basel; Wien: 
Herder, 1976), 1.166.  Pesch comments, “Daß Jesus (er wird erneut genannt) den Vorwurf hört, wie die 
pharisäischen Schriftgelehrten sein anstößiges Verhalten sehen, ist sachgemäß erzählt. Er antwortet den 
Gegnern (αὐτοῖς nicht = den Jüngern!) mit zwei formal parallel gebauten (οὐκ-ἀλλά) Sprüchen, die aber 
zueinander in Spannung stehen und nicht derselben Überlieferungsstufe angehören. Der zweite Spruch 
V 17 c dürfte die ursprüngliche Antwort Jesu sein; mit οὐκ-ἀλλά ist kein ausschließender Gegensatz 
bezeichnet, sondern mittels der sogenannten „dialektischen Negation” der Vorzug einer Gruppe: Jesu 
Einladung gilt weniger den Gerech-ten als vielmehr den Sündern. Der Spruch ist ‒ im Unterschied zum 
Sprichwort vom Arzt ‒ nicht selbständig tradierbar, paßt mit dem deutlichen Bezug auf das Gastmahl 
(καλέω) jedoch vorzüglich in die vorausgesetzte Situation. Jesus ist gekommen ‒ das ist das Ziel seiner 
Sendung ‒, die Sünder zum Gastmahl der Gottesherrschaft einzuladen; die „Gerechten” (vgl. Lk 19, 9-
13; 15,7) werden nicht ausgeschlossen, aber die Sorge des Boten gilt vorzüglich den Sündern.”  This 
quotation allows us to see his reason for viewing dialectical negation as a possibility in this instance, and 
for interpreting the verse according to this understanding.   
168 Kruse, “dialektische Negation.” 
169 Pesch, Markusevangelium, 1.166 n8. 
170 Luz, Matthew 8-20, 35 n43. 
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print version of this commentary, I frankly thought it was a misprint in the electronic version.  Although 
I am not defending dialectic negation, preferring instead the explanation offered by the phenomenon 
known as metalinguistic negation, I simply cannot agree with Luz’s blanket rejection of the possibility 
that the οὐ...ἀλλά construction could be used to signal something less than an “absolute” negation, 
whether dialectic or metalinguistic.   
As Luz does not offer any explanation or supporting evidence for this assertion, I am unable to 
assess his argument, or point to particular instances that may have led him to this conclusion.  As we 
have already seen in this survey, a negation of the form “not X, but Y” is the construction generally 
advanced as the prototypical form for dialectic (and, for that matter, metalinguistic) negation, while the 
form “X, but not Y” is generally recognized as signaling absolute (or descriptive) negation. 
L. Horn, commenting on the intersection of the former construction, metalinguistic negation, and 
the Gospels, remarks,  
The archetypal frame for metalinguistic negation is the not X but Y construction, functioning as a 
single constituent within a sentence.  This construction provides a straightforward way to reject X 
(on any grounds) and to offer Y as its appropriate rectification.  As with other forms of 
metalinguistic negation, it is irrelevant whether or not the rejected utterance is […X…] in fact 
expressed a true proposition. 
 As we have observed, this frame provides a favored type of opposition with the synoptic 
Gospels of the New Testament.171 
J. McCawley offers an important clarifying critique of this very assertion, however, when he says that  
The latter construction and the other members of the family of constructions that it exemplifies are 
not inherently metalinguistic, and a correlation between contrastive and metalinguistic negation 
exists only because contrastive negation lends itself particularly easily to metalinguistic uses.172 
                                                 
171 Horn, Natural History of Negation, 402. 
172 James D. McCawley, “Contrastive Negation and Metalinguistic Negation,” in Papers from 
the 27th Annual Meeting of the Chicago Linguistics Society (CLS 27): Part 2: Parasession on Negation 
(Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, 1991), 189. 
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I agree with McCawley’s assertion that this construction should not be seen as inherently metalinguistic.  
However, I also do not see Horn’s comments as requiring such an interpretation, and in fact I believe 
that there is substantial agreement between these two scholars’ respective positions.  I will deal further 
with Horn’s presentation later in some detail within the section devoted to his contributions to my 
investigation.   
N. Gupta 
A helpful and suggestive contribution to the discussion has been made by N. Gupta, who notes 
both the flexibility of the οὐ...ἀλλά construction,173 and the possible rhetorical effects that may be 
produced by the use of the construction.174  He proposes two general categories, which he calls 
“syntactic labels,” for the uses of the construction: exclusive negation, and contrast of significance.175 
S. Runge 
The next source that I will consider in this survey is Runge’s Discourse Grammar.176  Runge 
interacts positively with both Heckert and Levinsohn, while drawing his own conclusions regarding the 
function of ἀλλά.  He gives a helpful summary of his conclusions regarding the parameters for which 
various connectors are marked, as well as the respective semantic constraints that they bring to a 
context.177  Runge concludes that ἀλλά is unmarked for any of the parameters that he lists with the 
                                                 
173 Gupta, “The ‘Not...but’ (ou...alla) New Testament Rhetorical Pattern,” 14. 
174 Ibid., 15. 
175 Ibid., 15–8. 
176 Runge, Discourse Grammar. 
177 Ibid., 56–7.  Runge’s Table 3 on page 57 is especially useful in presenting the parameters and 
the markings for the various connectors in a compact, orderly fashion. 
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exception of “correlation.”  By this he means that “it is a correlator of items of equal status.”178  He also 
posits, “The constraint that it brings to bear is “correction” of some aspect in the preceding context.”179   
This insight appears again in Chapter 4 of his work, where Runge explores the complex of 
constituents that he labels “point/counterpoint” sets, offering the following definition and description. 
Note especially his comments on ἀλλά: 
The term point/counterpoint set describes clauses or clause elements that have been related to one 
another through one or more grammatical means: 
 the prospective use of μέν to create anticipation that some related point will follow; 
 the use of an interrogative or negated clause that is restricted using εἰ μή or πλήν; 
 the use of ἀλλά to correct or replace something in the preceding context.180 
Although I do find Runge’s label to be descriptive and heuristically valuable, I have not elected to use it 
in this work.  Instead, I have opted to identify such constructions by their respective negations and 
conjunctions: namely, οὐ...ἀλλά, μή...ἀλλά, οὐ μόνον... ἀλλὰ καί, etc.  
Runge also briefly explores the difference between the function of ἀλλά and εἰ μή, and makes an 
important observation concerning the status of the second conjuncts associated with these conjunctions: 
“In both cases, the element following these particles receives more attention than if a simple, positive 
assertion has been used that did not involve exception or restriction.”181  I completely agree with this 
insight, and it is one of the main reasons why I do not hold with the “not so much…but…” explanation 
of Kruse, Zerwick, BDF, and others.  Specifically, I assert that what is primarily intended by the 
constructions is the demotion of the proposition in the first conjuct, but rather the elevation, the 
emphasizing, of the proposition in the second conjuct. 
                                                 
178 Ibid., 56. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid., 73–4.  Emphasis is Runge’s. 
181 Ibid., 93. 
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By utilizing this antithetical frame, a speaker/writer is able to emphasize a point, or, according to 
Runge’s terminology, a counterpoint, in a way that is not achievable by asserting the same in isolation.  
It is the contrast with what has been brought up in the first conjunct that allows this emphasis to be 
placed on the proposition in the second.  Thus Runge approvingly quotes Levinsohn, with whom I have 
already engaged, who has rightly noted that “When ἀλλά links a negative characteristic or proposition 
with a positive one, the negative part usually retains its relevance.”182  The continued relevance of some 
or all of the information within the first conjunct may, in certain circumstances, serve to provide the 
contrast with the second conjunct in order to better demonstrate what is being asserted by placing it 
against a background of what is not.  The potential rhetorical utility of such a contrast should be 
apparent. 
Utilizing these insights, Runge also provides further in-depth treatment of the use of ἀλλά 
throughout the NT, with helpful comments on, and explanations for, some of the occurrences within 
Matthew.183  One set of comments in particular bears mention. In his comments on both Matt 4:4 and 
Matt 10:20, Runge rightly draws attention to the fact that there is usually some similarity, or 
correspondence between the item being replaced, and the item that replaces it (the preceding and 
following constituents, respectively, in my terminology).  On Matt 4:4 he notes, 
Notice that one prepositional phrase is replaced by an analogous prepositional phrase. There will 
typically be a close grammatical correspondence between the two elements.184 
Likewise, on Matt 10:20 he observes, 
                                                 
182 Levinsohn, Discourse Features, 115, cf. 114, 116. 
183 Runge, Discourse Grammar, 92–100. 
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90 
 
 
 
there is also a close grammatical correspondence between what is replaced and its replacement, 
just as in Matt 4:4; in this case, the complement of the verb is replaced with an alternate 
complement.185 
I would agree that, in the simplest, unmarked construction, this is indeed the case.  As may be seen 
within Appendix 2, however, there are exceptions to this general rule.  I will interact with more of 
Runge’s comments in my coverage of specific examples, and particularly in my engagement with Matt 
10:20.  
R. Brannan 
The scope of R. Brannan’s consideration of ἀλλά is limited to “non-negative instances within the 
synoptic gospels.”186  However, his insights concerning the use of ἀλλά, and specifically his discussion 
of its role in contrasting various constituents (words, phrases, and clauses) and in communicating that 
constituents are being offered to replace other, rejected constituents, are very helpful for my own 
investigation.   
Brannan is careful to clearly present his proposals regarding the functions of ἀλλά near the 
beginning of his essay: then, in the main body of his work, he examines select non-negative occurrences 
of ἀλλά, demonstrating the explanatory and interpretive value of these proposals.  His “guidelines for 
understanding the role of ἀλλά in a given passage” follow: 
 ἀλλά involves enhancing the contrast between two things. To understand a particular 
instance, the two contrasting items must be located. The antecedent item usually directly precedes 
the ἀλλά; but it may be discontiguous and it may even be a general assumption in the current 
context. Context (e.g., presence of a negator, contrast based on word choice) determines the degree 
of contrast between the two items. 
 ἀλλά involves correction or replacement. The second item either corrects or replaces the 
first. “Correction” is when the second item sharpens, redirects or clarifies the first item. 
                                                 
185 Ibid., 95. 
186 Brannan, “Discourse Function of ἀλλά,” 266. 
91 
 
 
 
“Replacement” is when the second item wipes the first item off of the table and replaces it 
completely. In discourse, the correction or replacement has the effect of making the second item 
more prominent than the first.187 
After a brief survey but comprehensive survey of relevant secondary literature, Brannan again presents 
these in condensed form as: (1) “ἀλλά involves enhancing the contrast between two things”; and (2) 
“ἀλλά involves correction or replacement.”   
He also offers two questions that he believes should guide the examination of particular 
occurrences.  The first is “What items (words, phrases, clauses) are being contrasted?”; the second is 
“What is the correction or replacement that is taking place?”188  The value of these questions is not 
limited to examination of non-negative occurrences of ἀλλά: on the contrary, I find that these questions 
substantially reflect my thinking as I approach each occurrence of ἀλλά, not only the non-negative ones.  
My only reservations regarding Brannan’s proposals, and in fact, his second question, are closely 
related to one another.  First, although I do not object to the term “correction” per se, I would rather use 
terms such as “rejection” and “replacement” to provide the detail that some may be implying in their use 
of “correction.”  Second, I would rephrase the second question to include the constituents contained in 
the first: namely, “What items (words, phrases, clauses) are being rejected, and what items (words, 
phrases, or clauses) are being offered to replace them?” 
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Sources Related More Generally to Linguistics and Negation 
H.P. Grice: Cooperative Principle and Conversational Implicature 
I will first engage briefly the work of H.P. Grice.  My reason for this is twofold: first, his insights 
into the intentions underlying most communications are, without any secondary mediation, informative 
for our investigation.  Second, several of the following linguistic works that we will encounter either 
build directly upon Grice’s work, with modifications, or at least acknowledge the insights, even if 
offering alternative explanations.  In particular, we will see in the later coverage of the work of L. Horn 
how he adapts some of Grice’s suggestions, especially with respect to the important concept of 
implicature.189   
Grice presents a hypothetical utterance conversation between parties A and B in which part of 
the utterance made by B resulted in a situation where “A might well inquire what B was implying, what 
he was suggesting, or even what he meant by saying…” something within the utterance.  Further, he 
asserts that “It is clear that whatever B implied, suggested, meant in this example, is distinct from what 
B said….  I wish to introduce, as terms of art, the verb implicate and the related nouns implicature (cf. 
implying) and implicatum (cf. what is implied).”190  It should come as no surprise that Grice holds that 
“In some cases, the conventional meaning of the words used will determine what is implicated, besides 
helping to determine what is said.”  However, Grice advances the idea that there are other implicatures, 
namely nonconventional implicatures, with his focus being on the genus of this family that has as its 
members those items that he refers to as “conversational implicatures.”191 
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Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would 
not be rational if they did.  They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; 
and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or 
at least a mutually accepted direction. … But at each stage, some possible conversational moves 
would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable.  We might then formulate a rough general 
principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted 
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.  One might label this the 
Cooperative Principle.192 
Further, Grice advances four categories with subordinate maxims and submaxims governing 
conversations “the following of which will, in general, yield results in accordance with the Cooperative 
Principle.”  The four categories he presents, with the constituent maxims, are as follows:193 
A. Quantity 
a. “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the 
exchange).” 
b. “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.” 
B. Quality: Supermaxim: “Try to make your contribution one that is true.” 
a. “Do not say what you believe to be false.” 
b. “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” 
C. Relation 
a. “Be Relevant.” 
D. Manner: Supermaxim: “Be Perspicuous.” 
a. “Avoid obscurity of expression.” 
b. “Avoid ambiguity.” 
c. “Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).” 
d. “Be orderly.” 
Thus Grice sees the observance of these supermaxims and maxims as generating their own 
conversational implicatures.  He notes the following regarding these conversational implicatures, as 
opposed to conventional implicatures: 
                                                 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid., 26–7.  The category names, together with the numbering of their respective constituent 
maxims, is important to note here, as the two main alternative proposals offered by L. Horn and S. 
Levinson are described in terms of Grice’s original formulation as presented above.   
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The conversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicatures connected with them, 
are specially connected (I hope) with the particular purposes that talk (and so, talk exchange) is 
adapted to serve and is primarily employed to serve.  I have stated my maxims as if this purpose 
were a maximally effective exchange of information; this specification is, of course, too narrow, 
and the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such general purposes as influencing or 
directing the actions of others.194 
This connection between the a (super)maxim and its respective implicatures is important, as later 
scholars interact with the Gricean proposal and modify, or even replace, the same.  In particular, two 
scholars, S. Levinson and L. Horn, have modified Grice’s original proposal, each devising his own 
system for explaining conversational implicature.  Levinson’s proposal contains three “heuristics,” that 
are labelled Q (Quantity), I (Informativeness), and M (Manner).195  Horn condenses the Gricean model, 
with its four categories, into a somewhat streamlined model having two “cardinal” principles with their 
associated implicatures: namely, Q-based and R-based implicature.196   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
194 H. Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
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195 Stephen C. Levinson, Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational 
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It may be beneficial to the reader to examine visually Horn’s Q and R Principles and Levinson’s 
Q, I, and M heuristics map to Grice’s original categories and maxims (given above). 
Horn Grice Levinson 
 Category Maxim  
 Quantity   
Q  
Quantity 
Maxim 1 
Q-Heuristic 
R  
Quantity 
Maxim 2 
I-Heuristic 
Assumed--Unreducible Quality  Assumed--Background 
R Relation   
 Manner   
Q  
Manner 
Maxim 1 
M-Heuristic 
Q  
Manner 
Maxim 2 
 
R  
Manner 
Maxim 3 
 
R  
Manner 
Maxim 4 
M-Heuristic 
   
 
I have found Horn’s presentation of his understanding of conversational implicature more 
persuasive, partially due its simplicity and explanatory value, and partially due to its importance for 
further discussions of negation by Horn and other scholars.  Given the importance of Horn’s proposal 
for my own investigation, I will expound on it in the next section. 
Modification of Grice’s Proposal for Conversational Implicature by L. Horn 
It is important to note that, while Horn does reduce Grice’s proposal to two elements, namely the 
Q principle and the R principle, he still holds, quite strongly in fact, to Grice’s Quality maxim: 
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Following Grice himself … many (e.g. Levinson 1983, Horn 1984a) have accorded a privileged 
status to Quality, since without the observation of Quality, or what Lewis (1969) calls the 
convention of truthfulness, it is hard to see how any of the other maxims can be satisfied (though 
see Sperber and Wilson 1986a for a dissenting view).197 
Regarding what he holds constant from Grice’s model, as well as what he changes, Horn states 
the following: 
If I assume (with Horn 1984b198 and most other work in the this area, and against Sperber and 
Wilson 1986199) that Quality … is primary and essentially unreducible, I can attempt to boil the 
remaining maxims and submaxims down to two fundamental principles corresponding to the two 
basic forces identified by Zipf200 and others.  I use Q to evoke Quantity (i.e., Quantity1) and R 
Relation, with no commitment to an exact mapping between my principles and Grice’s maxims.201 
First, a bit of explanation regarding G.K. Zipf and the “two forces” Horn mentions is in order here.  
Horn interacts with Zipf in his assertions regarding language use, and in particular his proposal that 
there are two opposing forces at work in language development and use.  The first force, according to 
Horn, is the “Force of Unification” or “Force of Speaker’s Economy.”  It captures the tendency for 
speakers to utilize the least expenditure of effort possible with respect to development of, and use of, 
vocabulary.  In other words, speakers will tend to utilize the smallest vocabulary set possible to 
communicate their messages.  The second force is the “Force of Diversification,” or the “Force of 
Auditor’s Economy,” which captures the push, on the part of hearers, for the development and use of as 
many different terms as there are meanings, such that the potential for ambiguity in, and 
misinterpretation of, messages is minimized. 
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Given this understanding of Zipf’s work, and its relationship to linguistics, Horn’s advancement 
of two principles acting in accordance with these two forces is reasonable.   
Regarding the Q principle and the associated Q-based implicature, Horn states that  
The Q principle is a lower-bounding hearer-based guarantee of the sufficiency of informative 
content (“Say as much as you can, modulo Quality and R”); it collects the first Quantity maxim 
along with the first two “clarity” submaxims of manner and is systematically exploited … to 
generate upper-bounding implicata.202 
Regarding the R principle and the associated R-based implicature, he asserts, 
The R principle, by contrast, is an upper-bounding correlate of the Law of Least Effort dictating 
minimization of form (“Say no more than you must, modulo Q”); it collects the Relation maxim, 
the second Quantity maxim, and the last two submaxims of Manner, and is exploited to induce 
strengthening implicata.203 
Having considered Horn’s proposal in some detail, I will now turn one last alternative to Grice’s 
Cooperative Principle: namely, Relevance Theory as presented by S. Sperber and D. Wilson. 
Alternative to Grice’s Proposal for Conversational Implicature: S. Sperber and D. Wilson 
D. Wilson and D. Sperber offer the following description of their project’s aim, noting its 
relationship to Grice’s proposal: “Relevance theory may be seen as an attempt to work out in detail one 
of Grice’s central claims: that an essential feature of most human communication, both verbal and non-
verbal, is the expression and recognition of intentions.”204  They further validate Grice’s program by 
noting that their “relevance-theoretic account is based on another of Grice’s central claims: that 
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utterances automatically create expectations which guide the hearer toward the speaker’s meaning.”  
However, they express reservations about Grice’s categories, maxims, and implicatures, noting that 
We share Grice’s intuition that utterances raise expectations of relevance, but question several 
other aspects of his account, including the need for a Cooperative Principle and maxims, the focus 
on pragmatic contributions to implicit (as opposed to explicit) content, the role of maxim violation 
in utterance interpretation, and the treatment of figurative utterances.205     
We have already observed with the respective proposals of Levinson and Horn a movement to pare 
down, combine, and/or condense the constituent parts of the Gricean system without losing anything 
deemed to be essential in explaining those things (or, that thing) shared by the Speaker and Hearer 
which allow them to communicate successfully.  Sperber and Wilson present an even more condensed 
accounting of communication, in which relevance is the expectation of each party to the communication, 
or, in their own words,  
The central claim of relevance theory is that the expectations of relevance raised by an utterance 
are precise and predictable enough to guide the hearer toward the speaker’s meaning.206 
This view does indeed appear to have simplicity on its side, but both Horn and Levinson question 
whether this appearance is equivalent to the reality.  For example, Horn comments,   
relevance theory is predicated on a minmax or cost/benefit relation which takes the goal of 
communication as maximizing contextual effects while minimizing processing effort, and the 
Principle of Relevance is itself couched in terms of this trade-off of effort and effect.  In this sense, 
relevance theory is a dialectical model as much as that of Horn …, although the former model 
associates effort with the hearer rather than the speaker.207 
If Horn’s critique is correct, or at least partially correct, in asserting that the Principle of Relevance is 
actually composed of something akin to the Principles of Speaker’s Economy and the Principles of 
Auditor’s Economy, then this reduction to one unifying term, namely relevance, is useful mainly as a 
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general description and tool for understanding, and less so as an detailed description and a tool for 
analysis. 
In his treatment of Generalized Conversational Implicature (GCI), Levinson offers an assessment 
of the Relevance Theory as proposed by S. Sperber and D. Wilson,208 (which he refers to as “Sperber-
Wilson Relevance,” or “SW-R”), noting that it is the “most prominent of the reductionist views,” which 
“holds that implicature is a side effect, as it were, or a mental automatism, a tendency to extract the 
maximal inferences for the minimal psychic effort.”  The questions raised by Levinson’s use of the term 
“reductionist” to describe SW-R concern: (1) whether or not the explanation offered is adequate for the 
phenomena discussed; (2) exactly which way or ways the SW-R discussion is inadequate; and (3) which 
one of the non-reductionist explanations is in fact the best explanation, unless still another one should be 
sought that better accounts for all that is observed, with as few exceptions or omissions as possible. 
Levinson further discusses the SW-R proposal, noting that  
There are no maxims, no heuristics, no special modes of reasoning involved in implicature 
derivation.  Thus that fact that the GCI phenomena do not seem properly attributed to a maxim of 
Relevance is, on this view, beside the point; … [SW-R] is intended to replace the whole Gricean 
apparatus. … SW-R seems to have overwhelming disadvantages as an account of implicature in 
general, but it faces even worse problems as an account of GCIs in particular.209 
Levinson proceeds to show some of the issues faced by SW-R, and the inadequacy of the model to 
account for particular instances of some linguistic phenomena. 
As mentioned earlier, have found Horn’s adaptation of the Gricean proposal the most 
convincing, and as such I have engaged with his various works, and in particularly with those works 
touching on negation, to a greater degree than those of either Levinson or Wilson and Sperber.  This in 
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no way negates the general insights that are shared by these scholars, regardless of their particular 
proposals.  Without being reductionist, on the one hand I view Wilson and Sperber’s proposal as having 
distilled Grice’s system too much; while, on the other hand, I view Levinson’s proposal as not having 
distilled it enough, or not as much as it could be without the loss of something essential.  In this respect, 
I see Horn’s perspective as “just right,” as it were, and capable of offering the clearest, most useful 
insights available for helping me to understand and to explain my observations. 
L. Horn: Descriptive and Metalinguistic Negation 
In A Natural History of Negation  L. Horn endeavors both to provide “a historical perspective on 
the place of negation within classical, traditional, and modern investigations of language and thought” 
and to demonstrate “how recent developments in formal theory apply to the analysis of negative 
statements and how results from work on negation affect (or should affect) current work within semantic 
and pragmatic theory.”210  In this course of his engagement with ancient literature, and especially 
literature connected with “spiritual” or “religious” concerns, he touches on the particular construction 
“not X but Y,” and the use of this construction within the Gospels.   
Within his discussion of the teachings of Jesus (especially as represented in the Sermon on the 
Mount) in contrast to the Ten Commandments within the Hebrew Bible, Horn observes  
A significant rhetorical hallmark in the Sermon and throughout the Synoptic Gospels is the 
recurring turn not X but Y:… 
Do not store up your riches on earth, where moths and rust destroy them… 
but store up your riches in heaven…. 
Judge not, lest ye be judged. 
I tell you not to resist injury,  
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but if anyone strikes you on your right cheek, turn the other to him too. 
Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth.   
I have not come to bring peace but a sword.211  
Horn has identified particular instances in the NT diplaying this general form.  Of special interest to me 
in this investigation are the different ways in which this form is able to function, and how the 
hearer/reader is to distinguish between these uses.  I now turn to a particular function that may help 
explain a select few uses of the οὐ...ἀλλά construction found in the Synoptic gospels: namely, the 
phenomenon known as metalinguistic negation. 
Metalinguistic Negation 
As I noted previously in my engagement with U. Luz’s dismissal of the use οὐ...ἀλλά 
construction for dialectic negation, Horn notes the particular suitability of this form, or frame, “not X 
but Y,” in uses that he refers to as “metalinguistic negation,” asserting that 
The archetypal frame for metalinguistic negation is the not X but Y construction, functioning as a 
single constituent within a sentence.  This construction provides a straightforward way to reject X 
(on any grounds) and to offer Y as its appropriate rectification.  As with other forms of 
metalinguistic negation, it is irrelevant whether or not the rejected utterance is […X…] in fact 
expressed a true proposition. 
 As we have observed, this frame provides a favored type of opposition with the synoptic 
Gospels of the New Testament.212 
Horn uses the term “metalinguistic negation” to refer to “a device for objecting to a previous utterance 
on any grounds whatever, including the conventional or conversational implicata it potentially induces, 
its morphology, its style or register, or its phonetic realization.”213  He remarks that, of the “two distinct 
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uses of sentential negation,” this one is the “marked, nondescriptive variety” and is “not a truth-
functional or semantic operator on propositions….”214  A. Pitts provides the following definitions based 
upon Horn’s presentation: 
DESCRIPTIVE NEGATION (henceforth DN) is so named by virtue of describing how things are (not) 
in the world.  It is used as a standard truth-functional (presupposition-preserving) logical operator 
on the semantic content of propositions. 
METALINGUISTIC NEGATION (henceforth DN), by contrast, is discourse-oriented and focuses on 
linguistic and/or interpretive features of the utterance-level expression.215 
Huang follows Horn’s basic definition, and helpfully expands upon it by positing certain distinctive 
features of metalinguistic negation.216   
J. McCawley on the Form of a Construction Versus Its Function 
James McCawley offers some important criticism regarding Horn’s assertions concerning 
metalinguistic negation and its connection with the “not X but Y” form we have discussed.  First, 
McCawley agrees with the existence of the phenomenon, and saying that  
In “metalinguistic negation” (more accurately, in a metalinguistic use of negation), a negative 
sentence is interpreted not as the negation of the proposition expressed by the negated sentence 
but rather as a rejection of the way that the content of that sentence is expressed.217 
Regarding the “not X but Y” construction, he asserts that  
the latter construction and the other members of the family of constructions that it exemplifies are 
not inherently metalinguistic, and a correlation between contrastive and metalinguistic negation 
exists only because contrastive negation lends itself particularly easily to metalinguistic uses.218  
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In his concluding remarks in the same article, he restates this position, helpfully providing a distinction 
between the form of a construction observed in a text, and the function it performs within that text: 
‘Metalinguistic’ is not a form of negation but a function that negative constructions may fulfill, 
and the only relation between contrastive negation and metalinguistic use of negation is the 
naturalness of employing the former constructions when one has the latter goal.219 
I found McCawley’s clarifying remarks most helpful, and I would agree that it is important to note that 
the presence of a particular function, in this case, metalinguistic negation, is not always indicated by the 
presence of a complex of elements that is particularly suited to perform that function.  The exegete 
should keep in mind that, while this function is indeed one possibility, it is still only one of many.  As 
such, she should continue to look at the other evidence in the text, co-text, and context to assist in 
determining how the negative construction is functioning in that text. 
McCawley also provides a helpful taxonomy of the various arrangements used for contrastive 
negation in English, some of which are suggestive for my examination of negation within Κοινή Greek.  
His taxonomy, with examples, is as follows: 
1. “Short” forms: 
a. John drank not coffee but tea.      (basic form) 
b. John drank tea, not coffee.     (reverse form) 
c. John didn’t drink coffee but tea.     (anchored form) 
c'.   I’m surprised at John not drinking coffee but tea. 
 
2. “Expanded” forms: 
d. John didn’t drink coffee, he drank tea.     (basic expanded form) 
e. John drank tea, he didn’t drink coffee.   (reverse expanded form)220 
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McCawley sees no limitation on the ability of forms to express metalinguistic negation, noting that “all 
five forms can be used metalinguistically, but there is nothing inherently metalinguistic about any of 
them.”221  For the purposes of my investigation, two of the forms merit special attention: specifically, 
the basic form (a) and the anchored form (c).  In the basic form, the negation is immediately adjacent to 
the negated constituent, with both members of the contrast pair, in this case (coffee, tea), immediately 
adjacent to the conjunction.  In the anchored, form, (c), the negation is moved closer to the beginning of 
the clause, allowing for some “garden-pathing” and ambiguity as to whether or not it should be given a 
wide-scope interpretation, i.e., “John didn’t drink … anything.”  This interpretation is stalled, however, 
when the reader/hearer encounters the conjunction.  The conjunction itself, the parallelism between the 
members of the contrast pair, and their proximity to the conjunction all point to the conclusion that it is 
the constituent “coffee” that is being negated, and not the main verb “drink” with its auxiliary “did.”  
Ewald Lang offers a more detailed explanation of the steps involved in this correction: 
Here we must first discuss the correction operation induced by the meaning of not — but. It 
includes at least three structural and two processual or operational components. The former can be 
specified as follows: (1) the corrigendum, i.e. the asserted proposition p expressed by the left 
conjunct; (2) the negation element which is applied to p; (3) the corrigens, i.e. an asserted 
proposition q which is to be substituted for p. The processual components are: (i) the blocking 
operation carried out by the negation element, that is the operation which prevents p from being 
incorporated into the actual stock of text-information stored in the (short-term) memory; (ii) the 
substitution operation which replaces p by q. Normally it is not the complete p which is subject to 
the correction operation, but some linguistically specified component of it.  
 The specific linguistic means to determine the scope of correction, i.e. that part of p which 
is directly affected by the negation element, include among other things a characteristic intonation 
contour of the ‘corrected’ sentence (fall or fall-rise) in relation to that of the ‘correcting’ sentence 
(fall) and special stress pattern.222 
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As we do not have the intonation contour of either sentence available to us, we have to rely on the “other 
things” which may be observed, including any parallels between the “corrigendum,” or preceding 
constituent and the “corrigens,” or following constituent.  Also, the ellipsis of the continuous 
information removes it as interference, such that any material included after ἀλλά in the second conjuct 
is likely to be seen as the information being proffered to correct what has been negated/rejected in the 
first.   
Lang also comments on the role of the negation itself—in the case of his discussion, nicht—in the 
determination of the corrected and correcting elements, explaining that  
in the first conjunct nicht delimits a certain semantic component as a possible corrigendum …; the 
second conjunct, however, specifies the corrigens, i.e. that semantic component which is to be 
replaced for the one rejected as wrong in the first conjunct.  As corrigendum and corrigens have 
to match exactly, it is by way of specifying the corrigens that the extent of the correction domain 
is finally fixed for the given nicht—sondern conjoining.223  
Let us synthesize the observations of McCawley and Lang.  We can see that the form placing the 
negation closest to that constituent to be rejected—McCawley’s basic form—presents the reader with 
the least ambiguity as to what is being rejected.  It does this by effectively marking the constituent as a 
potential corrigendum within the first conjunct.  The position of the negation, the ellipsis in the second 
conjunct, and the similarity/parallelism between the preceding and following constituents all provide 
reinforcing signals which guide the reader to make the proper rejection, replacement, and thus 
correction.  We have thus seen the “not … but” form with its variations, and the correction operation 
associated with it.  But what of those instances which seem to raise an objection to either the way in 
                                                 
223 Ibid., 241. 
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which something is said or asserted in the first conjunct, or the extent of the assertion there, thereby 
resulting in metalinguistic negation?  It is to this topic I now turn.  
Horn’s Metalinguistic Negation Proposal 
Although I will not be able to engage with Horn’s examination of metalinguistic negation as 
extensively as I would like to, I will discuss briefly both the theoretical framework in which he engages 
negation, as well as the textual examples he advances to illustrate his understanding of negation in 
various arranges.  My purpose in doing so is to (1) understand how he distinguishes metalinguistic 
negation from descriptive negation, and (2) ascertain the applicability of his observations on, and 
analyses of, both types of negation to our own investigation.   
It is important for the reader to recall from my earlier treatment of Grice’s contribution to our 
discussion that Horn takes the four sub-principles that compose Grice’s Cooperative Principle (hereafter 
CP, following Horn)224 and condenses them into two principles, which Horn refers to as the “Q-
Principle” and the “R-Principle,” each having its own associated implicatures, the “Q-based implicata” 
and “R-based implicata,” respectively.225   
Horn explores “the relation between the one-sided (less than p) and the two-sided (exactly p) 
reading that tend to be available for a scalar operator or predicate p.”226  He then addresses the 
occurrence of metalinguistic negation with respect to such “scalar predicates,” noting its frequent use to 
“as a means for disconnecting the implicated upper bound of relatively weak scalar predicates.”227     
                                                 
224 Horn, Natural History of Negation, 193. 
225 Ibid., 204, 239, 242, 248, 254–5, 387–92. 
226 Ibid., xvi, 205–16. 
227 Ibid., 382. 
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First Horn identifies what he sees as the lower bound, or “one-sided” readings of various sentences, as 
well as the upper bound, or “two-sided” readings of the same. 
 
      ONE-SIDED  TWO-SIDED 
      READING  READING 
(42) a. Max has three children.  at least three.  exactly three. 
b. You ate some of the cookies.  some if not all. some but not all. 
c. It’s possible    at least possible. possible but not certain. 
 d. John is patriotic or quixotic.  and perhaps both. but not both. 
e. I’m happy.    if not ecstatic.  but not ecstatic. 
f. It’s warm out.    at least warm.  but not hot. 
What metalinguistic negation appears to be doing, according to Horn, is denying the interpretation 
specified by the two-sided reading as inadequate or insufficient for some reason.  Using the examples in 
(42), above, Horn then demonstrates in (43), below, how metalinguistic negation would lead the 
reader/hearer to reevaluate the two-sided interpretation.  His underlining indicating the scalar terms that 
are being contrasted: 
(43)  a. He doesn’t have three children, he has four. 
b. You didn’t eat some cookies, you ate all of them. 
c. It isn’t possible she’ll win, it’s downright certain she will. 
d. John isn’t patriotic or quixotic, he both patriotic and quixotic. 
e. I’m not happy—I’m ecstatic. 
f. It’s not warm out; it’s downright hot. 
Regarding the distinction between descriptive and metalinguistic negation, Horn poses the 
questions, (A) “If every negation is either descriptive or metalinguistic, how exclusive is this 
disjunction?”; (B) “Can some negations be both?”; and, regarding descriptive negation in particular, (C) 
“What varieties of sentential- and constituent-scope negation must be recognized within the syntactic 
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and semantic description of natural languages?”228  The answers to questions (A) and (C) are of special 
interest for the purposes of our investigation, as they provide us with suggestions for identifying 
instances of metalinguistic negation, and for describing the instance of descriptive negation that we 
encounter in the Synoptic Gospels. 
S. Schwenter’s Interaction with Horn’s Proposal 
Scott Schwenter interacts positively with Horn’s presentation of metalinguistic negation, but 
restricts his use of the particular term metalinguistic for those instances of refutation in which the 
objection involves “how the language itself is being used.”229  He offers examples involving errors in 
pronunciation, but notes that “metalinguistic objections need not be limited to pronunciations: indeed, 
they might also refer to word choice or perceived violations of register level.”230  He does, however, 
acknowledge the other objections noted by Horn under the general heading of metalinguistic negation. 
In particular, Schwenter mentions those instances in which “the speaker’s objection is to Q-based 
scalar implicatures that are evoked by particular utterances in context, commenting on their lack of 
informativeness.”231  Schwenter’s disagreement with Horn involves terminology, and he explains his 
alternative, saying that such instances “better classified as “metapragmatic” instead of “metalinguistic”, 
since it is not a mispronunciation or poor lexical choice that constitutes the offense to be rectified, but 
rather what an interlocutor has implicated.”232  Schwenter’s proposed distinction via terminology is 
                                                 
228 Ibid., 444. 
229 Scott A. Schwenter, Pragmatics of Conditional Marking: Implicature, Scalarity, and 
Exclusivity, Outstanding Dissertations in Linguistics (New York: Garland, 1999), 135. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid. 
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reasonable, especially since it is clear that the objections noted are to different aspects (language or 
linguistic aspects versus pragmatic aspects) of refuted utterances.  His classification system is 
reminiscent of Bart Geurts’s division of denials into four major categories: proposition denials, 
presupposition denials, implicature denials, and form denials.233   
This latter category of “form denials” seems to map generally to Schwenter’s “metalinguistic” 
refutation, and while the category “implicature denials” seems to correspond to Schwenter’s 
“metapragmatic” refutation.234  Although Schwenter’s motivation to distinguish between the different 
varieties of metalinguistic is quite reasonable, his label, “metapragmatic,” seems to me to be less useful 
than Geurts’s “implicature denial,” chiefly due to the particular descriptiveness of the latter.  However, I 
have not adopted either label within this work, and if I have seen a particular occurrence as characterized 
by an overturning of the scalar Q-implicature present within a conjunct, I have stated so, and referred to 
it using Horn’s more general term “metalinguistic negation.” 
A. Lehrer and K. Lehrer: The “Not Only” Proposal 
One final issue concerning Horn’s presentation of metalinguistic negation needs to be addressed.  
Horn address the fact that, in some instances of metalinguistic negation, it may appear that what is being 
communicated is actually the insertion, elliptically, of either “only” or “just,” following the negation in 
the first conjunct.  He writes, 
When negation is used metalinguistically to focus on a Q-based implicatum, it often appears to 
build in a covert just or only which can in fact be expressed directly without directly affecting what 
is communicated. Thus, compare the versions of (45) with and without the parenthesized adverb 
immediately following the negation; 
                                                 
233 Bart Geurts, “The Mechanisms of Denial,” Language 74, no. 2 (1998): 275. 
234 Ibid., 276–77. 
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(45)  a.  Max doesn’t have (just) three children—he has four. 
b.  You didn’t eat (only) some of the cookies—you ate all of them. 
c.  Around here, we don’t (just) like coffee—we love it. 
d.  I don’t (just) believe it—I know it.235 
The possibility of such a reading was originally proposed by A. Lehrer and K. Lehrer, and was referred 
to as the “hyponymy” reading, or interpretation.236   
To provide some context, I should note that the Lehrers are discussing antonymy in general and 
the concept of “gradable antonymy” in particular.  They advance the possibility that a hyponomy 
interpretation of certain utterances involving seemingly incompatible assertions offered a satisfactory 
explanation of what was being observed.  In particular, if the assertions involved terms that could be 
seen as different values on a continuum, then what is being objected to in the first conjunct is the 
implication of the upper-bound, not the lower-bound that is explicit.237  Their test to see if this is, in fact, 
the case is to insert “only” after the negation and assess the resulting sense of the utterances.238 
Horn has the following to say regarding their proposal: 
the fact that just or only may be insertable into this frame without changing the conveyed meaning 
should not be taken as evidence that metalinguistic not can be analyzed as elliptical for not just, 
not only (pace Lehrer and Lehrer 1982…), any more than the fact that some and not all can be 
substituted for each other in some contexts implies that they contribute the same meaning to the 
sentences in which they occur.239 
Interestingly, Horn’s objections to this “not only” proposal are very much like those noted earlier 
for H. Kruse.  In both cases, the idea is advanced that these seemingly incompatible or contradictory 
                                                 
235 Horn, Natural History of Negation, 385. 
236 Adrienne Lehrer and Keith Lehrer, “Antonymy,” Linguistics and Philosophy 5, no. 4 (1982): 
487–8. 
237 Ibid., 488–9. 
238 Ibid., 488. 
239 Horn, Natural History of Negation, 385. 
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statements can be resolved if the negation is seen as objecting to the completeness—perhaps better, the 
exhaustiveness—of the assertion in the first conjunct, with a sufficiently exhaustive alternative being 
proposed in the second conjunct.  Such an understanding is not acceptable for Kruse or Horn, although it 
does seem reasonable and could account for what is being observed.   
He later returns to their proposal, providing further explanation as to why he rejects it: 
Lehrer and Lehrer (1982) distinguish two rival analyses of the relation between scalar operators 
like good and excellent: the HYPONOMY interpretation, on which good is a superordinate term for 
the category containing excellent, and the INCOMPATIBLE interpretation, on which the predicates 
good and excellent are mutually inconsistent. The Lehrers point out that (118a) seems to favor the 
former analysis and (118b) the latter. 
(118)  a.  This wine is good— it’s even excellent. 
b.  This wine is not good, it’s excellent. … 
 
(119)  That wine is not only good; it’s excellent. 
I agree with the Lehrers’ conclusion that excellent is a hyponym, rather than an incompatible, 
relation of good. But I cannot accept their implication that the negative predication not good in the 
first clause of (118b) is to be regarded as elliptical for not only good in (119). Given the scalar 
nature of the relation between good and excellent— that is, that a is excellent unilaterally entails a 
is good— (118b) and (119) will in fact convey the same information; the same point was made in 
connection with the examples of (45) above.240 
And why is Horn unable to accept the Lehrers’ implication?  It appears that Horn’s objection to this 
explanation in these circumstances is due to the fact that it is not applicable in other instances of 
metalinguistic negation involving other Q-based implicata: 
Given the scalar nature of the relation between good and excellent— that is, that a is excellent 
unilaterally entails a is good— (118b) and (119) will in fact convey the same information; the 
same point was made in connection with the examples of (45) above. But only those instances of 
metalinguistic negation which involve an upper-bounding Q-based implicatum will share this 
characteristic.241 
                                                 
240 Ibid., 423–4.  Emphasis in the original. 
241 Ibid., 424. 
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However, if those instances of metalinguistic negation with upper-bounding implicatum can be best 
explained in this way, then it is not reasonable to reject this explanation simply because it does not have 
explanatory power for every instance of metalinguistic negation, regardless of the Q-implicata involved.  
There may, in fact, not be any explanation that can account for all instances, as not all instances are 
produced by the same effects. 
B. Geurts, interacts with the proposals of Horn and another scholar, R.A. van der Sandt, and 
asserts that these scholars’ theories are  
unitarian in the sense that they seek to explain denial in terms of a single key concept.  In Horn’s 
account, this is metalinguistic negation, in van der Sandt’s it is echoing.  Thus, both theories are 
committed to the claim that we are dealing with a collection of phenomena subsumed by a single 
unifying principle.  I believe that this claim is wrong.242 
It should be noted that Geurts uses the term “denial” (following van der Sandt) to refer to those instances 
of negation that Horn would label as “metalinguistic.”243  Geurts is clear concerning his differences from 
these scholars, both in his view of metalinguistic negation, and, as a result, in his approach for 
explaining it: 
In contrast to this Unitarian perspective, the theory that I advocated adopts a more eclectic stance.  
It repudiates the notion that denial is a phenomenon amendable to unified treatment: there are 
several types of denial, whose underlying mechanisms are quite diverse. ... There is no natural 
class of denials or instances of metalinguistic negation, and no single principle to account to 
account for the phenomena that Horn and van der Sandt are concerned with. … Although there is 
no such unifying principle, denials can always be accounted for in a principled way.244 
                                                 
242 Geurts, “Mechanisms of Denial,” 286–7. 
243 Ibid., 275.  Geurts also divides denials into four classes: (1) proposition denials, (2) 
presupposition denials, (3) implicature denials, and (4) form denials.  It is this third class, namely 
implicature denials, that are of particular interest to my investigation. 
244 Ibid., 277, 287. 
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 Geurts’s insights are important for my investigation, as I am advocating an explanation for one type of 
metalinguistic negation even while readily acknowledging that it is does not have explanatory value for 
every type or every instance of metalinguistic negation. 
The following question has arisen based upon my observations: “Is the simple expression 
οὐ...ἀλλά able to convey this sense of “not only…but also” implicitly, or better, elliptically, without the 
explicit addition of μόνον...καί, such that these latter terms simply serve to disambiguate the 
expression?”  For certain occurrences in certain contexts, the evidence indicates that indeed οὐ...ἀλλά 
can be used to communicates this sense pragmatically, overcoming an implicatum (particularly a Q-
implicatum, according to Horn’s terminology), and causing the hearer/reader to reevaluate what exactly 
is being negated in, or about, the utterance or proposition in the first conjunct. 
I will cover this is much greater detail in my later coverage of Mark 9:37, which I mentioned 
earlier in the Introduction.  My point is, Horn’s rejection of the elliptical “not only” explanation was 
based, not on its lack of explanatory power, but upon its lack of applicability to other types of 
metalinguistic negation.  Geurts’s insights effectively remove this artificial obstacle.   
A. Pitts addresses Horn’s interaction with the Lehrer’s proposal in particular, remarking,   
for these scalar cases, Horn (1985, 1989) permits the paraphrase not just X or not only X…. In 
accordance with a similar endorsement from Lehrer and Lehrer (1982), Horn … appears to 
promote a clear criterion for delimiting such cases by claiming that they present the only examples 
of MN245 in which this paraphrase is acceptable.  He therefore rejects the suggestion that 
metalinguistic not is elliptical for not only or not just, precisely on the basis that all remaining 
cases (targeting implicature, phonetic detail, morphology, style, or connotation) are incompatible 
with such a move.246 
                                                 
245 MN = Metalinguistic Negation 
246 Pitts, “Exploring a ‘Pragmatic Ambiguity’ of Negation,” 358.  Emphasis is in the original. 
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I fully agree with Pitts’s assessments of both (1) Horn’s assent to the explanatory power of this proposal 
in some cases, and (2) his dissent with the same due to the lack of explanatory power for all cases.  Pitts 
continues: 
While Horn is right to reject an overarching correspondence between MN constructs and elliptical 
not only/just (not least when we bear in mind that this feature is also likely to spoil the oft-desired 
garden path effect…), it does however appear that just/only insertion MAY in fact work in certain 
constructions targeting implied exclusive disjunction…, style…, and perhaps also occasional 
instances targeting pronunciations….  So once again, although scalar implicatures might be 
delimited by virtue of their NECESSARY compatibility with such paraphrasing, this feature is clearly 
not a sufficient indication of (scalar) implicature denial.247 
I would agree with Horn’s (and by her agreement with his position, Pitts’s) rejection of an assertion that 
an elliptical “not only” for “not” should be seen in, and provides for the proper interpretation of, every 
instance of metalinguistic negation.   
The relevance of Pitt’s comments to my investigation in general, and to my assertion particular 
should be clear: this explanation (1) is applicable to those instances of MN involving implicature denial 
(particularly scalar implicature denial), and (2) may be applicable to instances of the other types of MN 
as well.  Point (2), on its own, would go some distance to addressing Horn’s objection to the “not only” 
proposal based on limited applicability.  When these points are considered together, however, Horn’s, 
and for that matter, Kruse’s, objection to elliptical “not only” is overturned, and the way forward is 
cleared for making use of this explanation to explain some occurrences of the οὐ...ἀλλά construction in 
the Synoptics. 
 
 
                                                 
247 Ibid.  Emphasis is in the original. 
115 
 
 
 
The PA/SN Adversative Particle Distinction  
Horn also interacts with the (still) ongoing important discussion regarding (1) the two functions 
of adversative particles, and (2) whether or not a particular language (during a particular time period) 
utilizes an adversative particle for each of these functions: 
I have claimed that negation bears two distinct functions [descriptive negation and metalinguistic 
negation]248 in natural language.  The evidence I have been considering here suggests that there 
are two distinct functions for but as well.  But here, the cross-linguistic evidence supports the 
hypothesis that there is a lexical rather than merely a pragmatic ambiguity involved.  As discussed 
by Tobler (1896)249 and, in more detail, by Melander (1916),250 a language may either (as with 
English) contain one adversative particle with two functions or (as with German) display two 
particles differentiated for these two functions.251 
In their study of adversative conjunctions, and in particular of the conjunction mais in French,252 
J. C. Anscombre and O. Ducrot proposed two classes of adversative conjunctions based upon their 
differing functions.  These classes (sometimes referred to by the shorthand PA and SN) are nicely 
explained by S. Schwenter:   
In a now classic paper, Anscombre & Ducrot (1977) examine in detail the syntactic, semantic and 
pragmatic characteristics of the two adversative conjunction-types…which they label PA (from 
Pero, German Aber) and SN (from Sino, German SonderN).  They point out that, while not all 
languages possess two morphologically distinct, lexicalized PA/SN forms (e.g. French has only 
mais and English only but), all languages do possess different constructions that allow speakers to 
                                                 
248 The bracketed insertion, and the emphases within it, are mine. 
249 Adolf Tobler, “Ne...se...non, Mais, Fors, Que.,” in Vermischte Beiträge Zur Französischen 
Grammatik 3, 2nd ed., 1896; Repr. (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1908), 78–111. 
250 J. Melander, “Étude Sur Magis et Les Expressions Adversatives Dans Les Langues Romanes” 
(Almqvist & Wiksell, 1916). 
251 Horn, Natural History of Negation, 406. 
252 Jean-Claude Anscombre and Oswald Ducrot, “Deux Mais En Français?,” Lingua 43 (1977): 
23–40. 
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express the notions associated with PA (restrictive) and SN (exclusive) adversativity at the 
sentence level.253 
Schwenter also points to Ewald Lang’s designation “A/S” for the languages with “distinct forms for PA 
and SN conjunction” as opposed to those without the same.254  In the context of Lang’s treatment of the 
difference between the use of nicht – sondern and aber in German, he uses the term “correction” for the 
former “conjoining,” and “contrast” for the latter.255  He also discusses the potential difficulties 
associated with “showing how the semantic distinction ‘correction’ vs. ‘contrast’ correlates with the 
lexical distinction sondern vs. aber.”256  He asserts that 
Any theory attempting to reduce the semantic difference between ‘correction’ and ‘contrast’ to 
what manifests itself in the overt lexical distinction would, however, immediately prove to be 
naïve: it is a well-known fact that such a lexical distinction is by no means a universal phenomenon.  
Even closely related cognate languages may differ from each other as to whether or not they make 
such a distinction on the lexical level.  Thus, on the one hand we find the A/S languages including 
German (aber/sondern), Swedish (men/utan), Spanish (pero/sino), Hebrew (aval/ela) etc., on the 
other hand we find the A-languages English (but), Norwegian (men), Dutch (maar), French (mais), 
Latin (sed), Greek (alla) etc., which lack a corresponding lexical differentiation.257   
Although Lang does not specify that his reference is to αλλα in Modern Greek, I have taken it as such.  I 
am in no way attempting to imply that the current use of αλλα in Modern Greek should be the basis for 
determining the use of ἀλλά in Κοινή Greek, or that Lang was making a statement about Κοινή Greek.  
That being said, I do believe that the evidence consisting of the data present within the Synoptics does 
suggest that Κοινή Greek is an “A-language” according to Lang’s terminology. 
                                                 
253 Scott A. Schwenter, “Discourse Markers and the PA/SN Distinction,” Journal of Linguistics 
38 (2002): 45. 
254 Schwenter, Pragmatics of Conditional Marking, 119, 171n2. 
255 Lang, The Semantics of Coordination, 252. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ibid.   
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Horn also helpfully notes similar phenomena in several other languages, and provides a brief treatment 
of the historical development from Classical Latin, with “autem for modification,” “sed for exclusion or 
modification,” and “the comparative particle magis” that “eventually subsumed both of these functions,” 
through Old French (movement from magis to mais).258  He proposes that his readers 
… follow Anscombre and Ducrot (1977) in distinguishing these two functions of mais clauses as 
PA (for pero/aber) and SN (for sondern/sino), respectively.  What we find in the historical records, 
as Tobler and Melander show, is that maisPA occurs in full clauses after positive or negative 
propositions, while maisSN—from the early period on—occurs only in reduced (gapped) clauses, 
immediately after negation.259 
J. Huang, interacting with Anscombre and Ducrot,260 as well as Horn,261 follows Horn’s 
explanation, namely “lexical” or “semantic” ambiguity, for the English but and French mais, noting that 
“this analysis can be supported by the fact that there are languages in which the different uses of but are 
lexicalized.  For example, German uses aber for the denial of expectation/contrastive but and sondern 
for the correction but.”262  As such, whether one uses the abbreviations PA or SN, there is general 
recognition that these particular adversative conjunctions (German: aber, sondern; Spanish: pero, sino) 
may be (carefully) taken as representative of how other languages divide the respective adversative 
functions between two different conjuctions.263 
 
 
                                                 
258 Horn, Natural History of Negation, 406–13. 
259 Ibid., 406. 
260 Anscombre and Ducrot, “Deux Mais En Français?” 
261 Horn, Natural History of Negation, 406–8; esp. 406.   
262 Huang, Pragmatics, 74n25. 
263 Horn, Natural History of Negation, 406. 
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Correction and Contrast According to E. Lang 
I propose that Ewald Lang’s discussion of the differences between the uses of aber and sondern 
in German provides some helpful insights for understanding the differences between the function of 
ἀλλά in Pattern 1 occurrences as opposed to Pattern 2 occurrences.  First, Lang poses a question that 
helpfully frames the issue: 
Are the lexical items we find in the A-languages (but, mais, maar, sed etc.) semantically 
ambiguous between an A-reading and an S-reading?  Or are they semantically unspecified in the 
sense that their actual interpretation in terms of ‘correction’ vs. ‘contrast’ is determined by a 
conspiracy of syntactic, semantic, and prosodic properties of the given conjoining?264 
To Lang’s high level list of conspirators, I would add pragmatic properties, and I would specify some of 
the lower level accomplices such as parallelism, ellipsis, and especially negation.   
This last element is so important for Lang’s discussion that he actually contrasts, not sondern and 
aber, but nicht – sondern and aber.  Commenting on the similarities and differences between the logical 
operator “¬” and nicht, Lang proposes that, in natural language, “adding nicht at the proper place to 
some sentence S produces some sentence S'.  Thus nicht, seen syntactically, is a sentential operator 
making sentences out of sentences, which clearly distincts nicht from other negation elements like un-, 
in-, non- etc. which apply to minor categories (verbs, adjectives, nouns etc.) only.  But with the regard to 
the semantic operation of nicht, the seemingly parallel behavior of ‘¬’ and nicht is limited.”  What Lang 
has proposed here for nicht may properly be seen as analogous to what we observe for the negations οὐ 
and μή in Κοινή Greek.  But how exactly does Lang see nicht interacting with sondern? 
                                                 
264 Lang, The Semantics of Coordination, 252–3. 
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Lang discusses some particular examples in which he evaluates the acceptability of inserting 
either sondern or aber in an attempt to assess the limits of their interchangeability with each other.  His 
example follows: 
  muß       will 
  will    aber   soll 
(33) John  soll nicht schlafen,    er  muß  schalfen 
  darf    sondern  kann 
  …       … 
He notes that “the occurrence of sondern is bound to the occurrences of nicht … in the first conjunct S', 
whereas aber can occur with non-negative first conjuncts ….”265  The importance of the interaction 
between the negation and the conjunction is clear, as Lang proposes that “the A-cases and the S-cases do 
not only differ as to the lexical distinction of aber vs. sondern, but also as to the role of nicht in the 
interpretation of the relevant structure.”266  One of his conclusions: “despite their superficial similarity, 
the A-cases and the S-cases of a given example do not really form a minimal pair, because aber and 
sondern interact differently with nicht in the first conjunct.”267  According to Lang, this difference 
impacts how the distinction between “correction” and “contrast” should be viewed.   
His observations are very suggestive for my own investigation, and I will cover them here in 
brief compass.  First, regarding the S-cases, which generally correspond to those occurrences that I have 
classified as Pattern 1, he asserts that  
                                                 
265 Ibid., 253. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid. 
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(a) in an S-case, the sondern C268 adjunct is dependent on the structure of the first conjunct 
S',269 namely on the occurrence of nicht in S' and on the internal structure of S' due to the 
parallelism condition. 
(b) the sondern C has the task of determining the focus of S' “in retrospect” 
(c)  nicht in S' binds a focus variable x which is replaced by some definite value b … hence the 
meaning of nicht is not integrated into the meaning of S' until the value of x is fixed.270 
The first characteristic noted above, point (a), is also observed in the Pattern 1 instances with which I 
have engaged, as information which is held in common between the two conjuncts (“continuous 
information” in Halliday’s presentation)271 is routinely explicit in the first conjunct and ellipsed in the 
second, such that the second conjunct may be said to be dependent upon the structure of the first.  
Lang’s second and third characteristics also generally hold, as the proffered replacement constituent 
(Lang’s b),272 that is present after ἀλλά signals the reader/hearer which corresponding constituent in the 
first conjunct (Lang’s x)273 has been negated and thereby rejected. 
But what about the so-called A-cases (which generally correspond to those occurrences that I 
have classified as Pattern 2, the No Constant Pattern), in which contrast, not correction, is intended?  I 
submit that Lang’s insights are no less suggestive for these instances than they were in the instances 
addressed immediately above.  He proposes  
“the interaction between aber and nicht in the A-cases displays the following properties: 
(a') in an A-case, the aber conjunct is independent of the first conjunct, it neither requires nor 
forbids the occurrence of a nicht in the first conjuct, and it is not subject to the parallelism condition 
                                                 
268 C here stands for the material following sondern. 
269 Lang, The Semantics of Coordination, 238.  S' is Lang’s notation for a sentence negated by 
means of nicht.   
270 Ibid., 254. 
271 Halliday, Introduction to Functional Grammar, 635.  See my engagement with Halliday’s 
relevant contributions later in this survey. 
272 I have used the term “following constituent” for this element. 
273 I have used the term “preceding constituent” for this element.  
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(b') the focus of the aber conjunct does not necessarily have any repercussions on the focus of 
the first conjunct 
(c') the meaning of nicht is integrated in the meaning of the first conjunct, the focus of the first 
conjunct is fixed.274 
But how applicable are these characteristics, noted by Lang in his engagement with the German 
language, to Pattern 2 occurrences of ἀλλά in Κοινή Greek?   
Let’s move through each of them in order, beginning with (a').  I will first divide Lang’s point 
(a') into three parts and then express them, mutatis mutandis, to fit my discussion of Κοινή Greek.  Thus 
expressed, (a'1) would be an assertion that the ἀλλά (second) conjunct is independent of the first 
conjunct.  Then (a'2) would posit that this second conjunct neither requires nor forbids the occurrence of 
οὐ, μή, or another negative content item in the first conjunct.  Finally, (a'3) would assert that the second 
conjunct is not required to parallel the first conjunct.  I would like to engage briefly with the first (a'1) 
and third (a'3) points together before addressing the second point (a'2). 
With respect to (a'1), I can safely say that the two conjuncts are independent insofar as there is 
no shared constant/continuous information.  It was this very absence of continuous information in some 
occurrences which caused me to posit the Pattern 2 category.  This independence does not mean that the 
two conjuncts do not or cannot exhibit similarities, such as both containing imperatives, both advancing 
propositions, etc.  This overlaps with point (a'3) in that the second conjunct need not be parallel to the 
first.  I would extend this description to note that there is no parallelism evident between the first and 
second conjunct as there is no continuous information from the first conjunct expressed either explicitly 
or elliptically in the second.  In this respect, then, (a'3) represents a specification, and explication if you 
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will, of (a'1).  In fact, the second point in Lang’s proposal, point (b'), also provides even further 
explication as to how the conjuncts are independent, and need not be commented on in detail here. 
Now to point (a'2), namely the proposal that the second conjunct neither requires nor forbids the 
occurrence of οὐ, μή, or another negative content item in the first.275  This proposal holds, as there are a 
few instances of Pattern 2 occurrences in the Synoptics in which there is neither negation nor any other 
negative content item.  However, as may be seen both in my description of Pattern 2, and the frequency 
distribution of Pattern 2 throughout the Synoptics, most occurrences involve either overt negation or 
some negative element, with the archetypical sub-pattern being Sub-Pattern 2A.  As such, while 
negation need not be present in the first conjunct, it usually is.   
This possibility that the negation may be present or absent in Pattern 2 leads us to Lang’s last 
point, adjusted of course for our discussion of Κοινή Greek, that the negation present in the first 
conjunct in actually integrated in the meaning of the first conjunct.  The negation or negative content 
item can thus be part of an affirmation of a negative proposition or a prohibition in the first conjuct 
which is not done away with by the advancement of a proposition, command, etc. in the second 
conjunct.  In other words, both can hold, such that the first conjunct is not being rejected and replaced, 
or corrected, by some part or all of content of the second conjunct.  Rather, it is being contrasted in some 
way with the second conjunct that follows.  
 
 
                                                 
275 This is in contrast to the S-cases in which negation in the first conjunct is required.  For 
further discussion of this characteristic for SN conjoinings in other languages, cf. Rudolph, Contrast, 
314; Schwenter, “Discourse Markers and the PA/SN Distinction,” 48–50. 
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Contrast and Adversativity According to S. Schwenter 
Schwenter attempts to bring greater precision to his discussion the idea of “adversativity” by 
situating it in the context of the related concept, “contrast.”  He comments that 
Providing a definition of adversativity is difficult because of its closeness to, and frequent 
confusion with, another more general concept, viz. CONTRAST. … I would like to avoid this 
confusion from the start by classifying contrast as a general cognitive concept, but adversativity 
as a purely linguistic notion.276 
He then defines contrast as “the perception of difference, as some level and by any means possible, 
between two entities comparable by some other dimension.”277  He also asserts  
contrast is not restricted to linguistic (or discourse) entities, but is also perceivable through other 
senses….  Of course, contrast CAN be explicitly encoded by linguistic items (cf. connectives like 
in/by contrast), but typically contrast in language use arises as a result of conversational 
implicature….278 
He proceeds to define “adversativity,” which he sees as a “strictly linguistic notion that involves contrast 
of a particular sort,” in the following way: 
Contrast between different points of view as these are construed IN LANGUAGE USE.  These points 
of view may correspond to those of the interlocutors in the actual discourse situation, or may 
correspond to other points of view, e.g. general assumptions about “how the world works.”279 
But what purpose is his precision in terminology intended to serve?  From Schwenter’s perspective, 
these definitions “provide a clear basis for distinguishing between pragmatic effects of contrast and 
conventionalized adversativity.”280  He then addresses a particular example in Spanish, namely the 
conjunction “y,” and shows a particular example where the contrast between the conjuncts arises due, 
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not to the conventionalized function of the conjunction, but to the readers’ knowledge about the 
propositions expressed in the conjuncts and their congruence with generally observed realities.281   
Schwenter’s discussion then turns to considerations of particular occurrences in Spanish which 
demonstrate contrast, but not adversativity, as well as instances of exclusive and inclusive (or 
concessive) adversativity.282  The difference between these two types of adversativity is that, on the one 
hand, inclusive adversativity “refers to points of view that are in contrast at some level, yet do not 
exclude each other,”  while on the other hand, exclusive adversativity “results in the exclusion of one of 
the points of view salient in the discourse.”283  These insights are helpful for my investigation, as they 
suggest that I keep open the option for some relationship less than adversative between two conjoined 
conjuncts, even while acknowledging that there is still a contrast between the information present with 
the conjuncts.  Also, the idea that there may be a spectrum of contrast and adversativity between two 
conjuncts is also useful, as it allows for nuance in describing the degree of contrast or opposition 
present. 
E. Rudolph: Correction 
E. Rudolph’s study of adversative and concessive relations provides further details, particularly 
concerning correction, which are of great use in my investigation.  In the context of explaining the 
various types of adversative relations noted within linguistic studies, Rudolph addresses the correction 
relation, noting that this sub-type has been the focus of European studies more than North American 
ones.  She surmises that  
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the reason for this is the fact that in a number of Slavic languages, but also in Spanish and in 
German, one or more adversative connectives are distinguished by their being mainly or 
exclusively used in sentences of correction after a first conjunct containing an explicit negation.284 
I have already noted this division, namely the PA/SN distinction, in the immediately preceding section, 
and I will not rehearse it here.   
Rudolph adds to our conversation by presenting one result arising from the study of this 
distinction and its manifestation in various European languages: namely, the main properties associated 
with correction: 
1. the first conjunct S1 always contains an explicit negation, implicit negations that are integrated 
in the semantic content of the word are deviating, 
2. the domain of the negation is not restricted; it implies pragmatically that the negation disputes 
instead of merely denying the assertion of the first conjunct, 
3. in languages with special conjunctions for indicating the act of correction in the second 
conjunct S2 this conjunction is obligatory and other adversative conjunctions are deviating.285 
Within this list, points 1 and 3 are of special interest to my investigation.  Although I hesitate to use the 
word “always” to describe the frequency with which an explicit negation, such as οὐ or μή, occurs in the 
occurrences of ἀλλά involving correction, I will say with the confidence that this is very nearly the case.  
In the overwhelming majority of cases, there is negation of some sort, whether explicit negation, as 
noted above, or, far less frequently, a negative content item, such as “no one,” “nothing,” etc.  With 
respect to point 3: although the evidence points to the conclusion that ἀλλά is indeed the preferred 
conjunction for “indicating the act of correction,” I cannot assert that it is “obligatory.” 
                                                 
284 Rudolph, Contrast, 141. 
285 Ibid.  Rudolph’s list utilized bullet points, which I have converted to Arabic numerals for the 
sake of easy reference.  Note also that Rudolph uses “S1” to designate the utterance in the first conjunct, 
and “S2” for the utterance in the second. 
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Rudolph interacts favorably with the work of Anscombre and Ducrot, which I have referred to 
previously, and focus on their findings concerning the use of the French mais.  The example she cites 
from their work, with her translation, demonstrate the relevance of their conclusions for my 
investigation: 
(46)  (a)  Il n’est pas français, mais allemande  He is not French but ( = sino) German. 
 (b) Il n’est pas français, mais il parle He is not French but ( = pero) he speaks 
 très bien français    French very well.286 
Commenting on the conclusions of the Anscombre and Ducrot, she remarks,  
the authors emphasize that mais = sino/sondern is always the prolongation of a polemic negation 
introducing a correction of a rejected assertion. 
 One of the syntactic properties of the type of correction is that in many languages the 
second conjunct has to be reduced except for the elements correcting those elements of the first 
conjunct that are affected by the negation.287 
Based upon the observations I have made in the Synoptics, Κοινή Greek appears to follow this last rule 
in general, and I am able to confidently assert that, given a negation or negative content item, and two 
conjuncts joined by ἀλλά involving correction, there will be ellipsis in the second conjunct, resulting in 
the arrangement of elements known within linguistics as “stripping.”288 
Rudolph’s arrives at some very instructive conclusions after examining several scholars’ 
respective studies of adversative relations and correction; she observes the following: 
Looking back on different methodological approaches, one can have the following impression: the 
methods differ, but the results are similar.  The majority of the studies agree in that all the 
classifications and sub-classifications do not describe different meanings of the adversative 
connectives, mainly of but and the corresponding main connective in other languages.  They rather 
                                                 
286 Anscombre and Ducrot, “Deux Mais En Français?,” 34; Rudolph, Contrast, 144.  Emphasis is 
Rudolph’s. 
287 Rudolph, Contrast, 144. 
288 I will discuss this phenomenon in greater detail in the next section covering S. Repp’s 
treatment of gapping, as stripping is, arguably, a subset of, or a particular type of, gapping. 
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describe different functions of one connective that is used as an indicator of a contrast between 
two entities, where the semantic content of these entities and their syntactic form plays a role in 
distinguishing the functions.289 
Applying this to my investigation, I would simply say that only part of all that ἀλλά does within a 
complex of one or more utterances arises from its semantic value, with the majority, if not the 
overwhelming majority, of the effects produced arising pragmatically based upon the negation present, 
the presence or absence of a constant constituent, ellipsis, the preceding and following constituents, etc., 
to speak only of syntactical and grammatical considerations.  When we add the contributions of the co-
text, the context, the genre, the content of the conjuncts, and social and historical considerations, we 
realize that the careful exegete needs to be critically aware of all of these components and their 
respective contributions, as well as the way in which they interact richly to allow authors to 
communicate effectively with the members of their respective audiences. 
S. Repp: Gapping 
S. Repp’s Negation in Gapping offers some insights regarding negation and ellipsis that I have 
found to be helpful for my investigation.  Repp also uses some particular terminology that I have found 
to be suggestive for my own descriptions and analyses, the first and most obvious of which is the term 
“gapping.”  Repp offers the following definition that she characterizes as, in her own terms, “semantic-
pragmatic”: 
Gapping is the coordination of two sentences where the elliptic conjunct copies the anchoring of 
the proposition to the factual world from its non-elliptic antecedent.290 
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Most of this definition is very straightforward, but one part, namely “the anchoring of the proposition to 
the factual world,” will require some brief explanation.  First, let us begin with what we have already 
encountered: namely, ellipsis and conjuncts.  Repp advances the following concerning ellipsis: 
I have argued that gapping is a copying process where the second conjunct is derived from the first 
by sideward movement of material whose phonology has already been spelt out.  The copying 
process is licensed by the requirement to build a convergent structure from a numeration that only 
contains those elements that are visible on the surface of the gapping conjunct.  Elements which 
are not required for the derivation of a convergent structure but are not part of the numeration are 
copied.  Since adjuncts are not required in this sense they are not copied.291 
In connection with this description, Repp asserts this will result in different copying and ellipsis in 
different languages, particularly contrasting German and English, due to how negation is accomplished 
in these respective languages.292  Furthermore, she posits, 
Gapping is a type of ellipsis which in English as well as in other head-initial languages elides the 
finite verb in the second conjunct, and which in strictly head-final languages like Japanese or 
Korean, elides the finite verb in the first conjunct. … In head-final languages where the finite verb 
can also take a non-final position, as is the case in the V2 languages German or Dutch, gapping 
elides the finite verb in the second conjunct.293 
Before I discuss this description and its relevance for my investigation, it will be helpful for the reader to 
understand what is meant by the terms “head” and “head-initial.”  A head may be defined in the 
following manner: 
In a phrase or clause, the word that is obligatory and controls the other words, its dependents. A 
growing number of analysts consider the head of a clause to be a verb. … Prepositions are the 
heads of prepositional phrases; … With respect to meaning heads convey central pieces of 
information and their dependents contribute extra information.294 
                                                 
291 Ibid., 81–2. 
292 Ibid., 4. 
293 Ibid., 6. 
294 Brown and Miller, The Cambridge Dictionary of Linguistics, “head,” 206. 
129 
 
 
 
Head-initial, or “head-first,” refers to the position of the head relative to its modifiers, in accordance 
with the concept of the head “parameter,” which is 
A proposed parameter of Universal Grammar that determines the order of head and dependent for 
a given language. For English the parameter would be set ‘head first’, i.e. the order is head 
followed by modifiers: Preposition + NP as in on the beach, Verb + NP as in invented many 
machines and Det + N as in the cheese, a mouse, our cat (on the assumption that determiners are 
the heads of noun phrases).295 
For her part, Repp provides an expanded description of what a head is in terms of the criteria by which it 
may be identified.296  She notes, “not all of these criteria are relevant in the present context,” and draws 
special attention to two criteria: namely that (1) “it can be the distributional equivalent of its phrase (as 
in VP ellipsis),” and (2) “it is obligatory.”297   
 Repp also employs particular terminology for the various constituents associated with gapped 
sentences, which she helpfully defines early in her work: 
Throughout, I shall use the following terms for the description of gapping sentences.  The elided 
material in the second conjunct is the gap, and the corresponding identical material in the first 
conjunct is the gap’s antecedent.  The remaining overt material in the second conjunct are the 
remnants and the corresponding constituents in the first conjunct, their correlates.  Remnants and 
correlates together are the contrast pairs. 
 Along with the verb, other materials such as direct and indirect objects can be omitted as 
well.  In (1.5), the indirect object is elided in addition to the verb: 
  
 (1.5)  John gave Mary a flower and Bill _ Sue _.298 
Although I find Repp’s terminology suggestive, and I can appreciate the level of detail and thought 
which the selection of these terms must represent, I did not adopt them for my own work.  Instead of 
“gap” and “antecedent,” I used the term “constant” to represent what was explicit in the first conjunct, 
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and either implicit or explicit in the second.  Since it is identical, as Repp notes, and it is repeated, I did 
not find it useful to use a separate label, especially since there are times when the constant is, in fact, 
repeated, and not gapped.  I can also appreciate what Repp is highlighting by classifying material either 
as “remnants” or “correlates,” but I elected instead to use the somewhat simpler notation of either 
“preceding” or “following” based upon whether the contrasted item occurs in the conjunct before the 
ἀλλά (preceding), or in the conjunct after it (following).   
Gapping versus Stripping 
In Repp’s example (1.5) above, the two contrast pairs are (John, Bill) and (Mary, Sue).  The term 
“contrast pair” is a useful label, and as I do not have any simpler, more recognizable term to employ, I 
will use it when I am speaking about both of the contrasted items.  However, this discussion of contrast 
pairs brings us to an important difference between the texts that are of interest in Repp’s study as 
opposed to those with which I have engaged: namely, the issue of how many contrast pairs are present.  
Repp notes the following: 
There are always at least two contrast pairs in gapping.  If the elision of the finite verb and 
additional material leaves only one contrast between the two conjuncts, as for instance in (1.7), the 
result is usually referred to as stripping or bare argument ellipsis.  This type of ellipsis  
usually comes with an extra polarity element (too, not):  
 (1.7) John put sugar on the table, and the salt too. 
Whether stripping is a subtype of gapping or not is controversial.  I shall not be concerned with 
stripping in this study….299 
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I, on the other hand, will be very concerned with stripping in my study, for reasons that should quickly 
become apparent.  The difference between gapping and stripping may be seen clearly in the following 
examples presented by Repp in her discussion of corrections: 
In corrections, the negation, which is obligatory in the first conjunct, has narrow scope.  This holds 
both for stripping, which is the typical correction structure, see (4.1), and gapping, see (4.2): 
 (4.1) Peter is not in Leipzig but in Berlin 
 (4.2) Peter  bewundert  nicht  Luise  sondern  Luise Peter  
  Peter  admires not  Luise  butCORR Luise Peter 
  ‘Peter doesn’t admire Luise: Luise admires Peter.’300 
 Several points from Repp’s comments are important for our investigation.  First, the idea that a 
particular structure may be typical structure used for correction within a particular language is a valuable 
insight; it is also applicable to the study of Κοινή Greek, as shown by the evidence from the Synoptic 
Gospels.  Second, the distinction between ellipsis involving just one contrast pair, which Repp refers to 
as “stripping,” and ellipsis that involves two or more contrast pairs, for which she reserves the term 
“gapping,” is helpful for situating the phenomenon that we are studying in its larger linguistic context.   
Commenting further on these examples, Repp notes the following: 
It has been suggested that in corrections, we are actually dealing with a complex operator not-
but….  Its contribution is usually taken to signal to the addressee that some material is to be 
removed from the discourse record and must be replaced with some alternative provided by the 
speaker.  So corrections are denials that come with a substitution.  For instance, (4.1) above means 
that rather than being in Leipzig (which is denied), Peter is in Berlin.  In the gapping sentence in 
(4.2) the proposition that Peter admires Luise is rejected and corrected subsequently.301 
To be clear, the contrast pair from (4.1) is (Leipzig, Berlin), while the contrast pairs from (4.2) are 
(Peter, Luise) and (Luise, Peter).  The first member of the pair, Leipzig, would be labelled as the 
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preceding constituent according to my schema, while the second member of the pair, Berlin, would be 
labelled as the following constituent.   
It should come as no surprise that many of the occurrences of ἀλλά in the Synoptics occur in 
arrangements that would, according to Repp’s description, be best classified as instances of stripping.  In 
fact, two of the examples included in the introduction, namely Matt 5:17b and Mark 12:27a, are 
recognizable as fairly straightforward examples of stripping, as may be seen in the following: 
Matt 5:17 
Μὴ νομίσητε ὅτι ἦλθον καταλῦσαι τὸν νόμον ἢ τοὺς προφήτας·  
Do not think that I came to destroy the Torah and the Prophets: 
οὐκ ἦλθον καταλῦσαι ἀλλὰ πληρῶσαι. 
I came not to destroy but to fulfill.  OR  I did not come to destroy but to fulfill. 
Mark 12:27 
οὐκ ἔστιν θεὸς νεκρῶν ἀλλὰ ζώντων· πολὺ πλανᾶσθε. 
He is not God of the dead [ones] but of the living [ones]: you are greatly mistaken. 
The typical correction structure noted by Repp, and that we see in these two verses, corresponds to one 
of the patterns, particularly Sub-Pattern 1B1, which I have identified within this work.302 
Gapping, and especially gapping in association with ἀλλά, does not appear to be nearly as 
common as stripping in the Synoptics, but I have identified Matt 10:20 as one such instance: 
       Implicit 
Negation Preceding1 Constant Preceding2 ἀλλά  Following1  Constant  Following2 
οὐ γὰρ   ὑμεῖς   ἐστε  οἱ λαλοῦντες  ἀλλὰ  τὸ πνεῦμα … [ἔστιν] τὸ λαλοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν 
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In this case, the contrast pairs are (ὑμεῖς, τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν) and (οἱ λαλοῦντες, τὸ λαλοῦν), and 
the constant (or antecedent/gap according to Repp’s terminology) is ἐστέ/[ἔστιν].  This identification is 
not without its difficulties, especially given the parallel text in Mark 13:11, in which I have identified as 
part of the constant constituent.  Please see my later discussion of this unusual occurrence, and its 
Marcan parallel, in the section devoted to Matt 10:20//Mark 13:11.   
An even clearer NT example from outside the scope of my investigation is Romans 11:18b: 
Romans 11:18 
μὴ κατακαυχῶ τῶν κλάδων· 
Do not boast against the branches:  
εἰ δὲ κατακαυχᾶσαι   οὐ σὺ τὴν ῥίζαν βαστάζεις ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ῥίζα σέ.  
But if you are boasting‒   you are not bearing the root but rather the root you. 
In this case, the contrast pairs are (σύ, ἡ ῥίζα) and (τὴν ῥίζαν, σέ) and the constant (or antecedent/gap 
according to Repp’s terminology) is βαστάζεις/[βαστάζει].  
Having addressed some of these technical terms with their definitions, and some examples, let us 
return to Repp’s definition of gapping so that we may deal with the DP “the anchoring of the proposition 
to the factual world”  
Gapping is the coordination of two sentences where the elliptic conjunct copies the anchoring of 
the proposition to the factual world from its non-elliptic antecedent.303 
Repp sees both finiteness (of verbs) and complementizers as “anchors” connecting clauses to the 
“factual world,” especially with respect to time: 
Thus, overall, we find that non-finite root clauses are restricted when it comes to temporal 
reference.  This is what we would expect if the finite element is missing and if finiteness is the 
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temporal anchoring of a proposition in the utterance context, or referential anchoring in general.  
This anchoring is missing in non-finite root clauses.304 
In Repp’s view, then, what does anchor non-finite clauses to the factual world?  Repp distinguishes 
between non-finite root clauses and non-finite embedded clauses.  She refers to the clauses in which 
embedded clauses are found as “matrix” clauses.  Hence, she comments, “we may say that an embedded 
non-finite clause receives its anchoring via the matrix clause.  It is dependent on the matrix clause, and 
not linked directly to the extrasentential discourse.”305  But what of non-finite root clauses?  Repp 
asserts that they “must be linked directly to the discourse but the kind of linking that is chosen is subject 
to particular restrictions because of the lack of finiteness features,” and discusses particular examples of 
how this may be accomplished.306 
K. Jasinskaja: Correction 
The articles by K. Jasinskaja are informative for our investigations, as they provide detailed 
treatment of (1) the phenomenon of “correction,” (2) the functions that adversative particles may serve 
in connection with it, and (3) the particular intersection of these two in juxtaposed utterances.307  First, it 
will be useful to see the type of correction that Jasinskaja has in mind, as she distinguishes between 
Type 1 Correction (her designation for this is correction1) and Type 2 Correction (which she similarly 
labels correction2).  She offers the following explanation and example for Type 1 Correction: 
The focus of this paper is on pairs of juxtaposed utterances, such as (1), which express correction. 
I use the term ‘correction’ to refer to a discourse relation between an utterance that explicitly 
negates some proposition in the context, e.g. John didn’t praise Bill, and one that ‘‘replaces’’ the 
‘‘wrong’’ part of that proposition by a ‘‘correct’’ element: he praised Mary. 
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(1) John didn’t praise BILL. He praised MARY.308 
The reader will note that Jasinskaja has marked both “Bill” and “Mary” to indicate that (a) “Bill” is the 
element, in this case the substantive functioning as the direct object of the verb, which is being rejected, 
and that (b) “Mary” is the element that is being proffered as a replacement for “Bill.”  The elements that 
do not change, or are held constant, are the subject (John) and the verb (did praise/praised).   
It is clear from that example that only the element “Bill” is being corrected, with the “correction” 
consisting of its replacement with “Mary.” Jasinskaja adds 
This use of the term ‘correction’ is common in descriptive, typological and some philosophical 
literature on discourse connectives…, where it refers to one of the functions (or meanings, or uses) 
of connectives like the English but, illustrated in (2), or the sole function of 
certain connectives in other languages, e.g. the German sondern, the Spanish sino. Notice that (2) 
expresses the same idea as (1). 
(2) John didn’t praise BILL, but MARY.309 
The reader will note the similarity of Jasinskaja’s last example, (2), to the hypothetical “ideal” 
form of the οὐ...ἀλλά construction including a constant: namely, “οὐ Constant X...ἀλλά [Constant] Y.”  
Of course, this form is not hypothetical with respect to whether it exists or not, as we actually observe 
arrangements similar to or identical with this form in some of the occurrences of ἀλλά within the 
Synoptics.  What I mean by “ideal” here, and what is, in fact, hypothetical, is that this particular 
arrangement is the “paradigm” or the “archetype”310 for the arrangement of the constituents in instances 
where (1) rejection and replacement is intended, and (2) a constant constituent is present.  In Matthew, 
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for example, this is the most frequently observed arrangement: however, this does not guarantee that it is 
the “model” that the writer had in mind when utilizing this construction for “correction.” 
Jasinskaja’s insights concerning pragmatic signals within the text are also relevant for my 
investigation, as she asserts it is not simply the semantic value of an adversative particle that provides a 
signal to the reader that correction is intended: 
…even (1) contains a number of indirect cues that guide the inference of correction, such as 
negation, parallel syntactic structure and substantial overlap of linguistic material of the two 
utterances, as well as their characteristic accentual pattern. However, none of these devices 
encodes correction by convention, therefore the way (1) comes to mean roughly the same as (2) 
must be a matter of pragmatic inference, rather than semantic interpretation. The main goal of this 
paper is to characterise the pragmatic processes behind this inference in precise terms.311 
It is important for us to remember that Jasinskaja’s primary focus is not those circumstances in 
which there is correction and an adversative particle is present.  Commenting on the differences between 
those corrective negations with a conjunction, and those without, she states that  
The central question addressed in this paper is how the correction relation is inferred in examples 
like (1). While the German sondern or the Spanish sino can be assumed to directly encode the 
correction relation in their lexical entry, whereas the English but, as in (2), could be treated as a 
polysemous item, correction being one of its “meanings”, juxtapositive cases like (1) contain no 
linguistic expressions for which correction could be reasonably claimed to constitute 
part of their conventional semantics.312 
Although I am not addressing those negations in the GNT in which there is asyndeton, this would be a 
very interesting study, particularly if it could be shown that a particular author, ceteris paribus, elected 
to express a correction of this nature using asyndeton with juxtaposition rather than by means of ἀλλά. 
I have no firm conjecture at this time as to why this would be done, except the impression that, 
since such a construction requires more cognitive processing on the part of the hearer/reader, it may be 
                                                 
311 Jasinskaja, “Corrective Elaboration,” 52. 
312 Ibid. 
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seen as more marked.  This is only my impression apart from an examination of (1) whether or not such 
instances even exist in a given corpus, (2) the particular occurrences themselves, (3) what in which 
contexts they occur, as opposed to those contexts in which the adversative particle is present, and (4) the 
difference in the pragmatic effects accruing from the absence of the adversative particle, as opposed to 
the presence of the same.  Clearly, the significance of an author’s choice would need to be explored, not 
simply assumed.  For her part, Jasinskaja explains these juxtapositive corrections in terms of their 
similarities to juxtapositive elaborations.313  Her insights would undoubtedly be quite helpful in the 
investigation I have proposed, but not pursued.   
But what of the situation in which the adversative particle is present, in addition to the pragmatic 
signals indicating correction?  Jasinskaja has also provided a detailed treatment of “asymmetric 
correction” involving adversative particles, in which she endeavors to: 
discuss a so far rather understudied phenomenon, which, I will argue, speaks in favour of a unified 
account after all. Adversative markers establish an asymmetry between their conjuncts both in 
argumentative and in corrective uses. In argumentative uses, the second conjunct presents the 
stronger argument. In corrective uses, the first conjunct must contain negation, while the second 
conjunct must be positive. In contrast, corrective uses of additive markers---in languages that 
generally use additive markers to express correction, e.g. Russian, or in languages where additive 
markers can appear in this function along with adversatives---do not show the same asymmetries. 
I will demonstrate that both asymmetries of but can be captured as manifestations of the same 
underlying property within a unified theory of this marker.314 
If Jasinskaja’s claims are correct in general, and applicable to NT Greek in particular, then the 
implications for our investigation of ἀλλά, and particularly for the οὐ...ἀλλά construction, should be 
evident. 
                                                 
313 Ibid., 53–61. 
314 Jasinskaja, “Correction,” 1900. 
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With respect to the emphasis signaled by the use of the οὐ...ἀλλά construction, I have already 
presented the claim that the utterance following ἀλλά is the one that is in focus, elevated in importance 
relative to the first utterance.  The first utterance need not “disappear” completely from what is being 
argued, however.  With respect to the corrective uses mentioned above, Jasinskaja’s assertion that “the 
first conjunct must contain negation, while the second conjunct must be positive” fits exactly what we 
see happening with the οὐ...ἀλλά construction in many, if not most, of the occurrences in the Synoptics. 
I have already discussed the importance of one species of correction, namely Type 1 Correction, 
to my own investigation.  Jasinskaja also presents a useful description of Type 2 Correction, together 
with examples of both types of correction within a discourse: 
This use of the term (henceforth correction1) should not be confused with another use 
(correction2), more common in the literature on discourse relations…, where it refers to the 
relation between, on the one hand, the utterance or sequence of utterances providing the 
correct information and on the other, the incorrect utterance, usually by a different speaker. 
Correction1 and correction2 often go together. In (3), for instance, correction1 is the relation that 
holds between β and γ, whereas correction2 relates the <β, γ >-sequence to α. However, the two 
relations also occur independently: (4) is an instance of correction2 without correction1, and (5) 
exemplifies pure correction1 between the embedded segments α and β. 
 
(3)  A:  John praised Bill. (α) 
 B:  He didn’t praise BILL. (β) 
  He praised MARY. (γ) 
(4)  A:  John praised Bill. 
 B:  He praised MARY! 
(5)  John praised Bill.  
 If he hadn’t praised Bill (α) but Mary (β), I would have been very much surprised. 
I have noted previously that most of the instances of negation with which I am engaging, and in 
particular those involving correction, do not involve the correction of some part of one speaker’s 
utterance by another speaker’s utterance, or Type 2 Correction.  Rather, most of the instances involve 
Type 1 Correction, in which both utterances are from one speaker, with some constituent from the first 
139 
 
 
 
utterance negated, and the second utterance proffering the replacement for the rejected constituent.  
Jasinskaja’s presentation careful distinction is thus helpful for my investigation. 
M.A.K Halliday: Ellipsis and Continuous Information 
The contributions of M.A.K. Halliday’s work to my investigation are twofold, and include both 
(1) the insights arising from his engagement with the phenomenon of ellipsis, as well as (2) the 
taxonomy he proposes regarding the underlying hypotactic and paratactic relationships between clauses 
in a “clause-complex,” and how these relationships are often signaled by some connective particles 
and/or phrases. 
First, with respect to ellipsis, Halliday discusses the characteristics of material which is ellipsed, 
as opposed to the material which is not.  He notes the following: 
Another form of anaphoric cohesion in the text is achieved by ELLIPSIS, where we 
presuppose something by means of what is left out. Like all cohesive agencies, ellipsis 
contributes to the semantic structure of the discourse. But unlike reference, which is itself 
a semantic relation, ellipsis sets up a relationship that is not semantic but lexicogrammatical 
– a relationship in the wording rather than directly in the meaning.315 
                                                 
315 Halliday, Introduction to Functional Grammar, 635.  In his example which follows these 
comments, Halliday shows how the reader is required to provide a noun phrase from the preceding co-
text to understand to what the following pronoun is referring.  His example is as follows: “Attacks on 
our information systems, use of weapons of mass destruction, domestic and international terrorism, and 
even man-made environmental disasters are all examples of asymmetric threats [[ that could be 
employed against us]]. Indeed, some [∅: asymmetric threats] already have.”    His use of double 
brackets, [[ ]], indicates a “rankshifted (embedded) clauses,” while his use of the null set symbol in 
conjunction with the single brackets indicates an “element of structure ellipsed,” with his proposal for 
the same following, with this ellipsed element being classified as a “rankshifted (embedded) phrase.”  
Please see his “Conventions” on pages ix-xi for a detailed explanation of these symbols and their uses. 
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Halliday is particularly detailed in his treatment of the use of ellipsis within direct, turn-based discourse, 
in which one or more of the speakers ellipse some material, either from their own previous utterances, or 
the previous utterances of their dialogue partner(s).   
Such uses of ellipsis do not map exactly to those I have encountered in my investigation.  On the 
contrary, I would argue that in the majority of such occurrences it is a single speaker who ellipses a 
constituent, phrase, etc. from his own utterance.  Usually, the utterance thus ellipsed (1) precedes the 
conjunction ἀλλά, and (2) is negated.  The ellipsis requires that the constituent or phrase be supplied by 
the hearer(s)/reader(s) mentally to understand a second, usually related utterance.  I will deal with this in 
some detail later.  At this point, however, my interest is in Halliday’s insights into the phenomenon of 
ellipsis in general, and the potential utility of these insights for our understanding of ellipsis in the 
οὐ...ἀλλά constructions in the Synoptic Gospels. 
Halliday helpfully distinguishes between material that is ellipsed and that which is not, offering 
the following explanation of the relationship between “prominence” and ellipsis: 
Ellipsis marks the textual status of continuous information within a certain grammatical structure. 
At the same time, the non-ellipsed elements of that structure are given the status of being 
contrastive in the environment of continuous information. Ellipsis thus assigns differential 
prominence to the elements of a structure: if they are non-prominent (continuous), they are 
ellipsed; if they are prominent (contrastive), they are present. The absence of elements through 
ellipsis is an iconic realization of lack of prominence.316 
Halliday’s explanation informs our understanding of how we should view the ellipsed constituents.  I 
have referred to the ellipsed constituents as the “constant” or the “constant constituents,” indicating that 
they are known to the hearer/reader since they have been mentioned in the co-text preceding the text in 
question.  Alternative labels that could be equally useful are “continuous” or “continuous 
                                                 
316 Ibid. 
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constituent(s).”  Although I have not elected to pursue this alternative labelling scheme, I find Halliday’s 
articulation of this link between ellipsis and the continuous nature of the information valuable: as such, I 
have incorporated this understanding into some of my explanations for various instances of ellipsis 
encountered. 
Up to this point in my work, I have focused mainly on the “what” of ellipsis, without addressing 
much of the “why” behind it.  I have found no better explanation for the very existence of ellipsis as a 
phenomenon, or the challenges arising from its presence in communication, than that of J. Merchant: 
Various forms of ellipsis are pervasive in natural language—words and phrases that by rights 
should be in the linguistic signal go missing?  How is this possible? 
 It is possible because ellipsis is parasitic on redundancy: to paraphrase Wittgenstein, 
‘wovon man nicht sprechen muß, darüber kann man schweigen’.317  Elliptical processes capitalize 
on the redundancy of certain kinds of information in certain contexts, and permit an economy of 
expression by omitting the linguistic structures that would otherwise be required to express this 
information.318 
Although Merchant does not explicitly mention the G.K. Zipf, whose work I discussed briefly in my 
previous treatment of L. Horn’s discussion of implicature, he is clearly advancing a proposal that is 
consonant with, if not derivative from, Zipf’s presentation: 
Such redundancy is a general property of biological systems, and is exploited by numerous other 
systems as well (compression algorithms being one contemporary example).  But there will always 
be a competition between economy of expression (speaker-based least-effort principles) and the 
requirement that the output expression be usable (that is, interpretable) in the intended way (hearer-
based least-effort principles).  The use of ellipsis by a speaker is obviously more economical from 
the speaker’s standpoint….  By the same token, interpreting elliptical utterances is concomitantly 
more work for the hearer, since a meaning must be derived from no overt linguistic signal. 
                                                 
317 As opposed to “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.” My 
translation of Merchant’s paraphrase: “Whereof one must not speak, thereof one can be silent.” 
318 Jason Merchant, The Syntax of Silence: Sluicing, Islands, and the Theory of Ellipsis, Oxford 
Studies in Theoretical Linguistics 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1. 
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 These competing demands on the language system ensure that it will resemble various 
other systems selected for optimizing resource allocation.  The widespread use of ellipsis in natural 
languages is, from this standpoint, natural and expected: an obvious method to exploit 
redundancies in a system while maintaining usability.319 
Let us combine the idea of the exploitation of redundancy into the ongoing discussions of both (1) 
Halliday, concerning continuous information and (2) Horn, concerning both conversational implicature 
and negation.  Doing so allows us to see that, in order to understand what is being communicated by an 
utterance, we need to note not only what is ellipsed, but also whether or not there is ellipsis at all.  The 
very presence or absence of ellipsis can mean the difference between corrective versus contrastive 
negation constructions. 
I will now move on to briefly consider Halliday’s second contribution to my investigation: 
namely, his taxonomy of the relationships between clauses within clausal complexes.320  One of these 
relationships, “expansion,” is of particular interest for the purpose of our investigation.  Halliday 
proposes the following description of the “expansion” of a clause: … given a clause (or part of a clause 
or complex, if there is nesting) then this may enter into construction with another clause (or part of a 
clause complex) that is an expansion of it, the two together forming a clause nexus.”321  He further 
proposes that this expansion can take place by any of three, sometimes overlapping, means: namely, 
elaboration, extension, and enhancement.322   
I would like to dwell very briefly upon Halliday’s treatment of one of these means: namely, 
extension.  Halliday asserts that “In extension, one clause extends the meaning of another by adding 
something new to it,” while “what is added may be just an addition, or else a replacement, or an 
                                                 
319 Ibid., 1–2. 
320 Halliday, Introduction to Functional Grammar, 438, esp. Figure 7–3. 
321 Ibid., 460. 
322 Ibid. 
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alternative.”323  Not unexpectedly, Halliday introduces a category for each of these possibilities: namely, 
addition, variation, and alternation, respectively.324  In his description of “variation,” Halliday proposes 
that in this relation “one clause is presented as being in total or partial replacement of another.”325   
Under this category of variation, then, Halliday proposes two sub-categories: “replacive” and 
“subtractive.”  Regarding this “replacive relation,” he observes that “clauses related in this way often 
differ in polarity value, one being ‘positive’ and the other ‘negative.’”326  This accords strongly with 
what I have observed in many of the occurrences of ἀλλά, as either a negation or negative content item 
is often present before the first utterance, with no negation or negative content item present in the second 
utterance. 
Although Halliday’s treatment engages with English examples and usage, many of the linguistic 
insights appear to be applicable to the Κοινή Greek of the NT, as well, and are thus valuable for my later 
treatment regarding constituent and propositional negation. 
Yan Huang: Pragmatics; Conversational and Conventional Implicature 
I have resisted the temptation to include even more references to Y. Huang’s important works327 
in response to the various assertions and insights presented above than I already have.  I feel that my 
reservation has been fully justified, as Huang’s contributions to our discussion are less in the forms of 
either responses or positions opposing those previously offered, and more in the form of information 
providing useful contexts, definitions, and/or terminology for the discussion already taking place.  In 
                                                 
323 Ibid., 471.  Emphasis is Halliday’s. 
324 Ibid., 471, esp. Table 7–9. 
325 Ibid., 473. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Huang, Dictionary of Pragmatics; Huang, Pragmatics. 
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fact, several of these contributions will be in the form of definitions for some terms that we have already 
encountered, and will continue to encounter, in the course of this work. 
The first definitions of importance to our investigation are those of (1) pragmatics and (2) 
semantics.  In particular, it will be useful to us to distinguish, as much as is possible, between those 
things that are “pragmatic,” and those that are “semantic.”  Huang provides a general definition for 
pragmatics, stating that it is “the systematic study of meaning by virtue of, or dependent on, the use of 
language.  The central topics of inquiry in pragmatics include implication, presupposition, speech act, 
deixis, and reference.”328  Pragmatics as a field of inquiry takes its place within a hierarchy of related but 
distinct pursuits under the aegis of semiotics, or the study of signs.  The hierarchy, from the least 
abstract (most concrete) to the most abstract (least concrete) consists of (1) pragmatics, (2) semantics, 
and, finally, (3) syntax.329  Commenting on this hierarchy, Huang helpfully explains that 
According to this typology, syntax is the study of the formal relation of one sign with another, 
semantics deals with the relation of the signs to what they denote, and pragmatics addresses the 
relation of signs to what their uses and interpreters.330 
But what of the intersection of the “semantic” and the “pragmatic” in particular utterances?  Is there a 
tidy demarcation between the two, a clear definition of jurisdiction where the influence of one ends and 
the influence of the other begins?  Apparently not, as Huang notes in his treatment on the relationship 
between the two.  A full engagement with the ongoing linguistic debate is beyond the scope of this 
work.  However, it will be useful for our investigation to at least sketch the contours of the discussion. 
                                                 
328 Huang, Pragmatics, 2. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Ibid. 
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Huang gives thorough attention the various proposals that have been offered to define and 
explain the semantic versus pragmatic distinction.331  He settles on three of the strongest proposals, 
which he sees as “…(i) truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional meaning, (ii)  conventional versus 
non-conventional meaning, and (iii) context dependence versus context dependence...,”332 and 
challenges the ability of each to properly mark the semantic/pragmatic boundary.333  Although he refutes 
these proposals, he does not intend to leave his reader with the impression that no distinction between 
semantics and pragmatics can be made. 
Following the proposal of F. Recanati,334 Huang offers different criteria for discerning the 
outline of pragmatic territory.  He presents what he sees as the three “essential features of pragmatic 
interpretation”: namely, (1) charity, (2) non-monotonicity, and (3) holism, which together give 
pragmatic interpretation its “hermeneutic character.”335  His discussion of these three is helpful: 
By charity is meant that a pragmatic interpretation is possible only if we presuppose that the 
interlocutors are rational.  Secondly, there is non-monotonicity.  This amounts to saying that a 
pragmatic interpretation is defeasible or cancellable.  The third and final property identified by 
Recanati is holism.  Given the feature of defeasibility or cancellability of a pragmatic 
interpretation, there is virtually no limit to the amount of contextual information that can in 
principle affect such an interpretation.336 
                                                 
331 Ibid., 299–300. 
332 Ibid., 300. 
333 Ibid., 300–303. 
334 François Recanati, “Pragmatics and Semantics,” in The Handbook of Pragmatics, ed. 
Laurence R. Horn and Gregory L. Ward, Blackwell Handbooks in Linguistics 16 (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2004), 442–62. 
335 Huang, Pragmatics, 303. 
336 Ibid. 
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This next series includes definitions for (1) the sentence, (2) the utterance, and (3) the 
proposition, respectively.  As will be quickly apparent to the reader, in Huang’s treatment these 
definitions are interdependent; hence my grouping of them together here: 
A sentence is a well-formed string of words put together by the grammatical rules of a language.  
As a unit of the language system, it is an abstract entity or construct defined within a theory of 
grammar. …  
 By contrast, an utterance is a particular piece of language—be it a word, a phrase, a 
sentence, or a sequence of sentences—spoken or written by a particular speaker or writer in a 
particular context on a particular occasion.  In other words, it is a situated instance of language use 
which is partially contextually, culturally, and/or socially conditioned.  It constitutes an occurrence 
of language behavior on the part of a speaker or writer. … 
 Finally, there is the notion of a proposition.  A proposition is what is expressed by a 
declarative sentence when that sentence is used to make a statement, that is, to say something, true 
or false, about some state of affairs in the external world.  Put the other way around, a declarative 
sentence, when uttered to make a statement, is said to convey a proposition.337 
For the purposes of my work, all of the texts of the NT which I engage with are, according to the 
definitions advanced by Huang, to be considered utterances.   
This understanding is critically important for my work, as I am attempting to engage with the 
“utterance-meaning” (or “speaker-meaning”) represented by each of these utterances, as opposed to the 
“sentence-meaning” conveyed by the sentences.  As Huang notes, the “sentence-meaning” as such, 
“refers to those aspects of meaning that are ascribed to the sentence in the abstract, that is, a sentence 
independent of its realization in any concrete form.”338  I am not pursuing such an inquiry here, and in 
fact, as Huang explains, “the study of sentence-meaning normally belongs to semantics.”339     
                                                 
337 Ibid., 13–4. Emphasis is Huang’s. 
338 Ibid., 13. 
339 Ibid. 
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What then, can be said concerning “utterance-meaning” and its importance for our present 
inquiry?  Huang states that the utterance-meaning is “definable as what a speaker intends to convey by 
making an utterance…” and that “the study of utterance-meaning normally falls under pragmatics.”340  
Clearly we are not seeking an abstracted meaning for ἀλλά apart from any context: it is doubtful that 
anyone reading this would think so.  But what may not be so clear to every reader is that we are also not 
seeking an abstracted “sentence-meaning” for the sentences in which ἀλλά occurs.  
These uses of ἀλλά are contextually conditioned, as are the sentences in which they occur.  They 
should not be divorced conceptually from their context, as they are properly understood in, and 
interacting with, the other elements present within their respective co-texts and contexts.  Further and 
finally, we should not look for, nor settle for, explanations that are largely semantic or that rely on 
semantic ambiguity when, in fact, the effects observed are largely pragmatic in their origins and 
character.341   
Slightly less theoretical than Huang’s previous contributions to our discussion is his definition of 
a conjunction, which he gives as, 
A term of logic which refers to the joining together of two propositions or sentences p and q to 
obtain a proposition or sentence in the form of p & q.  The propositions or sentences p and q are 
in this context described as conjuncts.342 
                                                 
340 Ibid., 14. 
341 Cf. Stephanie L. Black, Sentence Conjunctions in the Gospel of Matthew: καί, δέ, τότε, γάρ, 
οὖν, and Asyndeton in Narrative Discourse, JSNTSup 216 (London: Sheffield Academic, 2002), 51–7.  
Stephanie Black’s excellent discussion of conjunctions and their contributions to the texts in which they 
occur is very helpful, especially her elaboration, following Blakemore, of the difference between 
“procedural” and “conceptual” meaning.   
342 Huang, Dictionary of Pragmatics, 62. 
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Especially relevant to our discussion is the term “conjunct,” which I will use to describe those elements 
within an utterance that are being connected by the conjunction ἀλλά. 
One last point of discussion from Huang will also be helpful for our consideration of ἀλλά.  As 
noted in our engagement with Jasinskaja’s work, above, there is an ongoing and lively discussion 
regarding the English conjunction but, and the relationship that it signals between the conjuncts it joins.  
This discussion is not limited to English, and in fact touches upon equivalent or near-equivalent 
conjunctions in several other languages.  Key to our discussion is the idea of conventional versus 
conversational implicature.  Huang briefly describes conventional implicature as  
…a non-truth-conditional meaning which is not derivable in any general considerations of co-
operation and rationality from the saying of what is said, but arises solely because of the 
conventional features attached to particular lexical and/or linguistic constructions.343   
Huang observes that, in English, one of the lexical items said to “trigger” a conventional implicature is 
but. 
Unfortunately, the very existence of conventional implicature is the subject of continuing debate. 
Huang ably gives the contours of the opposition to conventional implicature, as well as recent arguments 
in favor of it.  Further, he helpfully offers a description of the general characteristics associated with 
conventional implicature, leaving in question if the phenomenon should (1) be located firmly in the 
realm of either the semantic (following the work of C. Potts344); or (2) be viewed as having both 
                                                 
343 Huang, Pragmatics, 73. 
344 Christopher Potts, The Logic of Conventional Implicatures, Oxford Studies in Theoretical 
Linguistics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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semantic and pragmatic characteristics (following the contrary assertions of L. Horn345), occupying a 
precarious position somehow balanced at their interface.346   
These are not the only possibilities being advanced, as has been made clear by an alternative 
perspective presented by L. Vicente.  In his engagement with the two semantic values of but (corrective 
and counterexpectational), Vicente comments, “the semantic/pragmatic difference between corrective 
and counterexpectational but also has a reflection in syntax.”347  Although I did not choose to engage 
Vicente’s paper extensively in this survey of secondary sources, I should note that he also addresses the 
issue of ellipses, especially in connection with the use of counterexpectational but.348  He endeavors to 
“defend the hypothesis that corrective but (sino) always requires clause-level coordination, with an 
optional subsequent step of ellipsis.  On the other hand, counterexpectational but can directly coordinate 
subclausal constituents (DPs, bare adjectives, etc.) without resorting to ellipsis.”349 
                                                 
345 Laurence R. Horn, “Toward a Fregean Pragmatics: Voraussetzung, Nebengedanke, 
Andeutung,” in Explorations in Pragmatics: Linguistic, Cognitive and Intercultural Aspects, ed. 
Laurence R. Horn and Istvan Kecskes, Mouton Series in Pragmatics 1 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007), 39–69. 
346 Huang, Pragmatics, 73–7. 
347 Luis Vicente, “On the Syntax of Adversative Coordination,” Natural Language & Linguistic 
Theory 28 (2010): 381, 383. 
348 Ibid., 383, 385, 390–1, 394–403. 
349 Ibid., 383. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Occurrences of ἀλλά Found in All of the Synoptic Gospels 
This chapter is devoted to consideration of the nine occurrences of ἀλλά that are found in 
all of the Synoptics.350   For the convenience of the reader, I have listed these parallel 
occurrences below: 
1. Matt 8:4  //Mark 1:44  //Luke 5:14 
2. Matt 9:12  //Mark 2:17  //Luke 5:31 
3. Matt 9:13  //Mark 2:17  //Luke 5:32 
4. Matt 9:17  //Mark 2:22  //Luke 5:38 
5. Matt 9:24  //Mark 5:39  //Luke 8:52 
6. Matt 20:26  //Mark 10:43  //Luke 22:26 
7. Matt 22:32  //Mark 12:27  //Luke 20:38 
8. Matt 24:6  //Mark 13:7  //Luke 21:9 
9. Matt 26:39  //Mark 14:36  //Luke 22:42 
My organization of this chapter is based upon these parallel sets, with one section devoted to 
each.  Based upon the various similarities and differences between the members of the respective 
sets, I have elected, at times, to focus first either on one representative member or two very 
similar members, and then treat either all of the members of the set together, or focus on certain 
members of the set that diverge from the others significantly.   
My objectives in examining these are, in order of priority, (1) to observe the various 
possible functions of ἀλλά; (2) to identify and (3) to comment on the patterns of arrangement of 
constituents associated with these respective functions; and (4) to compare and (5) to contrast 
                                                 
350 Please refer to Tables 1-3 in the previous chapter, or in Appendix 4, to see the 
complete listing of these parallel texts from the perspective of each of the Synoptics. 
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each Gospel’s presentation of each parallel occurrence.  Points (1), (2) and (3) should require no 
further explanation for the reader.  Points (4) and (5), however, may: given my assumption of 
Marcan priority.  I will, in those instances in which it is appropriate, comment on the adherence 
to, or departure from, the Marcan source text observed in the Matthean and Lucan versions.    
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The Texts and Their Associated Patterns 
Matt 8:4//Mark 1:44//Luke 5:14 and Pattern 2—The “No Constant” Pattern 
The parallel texts in Matt 8:4, Mark 1:44, and Luke 5:14 provide us with clear examples 
of the arrangement that I have labelled Pattern 2, or the “No Constant” Pattern.351  I will first 
engage the occurrence found in Mark 1:44 together with its Matthean parallel, namely Matt 8:4.  
After this, I will expand my treatment to include the last text of this parallel set, Luke 5:14.   
Matt 8:4//Mark 1:44 
The texts from the Marcan and Matthean versions appear below: 
Matthew 8:4 ὅρα μηδενὶ εἴπῃς,  ἀλλὰ  
ὕπαγε σεαυτὸν  
δεῖξον τῷ ἱερεῖ καὶ  
προσένεγκον  τὸ δῶρον  
ὃ προσέταξεν Μωϋσῆς,  
εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς. 
Mark 1:44 ὅρα μηδενὶ μηδὲν εἴπῃς, ἀλλὰ  
ὕπαγε σεαυτὸν  
δεῖξον τῷ ἱερεῖ καὶ  
προσένεγκε  περὶ τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ σου  
ἃ προσέταξεν Μωϋσῆς,  
εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς 
Note that Mark’s version of this command has μηδὲν in addition to μηδενὶ.  In this case, the 
combined effect of the negative content elements μηδενὶ and is the production of a command to 
“say/speak nothing to no one” or, in conformance to the English avoidance of the double 
                                                 
351 I discussed this pattern in some detail in the Introduction, in the section devoted to the 
descriptions of the patterns and their respective functions. 
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negative, “say/speak nothing to anyone” or “do not say anything to anyone….” This would then 
be followed by “…rather, go, show yourself….” 
As may be noted in the relevant charts located in Appendix 2, I have indicated that there 
is no constant constituent present in either Matt 8:4 or in Mark 1:44.  However, as I have also 
placed “εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς” in parentheses with a question mark, some explanation is 
appropriate.  There is little doubt that the prepositional phrase signals the purpose of going to the 
priests and presenting the offerings prescribed: this complex of actions would be, or would 
function as,352 a witness to them.  I have already covered several examples where the constant 
from the first utterance is implied elliptically for the second utterance. There is a question 
remaining in my mind as to whether or not the prepositional phrase “εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς” is 
implied elliptically after the preceding constituent μηδενὶ μηδὲν εἴπῃς (or μηδενὶ εἴπῃς for Matt 
8:4).   
If this were the case, then the thrust of the argument would be that the one cleansed 
should not say anything to anyone as a witness to them, but go, show himself to the priest, and 
present for/on the occasion of his cleansing what Moses commanded, as a witness to them.  The 
rejected and replaced constituent under these circumstances is a verbal witness to the man’s 
cleansing.  Instead, the presentation of himself, together with a sacrifice in accordance with the 
Mosaic mandate, will be the witness. 
If we were to follow this line of thinking, a reclassification of this occurrence would be 
necessary.  As I mentioned in my discussion of Matt 19:6 above, I originally identified another 
sub-pattern, 1A2, in which the constant constituent occurred explicitly after ἀλλά, but was 
                                                 
352 BDAG, 290. 
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implied elliptically before the same.  The general form of this hypothetical sub-pattern would be 
as follows: 
*Pattern 1A2:  
Following Constituent Occurs Before the Constant Constituent, Which is After the ἀλλά.  
 
  
Implicit (Elliptical)? 
Negation Preceding  ἀλλά  Following  Constant 
μηδενὶ μηδὲν     εἴπῃς   ἀλλὰ  ὕπαγε…  εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς 
I use the term “hypothetical” as there are no other occurrences of such pattern within Matthew or 
Mark, save the questionable Sub-Pattern 1B2, which is based upon Matt 19:6//Mark 10:8.  As 
such, it would be highly unusual for the constant constituent to appear explicitly after ἀλλά, and 
implicitly before the same.  This does not rule out a determination that this is, in fact, what is 
happening in this text: it does, however, make it extremely unlikely.  As such, I have held with 
my categorization of this occurrence as Sub-Pattern 2A.  We will now turn to the final text of the 
parallel set, namely Luke 5:14.  
Matt 8:4//Mark 1:44//Luke 5:14 
Given all that we have learned in our exploration of the parallel occurrences of ἀλλά 
found in Matt 8:4 and Mark 1:44, I want to make clear that everything I have just presented 
concerning the presence and backward ellipsis of εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς, which is also present in 
our text in Luke, is also applicable here.   
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The text of Luke 5:14, which is our particular interest here, may be arranged as follows: 
καὶ αὐτὸς παρήγγειλεν αὐτῷ  
μηδενὶ εἰπεῖν,    ἀλλὰ  ἀπελθὼν  
δεῖξον   σεαυτὸν τῷ ἱερεῖ  
καὶ προσένεγκε   
περὶ τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ σου  
καθὼς προσέταξεν Μωϋσῆς,  
εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς. 
To allow us to better compare and contrast Luke 5:14 with the parallel accounts engaged above, I 
have included our texts from Matthew and Mark below: 
 
Matthew 8:4 Mark 1:44 Luke 5:14 
καὶ  καὶ  καὶ  
  αὐτὸς παρήγγειλεν 
λέγει  λέγει   
αὐτῷ αὐτῷ· αὐτῷ 
ὁ Ἰησοῦς·   
ὅρα ὅρα  
μηδενὶ  μηδενὶ  μηδενὶ  
 μηδὲν  
εἴπῃς, εἴπῃς, εἰπεῖν, 
ἀλλὰ ἀλλὰ ἀλλὰ 
  ἀπελθὼν 
ὕπαγε ὕπαγε  
σεαυτὸν δεῖξον τῷ ἱερεῖ  σεαυτὸν δεῖξον τῷ ἱερεῖ δεῖξον σεαυτὸν τῷ ἱερεῖ 
καὶ προσένεγκον  καὶ προσένεγκε καὶ προσένεγκε 
τὸ δῶρον περὶ τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ σου  περὶ τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ σου 
ὃ προσέταξεν Μωϋσῆς, ἃ προσέταξεν Μωϋσῆς, καθὼς προσέταξεν Μωϋσῆς, 
εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς. εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς. εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς.  
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We observe the use of the infinitive (εἰπεῖν) as if both the initial prohibition and subsequent 
commands will be reported as indirect discourse.  However, there is a change in the utterance 
following ἀλλά as the text clearly shifts to direct discourse.  Regarding this, Culy et al. 
comments, “as is fairly common in Hellenistic texts, the preceding indirect discourse gives way 
to direct discourse.”353 
Given my previous assertions and discussions regarding the usual presence of negation or 
a negative content term in connection with ἀλλά, the reader will surely note that this arrangement 
of constituents is not within either an οὐ...ἀλλά or a μή...ἀλλά construction.  However, there is a 
negative content term, in this case the negative pronoun μηδενί, marking the beginning of the 
construction.  The effect of the command “to speak to no one” is “to not speak to anyone.”  And 
it is that contrast between the prohibition of the preceding clause and the positive commands of 
the following clauses that appears to be signaled by the use of ἀλλά.   
If the preceding clause is not seen as a prohibition, but as a positive command, then it is 
difficult to imagine what any of these writers thought of the use of ἀλλά, as it would simply be a 
coordinating conjunction used only between the first in a string of commands and the subsequent 
commands.  This simply will not do: the negative element contained within this first utterance is 
important here in Luke.  We see the rejection of the idea of speaking to anyone, expressed as the 
command to speak to no one, and then the replacement of that idea with alternate commands.  As 
such, ἀλλά signals the shift from prohibitions “against X” to directives “to Y and Z and ….”   
                                                 
353 Martin M. Culy, Mikeal C. Parsons, and Joshua J. Stigall, Luke: A Handbook on the 
Greek Text, BHGNT (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010), 163. 
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There is a parallel, albeit an imperfect one, in Luke’s altered version.  There is a verb 
with a dative indirect object in both utterances connected by ἀλλά: namely, εἰπεῖν and μηδενί in 
the first utterance, and δεῖξον and τῷ ἱερεῖ in the second utterance.  However, the parallel is most 
clearly expressed in the Marcan version, where, as I noted in my earlier treatment of Mark 1:44, 
the prohibition is against saying anything to anyone. In Mark’s version, there is a verb (ὅρα … 
εἴπῃς and δεῖξον) with a dative indirect object (μηδενὶ and τῷ ἱερεῖ) and an accusative direct object 
(μηδὲν and σεαυτὸν) on either side of ἀλλά.   
Matt 9:12//Mark 2:17//Luke 5:31 and Pattern 1C 
Matt 9:12//Mark 2:17//Luke 5:31  
I will now turn to the parallel texts found in Matt 9:12, Mark 2:17 and Luke 5:31.  Due to 
the similarity of these texts, my treatment of them will be combined, and my comments 
applicable to all.  First, it will be helpful to see the relevant texts in parallel: 
Matthew 9:12b οὐ χρείαν ἔχουσιν  οἱ ἰσχύοντες  ἰατροῦ ἀλλ᾽ οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες 
Mark 2:17b  οὐ χρείαν ἔχουσιν  οἱ ἰσχύοντες  ἰατροῦ ἀλλ᾽ οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες 
Luke 5:31b  οὐ χρείαν ἔχουσιν  οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες  ἰατροῦ ἀλλὰ οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες 
Next, it may help to view the graphical representation of this verse, using the identical text found 
in both Matt 9:12 and Mark 2:17: 
 
Negation Constant Preceding Constant  ἀλλά  Following 
οὐ   χρείαν ἔχουσιν  οἱ ἰσχύοντες  ἰατροῦ   ἀλλ᾽   οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες 
The hypothetical reconstruction, with ellipsed constituents included, is as follows: 
*οὐ χρείαν ἔχουσιν οἱ ἰσχύοντες ἰατροῦ  ἀλλ᾽  χρείαν ἔχουσιν οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες ἰατροῦ 
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Given the remarkable similarity of this saying in all of the Synoptics (with the exception 
of οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες noted above), and holding (lightly) to Marcan priority, it would appear that 
Luke, like Matthew, simply followed the order of the constituents as they occurred in Mark’s 
text.  So the question naturally arises as to whether or not Mark intended to emphasize any 
constituent(s) by using this arrangement.  I am not able to determine, with certainty, such an 
intention on his part.  Further, given that the other writers who utilized Mark’s gospel as a source 
kept his arrangement, it is not unreasonable to assume that he, too, followed the arrangement 
delivered to him by his source(s)/witness(es).  This arrangement may reflect some desire to 
emphasize a constituent.  However, it may simply be the way that the witness heard it, either 
firsthand, or from another source.   
Of course I am not able to speak with certainty regarding the sources behind Mark’s 
gospel.  What I am able to do, however, is examine the text available to us: it is to this 
examination I now turn. 
The combined graphical analysis for these texts is as follows: 
 
Neg. Constant Preceding Constant ἀλλά Following 
Matt 9:12b οὐ  χρείαν ἔχουσιν  οἱ ἰσχύοντες  ἰατροῦ  ἀλλ᾽  οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες 
Mark 2:17b οὐ  χρείαν ἔχουσιν  οἱ ἰσχύοντες  ἰατροῦ  ἀλλ᾽  οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες 
Luke 5:31b οὐ  χρείαν ἔχουσιν  οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες  ἰατροῦ  ἀλλ᾽354  οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες 
Despite the difference involving Luke’s use of οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες, the arrangement of the 
constituents of the οὐ...ἀλλά construction is consistent among the Synoptics, and follows the 
                                                 
354 There is a change to ἀλλ᾽ in the NA28 from ἀλλά in the NA27. 
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pattern that I have designated Sub-Pattern 1C, which is characterized by the presence of constant 
constituent that (1) appears explicitly in the first utterance, (2) is interrupted, or “split,” by the 
preceding constituent, and (3) is ellipsed in the second utterance. For each of these occurrences, 
the constant constituent is “χρείαν ἔχουσιν … ἰατροῦ.”  The genitive form of ἰατρός modifies 
χρείαν, which in turn is the object of the verb ἔχουσιν.  This constant in is then implied in the 
utterance following ἀλλά, as Culy et al. also note in their comments on οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες, saying 
that it is the “nominative subject of an implied (χρείαν) ἔχουσιν (ἰατροῦ).”355  The sense in both 
utterances is “…[they] have need … of a physician….”   
With respect to the arrangement of the constituents and possible emphasis arising from it, 
I note that the utterance occurring before ἀλλά has a VSO (Verb-Subject-Object) arrangement, 
which is not particularly remarkable.  The reader may profitably consult Levinsohn’s comments 
on and discussion regarding “verb-initial” clauses and the VSO arrangement of constituents 
within clauses.356  In utilizing Pattern 1C, the author appears to be splitting some portion of the 
constant constituent in order to increase the prominence of one part or portion of it, bringing the 
same into focus.  In particular, I am referring to the fronting of χρείαν to the slot immediately 
preceding the verb ἔχουσιν.  My use of the term “focus” is the same as that of Levinsohn, who, 
following Dik, describes “focus” as “what is relatively the most important…information in the 
given setting.”357   
                                                 
355 Culy, Parsons, and Stigall, Luke, 176. 
356 Levinsohn, Discourse Features, 16–17. 
357 Kathleen Callow, Discourse Considerations in Translating the Word of God (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 1974), 52; Simon C. Dik, Functional Grammar (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1978), 19; Levinsohn, Discourse Features, 7. 
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If we were to take the VSO arrangement of constituents as the default, unmarked 
arrangement here (and there are, we should note, questions as to whether or not we should do 
so),358 then we might have expected to see something like *οὐ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἰσχύοντες χρείαν 
ἰατροῦ….  We note that, even if the arrangement of constituents was in accordance with the 
presumed default one, the constant constituent, χρείαν ἔχουσιν…ἰατροῦ, would have been split.  
This calls into question whether or not the presence of a split constant, without any other 
displacement of constituents, in fact signals prominence, focus, etc.  In this instance, the splitting 
of the constant could be simply due to the fact that it is the NP/DP359 οἱ ἰσχύοντες that is being 
rejected, with the verb and direct object with its genitive complement being held constant from 
the first utterance to the second utterance.  However, there does appear to be some displacement 
of a constituent, namely of the direct object χρείαν, away from its genitive complement and to the 
forward position. 
This of course raises the further question as to which position or positions, if any, in the 
first utterance between the negation and ἀλλά might signal an author’s intention to increase the 
prominence of a constituent located there.  The initial position would seem to lend prominence, if 
the placement there of a constituent, i.e., the preceding constituent, the direct object, etc., was 
unexpected.  The position immediately preceding ἀλλά could also be considered a position of 
prominence, provided that some constituent other than the preceding constituent was located 
                                                 
358 Callow, “Constituent Order in Copula Clauses,” 68–9; Ann Taylor, “The Change from 
SOV to SVO in Ancient Greek,” Language Variation and Change 6, no. 1 (1994): esp. 1–2, 9, 
33–4; Porter, Idioms, 293–7; Levinsohn, Discourse Features, 16–7.  Cf. Porter’s footnote on 
page 293, in which he provides a helpful listing of the locations where an assertion of VSO as 
the default word order may be found in several of the leading reference grammars.   
359 Noun Phrase (NP)/Determiner Phrase (DP) 
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there. In all of these instances, the second portion (ἰατροῦ) of the whole constant constituent 
(χρείαν ἔχουσιν…ἰατροῦ), appears in the pre-ἀλλά position.   
However, I am very reluctant to posit that ἰατροῦ should be seen as “dislocated” from 
some “normal” or expected position based upon the norms dictated by the οὐ...ἀλλά construction.  
It would appear that there are two “forces” at play here: the force exerted by the οὐ...ἀλλά 
construction, and the force exerted by the VSO arrangement, if indeed this is the default 
arrangement.  We should be aware of the presence of, and interaction of, these two forces, so we 
are careful not to claim more than our evidence supports.  For example, in the very next verse, 
Luke 5:32, we see the preceding and following constituents immediately adjacent to ἀλλά.  This 
does not mean the arrangement observed in either Luke 5:31 or 5:32 should be seen as the 
“normal” one.  Within the construction itself, Luke’s arrangement may have been more 
influenced by the typical pattern followed within clauses than by any special considerations 
dictated by this construction. 
What about the possibility that there is something other than descriptive negation at play 
in these texts?  In his commentary on Mark 2:17, Robert Guelich notes  
Jesus responds with parallel sayings. The first takes the proverbial form of a metaphor 
concerning the healthy and the sick.  The second is an “I have come” (ἠλθον-) saying in the 
form of a “dialectical negation” (Pesch, 1:166) concerning the righteous and the sinners. ... 
“I did not come to … but to …” is of the two sayings in Mark specifically dealing with 
Jesus’ coming (10:45). … Its structure as a “dialectical negation” is Semitic in keeping 
with OT counterparts (Kruse, VT 4 [1954] 385-400) as is the contrast “righteous” and 
“sinners.”   
Although some have interpreting the saying as being ironical … or forged in polemics…, 
set in the form of a dialectical negation the statement simply accents the positive member 
of two counter statements.  In a dialectical negation one statement, often the first, is placed 
in the negative in order to accentuate the other (Kruse, VT 4 [1954] 386).  Therefore, the 
import of the saying is found in the second statement about Jesus’ coming to call sinners.  
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Once cannot place the same weight on the first half and thus conclude that he meant to 
exclude the righteous.360 
 
I have previously addressed my concerns with the notion of “dialectical negation” in general, and 
Kruse’s presentation of the same in particular, in my survey of secondary literature, so I will not 
rehearse them here.  It would appear from his later comments that Guelich’s appeal to dialectical 
negation has as its end the affirmation of the inclusivity of Jesus’s ministry by means of the 
weakening the exclusivity of the saying.361  We may note that Guelich does not make explicit the 
message that would be communicated by dialectical negation if we were to follow the translation 
suggestions of Kruse, Zerwick, and BDF,362 namely “I did not come so much to call the 
righteous, as sinners.”  If this is correct, then Jesus’s assertion would be that he came to call 
individuals from both groups, the righteous and the sinners alike, but even more so those in the 
latter group. 
However, there is nothing in the text or co-text that moves the exegete in that direction, 
especially when the real world illustration regarding the sick and whole, and their respective 
need or lack thereof for a physician, clearly excludes the conclusion that both are in need of a 
physician, just to greater or lesser degrees.  We would actually have to move from an 
interpretation that excludes the one class and includes the other in the first saying, to an 
interpretation that includes both classes and asserts what is predicated to both of them in the 
second one.   
                                                 
360 Robert A. Guelich, Word Biblical Commentary 34A: Mark 1-8:26, ed. Ralph P. 
Martin, WBC 34A (Dallas: Word, 1989), 104. 
361 Ibid., 105. 
362 Please see my coverage of each of these sources within my survey of secondary 
literature. 
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Metalinguistic negation might appear offer a way forward, if in fact Jesus had said 
something like “I came not only to call the righteous (which is what you expect), but also, and 
even more so, the sinners (which is counter to your expectation).”  However, there is nothing that 
signals a movement from descriptive negation metalinguistic negation by triggering a Q-
implicature in the first conjuct that is subsequently overturned in the second.  If we observed 
something like “I did not come to call the righteous, but everyone,” where the constituent in the 
second conjunct refers to a broader category (everyone) that includes the corresponding 
constituent in the first conjunct (the righteous), then the second pass processing would result in a 
message which communicated “I did not come to call the righteous only, but also (and even 
more importantly) to call everyone.”  The scalar Q-implicature of the first conjunct would be 
overcome in light of the information present in the second conjunct.  But we simply do not 
observe this in the text, either.  It would seem the safest way forward is to see that both the first 
saying and second saying as excluding one group from consideration even while advancing 
another.  In the first saying, this accords well with the knowledge of the real world possessed by 
Jesus’s audience.  In the second saying, it accords well with the presentation of Jesus in the 
Gospels, as Guelich rightly observes,363 as a “friend of sinners” who did indeed, as is made 
explicit in Luke 5:32, call sinners “unto repentance.” 
The communicated emphasis is not particularly on the contrast between those who are 
healthy, or strong, but rather on (1) the need (2) for a physician experienced by (3) those who are 
ill.  Jesus gives this answer as a direct response to questions about his association with sinners, 
                                                 
363 Guelich, WBC 34A: Mark 1-8:26, 104. 
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and follows it with an assertion about his purpose in coming: namely, to call sinners,364 as 
opposed to the righteous.  The parallels are evident here: the need of the sick for a physician to 
heal them, and the need of sinners for a Savior to call them to repentance and restoration.  With 
his answer, Jesus not only defends his actions by declaring his purpose in coming, but also 
exposes the deep ignorance of the questioners about why he had come, and what God desired. 
As J. Fitzmyer notes in his comments on Luke 5:31: 
The first part of Jesus’ pronouncement is the quotation of a proverb or wisdom saying, 
identical in all three Synoptics, save for the Lucan substitution of hoi hygiainontes, “the 
healthy,” for the Marcan hoi ischyontes, “those who are well.”  The contrast of the 
“healthy” and the “sick” prepares for the “upright” and the sinners” of v. 32.365 
It is to Luke 5:32 and the parallel occurrences found in Matt 9:13 and Mark 2:17 that I now turn. 
Matt 9:13//Mark 2:17//Luke 5:32 
Matt 9:13b//Mark 2:17b 
Due to some notable differences found in the text of Luke 5:32, I will reserve my 
comments on this text until after my engagement with the occurrence in Matt 9:13b and its closer 
parallel, which is found in Mark 2:17b.  Here we see the two texts together: 
Matthew 9:13b οὐ  γὰρ  ἦλθον καλέσαι δικαίους  ἀλλὰ ἁμαρτωλούς. 
Mark 2:17b  οὐκ   ἦλθον καλέσαι δικαίους  ἀλλὰ ἁμαρτωλούς. 
                                                 
364 Luke 5:32 provides additional information, which is missing in both the Matthean and 
Marcan accounts, regarding unto what, or to what end or result, Jesus came to call sinners: 
namely, repentance (εἰς μετάνοιαν).   I will address this parallel text, in which ἀλλά also occurs, 
later in my treatment of Luke’s Gospel. 
365 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, The Gospel According to Luke I-IX: Introduction, Translation, 
and Notes, AB 28 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981), 592. 
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The presence of the postpositive conjunction γάρ makes explicit the relationship between the 
preceding two utterances and this following one: namely, that Jesus’s purpose in coming, as 
expressed in 9:13b, explains both his response to his critics in 9:12, as well as his direction for 
them to go and learn what was meant by the text of Hosea 6:6 in 9:13a.  The original inquiry 
concerned collectors and the sinners (πολλοὶ τελῶναι καὶ ἁμαρτωλοὶ), and Jesus’s eating with the 
same, with the clear implication being that he should not be.  Jesus does not flinch in his 
response, strongly asserting that, in fact, it is sinners such as these that he has come to call. 
We observe asyndeton in Mark’s presentation, with no explicit conjunction signaling the 
relationship between 2:17a and 2:17b.  We also see that Mark’s version does not have Matthew’s 
preceding challenge for the critics to go and learn: instead we see the gnomic “need for a 
physician” statement, immediately followed by the declaration of those whom Jesus did not, and 
did, come in order to call.  The transition between the two utterances is not as smooth, nor is the 
relationship between them as clear, in the Marcan version as in Matthean.   
Within the construction, however, it is clear that there is a constituent of the first 
proposition that is being corrected in the second: namely  
         Proposition 1     Proposition 2 
οὐκ  ἦλθον καλέσαι  δικαίους  ἀλλὰ   [ἦλθον καλέσαι] ἁμαρτωλούς. 
We do not see wide-scope negation here, as there is neither a complete rejection of his coming, 
nor of his purpose in coming as expressed by the infinitive καλέσαι.  Instead, we see narrow-
scope, constituent negation and correction in which a particular assertion within the first conjunct 
is being rejected: namely, the plural direct object of the infinitive of purpose, δικαίους.  The 
constituent proffered as the corrective replacement for this rejected constituent is ἁμαρτωλούς.  
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What signals this to the hearer/reader, given that this word alone appears?  How does one know 
what exactly is being corrected?   
There is a clear parallel to these constituents in that both are accusative masculine plural, 
signaling the replacement of one direct object with another.  Further, the idea of antithetical 
constituents has already been presented in the previous utterance, where those “being 
well/strong” are contrasted with those “having ill (lit. evil)/sickness.”  The reader is prepared for 
these opposing constituents, and is expected to supply ἀπὸ κοινοῦ what is ellipsed in the second 
utterance, in this case ἦλθον καλέσαι.  This parallelism, or sharing of some identifiable 
characteristic, and the ellipsis of continuous information, or the constant, together provide the 
indication necessary for the hearer/reader to determine that (1) correction is intended, and (2) 
which contrast pair is involved in the correction. 
Luke 5:32 
As I noted above, there are some features present in the Lucan version of this parallel 
occurrence that merit special comment.  For my treatment of this text, it will be profitable to 
move directly to the graphical analysis:  
 
Negation Constant 1  Preceding ἀλλά  Following Constant 2 
οὐκ   ἐλήλυθα καλέσαι  δικαίους  ἀλλὰ   ἁμαρτωλοὺς  εἰς μετάνοιαν 
The hypothetical reconstruction I am proposing, without ellipses, is as follows: 
*οὐκ ἐλήλυθα καλέσαι δικαίους εἰς μετάνοιαν ἀλλὰ ἐλήλυθα καλέσαι ἁμαρτωλοὺς εἰς μετάνοιαν 
My proposed repetition of ἐλήλυθα καλέσαι following ἀλλά should not be surprising, 
given my previous discussion of ellipsis, and the many examples we have already engaged.  
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Even in works where ellipsis is not the focus of the examination, such an implicit repetition has 
been noted; with respect to this particular occurrence, Culy et al., commenting on ἁμαρτωλοὺς, 
describe it as the “…accusative direct object of an implied (ἐλήλυθα) καλέσαι.”366  They even 
reflect this in their English translation: “I have not come to call righteous people, but (to call) 
sinners to repentance.”367 
However, the implicit repetition of εἰς μετάνοιαν to a position prior to ἀλλά could strike 
some as conjecture, but I contend that this is exactly the sense conveyed by the text.  Fitzmyer, in 
his comments on this passage, expresses as much in his English translation: “I have come not to 
invite the upright to reform, but rather sinners.”368  It may be helpful to see Luke’s arrangement 
of the constituents alongside the respective arrangements of Matthew and Mark. 
Matthew 9:13: οὐ γὰρ  ἦλθον  καλέσαι δικαίους  ἀλλὰ ἁμαρτωλούς 
Mark 2:17: οὐκ  ἦλθον  καλέσαι δικαίους  ἀλλὰ ἁμαρτωλούς 
Luke 5:32: οὐκ  ἐλήλυθα  καλέσαι δικαίους  ἀλλὰ ἁμαρτωλοὺς  εἰς μετάνοιαν 
Regarding Luke’s departure from the Marcan text, Fitzmyer’s observations serve us well, 
as he notes: “Jesus’ mission is described in terms that echo that of John the Baptist (3:3).  Luke’s 
formulation follows that of Mark 2:17c, but adds, significantly, “to reform” (eis metanoian, lit. 
“for repentance, reform”).”369  Although a consideration of the importance of μετάνοια and 
                                                 
366 Culy, Parsons, and Stigall, Luke, 176. 
367 Ibid., 173. 
368 Fitzmyer, Luke I-IX, 587. 
369 Ibid., 592.  Fitzmyer also comments on Luke’s use of the perfect form ἐλήλυθα, rather 
than the aorist ἦλθον used by Matthew and Mark, noting that “Luke uses the pf. elēlytha to depict 
Jesus’ mission as already in progress….  It has effects that perdure into the present (BDF § 
340).” 
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μετανοέω in the Gospel of Luke is beyond the scope of my work here, the reader is encouraged to 
consult both I.H. Marshall’s comments on “repentance” in Luke370 and J. Fitzmyer’s brief 
discussion of “repentance and conversion” as one of the ways in which Luke presents “the ideal 
Christian reaction to the proclamation of Jesus and his disciples….”371   
What is important for our discussion is that Luke has included εἰς μετάνοιαν, and in his 
arrangement of the constituents, the sense is “I have not come to call the righteous unto 
repentance, but rather I have come to call the sinners unto repentance.”  So we see that (1) there 
are constant constituents on either side of ἀλλά, (2) no one constant constituent occurs on both 
sides of ἀλλά, and (3) each constant constituent is in turn implied on the side of ἀλλά that is 
opposite its explicit appearance.  Hence my classification of this occurrence as an instance of 
Sub-Pattern 1B2.   
But are we able to move from observation of this unusual arrangement of constituents to 
a satisfactory explanation of (1) the writer’s motivation to use this arrangement and (2) the 
effects that it produces?  I believe that we are, especially when we consider that usually it is the 
preceding constituent that is “de-emphasized,” or at least less emphasized to a lesser degree than 
the following constituent.  In Luke 8:27, for example, we see a constituent pulled out of the usual 
preceding position and fronted for the purpose of emphasis.372  However, in our current text, 
Luke 5:32, we see a constituent that has been placed in the final position for the sake of 
emphasis.   
                                                 
370 Marshall, Gospel of Luke, 135–6, 552–5. 
371 Fitzmyer, Luke I-IX, 237. 
372 Please consult my later coverage of occurrences found only in Luke’s Gospel, and 
particularly the section devoted to Luke 8:27. 
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For Luke’s presentation does not end with the assertion that sinners are being called: in 
his presentation they are explicitly being called to something, to an end or result.  Within the 
οὐ...ἀλλά construction, the writer does not have any position of greater emphasis available to him 
than the final position, and this is where he places the prepositional phrase that signals the 
desired end or result of the calling: namely, repentance.  This inclusion appears to agree with his 
emphasis on repentance throughout the Gospel and Acts.   
I maintain that this sub-pattern, namely Sub-Pattern 1B2, is unusual, as indicated by its 
low frequency.  It is just this relative infrequency that increases its markedness, a markedness 
that Luke is aware of, and willing to make use of here for his communicative purposes.  This is 
not his only use of this sub-pattern, however, as he also calls upon it in his crafting of Luke 
22:42.373 
Matt 9:17//Mark 2:22//Luke 5:38 and Pattern 3—The “Supplied/Repeated Constant” 
Pattern 
Matt 9:17 
By way of introduction to these parallels, I will first engage with Matt 9:17.  The context 
of this occurrence is Jesus’s defense of his disciples regarding their lack of fasting.  He has 
already offered as an examples of incongruity the illustrations of (1) guests fasting at a wedding 
celebration and (2) unshrunk/unwashed cloth being used to patch a worn garment.  Our text 
presents the third and final illustration offered in response to the questioners. 
                                                 
373 Please see my coverage of Luke 22:42 in the last section of this chapter, which is 
devoted to the parallel occurrences found in Matt 26:39//Mark 14:36//Luke 22:42. 
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Due to (1) the presence of a constant constituent, and (2) the explicit repetition of that 
constant constituent, I have classified this occurrence of as an instance of Pattern 3.  The parallel 
arrangement is clearly observable, as the constant and preceding constituents taken as a complex 
before ἀλλά are balanced by the constant and following constituents, taken as a complex, after 
ἀλλά.  It would appear that the main effect of such parallelism is the emphasis placed on the 
preceding and following constituents as the last constituents at the end of the repeated clauses, 
namely the contrast pair consisting of the adjectives παλαιούς and καινούς.   
Immediately following his discussion of antithesis (ἀντίθεσις), Aristotle mentions the 
figures parisosis (παρίσωσις) and paromoiosis (παρομοίωσις), giving examples, and finally noting 
that “It is possible for one example to have all these features—for the same [colon] to be an 
antithesis, parison, and homoeoteleuton.”374 (“ἔστι δὲ ἅμα πάντα ἔχειν ταὐτό, καὶ ἀντίθεσιν εἶναι 
τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πάριον καὶ ὁμοιοτέλευτον.”)375  The relevance of antithesis to my investigation is 
clear: that of these other figures, and particularly παρομοίωσις, may not be. 
Aristotle states that παρομοίωσις is present “if each colon has similar extremities.”  He 
provides some further explanation of how this may be accomplished: 
This must occur either at the beginning or at the end [of the colon].  At the beginning it 
always takes the form of [similar] complete words, but at the end it may consist of [the 
same] final syllables or [the same] grammatical form or the same word.376 
                                                 
374 Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy, 2nd 
ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), III.9.9; 217. 
375 Aristotle, Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica, ed. Rudolf Kassel (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1976), 
III.9.1410a 36–1410b 1; 168. 
376 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, III.9.9; 217 (Kennedy). 
171 
 
 
 
He then provides some examples, one of which presents us with a clear instance of both 
antithesis and παρομοίωσις at the end (ἐπὶ τελευτῆς):  
ᾠήθης ἂν  αὐτον οὐ  παιδίον  τετοκέναι,  
ἀλλ’  αὐτὸν   παιδίον  γεγονέναι....377 
Kennedy’s translation of the same follows: 
You would have thought  him not to have  begotten a child,  
but    himself to have  become one….378 
But what of our text?  In translation, the effect from Matt 9:17 would be as follows: 
Nor are they putting new wine into   old wineskins… 
On the contrary they are putting new wine into   new wineskins… 
However, the effect may be more clearly seen in the source text: 
οὐδὲ    βάλλουσιν οἶνον νέον    εἰς ἀσκοὺς  παλαιούς· … 
ἀλλὰ    βάλλουσιν οἶνον νέον    εἰς ἀσκοὺς  καινούς, … 
I am not suggesting that the Matthean redaction of the Marcan source text was prompted by, or 
even in accordance with, Aristotle’s description of the tandem use of antithesis and paromoiosis.  
What I am suggesting is that Aristotle offered a description of and guidance concerning 
something that was in use, and that could be successfully employed in conjunction with 
antithesis.  And it would appear that the arrangement of constituents within the Matthean text 
could have had such a use in mind.   
                                                 
377 Aristotle, Ars Rhetorica, ΙΙΙ.9.1410a 30–1; 168. 
378 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, III.9.9; 217 (Kennedy).  Emphasis is Kennedy’s.  I am mildly 
surprised that Kennedy did not retain “child” in the second conjuct, thus better preserving the 
parallelism.  Instead, he opted to translate the second παιδίον as “one.” 
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We also note Aristotle’s view on the utility of antithesis, which is clear from Rhet. III.9.8: 
Such a style is pleasing because opposites are most knowable and more knowable when 
put beside each other and because they are like a syllogism, for refutation [elenkos] is a 
bringing together of contraries.379 
It should be remembered that in the verse immediately preceding this one, namely Matt 9:16, 
Jesus presented another object lesson based on incompatibility: there, however, the illustration 
consisted of a new piece of cloth being used to patch an old garment.  In that case only the 
consequences resulting from the wrong course action were presented: the proper course of 
action, by which such consequences could be avoided, was not explicitly mentioned.  In 9:17, 
however, Jesus presents the wrong course of action with its hypothetical consequences, followed 
by the proper course of action, together with its benefits.  On this use of εἰ δὲ μή γε, and the 
similar combination, εἰ δὲ μή, in Matthew 9:17 and other instances, Burton comments,  
Εἰ δὲ μή and εἰ δὲ μήγε are used elliptically in the sense of otherwise, i.e. if so, or if not, to 
introduce an alternative statement or command. Having become fixed phrases, they are 
used even when the preceding sentence is negative; also when the nature of the condition 
would naturally call for ἐάν rather than εἰ.380 
The presence of ἀλλά allows these two courses of action to be contrasted, with the latter one 
being presented as the proper course.  For further commentary on the relationship of this 
illustration to the question posed in Matt 9:14, the reader may profitably consult the discussions 
of Davies and Allison,381 Luz,382 and Keener.383  
                                                 
379 Ibid., III.9.8; 216 (Kennedy). 
380 Ernest De Witt Burton, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek, 3rd 
ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1900), 111. 
381 Davies and Allison, Matthew 8-18, 107–16. 
382 Luz, Matthew 8-20, 36–8. 
383 Craig S. Keener, The Gospel of Matthew: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 299–301. 
173 
 
 
 
Matt 9:17//Mark 2:22//Luke 5:37-38 
I now turn to a combined examination of the saying as it has been preserved, with notable 
changes, in each of the Synoptics.  It will be useful to see the texts arranged in parallel in order to 
facilitate comparison and discussion. 
 
Matthew 9:17 Mark 2:22 Luke 5:37 
17  οὐδὲ    
 22  καὶ οὐδεὶς 37  καὶ οὐδεὶς  
βάλλουσιν  βάλλει βάλλει  
οἶνον νέον  
εἰς ἀσκοὺς παλαιούς· 
οἶνον νέον  
εἰς ἀσκοὺς παλαιούς· 
οἶνον νέον  
εἰς ἀσκοὺς παλαιούς· 
εἰ δὲ μή γε,  εἰ δὲ μή,  εἰ δὲ μή γε,  
ῥήγνυνται    
οἱ ἀσκοὶ   
 ῥήξει ῥήξει 
 ὁ οἶνος ὁ οἶνος 
  ὁ νέος 
 τοὺς ἀσκοὺς τοὺς ἀσκοὺς 
καὶ ὁ οἶνος  καὶ ὁ οἶνος καὶ αὐτὸς  
ἐκχεῖται ἀπόλλυται  ἐκχυθήσεται 
καὶ οἱ ἀσκοὶ  καὶ οἱ ἀσκοί· καὶ οἱ ἀσκοὶ  
ἀπόλλυνται·  ἀπολοῦνται· 
ἀλλὰ ἀλλ᾽384  38  ἀλλ᾽  
βάλλουσιν    
οἶνον νέον  
εἰς ἀσκοὺς καινούς, 
οἶνον νέον  
εἰς ἀσκοὺς καινούς. 
οἶνον νέον  
εἰς ἀσκοὺς καινοὺς  
  βλητέον. 
καὶ ἀμφότεροι συντηροῦνται.   
 
 
                                                 
384 There is a change in both Mark 2:22 and Luke 5:38 to ἀλλ᾽ in the NA28 from ἀλλά in 
the NA27. 
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On the one hand, the reader is immediately confronted with several noticeable, significant 
differences with respect to the contents within these sayings.  On the other hand, however, the 
arrangement of the constituents within these sayings is, to a large degree, very similar.  In order 
to demonstrate this, let us first examine Luke 5:37-38.  Luke shows considerable adherence to 
the Marcan pattern in the opening of this saying, which is crafted as a parallel to the account of 
the garment patching in the previous verses, beginning with καὶ οὐδεὶς (…and no one…).  
Matthew’s opening to this saying, in contrast, differs from the Marcan pattern: by beginning with 
οὐδέ (…nor…), it appears to be more of a “negative additive extension” (following Halliday’s 
terminology)385 of what was asserted in the previous verses.   
We then note the difference between the use of a singular verb (βάλλει in agreement with 
οὐδείς for Mark and Luke) or a plural one (βάλλουσιν for Matthew, even though he used 
ἐπιβάλλει in Matt 9:16).  Matthew’s use of the plural form is noted by Davies and Allison, who 
comment that “Matthew’s impersonal plural (cf. 1:23; 5:15; 7:16) is Semitic.”386 Regardless of 
whether or not the writers disagree in their presentation of the verb as singular or plural, they all 
agree completely concerning the direct object of the verb (οἶνον νέον), and the prepositional 
phrase detailing the containers (ἀσκοὺς παλαιούς) into (εἰς) which the wine is being placed.   
We again observe some departure in the respective writers’ presentations of the inevitable 
consequences that will come to pass if someone were in fact to do what “no one” does.  I have 
                                                 
385 Halliday, Introduction to Functional Grammar, 472. 
386 Davies and Allison, Matthew 8-18, 113.  They do not, however, offer an explanation 
as to why he began with the singular and then shifted to the plural, unless that shift, or perhaps 
tendency toward or preference for, and not simply the use of, the impersonal plural is what they 
view as a Semitism. 
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referred to this detailing of the consequences as “intervening material,” because it occurs within 
the negation…ἀλλά construction and has the effect of moving the constituent to be replaced, 
namely the adjective παλαιούς, further from ἀλλά.  Detailed engagement with and evaluation of 
this intervening material, and the reasons for Matthew’s departure from the Marcan source 
material are beyond the scope of this work.  However, the reader may profitably consult the 
commentaries of Keener,387 Davies and Allison,388 and G. Osborne389 for further insights and 
discussion. 
In the utterance following ἀλλά, we once again find significant, and in fact complete, 
agreement with respect to the “new wine” (οἶνον νέον) and the containers (ἀσκοὺς καινούς) into 
(εἰς) which the wine is being placed.  The Marcan form uses the accusative οἶνον νέον, as if this is 
the direct object of a verb.  This indicates an ellipsis that was meant to be supplied by the reader 
ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, particularly from the explicit mention of the verb βάλλει earlier in the verse.  
Although he uses somewhat different terminology to describe the ellipsis seen in this verse, R. 
Decker rightly comments that “the subject and the verb is assumed from the first clause” and that 
οἶνον νέον is the “accusative direct object of an implied form of βάλλω.”390  Matthew departs 
from the Marcan form and makes explicit what is implicit by his repetition of the verb 
βάλλουσιν, which he used in the first conjunct of the οὐδέ...ἀλλά construction.   
                                                 
387 Keener, Gospel of Matthew, 299–301. 
388 W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, Matthew 1-7: Volume 1 (London: Bloomsbury 
T&T Clark, 2004), 112–13. 
389 Grant R. Osborne, Matthew, Zondervan Exegetical Commentary Series on the New 
Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2010), 343–44. 
390 Rodney J. Decker, Mark 1-8: A Handbook on the Greek Text, BHGNT (Waco, TX: 
Baylor University Press, 2014), 62. 
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Luke’s version of this second utterance also reflects an awareness of the implicit βάλλει, 
which he also makes explicit, albeit in a significantly different manner.  Rather than repeating 
the previous verb, he switches to a cognate, βλητέον, which as BDAG notes, is “the only verbal 
adj. in -τέος in NT.”391  Robertson provides a robust discussion about the personal and 
impersonal constructions associated with this “verbal” or “verbal adjective” form,392 asserting 
that the “personal is always passive in sense, while the impersonal is active and may be formed 
from transitive or intransitive verbs.”393  He classifies this sole NT use as the impersonal 
(without the expression of the agent) construction, and posits that it “expresses the idea of 
necessity.”394  This idea of necessity is reflected in the gloss provided by BDAG: “…must be 
put.”395  To say that Luke’s use here demonstrates both his familiarity and felicity with the Greek 
language would be an understatement.   
Another question arises concerning Luke’s version of this saying: Why is οἶνον νέον in the 
accusative?  Culy et al. offer that οἶνον νέον “is the accusative direct object of an implied form of 
βάλλω from verse 37.”396  As I noted in my discussion above, I am in complete agreement that is 
an accurate description of what is happening there in Mark’s version of the saying, but not here 
in Luke’s.  Instead, I believe that Robertson gives the correct explanation for the presence of the 
accusative case: “The impersonal verbal in –τέον occurs only once in the N. T. (Lu. 5:38) and as 
                                                 
391 BDAG, 179. 
392 Robertson, Grammar, 1095. 
393 Ibid., 1097. 
394 Ibid. 
395 BDAG, 179. 
396 Culy, Parsons, and Stigall, Luke, 180. 
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in the ancient Greek it is used with the accusative, οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς καινοὺς βλητέον.”397  
BDF provides even further explanation for this occurrence under a discussion of the omission of 
the ἐστίν: 
As in classical Greek, the most common form of the copula, the 3rd sing. ἐστίν, is by far 
the most frequently omitted, though no fixed usage developed. Still a preference for 
omission may be observed in (1) proverbs, (2) impersonal constructions, especially those 
expressing possibility or necessity (cf. with ἐστίν §353(5)), (3) questions, (4) exclamations. 
The omission of ἐστίν, too, in the single instance of the verbal adjective in –τέος agrees 
with classical usage: οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς καινοὺς βλητέον Lk 5: 38.398 
Culy et al. helpfully note the textual variants introduced in various manuscripts (the most notable 
being א* and D), likely in the interest of clarifying the syntax and improving the readability of 
the text.399 
Lest in my examination of the details of these parallels I forget one of my objectives, 
namely that of coming to some conclusions regarding the patterns these occurrences and 
parallels may represent, I would like to offer one final comment regarding what I see as the 
important, essential differences between the Marcan version, on the one hand, and the Matthean 
and Lucan versions, on the other.   In my comments on the Marcan version, I have noted both 
ellipsis and explicit repetition.  In the Matthean and Lucan versions, however, I have noted that 
there is a movement away from the implicit and elliptical to the explicit.   
All of these occurrences are classified as Sub-Pattern 3A based upon the presence of an 
explicit constant.  This would appear to be a weakness of, or at least a limitation of, my 
classification system, as the Marcan version is actually much closer in function to Pattern 1B1.  
                                                 
397 Robertson, Grammar, 486. 
398 BDF, 70. 
399 Culy, Parsons, and Stigall, Luke, 180. 
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The ellipsis of the verb in the second conjuct indicates that it is to be seen as continuous 
information, while the constituents that are parallel but different, namely the contrast pair 
(παλαιούς, καινούς) are the constituents which are being rejected and proffered as a replacement, 
respectively.  The core sentence reconstruction that I am proposing for Mark 2:22 is either  
* καὶ οὐδεὶς βάλλει οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς παλαιούς ἀλλὰ καινούς. 
or possibly 
* καὶ οὐδεὶς βάλλει οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς παλαιούς ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἀσκοὺς καινούς. 
In this presentation, the corrective function of the construction is much more evident.   
Of course this reconstruction is speculative, but the ellipsis observed here is not.  Based 
both upon the evidence I have examined from the Κοινή Greek of the Synoptics, as well the 
evidence from other languages noted in my survey of secondary literature, I conclude that this 
ellipsis signals the reader/hearer that correction is intended.  In both the Matthean and Lukan 
versions, the departure from ellipsis also signals a departure from the corrective function to a 
contrastive one.  The whole proposition of the first conjunct is presented as rejected, while the 
whole of second conjuct is advanced as affirmed, as representing the view held by the speaker.   
My classification system had categories for patterns with explicit/repeated constants 
(Pattern 3), explicit/ellipsed constants (Pattern 1), or no constants (Pattern 2), but no category for 
a pattern exhibiting both repetition of and ellipsis of constants.  If I had such a category, I would 
classify the Marcan occurrence from this parallel set accordingly.  
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Matt 9:24//Mark 5:39//Luke 8:52 
Matt 9:24//Mark 5:39 
Due to the similarities between Matt 9:24 and Mark 5:39, I will engage these occurrences 
together first, and then proceed to a consideration of Luke 8:52.   
Let us first consider Matt 9:24: 
ἔλεγεν· ἀναχωρεῖτε,   οὐ γὰρ   ἀπέθανεν τὸ κοράσιον  
ἀλλά   καθεύδει.   καὶ κατεγέλων αὐτοῦ. 
The graphical analysis of the constituents is as follows: 
 
Negation Preceding  Constant  ἀλλά   Following (Constant) 
οὐ γὰρ  ἀπέθανεν τὸ κοράσιον  ἀλλά καθεύδει (τὸ κοράσιον) 
One explanation for the forward position of the verb is that the tendency for the speaker/writer to 
place the verb in the initial position is in conflict with the tendency to place the preceding 
constituent adjacent to ἀλλά, and that the former tendency has prevailed in this instance.  
However, from my observations, it appears that, within the ἀλλά construction, the general form 
of the construction should normally prevail over this tendency to make the verb initial: in other 
words, if the verb was part of the preceding constituent, then the speaker/writer would be 
inclined to place it in the position immediately prior to ἀλλά, rather than the initial position in the 
clause.  As such, I would see the forward position of the verb as an indication that it is being 
emphasized by the speaker/writer.   
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Here I am using the term “emphasis” in the same way as Levinsohn: namely “to express 
strong feelings about an item or indicate that an event is unexpected.”400  Clearly what Jesus says 
here is jarring and unexpected, given the context in which he says it, and all the more so if he is 
seen as sending away the crowd mourning the death of the girl, together with the performing 
musicians.  He is not intending so much to contrast “having died” with “being asleep”: rather, he 
is asserting first and foremost that she has not died, and is, quite to the contrary, asleep. The 
reaction to this assertion by those hearing it is predictable, and is indeed confirmed by the text in 
Matthew’s version.  
Let us now move to the Marcan version.  I originally struggled to categorize the 
occurrence in Mark 5:39.  The reason for my struggle was the placement of the constant before 
the negation, which I had taken as the initial boundary of the construction.  In this instance, then, 
the constant constituent does still occur before the preceding constituent, and is implied after 
ἀλλά, which would normally identify it as belonging to Sub-Pattern 1B1.  Clearly, this issue is 
the result of the weakness of my definitions for the patterns and sub-patterns.  In particular, the 
determination of whether or not the constant constituent occurs before or after the preceding 
constituent is based upon both occurring within the boundaries of the construction: i.e., not 
before the initial negation that normally marks the beginning boundary of the same.  As I worked 
through more of the occurrences, however, I came to view this beginning boundary as somewhat 
more “permeable” or “porous” than I had originally thought.  It is not always the case that every 
constituent functioning with a construction is found within that construction, or at least not 
                                                 
400 Levinsohn, Discourse Features, 7. 
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within the boundaries demarcated by the initial negation and the ending of any peripheral 
constituents associated with the following constituent.   
In keeping with this “semi-permeable” understanding of the initial construction 
boundary, I have elected to treat the occurrence in Mark 5:39 in the same way I had previously 
treated both Matt 16:17 and 22:30: namely, as special cases of Sub-Pattern 1A1.  Let us consider 
this occurrence in greater detail, and in conjunction with the parallel to it that occurs in Matt 
9:24. 
Matthew 9:24 …   οὐ γὰρ  ἀπέθανεν  τὸ κοράσιον   ἀλλὰ καθεύδει. 
Mark 5:39  … τὸ παιδίον  οὐκ  ἀπέθανεν     ἀλλὰ καθεύδει. 
Two items of interest should be immediately discernible.  First, τὸ παιδίον in Mark corresponds 
to τὸ κοράσιον in Matthew.  In fact, both παιδίον and κοράσιον are found in the relevant passage in 
Mark, with the shift from the latter to the former occurring in Mark 5:41.  Second, in Mark, τὸ 
παιδίον is “fronted,” having been placed outside the normal boundaries of the οὐ...ἀλλά 
construction, presumably in order to increase its prominence.  Alternately, Mark’s version could 
have arisen based on the desire of the author to remove any extraneous constituents from the 
construction, thereby allowing the greatest possible contrast between (1) the preceding 
constituent, ἀπέθανεν, which is immediately adjacent to both (a) the negation applied to it and (b) 
the conjunction signaling that it is being corrected, and (2) the following constituent, καθεύδει. 
It is also worth noting that, on the one hand, the occurrence in Matthew is immediately 
preceded by an imperative (ἀναχωρεῖτε) from Jesus, commanding all of the musicians and the 
gathered crowd to leave.  The presence of the conjunction γάρ signals that the following 
statements provide the logical grounds for the reasonableness of this command.  On the other 
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hand, the occurrence within Mark is preceded immediately by a question from Jesus to those 
gathered, with no conjunction (asyndeton) to signal the relationship between the question and the 
following statements.  The statements suggest, however, the unreasonableness of the weeping of 
those gathered, since the child had not died, but rather was sleeping.  It is interesting to note that 
in Matthew’s presentation Jesus wants those gathered to do something based upon his assertions 
of the true state of the child, against all appearances.  In Mark’s presentation, Jesus questions the 
actions of those gathered, actions which were actually in accordance with what appeared to be 
the true state of the child.   
As I have noted above, Matthew’s arrangement, VS (verb, subject), although expected 
given the “normal” VSO arrangement of the verb, subject, and (when present) the object within a 
sentence, actually interrupts the arrangement expected within the οὐ...ἀλλά construction, thus 
blurring the contrast between ἀπέθανεν and καθεύδει (the preceding and following constituents, 
respectively) that we see clearly in Mark 5:39.  The graphical representation of the constituents 
of this construction in the Marcan version is as follows: 
 
        Logically Follows  Implicit (Elliptical) 
Constant Negation Preceding ἀλλά Following [Constant] 
τὸ παιδίον  οὐκ   ἀπέθανεν  ἀλλὰ  καθεύδει [τὸ παιδίον] 
Contrast the Matthean version: 
 
Negation Preceding  Constant ἀλλά   Following (Constant) 
οὐ γὰρ  ἀπέθανεν τὸ κοράσιον ἀλλά καθεύδει (τὸ κοράσιον) 
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My hypothetical reconstruction of the Marcan version, including elliptical constituents is: 
*οὐκ ἀπέθανεν  τὸ παιδίον ἀλλὰ καθεύδει [τὸ παιδίον]. 
By fronting τὸ παιδίον, the author both (1) brings it into focus, and (2) allows the preceding and 
following constituents to be immediately adjacent to ἀλλά, such that the reader is able to see 
more clearly which constituents are being contrasted.  The confluence of (1) the constituents 
included within these texts, and (2) the ellipsis in the second conjunct of a constituent present in 
the first conjunct provide evidence that both of these texts are instances of stripping, and that the 
function of this construction is correction. 
Luke 8:52 
Having considered Matt 9:24 and Mark 5:39, which both included a constant constituent, 
I will now engage the parallel occurrence of ἀλλά in Luke 8:52, which also involves direct 
discourse embedded within a narrative.  As I noted above, Jesus comes to the home of the young 
girl who has recently died, where all are described as weeping and mourning for the girl, as may 
reasonably be expected given the circumstances.  Luke’s account is different than Mark’s, 
though, in that he condenses the restrictions of (1) those accompanying him to the home, and (2) 
those accompanying him into the room with the girl.  In Luke’s account, there is only one 
restriction of those accompanying him, and it involves an entrance into the room with the girl.  
The characters permitted to accompany him remain the same in Luke’s account, as Jesus does 
not allow anyone to enter in with him (οὐκ ἀφῆκεν εἰσελθεῖν τινα σὺν αὐτω) save (εἰ μὴ) the inner 
circle of disciples, Peter, John, and James, and the father and mother of the girl.     
In sharp contrast with what has been asserted in the course of the narrative and what 
those in attendance are doing, Jesus commands them to stop their weeping.  His warrant for this 
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command, signaled by the use of γάρ, is that the basis of their weeping, namely her death, is not 
reflective of the actual state of affairs at all.  He asserts: “…for she has not died: but rather, she is 
sleeping.” 
52     ἔκλαιον  
δὲ  
πάντες καὶ  ἐκόπτοντο  αὐτήν.  
ὁ δὲ   εἶπεν·  
μὴ κλαίετε,  
οὐ γὰρ ἀπέθανεν ἀλλὰ καθεύδει. 
53   καὶ   κατεγέλων  αὐτοῦ  
εἰδότες ὅτι ἀπέθανεν. 
Their reaction to his declaration is predictable, given what the reader already knows from the 
narrative.  Luke not only includes their reaction, “they were ridiculing him” (κατεγέλων αὐτοῦ), 
(which is found in the other Synoptics, as well) but also the warrant for their reaction (which is 
not included in the other Synoptics): namely, that they knew (literally, “knowing”) that she had 
died.  I would (over)translate v. 53 as follows: 
“And they were ridiculing him, knowing [for a fact] that she had died.”   
It should be clear that there is no doubt in the minds of those in attendance concerning 
two important facts: (1) the girl had died, and was thus, at that time, dead; and (2) Jesus was 
asserting that she had not died, but was in fact sleeping.  Hence we see their reaction to Jesus’s 
assertion of a state of affairs that was completely contrary to reality as they knew it.  
Furthermore, these completely contrary assertions concerning reality create tension in the story 
for the reader, as there appears to be no way to resolve what Jesus asserts with what both the 
narrator and those within the story assert and know.  The use of the imperfect and present tenses 
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at this point in the narrative slows the narrative down, inviting the reader in, as it were, and 
making the description of the scene more vivid. 
But what of the assertion itself, and the use of ἀλλά within it?  The construction, and my 
analysis of it, is as follows: 
Negation Postpositive  Preceding ἀλλά  Following 
  Conjunction 
οὐ  γὰρ   ἀπέθανεν  ἀλλὰ   καθεύδει 
The process signaled by the presence of ἀλλά, namely the rejection of ἀπέθανεν and the 
replacement of it with καθεύδει, is fairly straightforward.  Luke does not include an explicit 
constant constituent either before or after ἀλλά.  The only extraneous intervening constituent 
within the construction is the postpositive conjunction that signals the link between this tightly 
connected grouping of utterances and those that came immediately before.  Aside from γάρ, this 
combination and permutation of constituents within the οὐ...ἀλλά construction is the simplest 
possible, and represents the rejection of one preceding constituent consisting of a single word, 
and its replacement with another following constituent, also consisting of a single word. 
This is potentially misleading, however, as each of these conjuncts is composed of a 
single word clause, with the subject implicit within the morphology of the verbs.  As such, the 
whole clause in the first conjunct is being rejected, as is the whole clause in the second conjunct.  
We might ask the question, Is this correction of a constituent, or the contrast of two propositions?  
To answer this, it may be helpful to compare this occurrence of ἀλλά, which I have classified as 
Sub-Pattern 2A, with the parallel occurrences found in Matt 9:24 and Mark 5:39, both of which I 
have classified as belonging to Sub-Pattern 1A1.  For ease of comparison, they are arranged 
together, below: 
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Matthew 9:24 …   οὐ γὰρ  ἀπέθανεν  τὸ κοράσιον   ἀλλὰ καθεύδει. 
Mark 5:39  … τὸ παιδίον  οὐκ  ἀπέθανεν     ἀλλὰ καθεύδει. 
Luke 8:52  …  οὐ γὰρ  ἀπέθανεν     ἀλλὰ καθεύδει. 
It is readily apparent that, according to my classification system, Mark 5:39 could be seen as 
Sub-Pattern 2A.  However, even though the constant τὸ παιδίον is present outside and before the 
οὐ...ἀλλά construction, it is clearly the subject of both verbs inside the οὐ...ἀλλά construction: 
hence my decision to view this occurrence as a special case of Sub-Pattern 1A1.  The answer to 
the question posed above, then, is that a constituent, in this case the verb ἀπέθανεν, is being 
rejected, and the replacement for that constituent, namely the verb καθεύδει, is being proffered as 
a replacement.  We have ellipsis of the DP τὸ παιδίον, which is explicit before ἀλλά, and implicit 
after the same. 
Matt 20:26//Mark 10:43//Luke 22:26 
Matt 20:26//Mark 10:43 and Pattern 3—The Supplied/Repeated Constant Pattern 
In my treatment of these parallel occurrences, I will be focusing on Matt 20:26 and Mark 
10:43, both of which I have classified as Pattern 3D.  Within this discussion, I will also be 
engaging to a lesser extent with Luke 22:26, which I have classified as conforming to Pattern 2A.  
I originally categorized these former two occurrences from Matthew and Mark under Pattern 3B, 
and only later moved them to their present category.  Were it not for the presence of ἐν ὑμῖν in 
both, they would be categorized under Pattern 2.  Please see my comments in Appendix 2, 
column 3, regarding the preceding constituent in each.  The texts of these parallel occurrences, 
with corresponding constituents aligned, appear in the table below. 
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Matthew 20:26 Mark 10:43 Luke 22:26 
  ὑμεῖς  
  δὲ 
οὐχ οὕτως οὐχ οὕτως οὐχ οὕτως, 
 δέ  
ἔσται ἐστιν  
ἐν ὑμῖν, ἐν ὑμῖν,  
ἀλλ᾽  ἀλλ᾽  ἀλλ᾽ 
ὃς ἐὰν ὃς ἂν  
θέλῃ θέλῃ  
ἐν ὑμῖν   
μέγας γενέσθαι μέγας γενέσθαι ὁ μείζων 
 ἐν ὑμῖν ἐν ὑμῖν 
  γινέσθω 
ἔσται ὑμῶν διάκονος, ἔσται ὑμῶν διάκονος,  
  
ὡς ὁ νεώτερος καὶ  
ὁ ἡγούμενος ὡς ὁ διακονῶν. 
27  καὶ ὃς ἂν θέλῃ ἐν ὑμῖν εἶναι 
πρῶτος ἔσται  
 44  καὶ ὃς ἂν θέλῃ ἐν ὑμῖν εἶναι 
πρῶτος ἔσται  
 
ὑμῶν πάντων  
δοῦλος· δοῦλος·  
In Matt 20:25, the contrast Jesus is setting forth is between the general state of affairs 
described there, and the desired state of affairs presented in the following constituent of 20:26.  
The effect is “Rather than things ἐν ὑμῖν being like they are among τῶν ἐθνῶν, the one ἐν ὑμῖν 
who wants to be great….”  Likewise, the occurrence in Mark 10:42-43 is located within an 
extended contrast between the well-known behaviors of (1) those who being perceived as rulers 
over the Gentiles (οἱ δοκοῦντες ἄρχειν τῶν ἐθνῶν) and (2) their “great ones” (οἱ μεγάλοι αὐτῶν), 
and the behaviors that Jesus envisioned for those who were within his community of followers.   
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Let us first examine how the actions of those in authority are portrayed in Mark 10:42: 
οἴδατε ὅτι  
οἱ δοκοῦντες ἄρχειν  τῶν ἐθνῶν  κατακυριεύουσιν αὐτῶν  
καὶ  
οἱ μεγάλοι   αὐτῶν   κατεξουσιάζουσιν αὐτῶν. 
These rulers and “great ones” are said to be “lording over” and “exercising authority,” 
respectively, over their subjects.  Jesus asserts that his listeners know this to be the state of 
affairs, presumably because it was so clearly observable in every situation and institution in 
which some sort of hierarchy or “power structure” existed.   
It is this knowledge of the state of affairs that is assumed, and that is carried forward into 
the next verse, where it is recalled and activated through the use of οὕτως.  BDAG rightly notes 
the use here, and in the Matthean parallel found in Matt 20:26, as such a reference:  
…οὕτως can take on a specif. mng. fr. what precedes: …οὐχ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν ὑμῖν it is not so 
among you Mt 20:26; Mk 10:43. Elliptically (B-D-F §480, 5) ὑμεῖς οὐχ οὕτως you (are) 
not (to act) in this way….”401   
It is worth noting that the relevant reference in BDF402 is to the use of οὕτως in the parallel 
occurrence found in Luke 22:26.  Also, this reference is made in the context of BDF’s discussion 
concerning the various forms of ellipsis/brachyology, a discussion with which I engaged briefly 
in the relevant section of my secondary literature survey.  The question of exactly what is being 
rejected from this state of affairs, and what, if anything, is being retained.   
 
 
                                                 
401 BDAG, 742. 
402 BDF, 254. 
189 
 
 
 
Let us consider the construction as we find it in the Mark 10:43: 
οὐχ  οὕτως δέ  ἐστιν    ἐν ὑμῖν,  
ἀλλ᾽  ὃς ἂν θέλῃ  μέγας γενέσθαι  ἐν ὑμῖν   ἔσται  ὑμῶν  διάκονος, 
καὶ  ὃς ἂν θέλῃ     ἐν ὑμῖν εἶναι πρῶτος  ἔσται  πάντων δοῦλος· 
The explicit constant constituent is the prepositional phrase ἐν ὑμῖν, which occurs once in 
the protasis and twice in the apodosis.  Remembering that οὕτως recalls what has been presented 
in 10:42, we first note the contrast between (1) those who are currently recognized as ruling (οἱ 
δοκοῦντες ἄρχειν), and the one who aspires/desires to be first (ὃς ἂν θέλῃ…εἶναι πρῶτος); and (2) 
those who are currently “great ones” (οἱ μεγάλοι) and those who desire to be great (ὃς ἂν θέλῃ 
μέγας γενέσθαι).   
We also note the contrast between the respective behaviors of each of these: in particular, 
we see the contrast between (1) κατακυριεύουσιν αὐτῶν and ἔσται πάντων δοῦλος; and (2) 
κατεξουσιάζουσιν αὐτῶν and ἔσται ὑμῶν διάκονος.  Rather than a description of what those within 
the community will “do,” we see what they will need to “be” or “become.”  Specifically, they 
will need to be the minister to those among whom they wish to be great; they will need to 
become the servant/slave to those among whom they desire to be first. 
The final contrast is between the present tense, which is used to speak of the current 
actions of those in authority, and the future tense, which is used to speak of the state of those 
who desire to be first or be great.  Although this could be temporal, it seems best to view it hear 
as carrying an imperatival force. 
What then, is being rejected?  Is it the whole state of affairs from 10:42?  I think not, 
based upon the evidence of the desires expressed and the resultant parallels between secular 
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leaders and those who would be leaders in the community.  Jesus does not say that whoever 
desires to be great or first is wrong.  But in contrast with the ways of the world for those who 
aspire to leadership, the actions they will take, or, better, the relative positions they will assume, 
are positions of service and humility, not lordship and authority.  C. Evans’s discussion 
concerning the depth of this contrast, namely between the “served” and those serving them, is 
especially helpful, as are his treatments of primary source texts that give some insight into the 
Greco-Roman perspectives on both service and greatness.403  
I have asserted previously, and I hold here, that when we see such parallels between the 
material occurring before and after ἀλλά, we should take this as the signal of the correction 
consisting of the rejection of and replacement of particular constituents from within the material 
before ἀλλά, and not a rejection of it in its entirety.  Besides the explicit repetition of the 
prepositional phrase on either side of ἀλλά, we see parallels between the rulers and those desiring 
to be first, between the “great ones” and those desiring to be first.  Based on these parallels and 
symmetries, I have concluded that we have such a correction happening in this occurrence of 
ἀλλά.  In this respect, Pattern 3 seems to occupy somewhat of a medial position between (1) 
Pattern 1, in which there is ellipsis, a constant constituent or constituents, clear parallels between 
contrast pairs, and correction, and (2) Pattern 2, in which there is no ellipsis, no constant 
constituent, and contrast between two conjuncts.  
 
 
                                                 
403 Craig A. Evans, Word Biblical Commentary 34B: Mark 8:27-16:20, ed. Ralph P. 
Martin, WBC 34B (Dallas: Thomas Nelson, 2001), 118–9. 
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Matt 22:32b//Mark 12:27//Luke 20:38 
I will cover this parallel set in fairly brief compass, as I have previously discussed one 
member of the set, Mark 12:27, in both the Introduction and in the survey of S. Repp’s work on 
gapping and stripping.  The parallel texts of particular relevance to our investigation are as 
follows: 
Matt 22:32 οὐκ ἔστιν [ὁ] θεὸς  νεκρῶν ἀλλὰ ζώντων. 
Mark 12:27 οὐκ ἔστιν θεὸς   νεκρῶν ἀλλὰ ζώντων·   πολὺ πλανᾶσθε. 
Luke 20:38 θεὸς δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν  νεκρῶν ἀλλὰ ζώντων,   πάντες γὰρ αὐτῷ ζῶσιν. 
The core that we considering is, in this case, best represented by the Marcan version, which 
commends itself to the following graphical analysis: 
  Negation Constant  Preceding ἀλλὰ  Following 
        
 
Mark 12:27 οὐκ   ἔστιν  θεὸς   νεκρῶν  ἀλλὰ   ζώντων· 
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For the sake of keeping the co-text and context in view, however, note the following 
parallels, which I have arranged to draw attention to both the similarities and the differences: 
 
Matthew Mark Luke 
31  περὶ  
δὲ  
τῆς ἀναστάσεως  
τῶν νεκρῶν  
 
 
οὐκ ἀνέγνωτε  
τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑμῖν  
 
 
ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ λέγοντος· 
 32  ἐγώ εἰμι  
ὁ θεὸς Ἀβραὰμ καὶ ὁ θεὸς 
Ἰσαὰκ καὶ ὁ θεὸς Ἰακώβ;  
 
 
οὐκ ἔστιν [ὁ] θεὸς νεκρῶν 
ἀλλὰ ζώντων. 
26  περὶ  
δὲ  
 
τῶν νεκρῶν  
ὅτι ἐγείρονται  
 
οὐκ ἀνέγνωτε  
ἐν τῇ βίβλῳ  
Μωϋσέως  
ἐπὶ τοῦ βάτου404  
πῶς εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ θεὸς λέγων·  
ἐγὼ  
ὁ θεὸς Ἀβραὰμ καὶ [ὁ] θεὸς 
Ἰσαὰκ καὶ [ὁ] θεὸς Ἰακώβ; 
  
 
27  οὐκ ἔστιν θεὸς νεκρῶν  
ἀλλὰ ζώντων·  
πολὺ πλανᾶσθε. 
37  ὅτι  
δὲ  
 
 
ἐγείρονται  
οἱ νεκροί,  
 
 
καὶ Μωϋσῆς ἐμήνυσεν  
ἐπὶ τῆς βάτου,  
ὡς λέγει κύριον  
 
τὸν θεὸν Ἀβραὰμ καὶ θεὸν 
Ἰσαὰκ καὶ θεὸν Ἰακώβ. 
 38  θεὸς  
δὲ  
οὐκ ἔστιν νεκρῶν  
ἀλλὰ ζώντων,  
πάντες γὰρ αὐτῷ ζῶσιν.  
For all of these instances, the presence of (1) the negation, (2) ἀλλά, and (3) ellipsis of the verb 
in the second conjunct signals a corrective function for the construction, with νεκρῶν being 
rejected, and ζώντων being proffered as the replacement.  Note also that in every case the 
                                                 
404 Cf. Rodney J. Decker, Mark 9-16: A Handbook on the Greek Text, BHGNT (Waco, 
TX: Baylor University Press, 2014), 127.  Commenting on this prepositional phrase, Decker 
observes, “The word βάτος appears as either masculine or feminine, though both used second 
declension endings.  The masculine, as here, is more common in Koine, with the feminine more 
commonly found in Attic texts (cf. ἐπί τῆς βάτου in || Luke 20:37).” 
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preceding and following constituents are immediately adjacent to ἀλλά.  Further, they are 
parallel genitive substantival participles denoting the options for which group over whom405 the 
God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob may rightly be said to be God.   
There is no little rhetorical import here, as Jesus’s framing of the dispute with the 
Sadducees presents his audience with two diametrically-opposed options: one linked to the 
Sadducees’ position, and one linked to his own.  The first, which amounts to a declaration that 
God is the God of the dead (νεκρῶν), is completely unacceptable on all counts by all parties, and 
as such would not even have been advanced by the Sadducees.  Jesus advances it as representing 
their position in an obvious reductio ad absurdum, only to demolish it with the correction “of the 
living” (ζώντων), which all, including his opponents, would either affirm (highly likely), or at 
least not easily deny (far less likely). 
But what of the differences between the Marcan text and the versions found in the 
Matthean and Lucan parallels?  I will restrict my comments to the most notable variants.  First, I 
note that there is a movement from the remarks being about the dead, and the fact that they are 
being raised/resurrected in Mark 12:26, to the remarks being about the resurrection of the dead in 
Matt 22:31.  Matthew’s version coheres better with both the mention of resurrection in the 
original question, as well as the subsequent mention of the same in Jesus’s answer, in which he 
provides a description of the state affairs for those who are raised.  Luke removes the preposition 
completely, and converts the preceding genitive τῶν νεκρῶν to a following nominative οἱ νεκροί 
to function as the subject of the verb ἐγείρονται, which he has retained.  
                                                 
405 Culy, Parsons, and Stigall, Luke, 237; Wallace, Greek Grammar, 103–4.  Culy et al. 
label the genitives in this verse and the previous as genitives of “subordination,” utilizing the 
label found in Wallace’s Grammar. 
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The text in Matthew moves closer to the text of the LXX by including εἰμι in the 
quotation of Exodus 3:6a 
καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ  
ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ θεὸς τοῦ πατρός σου θεὸς  Αβρααμ καὶ θεὸς Ισαακ καὶ θεὸς Ιακωβ 
 
Matt 22:32: ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ θεὸς    Ἀβραὰμ καὶ ὁ θεὸς Ἰσαὰκ καὶ ὁ θεὸς Ἰακώβ 
Note, however, that both the explicit mention of Moses prior to the quotation in Mark 12:26, and 
the implicit pronominal reference to him within the quotation (τοῦ πατρός σου θεὸς), are omitted 
in Matthew’s version.  Luke moves in a different direction, retaining the explicit reference to 
Moses, but changing the quoted material to reflect, not God’s declaration concerning himself to 
Moses, but Moses words concerning the Lord (κύριον).  J. Fitzmyer rightly comments, “Luke 
follows Mark 12:26c, but casts the titles for Yahweh in the acc., making Moses himself say that 
Yahweh is the God of the patriarchs.”406 
One final brief comment is in order: in both the Matthean and Marcan versions, θεὸς is 
located within the construction, while in the Lucan, it is placed before the opening negation.  
Commenting on Mark 12:27, R. Decker labels it a predicate nominative.  Culy et al., 
commenting on Luke 20:38, offer that it is either the “nominative subject (“God is not [the God] 
of the dead) or predicate nominative of ἔστιν.”407  J. Fitzmyer, commenting on the same, says 
that “Luke follows Mark 12:27, but puts theos emphatically at the head of the statement which 
                                                 
406 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, The Gospel According to Luke X-XXIV: Introduction, 
Translation, and Notes, AB 28A (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985), 1306. 
407 Culy, Parsons, and Stigall, Luke, 637. 
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concludes his argument from Scripture.  Theos is, however, predicative, lacking a def. art.”408  I 
take all of the parallel instances as being predicate nominatives with the implied subject of the 
verb recoverable from the context, i.e., He/God is not God of the dead, but of the living. 
Matt 24:6//Mark 13:7//Luke 21:9 
Matt 24:6b//Mark 13:7b//Luke 21:9—X but not [yet] Y? 
For this occurrence, it will be helpful to examine our text of interest, Luke 21:9, along 
with the parallel occurrences from Matt 24:6 and Mark 13:7. 
Matt 24:6b δεῖ  γὰρ   γενέσθαι,   ἀλλ᾽ οὔπω  ἐστὶν  τὸ τέλος 
Mark 13:7b δεῖ    γενέσθαι,   ἀλλ᾽ οὔπω   τὸ τέλος 
Luke 21:9 δεῖ  γὰρ  ταῦτα  γενέσθαι πρῶτον,  ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ  εὐθέως  τὸ τέλος 
Luke has departed from the Marcan example in that he has shifted from the adverb οὔπω to the 
negative particle οὐκ and the adverb εὐθέως.  In both examples, there is an ellipsis of the verb, 
which Matthew’s version supplies as ἐστὶν.  This would seem to indicate that Matthew did not 
feel the verb implied was clear from the context, and supplies it explicitly to remove the 
ambiguity.  Interestingly, Luke moves in a different direction, signaling that the issue was not 
ambiguity with respect to which verb should be supplied.   
On the contrary, the pressing issue for Luke appears to be ambiguity with respect to the 
adverb to be used with the implied verb.  Based on this, it seems likely that Luke expected a 
form of γίνομαι to be implied after ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ.  For Luke’s version, I propose that the most likely 
                                                 
408 Fitzmyer, Luke X-XXIV, 1306.  Fitzmyer directs the reader to §179 of Zerwick’s 
grammar, and §273 of BDF. 
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implied verb is the future tense-form of γίνομαι, γενήσεται.  With Mark’s version, however, the 
sense of the saying and the co-text could allow for the perfect form, γεγένηται.  Culy, et al., have 
an alternate proposal that, although different than mine, still suggests an implied verb in the 
future tense-form: commenting on the adverb εὐθέως, they describe it as “the adverb that 
modifies an implied verb, such as ἐλεύσεται.”409   
Matt 26:39//Mark 14:36//Luke 22:42 
In this section, I am examining how both Matthew and Luke have made use of their 
source material from Mark.  Both change the initial ἀλλά to πλήν, while retaining the second 
ἀλλά.  My focus, however, is not on the change from ἀλλά to πλήν, but rather on the function of 
the ἀλλά that is present in all of the parallels.  Further, I am interested in examining how 
Matthew and Luke edit the source material from the first and second conjuncts, resulting in 
different contrast pairs that nevertheless manage to preserve the essential contrast between “the 
will of the Father”/“what the Father wills” and “the will of Jesus”/“what Jesus wills.”   
J. Nolland offers the following perspective on Luke 22:42: 
Again, if Mark is the source for the statement about the will of God, Luke has preferred to 
link with πλήν, “but/only/yet/nevertheless” (as often), and has formulated the clause in a 
more abstract manner (cf. Acts 21:14; since the wording is so close to that of a clause of 
the Matthean form of the Lord’s prayer [Matt 6:10], we must also reckon with the 
possibility that Luke is reflecting the language of his second source here).410 
J. Fitzmyer notes this same shift in the Lucan version: 
Yet not my will, but yours be done! So Luke formulates abstractly what Mark 14:36 states 
more concretely, “Not what I want, but what you want.” The n. thelēma refers not to a 
                                                 
409 Culy, Parsons, and Stigall, Luke, 646. 
410 John Nolland, Word Biblical Commentary 35C: Luke 18:25-24:53, ed. Ralph P. 
Martin, WBC 35C (Dallas: Word, 1993), 1083. 
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capricious whim of the Father who subjects his son to death in satisfaction for human sins 
and offenses against divine majesty, but rather to the Father’s plan of salvation for 
humanity, as the n. is used in Acts 21:14; 22:14.411 
This shift to τὸ θέλημά μου and τὸ σὸν [θέλημά σοῦ?]412 is not present in the Matthean version, 
which retains ἐγὼ θέλω and σύ [θέλεις?]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
411 Fitzmyer, Luke X-XXIV, 1442.  Translation and emphasis is Fitzmyer’s. 
412 The bracketed material reflects my suggestion regarding the text which is ellipsed, but 
can be supplied ἀπὸ κοινοῦ from the material explicitly present in the first conjunct. 
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The relevant portions of the parallel texts, with the corresponding constituents aligned, 
follow: 
 
Matthew 26:39 Mark 14:36 Luke 22:42 
 αββα  
πάτερ ὁ πατήρ, πάτερ, 
μου,   
εἰ  εἰ 
 πάντα  
δυνατόν δυνατά  
 σοι·  
ἐστιν,   
  βούλει 
παρελθάτω   
 παρένεγκε παρένεγκε 
ἀπ᾽ ἐμοῦ   
  τοῦτο 
τὸ ποτήριον τὸ ποτήριον τὸ ποτήριον 
τοῦτο· τοῦτο  
 ἀπ᾽ ἐμοῦ· ἀπ᾽ ἐμοῦ· 
πλὴν ἀλλ᾽ πλὴν 
οὐχ οὐ μὴ 
ὡς τί τὸ θέλημά 
ἐγὼ θέλω ἐγὼ θέλω μου 
ἀλλ᾽ ἀλλὰ ἀλλὰ 
ὡς τί  
σύ.  σύ. τὸ σὸν  
  γινέσθω. 
I will first cover the Lucan version of this parallel, and then turn to the Matthean, discussing both 
significant departures from the Marcan version as well as differences between the Lucan and 
Matthean texts handling of their Marcan source. 
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Luke 22:42 
This occurrence is found within a saying, in this case a prayer, which in turn is embedded 
within the narrative of Jesus’s time of prayer on the Mount of Olives.  The particular place in 
which he prayed, which Luke does not mention, is known to be the Garden of Gethsemane from 
the parallel accounts in Matthew and Mark.413  In the prayer, Jesus requests that the Father take 
away (παρένεγκε) “this cup” (τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον) which he is about to drink.  Immediately 
following the imperative, however, he signals his submission to the will of the Father despite, or 
perhaps better, following BDAG’s comments on πλήν, in contrast to,414 what he has just 
requested.  
Following this contrastive conjunction, we have a μή...ἀλλά construction.  The presence 
of μή here is due to the imperative mood of the verb being negated, which in this case is the 
ellipsed verb in the first conjunct, γινέσθω.  In the graphical analysis of the text we see the 
following arrangement of constituents, which corresponds to my Sub-Pattern 1B2: 
 
Negation Constant 1 Preceding ἀλλά  Following Constant 2 
…μὴ   τὸ θέλημά  μου   ἀλλὰ   τὸ σὸν   γινέσθω 
The hypothetical reconstruction I am proposing, without ellipses, is as follows: 
* μὴ τὸ θέλημά μου γινέσθω ἀλλὰ τὸ θέλημά σοῦ γινέσθω. 
                                                 
413 Fitzmyer, Luke X-XXIV, 1436.  
414 BDAG, 826. BDAG gives one use of πλήν as an “adv. used as conj. (Trag.+), coming 
at the beginning of a sentence or clause: marker of someth. that is contrastingly added for 
consideration” and includes Luke 22:42 and Matt 26:39 as examples, while noting that Mark 
14:36 instead uses ἀλλά for this purpose. 
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There is a difficulty with this reconstruction that should be addressed: namely, my choice to use 
σοῦ instead of σόν (*τὸ θέλημά σοῦ, as in Matt 26:42, instead of *τὸ θέλημά σὸν).  The reason for 
the substantival use of the possessive adjective σὸν in the original text is precisely because the 
will of the Father, in contrast to the will of Jesus, was being referred to.  With the omission of the 
noun θέλημά and the resulting ellipsis produced, the article and adjective that Luke elected to use 
substantivally to refer to θέλημά involved a change from the masculine personal pronoun 
(referring to the Father) in the genitive to the neuter possessive adjective (referring instead to 
θέλημά).  As such, I see the use of σὸν as having arisen incidentally: Luke, had he explicitly 
repeated θέλημα, would not have chosen it.  I am in no wise proposing that Luke wrote out, or 
even thought out, the expanded reconstruction that I have proposed above, and then edited it, 
either manually or mentally, to the final form.  The process would have happened as 
transparently as it does when we formulate a question such as “Should we take my car or yours?” 
as opposed to “Should we take my car or your car?”   
In their comments on this verse, Culy, Parsons, and Stigall note that θέλημά is the 
“nominative subject of γινέσθω” and describe σόν as a “possessive adjective” that “modifies an 
implied θέλημα.”415  Not surprisingly, I would disagree slightly with their assertion regarding 
σόν, as I believe that it is, in fact, being used as a substantive, replacing the omitted θέλημα. 
Although they do not explicitly provide a reconstruction, I believe that it would be along the 
lines of the following: 
* μὴ τὸ θέλημά μου γινέσθω ἀλλὰ τὸ θέλημά σόν γινέσθω. 
                                                 
415 Culy, Parsons, and Stigall, Luke, 686. 
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Under these conditions, σόν would indeed modify θέλημα, producing the same effect as “τὸ 
θέλημά σοῦ”, or “your will.”  I prefer my reconstruction and associated explanation for the 
presence of σόν, above, as it preserves the parallelism between the two constituents that are being 
affected by ἀλλά, namely the constituents that denote “my” (μου) and “your,” (σου) respectively.   
However, it should be remembered that either reconstruction is hypothetical.  Further, 
one need not accept my proposed reconstruction in order to accept that the contrast signaled by 
this construction is between the possessive constituents located on either side of ἀλλά.  The 
rejection and replacement accomplished by the use of ἀλλά is focused on these particular 
constituents, “my” and “your,” and no others.  Once again we observe that ἀλλά, together with 
ellipsis of a constituent or constituents from the first conjunct, can be used by an author to signal 
the rejection and replacement of a particular constituent from an utterance, leaving the rest of the 
utterance as a positive affirmation. 
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Matt 26:39 
The occurrence in Matt 26:39, which is the basis for the pattern I have labelled Sub-
Pattern 3C, exhibits a two-part constant constituent that is “split,” or divided, by the preceding 
constituent before ἀλλά, with only one part repeated explicitly after ἀλλά.  The graphical analysis 
of the latter text follows: 
     Explicit 
Negation  Constant Preceding  Constant   ἀλλά  Constant   Following   [[Constant]] 
       Implicit 
πλὴν      οὐχ   ὡς      ἐγὼ   θέλω     ἀλλ᾽     ὡς   σύ     [[θέλεις]] 
Davies and Allison rightly note that Matthew’s version changes both the τί present in the 
first conjunct of the Marcan version, as well as the repeated τί found in the second conjunct of 
the same, to ὡς.416  It is possible that the function of ὡς here is closer to that of a relative 
pronoun, echoing the similar function of τίς in Mark 14:36.  Commenting on the relative use of 
τίς in the NT in general, and in our texts of interest in particular, Robertson asserts that “Just as 
ὅς and ὅςτις came to be used as interrogatives, so τίς drifted occasionally to a mere relative. … 
The plainest New Testament example of τίς as ὅς appears to be Mk. 14:36 οὐ τί ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλὰ τί 
σύ. Cf. Mt. 26:39 οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλ᾽ ὡς σύ.”417  This explains what we find in the Marcan 
version.  But what of the Matthean version and its changes from τί to ὡς mentioned above?   
                                                 
416 W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, Matthew 19-28: Volume 3 (London: Bloomsbury 
T&T Clark, 2004), 498. 
417 Robertson, Grammar, 737. 
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BDAG identifies ὡς as a “relative adv. of the relative pron. ὅς,” with the first use noted 
being as “a comparative particle, marking the manner in which someth. proceeds, as, 
like….”418  The occurrence in Matt 26:39 is then mentioned specifically under 1.b.β:  
ὡς and the words that go w. it can be the subj. or obj., of a clause: γενηθήτω σοι ὡς θέλεις 
let it be done (=it will be done) for you as you wish Mt 15:28. … The predicate belonging 
to such a subj. is to be supplied in οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω (γενηθήτω) Mt 26:39a.419 
The description that BDAG gives here is consistent with a relative use, but the general category 
under which they have placed this occurrence, as I have noted above, seems to indicate an 
adverbial one.  What might the difference be in this case?  The shift from a relative use to an 
adverbial one would nuance the meaning away from (a) “something” being allowed to come to 
be, or to pass, and to (b) a manner, or way in which the event or happening will unfold.  This 
latter option could also describe what is occurring in Matt 26:39.   
If this suggestion is correct, then ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω and ὡς σύ are to be taken adverbially, 
serving to connect the two different ways in which this thing could come to be: namely, either 
according to what Jesus wills, or according to what the Father wills, with this latter way being 
the way desired.  Clearly the contrast being presented here is between “as I will/desire” and “as 
you [[will/desire]].”420  But which verb is being modified?  BDAG suggests the aorist passive 
imperative form γενηθήτω to fill the elliptical gap.  BDAG probably makes this choice for 
insertion into Matt 26:39 in order to match the form of the second prayer present in Matt 
                                                 
418 BDAG, 1103.  Emphasis in the original. 
419 Ibid., 1104.  Emphasis in the original.  Apparently the motivation for offering the 
aorist form γενηθήτω as a suggestion to fill the elliptical gap in Matt 26:39 is to keep to the form 
present in Matt 26:42: namely, “τὸ θέλημά σου.” 
420 Note how most English translations provide a corresponding term to complete the 
thought “as you ____.” 
204 
 
 
 
26:42,421 namely, “γενηθήτω τὸ θέλημά σου,” which as Luz notes, has another occurrence in 
Matthew’s Gospel: 
Jesus goes away to pray a second time. The wording of his prayer in v. 42 goes beyond v. 
39 in two points. First, he now recognized that the cup of his death cannot pass him by but 
that he must drink it. Therefore what he still asks is only that God’s will be fulfilled. Thus 
obedience is emphasized more strongly. Second, the “not as I will but as you” is now newly 
formulated exactly with the words of the third petition of the Lord’s Prayer, Matt 6:10b. 
Thus Jesus prays as an example, just as he has taught his disciples.422 
By its addition of γενηθήτω in Matt 26:39, BDAG has done implicitly what Luke’s version has 
done explicitly with the addition of γινέσθω in Luke 22:42. That is certainly one valid option for 
expressing what Matthew intended to communicate, and may in fact be the correct one.  
However, as the reader may surmise based upon my previous discussion of the adverbial use of 
ὡς, I prefer to take ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω and ὡς σύ as modifying the verb that is explicitly present here: 
namely, the imperative παρελθάτω.423  The effect, with overtranslation, is “Let this cup pass from 
me…not as I will/desire, but as you will/desire.” 
This concludes my engagement with the occurrences of ἀλλά that are found in parallel 
passages in all of the Synoptics.  In the next chapter, I will engage with some representative 
occurrences found in only two of the Synoptics, beginning with the those in Matthew and Mark 
(eight (8) shared occurrences total), continuing with those found in Matthew and Luke (five (5) 
                                                 
421 Ulrich Luz, Matthew 21–28: A Commentary, ed. Helmut Koester, trans. James E. 
Crouch, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 369.  And, as Luz notes, Matt 6:10b. 
422 Ibid., 397. 
423 Note that the same verb occurs in the infinitive in Matt 26:42 (πάτερ μου, εἰ οὐ δύναται 
τοῦτο παρελθεῖν ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸ πίω, γενηθήτω τὸ θέλημά σου = My Father, if this is not able to pass 
except/unless I drink it, let your will be/come to pass). 
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shared occurrences total), and finishing with the only occurrence found in both Mark and Luke, 
but not in Matthew. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Occurrences of ἀλλά Found in Two Gospels 
This chapter is devoted to consideration of those occurrences that appear in parallel texts 
in only two of the Synoptics.  I will first consider those parallel sets found only in (1) Matthew 
and Mark, and then those found only in (2) Matthew and Luke.  For these first two sections, my 
coverage of parallel sets will not be exhaustive, as I have selected those sets that are of particular 
interest for my study.  For the Matthean and Marcan occurrences, I will engage with the 
following: Matt 10:20//Mark 13:11 and Matt 15:11//Mark 7:15.  For the Matthean and Lucan 
occurrences, I will engage with Matt 5:15//Luke 8:16 and 11:33.  In the final section I will 
consider the only parallel set shared by (3) Mark and Luke: namely Mark 12:14//Luke 20:21.  
Matthew and Mark Only 
Matt 10:20//Mark 13:11 
Matt 10:20 
I will begin my treatment of this parallel set with a consideration of Matt 10:20. 
Following this, I will engage Matt 10:20 together with the Marcan parallel in Mark 13:11, noting 
similarities and differences between the two versions.  In this Matthean occurrence, I have 
identified an ellipsed constant constituent, namely ἐστέ, which occurs explicitly before ἀλλά, and 
implicitly following it.  Further, there are other constituents, namely the participial forms of 
λαλέω before (οἱ λαλοῦντες) and after (τὸ λαλοῦν) ἀλλά, which clearly correspond to one another 
in their respective conjuncts.  How one should view these constituents?  Is this an explicitly 
repeated constant constituent?  If so, then we encounter the difficulty of why one constant 
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constituent, namely ἐστέ, was ellipsed, while the other constant constituent, οἱ λαλοῦντες, and 
(mutatis mutandis due to the change in subject in the second conjunct) τὸ λαλοῦν, was not.   
Or has Matthew actually introduced another explicit contrast pair into these constructs, 
such that the contrast pairs present are (ὑμεῖς, τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν) and (οἱ λαλοῦντες, τὸ 
λαλοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν)?  If this second answer is correct, then Matthew’s version presents us with an 
instance of the phenomenon known as gapping, which I previously covered in some detail in my 
engagement with S. Repp’s work.  The reader will remember that the difference between 
stripping and gapping is the number of contrast pairs present in the conjuncts, with stripping 
having only one contrast pair, and gapping having two or more.  I view this as an instance of 
gapping, and I have classified it as Sub-Pattern 1D.  The graphical analysis of the verse, which 
reflects this understanding, is as follows: 
       Implicit 
Negation Preceding1 Constant Preceding2 ἀλλά  Following1  Constant Following2 
οὐ γὰρ   ὑμεῖς   ἐστε  οἱ λαλοῦντες  ἀλλὰ  τὸ πνεῦμα … [ἔστιν] τὸ λαλοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν 
At least one other question of some significance arises: How should we interpret the 
negation present in the first conjunct, given both the prior co-text of Matt 10:19, and the 
assertion present in the second conjunct?  Early in my investigation, my inclination was to see 
this use of ἀλλά as representing the “not so much X…as Y” construction noted earlier in my 
survey of the secondary literature: such a conclusion was in agreement with the assertions of 
BDF and Zerwick.424    Although dialectical negation does indeed offer one possible explanation 
that accounts for the preservation of all or part of the first conjunct under negation, I hold that 
                                                 
424 Blass and Debrunner, BDF, 233; Zerwick, Biblical Greek, 150. 
208 
 
 
 
metalinguistic negation offers an alternate explanation, which better accounts for the both the 
preservation of the proposition in the first conjunct, as well as the emphasis on the second.  
However, I will reserve my fullest treatment of the metalinguistic use of the οὐ...ἀλλά 
construction for the later section dealing with the occurrence in Mark 9:37.  My reason for this is 
that Mark 9:37 presents a (relatively) unambiguous case that argues for the usage that I am 
advancing, namely that ἀλλά can, in some instances, signal that the preceding constituent is not 
to be completely negated as a constituent.  Rather, what is negated is the sufficiency of the 
assertion with the preceding constituent in isolation, or as an exhaustive predication.  In such a 
case, the preceding constituent is retained, the following constituent is added to it, and the 
following constituent is emphasized.   
Let us move away from such an abstract, formulaic discussion, and on to a consideration 
of the evidence in the text upon which we are focusing here: namely, Matt 10:20.  Consider the 
following related clauses, and let U = ὑμεῖς, and P = πνεῦμα: 
οὐ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐστε οἱ λαλοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τὸ λαλοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν. 
The simplest approach to this verse would be to take οὐ and ἀλλά together as signals (1) against 
[+adversative] U, and what is predicated about U, and (2) for replacement 
[+replacement/alternative] of the same with P, and what is predicated about P.  Runge’s 
comments on this verse alert us to the difficulties encountered by such a straightforward reading: 
Verse 20 provides support for the command not to be anxious, and it presupposes that 
someone will be speaking; we know that it will not be “you.” This raises the question of 
who will be speaking if not the disciples. The answer introduced following ἀλλά clarifies 
that although the disciples will be speaking, it is the Spirit of the Father who will be 
speaking through them. Note that there is also a close grammatical correspondence between 
what is replaced and its replacement, just as in Matt 4:4; in this case, the complement of 
the verb is replaced with an alternate complement. 
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The counterpoint here addresses the natural inclination to think that we are on our 
own in such instances. It is countered by stating that we are not the ones speaking; it is the 
Spirit, who indwells us. Stating “Do not be anxious …, the Spirit of our Father is the one 
speaking in you” communicates the same basic content, but without explicitly eliminating 
the thought that we need to go it alone.425 
Interestingly, although he provides a thorough treatment of the “point/counterpoint set” in this 
verse, Runge does not appeal to the phenomenon of dialectical negation.426  Instead, Runge 
engages the text itself, attempting to reconcile what appears to be a contradiction between the 
state of affairs described in the co-text of 10:19 and the result of the negation in 10:20.  While I 
agree fully with most of Runge’s insights regarding this verse, I would like to both (1) make 
clear that with which I disagree, and (2) explain in greater detail what is being negated in the first 
clause. 
First, my small point of disagreement is with the last part of the statement “Verse 20 
provides support for the command not to be anxious, and it presupposes that someone will be 
speaking; we know that it will not be “you.””  Based upon the context, however, and especially 
the co-text of 10:19, it is apparent that such a coarse treatment of the conjunction will not do: 
those being addressed are told not to worry about how or what they will speak (πῶς ἢ τί 
λαλήσητε), because what they are to speak will be given to them at that time (λαλήσητε).  
Without being tedious, it is important to note that, clearly, those to whom Jesus is speaking are 
being thought of as the speakers, the ones speaking.  Given that, we simply cannot see 10:20 as 
negating the fact that they will be the ones speaking.   
                                                 
425 Runge, Discourse Grammar, 95. 
426 This is certainly not a criticism, since, as I have noted, I do not hold to the dialectical 
negation explanation. 
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Moving forward from that point of disagreement, it is important to note that Runge then 
rightly remarks that the question of who will be speaking naturally arises, offering in response 
that “the answer introduced following ἀλλά clarifies that although the disciples will be speaking, 
it is the Spirit of the Father who will be speaking through them.”427  Runge comments indicate 
that it will still be the disciples who are speaking, though not alone: this seems to signal at least 
some concession to, or preservation of, the preceding constituent.428  And it is this very idea that 
they are not speaking alone—that it is not only they who will be speaking—that deserves greater 
attention.   
But first, a bit of “ground-clearing” is in order: pace BDF and Zerwick, we should not 
settle with the solution offered by “not so much U as P.”  While this may appear to offer a 
serviceable option for our translation purposes, it actually leaves us unclear as to what exactly is 
being asserted about both (1) the presumed speakers, namely those of whom it was said that they 
will be given “what” (τί) they should speak, and (2) the one who is said to be speaking: namely, 
the spirit of your Father (τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν).  Are they speaking, or are they not?  What 
does “not so much…as…” really mean?  I call attention to Winer’s contributions that I presented 
in my survey of secondary literature: namely, (1) his engagement with this very issue, (2) his 
rejection of the very sense offered by BDF and Zerwick, and (3) his citation of Matt 10:20 in 
particular as an example to which his argument should apply.429   
Based on the text, the spirit is speaking, so we can say with confidence that the one 
speaking is at least equal to P.  But we also know from the context that the ones speaking are, in 
                                                 
427 Runge, Discourse Grammar, 95.  Emphasis is mine. 
428 Ibid. 
429 Winer, Grammar of the Idiom, 497. 
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some way, also equal to U.  As such, the group of speakers, or ones who are speaking, is equal to 
(U + P).  But how exactly is this indicated in the text?  Is ἀλλά, together with the negation οὐ, 
able to signal that the writer is in fact communicating this?  The evidence points to the 
conclusion that it indeed can. 
A reasonable rebuttal from my reader at this point would be that, in order to adopt such 
an interpretation for the use of οὐ...ἀλλά, one would need to see οὐ μόνον... ἀλλὰ καί.  This 
would lead the reader to move beyond a simple negation of U, and instead see the combination 
of terms signaling “not simply/only U, but even more P in addition to U.”  It is thus not 
unreasonable to question whether or not the simple expression οὐ...ἀλλά is able to signal, or even 
allow for, this idea to be communicated implicitly in certain contexts.  Based upon the evidence 
we have examined from the text of Matt 10:20, I am claiming that οὐ...ἀλλά can, based upon the 
context in which it is used, indicate both [+alternative] and [+addition/accumulation], even 
without the explicit addition of μόνον…καί….   
The way forward is to view this as an instance of metalinguistic negation, in which the 
negation is not to the particular constituent, but rather to something connected with what is being 
said in the first conjunct, or how it is being said.  Recall my earlier treatment of Horn’s proposal 
concerning metalinguistic negation, and especially instances involving metalinguistic negation in 
connection with scalar implicature.  In those instances, what was objected to was the sufficiency 
of what was being predicated in the first conjunct, not the truth of the proposition itself.  The 
effect is that the proposition is true, but it is inadequate in some way, and so it is negated.  Recall 
also the proposal by Lehrer and Lehrer, that in particular contexts such a metalinguistic negation 
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could be seen as implying and elliptical “not (only)…but (also).”430  Horn did acknowledge that 
in some instances this could be seen, but rejected the proposal due to its inability to account for 
other types of metalinguistic negation.   
I also examined the respective contributions of Geurts and Pitts.  Geurts established both 
the non-unitary nature of metalinguistic negation as well as the absence of a unified explanation; 
Pitts showed that, in fact, the “not (only)…but (also)” explanation could be applied to other types 
of metalinguistic negation.  Taken together, these overturn Horn’s objections to the “not 
(only)…but (also)” proposal, allowing it to be considered as a viable explanation for some 
particular instances of metalinguistic negation.  In my later treatment of Mark 9:37, I will revisit 
this claim in more detail, and present further evidence from the Greek supporting it. 
Matt 10:20//Mark 13:11 
We find in Mark 13:11 the saying that parallels our previous text from Matt 10:20.  I 
have discussed metalinguistic negation in some detail in connection with this latter verse, and I 
will engage it only briefly in this section.  In my later treatment of Mark 9:37, I will return to the 
topic of metalinguistic negation, and engage it in some detail there.  In my treatment of Mark 
13:11, however, I would like to restrict the majority of my remarks to those features of the 
Matthean version of the saying that differ appreciably from Marcan presentation of the same.   
 
 
 
                                                 
430 Lehrer and Lehrer, “Antonymy,” 487–8. 
213 
 
 
 
First, it will be helpful to examine the parallel texts of interest: 
Matthew 10:20  
οὐ γὰρ  ὑμεῖς  ἐστε   οἱ λαλοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τὸ λαλοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν.  
Mark 13:11c 
οὐ γάρ   ἐστε ὑμεῖς  οἱ λαλοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. 
Comparing only the “core” of these verses, we observe: 
Matthew 10:20   οὐ γὰρ  ὑμεῖς  ἐστε   οἱ λαλοῦντες  ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα 
Mark 13:11c   οὐ γάρ   ἐστε ὑμεῖς  οἱ λαλοῦντες  ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα 
In Mark’s version, which is a straightforward instance of stripping, there is one contrast 
pair: namely (ὑμεῖς, τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον).  In Matthew’s version, however, we observe the 
introduction of constituents that both (1) strengthen the parallels between the propositions and 
(2) make explicit some of what is implicit within Mark’s shorter presentation.  First, the 
Matthean version includes a neuter singular substantival participle (τὸ λαλοῦν) that neatly 
parallels the masculine plural substantival participle (οἱ λαλοῦντες) found before the conjunction.  
We find no explicit copulative verb here, but it is easily supplied ἀπὸ κοινοῦ given the explicit 
presence of ἐστε linking the preceding subject with its predicate nominative, with the same 
relationship holding between τὸ πνεῦμα and τὸ λαλοῦν.  In his comments on τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, 
R. Decker rightly observes that it is the “nominative subject of an implied ἔστιν (τὸ λαλοῦν).  
This is partially fleshed out in || Matt 10:20.”431 
As the reader may remember from my treatment of Matt 10:20 above, however, not 
everything is expressed as explicitly as it could have been.  Even as I argued regarding the use of 
                                                 
431 Decker, Mark 9-16, 151. 
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οὐ...ἀλλά in Matt 10:20, so also I argue here in Mark 13:11c.  Based on the context of Mark 
13:11, those hearing this saying are being instructed to speak what they will be given.  There can 
be no doubt that they are the ones who are envisioned as speaking, even if the particular instance 
of that speech will be in some future, undetermined time.  As such, οὐ...ἀλλά cannot be taken as 
completely negating, discarding, and replacing their speaking.   
What is being negated then?  Precisely the idea that it will only, or exclusively, be they 
who are speaking.  Or, in other words, ὑμεῖς does not give an exhaustive accounting of those who 
will be speaking at that time.  Using the same notation as I used for my treatment of Matt 10:20 
(U = ὑμεῖς, and P = πνεῦμα), we can say the set of speakers, or ones who are speaking 
(represented by S), will include both ὑμεῖς and πνεῦμα, such that S = {U, P}.  Ἀλλά does not 
signal a removal of U from this set: on the contrary, in this context, it indicates that the group 
represented by U should not be seen as the exclusive member of the set S.   
The assertion that U is the only member of set S is what is being negated, and what is 
replacing it is the alternative description of S presented above.  The context leads us to this 
conclusion, not the explicit inclusion of μόνον...καί.  As such, I would see the feature 
[+addition/accumulation] as cancellable and arising from pragmatic considerations based upon 
elements in the context, not semantic ones arising from ἀλλά considered in isolation from its co-
text and context. 
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Matt 15:11//Mark 7:15 
Matthew 15:11 
I have classified the occurrence in Matthew 15:11 as an instance of Sub-Pattern 3B.  This 
arrangement, while slightly different from Sub-Pattern 3A, in that it begins with an explicit 
negation rather than a negative conjunction, still results in a clearly recognizable parallelism.  
Having separate categories for these occurrences may be seen by some as being too atomistic.  
This is entirely possible; however, for the purposes of my investigation I have elected to 
distinguish between the two types, even while acknowledging their similarity.   
In this occurrence, both the preceding and following constituents occur before their 
respective constant constituents, allowing the members of the contrast pair, namely “(the thing 
which) what is entering into mouth” (τὸ εἰσερχόμενον εἰς τὸ στόμα) and “(the thing which) what 
is coming forth from the mouth” (τὸ ἐκπορευόμενον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος), to be given prominence.  
The defiling of a person per se is not in focus here: the thing which may rightly be viewed as 
causing a person to be defiled is.   
Matt 15:11 continues the apology (begun in 15:10) that Jesus gives in response to the 
implicit accusation leveled by the Pharisees and scribes in Matt 15:1-2.  Their question carries 
the implication that the disciples’ failure to follow the hand-washing ritual resulted in their 
defilement.  Jesus directly counters this, and with his first declarative statement he gives a 
complete refutation of the very principle underlying the charge against the disciples.  One 
translation, which attempts to follow the form of the original, is as follows: 
[It is] not  the thing entering into the mouth  [which] defiles the person:  
rather,  the thing coming out from the mouth  –this  defiles the person. 
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To better capture the thought and preserve the emphasis of the original, however, I prefer the 
following: 
 Not what is going into the mouth  is defiling the person,  
 but rather  what is coming out of the mouth –this is defiling the person. 
Matthew 15:11//Mark 7:15 
 Having briefly engaged with Matt 15:11 in isolation, I will now turn to a consideration 
of both of our parallel texts together.  It will be helpful to view these texts arranged with their 
corresponding constituents aligned: 
 
Matthew 15:11 Mark 7:15 
οὐ οὐδέν 
 ἐστιν 
 ἔξωθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου 
τὸ  
εἰσερχόμενον  εἰσπορευόμενον 
εἰς  εἰς 
τὸ στόμα αὐτὸν 
κοινοῖ ὃ δύναται κοινῶσαι 
τὸν ἄνθρωπον, αὐτόν, 
  
  
ἀλλὰ ἀλλὰ 
τὸ ἐκπορευόμενον  τὰ 
ἐκ ἐκ 
τοῦ στόματος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου 
 ἐκπορευόμενά ἐστιν  
τοῦτο   
κοινοῖ τὰ κοινοῦντα 
τὸν ἄνθρωπον. τὸν ἄνθρωπον. 
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I will begin with the first conjunct of Mark 7:15, and offer two rather rigid translations that 
illustrate how the participial phrase εἰσπορευόμενον εἰς αὐτὸν may be interpreted.   
οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔξωθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰσπορευόμενον εἰς αὐτὸν ὃ δύναται κοινῶσαι αὐτόν, … 
[There] is nothing outside of the person which, [by] entering into him, is able to defile him, … 
OR 
[There] is nothing entering into him from outside the person which is able to defile him,… 
The first translation accords with the view that the participial phrase is adverbial, indicating the 
means by which the thing entering in would defile, if indeed it were able.  In such a case, the 
adverbial participial phrase εἰσπορευόμενον εἰς αὐτὸν modifies the verbal phrase δύναται κοινῶσαι, 
which consists of a finite verb with its infinitive complement, telling the means by which the 
defiling would occur.  Further, such a translation appears to view the phrase ἔξωθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου 
as modifying οὐδέν.  The second sentence reflects the view that the prepositional phrase ἔξωθεν 
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου modifies the participial phrase, telling from whence the thing enters, and the 
participial phrase in turn is adjectival, modifying the subject οὐδέν.  I incline toward this second 
understanding, for reasons that I hope to make clear in the remarks that follow.   
It will be helpful to briefly discuss ἔξωθεν here before proceeding.  As M. Harris notes, 
ἔξωθεν is an “adverb of place”432 that also functions as an “improper” preposition in the NT in at 
least three instances (with the use in Matt 23:25 open to debate), one of which is Mark 7:15.433  
Robertson’s remarks are in accord with this, as he comments,   
                                                 
432 Murray J. Harris, Prepositions and Theology in the Greek New Testament (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 2012), 246. 
433 Ibid., 240–1, 245–6. 
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In the N. T. it is much less frequent (13 times) both as adverb and preposition than ἔξω. 
Indeed, if τὸ ἔξωθεν τοῦ ποτηρίου (Mt. 23:25; Lu. 11:39) be not considered the prepositional 
usage, there would be only three left (Mk. 7:15; Rev. 11:2; 14:20).434 
R. Decker, in his comments on this verse, labels the phrase ἔξωθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου as “locative,” 
and notes the following,  
although ἔξωθεν usually functions as an adverb, here it functions as a preposition with a 
genitive object (τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) modifying εἰσπορευόμενον.  Most instances of ἔξωθεν in the 
Koine are equivalent to ἔξω, but the use here (and in v. 18) reflect the older, classical use 
meaning “from without” (rather than simply “outside”).”435   
However, in his comments on εἰσπορευόμενον, he labels its function as “conditional,” which he 
reflects in his translation as follows: “There is nothing outside a person which, if it enters into 
him, is able to make him unclean.”436  As I noted previously, such a translation indicates that the 
prepositional phrase is functioning adjectivally, not adverbially. 
But why is this distinction important?  Chiefly due to the contrast that Mark is attempting 
to show between the thing described in the first conjunct, and the things described in the second 
conjunct.  The effect I am describing may best be illustrated by the following expanded 
translation: 
There is no thing which is entering into the person from outside himself,  
which is able to defile him: 
rather, the things which are coming out from the person  
are the things which are defiling the person. 
                                                 
434 Robertson, Grammar, 642. 
435 Decker, Mark 1-8, 190.  In addition to the parallel use in Mark 7:18, Decker also notes 
uses in Mark 7:21 and 23. 
436 Ibid., 189. 
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The contrast here is not (pace J. Marcus,437 W. Loader438, and U. Luz,439) between things 
external to a person and things internal to the same.  The contrast is between things entering into 
a person versus the things coming out from the same.  This is one piece of evidence, from the 
text itself, for why the prepositional phrase should be viewed as (a) functioning adverbially and 
(b) modifying the participial phrase.  The parallel use in Mark 7:18 (τὸ ἔξωθεν εἰσπορευόμενον = 
“the thing entering from the outside”) offers clearer evidence of the same, especially given its 
nesting between the article and participle.   
Thus the assertions concerning both the adverbial nature of the prepositional phrase, and 
the constituent that is modifies, namely the participial phrase, should not be controversial to most 
readers.  The assertions that the whole participial phrase, including its modifying adverbial 
prepositional phrase, is functioning adjectivally, and that it is modifying the subject οὐδέν, may 
in fact be to some.  I would anticipate that most readers who would disagree with my 
understanding would alternately hold to an explanation involving adverbial function, modifying 
the verbal phrase δύναται κοινῶσαι, and indicating the means by which the defiling would occur.  
Pace Decker, I find the application of the label “conditional” for the participial phrase’s function 
in Mark 7:15 to be the least convincing.440 
                                                 
437 Joel Marcus, Mark 1-8: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 
27 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 452–3. 
438 William R. G. Loader, Jesus’ Attitude Towards the Law: A Study of the Gospels, 
1997; Repr. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 74. 
439 Luz, Matthew 8-20, 327. 
440 Decker, Mark 1-8, 190. 
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Matthew’s version does not provoke the same questions or discussions as its Marcan 
parallel, mainly because the participles involved (τὸ εἰσερχόμενον and τὸ ἐκπορευόμενον) are 
clearly substantival, and the prepositional phrases (εἰς τὸ στόμα and ἐκ τοῦ στόματος) nearly 
unmistakably correspond to the participles that they modify adverbially.  The neat parallelism 
thereby presented is complete with the explicit repetition of κοινοῖ.  This is not the case, however, 
with the Marcan version, in which we observe the verb κοινόω present in the first conjunct as an 
aorist infinitive, but in the second conjunct as a substantival present participle.  Further, as 
discussed above, the participle present in the first conjunct is not substantival, and is singular, 
while the participle present in the second conjunct is substantival, plural, and functioning as the 
subject of the clause in which it occurs.  Parallel-enhancing elements are not, however, absent in 
the Marcan version:  both of the participles in Mark 7:15 are prefixed forms of πορεύομαι, while 
in the Matthean version the first conjunct participle is a prefixed form of ἔρχομαι,441 but the 
second conjunct participle is a prefixed form of πορεύομαι.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
441 This change from εἰσπορευόμενον to εἰσερχόμενον may simply be a matter of 
familiarity or preference, as indicated by the paucity of any other occurrences of any forms of 
εἰσπορεύομαι in Matthew’s Gospel, save its appearance in Matt 15:17, as opposed to the thirty-six 
(36) total occurrences of the various forms of εἰσέρχομαι in the same.  I should also note that 
Mark uses various forms of εἰσπορεύομαι a total of eight (8) times, but uses multiple forms of 
εἰσέρχομαι a total of thirty (30) times. 
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EXCURSUS ON DIALECTICAL NEGATION, METALINGUISTIC NEGATION, AND HALAKHIC PURITY 
I would be neglect if I did not mention a significant issue associated with these parallel 
texts in general, and in particular with Matthew 15:11.  thus I will, in brief compass, and in 
outline form, attempt to present the relevant voices and discussions.  Then, I will briefly present 
my own perspective on the issue thus framed, which perspective is informed and shaped by the 
present investigation.  For thorough treatments of the questions raised, the various answers posed 
and positions held, and some of the main scholars involved in the discussion, the reader may 
profitably consult the respective works of R. Gundry,442 J. D. G. Dunn,443 U. Luz,444 and B. 
Witherington.445 
1. Both of our parallel texts clearly include οὐ...ἀλλά constructions.   
2. As I have discussed previously, there are scholars who hold that, in certain 
circumstances, the οὐ...ἀλλά construction should be viewed as signaling, not an 
“absolute” negation, but a “relative” one, also called by some a “dialectical” negation.   
3. The ground sometimes given for such an interpretation of the construction is that it is 
a “Semitic” idiom, and that the idiom diminishes, or de-emphasizes the proposition of 
the first conjunct relative to the proposition of the second, with the translation effect 
being “not [so much] X… but [rather] Y….”   
                                                 
442 Robert H. Gundry, Mark: A Commentary on His Apology for the Cross (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 364–71. 
443 James D. G. Dunn, “Jesus and Ritual Purity: A Study of the Tradition-History of Mark 
7:15,” in Jesus, Paul, and the Law (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1990), 37–60. 
444 Luz, Matthew 8-20, 327–29, 332–4. 
445 Ben Witherington, The Gospel of Mark: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 228–30. 
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4. As previously discussed, several scholars approvingly cite the article by H. Kruse as an 
authoritative source regarding the existence of, and the interpretation of, this idiom.446 
5. Scholars such as S. Westerholm,447 R. Booth,448 and T. Kazen,449 have (a) argued for 
the presence of dialectical negation, especially in Matt 15:11, and (b) based this 
argument, at least partially, on the presence the οὐ...ἀλλά construction.  J. Marcus 
advances the possibility of dialectical negation being present, citing Kruse and Booth, 
but does not mention the οὐ...ἀλλά construction specifically.  W. Loader also appears 
to favor such an approach, although he does not explicitly mention either the οὐ...ἀλλά 
construction, dialectical negation, or Semitic idiom.450 Stein does not mention any of 
these, either, but seems to support a relative negation, as well.451  Others such as R. 
                                                 
446 The reader may profitably consult my earlier engagement with Kruse’s article in the 
survey of secondary literature. 
447 Stephen Westerholm, Jesus and Scribal Authority, ConBNT 10 (Lund: Gleerup, 
1978), 83, 147 n118. 
448 Roger P. Booth, Jesus and the Laws of Purity: Tradition History and Legal History in 
Mark 7, JSNTSup 13 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1986), 68–71, 231 n35. 
449 Thomas Kazen, Jesus and Purity Halakhah: Was Jesus Indifferent to Impurity?, 
ConBNT 38 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2010), 65–7.  On page 66 Kazen discusses the 
οὐ...ἀλλά construction, citing the respective treatments of Westerholm and Booth concerning 
both the nature of the construction as a Semitic idiom, and the effect of the idiom in translation.  
He comments, “A relative interpretation finds support in Semitic idiom.  The οὐ...ἀλλά 
construction could be seen as reflecting a Semitic dialectic negation, meaning “not so much as,” 
or “rather.”  Furthermore, the context favours such a reading.  A possible rendering would be: “A 
man is not so much defiled by that which enters him from outside as he is by that which comes 
from within.”” 
450 Loader, Jesus’ Attitude towards the Law, 74–6, esp. 76. 
451 Robert H. Stein, Mark, BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 344.  Stein 
remarks on page 344 that “Mark 7:15 is not an isolated legal ruling uttered by Jesus. In the 
original context it was probably understood as meaning, “There is nothing outside a person that 
enters into him via defiled hands that defiles him.” The implication from this saying that the OT 
food regulations were being done away with by Jesus due to the arrival of the kingdom of God is 
far from self-evident. For Jesus’s hearers, it appeared that he was rejecting the Pharisaic 
traditions concerning defilement and saying, “A person is not so much defiled by what enters 
him from outside as by what comes from within” (Marcus 2000: 453). Compare also the message 
of the OT prophets (Isa. 1:11–17; Hos. 6:6; Amos 5:21–27), where the spiritual meaning and the 
literal observance are seen not as contradictory but as supplementary.”  Emphasis is Stein’s. 
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Gundry,452 U. Luz,453 R. France,454 and B. Witherington,455 have argued against such 
an interpretation. 
6. One reason cited by scholars in support of the dialectical negation interpretation is the 
seeming incongruity between a clear, absolute negation here and the disputes in the 
early church over related issues.  Some also see this as evidence that the Matthean, not 
the Marcan, version of the saying as closer to the historical utterance of Jesus.  As Stein 
succinctly puts it, “The question has been raised as to why the church struggled so 
greatly over the issue of what one could or could not eat (Acts 10:14–15; 15:28–29; 
Rom. 14:14, 20; Gal. 2:11–14; Col. 2:20–22), if Jesus had indeed said 7:15.”456 
Given these various and often opposing claims, as well as the arguments and evidence 
mustered in support of them by the various scholars, the best course forward is to focus on that 
which my investigation has in common with many of the presentations I have surveyed above: 
namely, the οὐ...ἀλλά construction and dialectical negation.  Any further engagement with the 
issues associated with this discussion is clearly beyond the scope of this work.  These issues 
include, but are not limited to the following: (1) whether the Marcan form of the saying or the 
Matthean is closer to the historical utterance of Jesus; (2) to what degree either the Marcan and 
Matthean Jesus confirms, challenges, changes, or confounds Torah and/or the tradition of the 
elders; (3) how the Marcan and Matthean versions were received, recorded, composed, and/or 
                                                 
452 Gundry, Mark, 365–71. 
453 Luz, Matthew 8-20, 332.  Note Luz’s remarks that “Of even more importance is 
Matthew’s avoidance of the exclusive and basically Markan formulation with οὐδέν ἐστιν … ὃ 
δύναται κοινῶσαι. Thus in Matthew the logion is in part “deprincipled.” To be sure, it can hardly 
be interpreted linguistically as a so-called dialectic negation (“Not so much what goes into a 
person as …”).” 
454 France, Gospel of Mark, 289–90. 
455 Witherington, Gospel of Mark, 228–30, esp. 228. 
456 Stein, Mark, 344. 
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redacted; or (4) why the early church continued to struggle with related concerns that are 
resolved by reading either text, especially Mark 7:15, as an instance of absolute negation.  
What is squarely within the scope of this work is the issue of whether or not the presence 
of the οὐ...ἀλλά constructions in these two texts warrant our viewing either one as an instance of 
metalinguistic negation.  I am not using the terminology dialectical negation for reasons that 
should be apparent by this point in my work.  Metalinguistic negation is not dialectical negation, 
although both are attempting to explain the same observation: namely, that (1) a negation of a 
proposition in the first conjunct does not seem to completely negate the proposition, and (2) a 
positive assertion in the second conjunct of such a construction seems to be stressed, or 
emphasized, to a greater degree than that of the first.  So although I object to the terminology 
employed and the phenomenon described by some scholars when they use the term dialectical 
negation, I can agree with their observations that lead them to seek out and to embrace this 
explanation as a way to make sense of these challenging constructions. 
First, it should be noted that, in accord with McCawley’s assertions (contra Horn) 
concerning the “not X … but Y” construction, the οὐ...ἀλλά construction is not inherently 
metalinguistic.457  In other words, when the οὐ...ἀλλά construction is present, metalinguistic 
negation is indeed one possibility, but it is by no means the only possibility.  The text, co-text, 
and context should be examined in conjunction with the construction’s presence to determine if 
                                                 
457 McCawley, “Contrastive Negation and Metalinguistic Negation,” 189.  McCawley 
comments that this construction and “the other members of the family of constructions that it 
exemplifies are not inherently metalinguistic, and a correlation between contrastive and 
metalinguistic negation exists only because contrastive negation lends itself particularly easily to 
metalinguistic uses.” 
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an interpretation of metalinguistic negation is in fact indicated.  This much is in effect asserted 
by two of the scholar’s mentioned above, namely, R. Booth and B. Witherington, even though 
they arrive at opposition conclusions concerning the presence of dialectical negation.  Of all of 
the scholars who discussed the οὐ...ἀλλά construction in relation to Mark 7:15, these two did so 
with the most care and in the greatest detail; as such, their thoughtful remarks bear repeating, 
beginning with those of Booth.   
Booth employs the term “limb” where I have used “conjunct,” such that he speaks of the 
first, or negative, “limb”458 and the second, or positive, one.  He asserts,   
Mark thus uses οὐ...ἀλλά in his Gospel to point a contrast.  Sometimes it is a parallel 
contrast in which the second limb reflects in a positive form almost the same statement as 
the first, negative limb.459 … In other cases, the contrast produced by this construction is 
not parallel because it introduces a different idea….460  The distinction between Mark's two 
uses of the negative followed by ἀλλά is that in the first use described, the positive limb is 
just the converse of the negative limb, while in the second use, a fresh statement is made 
by the second limb. There is not a complete dichotomy between the two uses, however, for 
even in the first use of the construction the second limb will sometimes not merely reflect 
the negative limb, but will amplify it….461 
                                                 
458 Booth, Jesus and the Laws of Purity, 37, 63–73, 96–7. 
459 He offers Mark 2:17 as an example.  Note that according to my classification system, 
this is an instance of Pattern 1, the Supplied/Implied Constant Pattern.  This pattern is most often 
used for constituent correction, and always involves ellipsis.  
460 He offers Mark 12:25 and 1:44 as examples of this use.  I have classified Mark 12:25 
as Sub-Pattern 1B1, and Mark 1:44 as Pattern 2A.  My classification of Mark 12:25 is tentative, 
as it could also be seen as Sub-Pattern 2A.  For further discussion of the reason for my 
tentativeness, please see my treatment of this verse in the chapter devoted to occurrences found 
only in the Gospel of Mark. 
461 Booth, Jesus and the Laws of Purity, 63.  As examples of this combination of uses, 
Booth offers Mark 4:17 and 10:40.  I have classified Mark 4:17 as Sub-Pattern 2A, and Mark 
10:40 as Sub-Pattern 1B1. 
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Booth is particularly interested in whether or not the second conjunct originally occurred with 
the first, and poses the question “Did the original Reply include the second limb of the purity 
logion?”462  For him, the determination of whether or not relative, or dialectical, negation is 
intended in this saying assists in the determination of whether or not the second conjunct is 
original: 
Support for the inclusion of the second limb in the original Purity Reply may lie in the 
likelihood of Jesus intending a relative, rather than an absolute, denial of the defiling power 
of external things; for if Jesus only meant that things outside a man do not defile him as 
much as things inside him, then the logion must have contained both limbs in order to make 
the comparison. But support for the second limb from this quarter is impeded by the 
difficulty of showing whether the syntax indicates a relative denial in this sense, or an 
absolute denial that external things defile.463 
We have seen previously that several scholars reference Kruse’s article when discussing 
dialectical negation, and Booth is no exception to this practice.464  However, he also observes 
that Winer had discussed this sort of negation long before Kruse: 
But Winer had recognized this relative meaning of οὐ...ἀλλά more than 100 years 
previously, and had stressed that only careful consideration of the context could determine 
whether an unconditional denial was intended or whether, for rhetorical reason, an intended 
relative denial has been expressed as an unconditional denial not in order to cancel the first 
statement, but to direct all attention upon the second. He pointed out that in every place 
where, according to the logical sense, οὐ...ἀλλά means 'not so much... as', it involves a 
rhetorical colouring which must be retained in the translation.465 
                                                 
462 Ibid., 68. 
463 Ibid., 69. 
464 Ibid. 
465 Ibid.  For further discussion of Winer’s position, please consult my earlier treatment of 
his work in the survey of secondary literature. 
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Booth notes other scholarly support for viewing the οὐ...ἀλλά in this way, and particularly for 
identifying the occurrence in Mark 7:15 as an instance of relative negation.  However, he also 
rightly expresses some caution concerning such an interpretation, and offers the following: 
But in view of the subjectivity which must attend a choice of the relative or absolute sense 
of the οὐ...ἀλλά construction, we hesitate to rely on the Semitic idiom entirely, and on 
Winer's advice look to the context for support. The importance of the choice of meaning to 
be given to this construction cannot be over-stated, for upon it may depend whether Jesus 
is considered to abrogate, or merely depreciate the cultic law of Israel.466  
I agree completely with Booth’s direction to look to the context, and in fact this is almost exactly 
the position taken by Witherington in his evaluation of Booth’s argument.   
Of particular relevance to our discussion is the third point of his list of problems 
associated with Booth’s position: 
While a relative reading of the οὐ...ἀλλά is possible, one would expect some sort of signal 
in the context that “not … but” means “not so much … but.”  In other words, one would 
expect some sort of contextual signal that a relative comparison rather than a real contrast 
is meant.  Such signals are entirely lacking in the context; indeed, the editorial remark of 
the Evangelist points in the opposite direction.  The criterion of double dissimilarity also 
suggests the authenticity of the more radical reading of this saying.467 
So how do two scholars, who both acknowledge the care needed to determine if relative negation 
is present or not, and who also both assert that it is the context that should guide this very 
determination, differ in their conclusions?  The issue concerns what each scholar views as the 
context.  For Witherington, as we saw above, the “context” is in fact the text, and the co-text 
                                                 
466 Ibid., 70. 
467 Witherington, Gospel of Mark, 228.  Cf. Witherington’s excursus “Mark 7:15 and the 
Radical Jesus” on pages 228-30 for more detail concerning both the issues and scholars involved 
in this discussion. 
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within the pericope.  Witherington looks for signals of relative negation, or of the resulting effect 
of such a negation, in the text and co-text, and actually finds signals that point to the contrary.   
Booth finds the “context” to guide his determination elsewhere: 
The contextual evidence of the correct meaning lies mainly, in our opinion, in the 
unlikelihood of Jesus making an unqualified abrogation of the cultic law in response to a 
question about handwashing, which appears a minor feature of purity law in comparison 
with the Levitical methods of purification and the more serious defilements which they 
would remove. …  
 We are also supported in a relative understanding of the οὐ...ἀλλά construction here 
by the evidence of Jesus’ upbringing and behavior within the law….   
 A further supportive point is Neirynck’s suggestion that the οὐ...ἀλλά construction 
is so suited to Mark’s proclivity to progressive double phrases that he may have often by 
this device “reinforced the antithetical character of the sayings of Jesus”.  This may apply 
to our logion, for we have already noted other Marcan vocabulary in it.  If so, the logion 
had a more relative and less absolute tendency before the insertion of this construction.   
 We are strengthened by the above considerations in our preference for the relative 
understanding of the construction, and accordingly interpret the Purity Reply as meaning 
that things outside a man do not defile him as much as things coming from him.468   
My examination of “context” will be more in line with Witherington’s, as I am interested in the 
signals within the text and co-text that may serve to indicate whether the primary intent of the 
οὐ...ἀλλά construction is (1) to correct a constituent (a corrective use) or (2) to contrast either 
two equal, parallel utterances or two, asymmetrical utterances (a contrastive use).  The Marcan 
use in 7:15 is fairly straightforward: there is no ellipsis, and there are notable parallels that rise to 
the level of explicit repetition of the constant constituents.  Based on what I have observed with 
the οὐ...ἀλλά construction in the Synoptics, these features usually signal a contrast between two 
utterances, not an attempt to correct one or more constituents from the first conjunct with 
                                                 
468 Booth, Jesus and the Laws of Purity, 70–1.  Emphasis is Booth’s. 
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suggestions offered in the second.  There is no Q-implicature469 arising from the first conjunct 
that is subsequently overturned by the second, as there are no members contained within the set 
of things characterized by (1) entering into a person from outside the same, and (2) being able to 
defile him: this is made clear by the presence of οὐδέν.  Of these two parallels, this one is less 
likely to be an instance of metalinguistic negation.   
But what of Matt 15:11?  In the Matthean version of this saying, the contrast pair is 
clearly (τὸ εἰσερχόμενον εἰς τὸ στόμα, τὸ ἐκπορευόμενον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος) and the constant 
constituent, or continuous information shared by the first and second conjunct, κοινοῖ τὸν 
ἄνθρωπον, is explicitly repeated.  The only intruding constituent is the demonstrative pronoun 
τοῦτο, which is being used pleonastically.470  It is not strictly speaking, necessary to have τοῦτο 
here to make clear that τὸ ἐκπορευόμενον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος κοινοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον.  The inclusion of 
τοῦτο actually Q-implicates that it is this thing, and this thing only, which is defiling the person.  
The contrast completed by the second conjunct, then, is the clear assertion of the thing which is 
                                                 
469 Please see my previous coverage of L. Horn’s presentation of Q-implicature under the 
section devoted to H.P. Grice in the survey of secondary literature. 
470 Wallace, Greek Grammar, 317, 329–30.  Wallace describes this use as follows: 
“Occasionally a demonstrative is used when no ambiguity would result if it had been deleted. 
This especially occurs in the nominative case: The demonstrative repeats a subject just 
mentioned (usually a substantival participle), even though the verb is not introduced until after 
the pronoun. In effect, the pronoun resumes the subject that is now separated from the verb by 
the participial construction. The pronoun is called pleonastic, redundant, or resumptive. In such 
cases, the pronoun is usually best left untranslated. However, at times, it has great rhetorical 
power and the English should reflect this.”  Emphasis is Wallace’s. 
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defiling the person, as opposed to the thing which on is not.  Metalinguistic negation is not 
present. 
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Matthew and Luke Only 
Matt 5:15//Luke 8:16 and 11:33 
Given their significant agreement with each other, I have elected to engage the texts 
found in Luke 8:16 and 11:33 jointly.  However, there are also significant differences that should 
be noted, especially in the latter portions of the utterances occurring immediately prior to the 
conjunction ἀλλά in each text.  To be clear, I have classified Luke 8:16 as conforming with Sub-
Pattern 3E, which I have proposed to explain this occurrence.  Luke 11:33, on the other hand, I 
have classified as Sub-Pattern 1C, based upon the lack of explicit repetition and the split 
constant. Beyond the comparison of these texts within Luke, I will present a broader comparison 
with the significant parallels that are found in Matt 5:15 and Mark 4:21. 
My examination of these texts will compare each of them (1) to the Synoptic parallels, as 
well as (2) to each other.  I will begin with a side by side comparison of these texts. 
 
Matt 5:15 Mark 4:21 Luke 8:16 Luke 11:33 
 
οὐδὲ  
καίουσιν λύχνον  
 
καὶ τιθέασιν αὐτὸν  
 
ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον  
 
 
ἀλλ᾽  
ἐπὶ τὴν λυχνίαν,  
καὶ λάμπει πᾶσιν τοῖς 
ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ. 
Καὶ ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς· 
μήτι  
ἔρχεται ὁ λύχνος  
ἵνα  
 
 
ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον  
τεθῇ  
ἢ ὑπὸ τὴν κλίνην;  
οὐχ ἵνα  
ἐπὶ τὴν λυχνίαν τεθῇ; 
 
Οὐδεὶς δὲ  
λύχνον ἅψας  
καλύπτει αὐτὸν 
σκεύει ἢ  
 
ὑποκάτω κλίνης  
τίθησιν,  
 
ἀλλ᾽  
ἐπὶ λυχνίας τίθησιν, 
ἵνα οἱ εἰσπορευόμενοι  
 
βλέπωσιν τὸ φῶς. 
 
Οὐδεὶς  
λύχνον ἅψας  
εἰς κρύπτην  
τίθησιν  
[οὐδὲ  
ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον] 
  
 
ἀλλ᾽  
ἐπὶ τὴν λυχνίαν,  
ἵνα οἱ εἰσπορευόμενοι  
 
τὸ φῶς βλέπωσιν. 
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With all of the versions considered, there are several noticeable differences that should be 
commented upon.  Even in the two Lucan versions we find some differences, with the version in 
Luke 8:16 being the longer of the two.  Both also depart from the Marcan original in no small 
fashion, although the questionable material that NA28 includes in Luke 11:33 (οὐδὲ  
ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον)471 does increase the agreement of the text with the Marcan original.  Given the 
generally-accepted assumptions regarding the priority of Mark, and the dependence of both Luke 
and Matthew on the same, the best place to begin is with a consideration of Mark 4:21. Gundry’s 
thorough commentary on, and discussion of, this text may be profitably consulted for a fuller 
treatment of the points that I shall explore in rather brief compass here.472 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
471 Deciding against the omission of the material by some witnesses, particularly the early 
witnesses 𝕻 45 and 𝕻75, based upon the inclusion of the material by several reliable witnesses, 
most notably א, A, and B.  In the course of the discussion of “Latinisms” and the citation of 
several examples thereof, BDF notes: “The fact that Lk is inclined to remove Latinisms is a 
further indirect proof of their popularity; thus he replaces … μόδιος Mt 5: 15=Mk 4: 21 with 
σκεῦος (8: 16, but μόδιος in the doublet in 11: 33, where, however, 𝕻45 L and several minusc. 
omit οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον)….” (BDF, 4-5). 
472 Gundry, Mark, 211–16.  See especially page 213 for Gundry’s careful examination of 
the various features (including an ellipsis) which may be used for emphasis and advancement of 
Mark’s rhetorical purpose. 
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Mark 4:21 consists in the main of two rhetorical questions, with the expected answer to 
the first being “No,” given the presence of the introductory μήτι,473 and the expected answer to 
the second being “Yes,” based upon the presence of the introductory οὐχ.  The progression, then, 
is as follows: 
μήτι ἔρχεται ὁ λύχνος  
ἵνα ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον τεθῇ ἢ ὑπὸ τὴν κλίνην; 
“The light is not coming (being brought)474 
in order that it may be placed under the measure,  
or under the bed, is it?” => “No.” (Or even, “Of course not!) 
οὐχ  
ἵνα ἐπὶ τὴν λυχνίαν τεθῇ; 
“Is it not rather coming (being brought)  
in order that it may be placed upon the lampstand?” => “Yes.” 
Based upon the expected responses to the questions, and their respective contents, it is clear the 
elements that are not being rejected are the (1) bringing/coming of the lamp and (2) the desirable 
outcome of it being placed somewhere, with that place being (3) on a lampstand.   
What is in fact being rejected is closely related to this last element, and it is the combined 
idea of the light coming in order to be placed either under a measure or under a bed (ὑπὸ τὸν 
μόδιον τεθῇ ἢ ὑπὸ τὴν κλίνην).  These related prepositional phrases (ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον and ὑπὸ τὴν 
κλίνην), which function adverbially to modify τεθῇ, and answer the question “Where?”, are being 
rejected, while the alternative being proffered is the prepositional phrase ἐπὶ τὴν λυχνίαν.  Mark 
                                                 
473 Robertson, Grammar, 917–18; BAGD, μήτι, 649. 
474 See BDAG, ἔρχομαι entry 3, page 394 for this alternate, passive sense, which is 
clearly different than the one conveyed in my translation.  Gundry also notes this possible sense, 
although citation is of BAGD rather than BDAG. (Gundry, Mark, 212).  
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has accomplished this rejection and replacement without the use of ἀλλά, while at the same time 
illustrating exactly what is happening in many οὐ...ἀλλά and μή...ἀλλά constructions: namely, 
the rejection of all or part of the first utterance presented prior to ἀλλά, with the proffering of all 
or part of the second utterance advanced following ἀλλά as an alternative, or replacement.  
Having engaged our text in Mark 4:21, let us move forward to a consideration of our 
occurrences in Luke.  Both of Luke’s versions move from the rhetorical interrogative form 
present in Mark to an indicative modification of it, including (1) the introduction of a negative 
pronoun (οὐδεὶς); (2) the move from the indicative verb ἔρχεται to an adverbial participle 
indicating the lighting of the lamp (λύχνον ἅψας) rather than its coming or being brought; and (3) 
the shift from the passive subjunctive τεθῇ to the active indicative τίθησιν.   
Related to point (1), namely, the use of οὐδείς, Robertson comments, “the form οὐδείς is 
intensive also, originally 'not one indeed' and was sometimes printed οὐδὲ εἷς (Ro. 3:10) for even 
stronger emphasis.”475  The comments of Davies and Allison on Matt 5:15, related to the 
differences between the versions of Matthew and Luke, are also relevant for our discussion here: 
οὐδὲ καίουσιν λύχνον. Lk 11:33 has: οὐδεὶς λύχνον ἅψας (cf. Lk 8:16). Matthew’s third 
person plural, which functions as a passive (cf. 9:2; 17:27), might be an Aramaism (see 
Jülicher 2, pp. 80–1; Black, pp. 126–7) and therefore judged original, Luke having 
improved upon the Greek. Yet because Matthew shows a fondness for οὐ, οὐδέ … οὐδέ (Mt: 
18; Mk: 3; Lk: 11), and because Luke does not like asyndeton (Jeremias, Lukasevangelium, 
pp. 60–1), certainty eludes us.476 
I will address Matthew’s version in short order.  However, as both of Luke’s versions agree with 
respect to points (1) and (2), I would like to move to engage point (3). 
                                                 
475 Robertson, Grammar, 1164. 
476 Davies and Allison, Matthew 1-7, 476. 
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In particular, I note with interest the explicit repetition of τίθησιν in 8:16, against the 
ellipsis of the Marcan original, and also in disagreement with the ellipsis present in Luke 11:33.  
This is no small disagreement, but it is completely explainable by a consideration of how Luke 
modifies Mark’s version.   
First, it will be helpful to examine the relevant portions of Mark 4:21 and Luke 8:16 in 
parallel: 
Mark 4:21: …ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον   τεθῇ  ἢ  ὑπὸ τὴν κλίνην…  
Luke 8:16: …καλύπτει αὐτὸν σκεύει   ἢ  ὑποκάτω κλίνης  τίθησιν… 
Luke has shifted from the prepositional phrase ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον with μόδιον as the noun which, by 
implication, will be covering the lamp to a clause utilizing another verb, καλύπτει, to make 
explicit the covering or hiding that is envisioned.  
Further, Luke does not use the prepositional phrase to signal where the lamp will be 
hidden.  Rather, he signals with his use of the dative σκεύει (rather μόδιον), the means by which 
this covering or hiding will take place.  Luke does utilize another prepositional phrase, ὑποκάτω 
κλίνης, to modify the verb τίθησιν. In doing so, however, he elected to change the preposition 
from ὑπό to ὑποκάτω.  In Mark’s version, the verbal action is distributed, such that both adverbial 
prepositional phrases modify the one verb present, namely τεθῇ.  This is not, however, the case 
with Luke’s version, as there are two different verbs explicitly present: καλύπτει and τίθησιν.   
It is quite reasonable to ask what these changes have to do with the repetition of τίθησιν.  
The simple answer is that Luke’s inclusion of the additional verb with its associated object and 
instrumental dative modifier makes it ambiguous as to (1) what is to be rejected and (2) with 
what it is to be replaced.  The repetition of signals to the reader that it is part of the constant to be 
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preserved, and it is the symmetrical items associated with it, namely ὑποκάτω κλίνης and ἐπὶ 
λυχνίας, which are being contrasted, with the former being rejected, and the latter being proffered 
as its replacement.   
Luke’s version introduced enough “noise” into the tight, terse communication present in 
Mark’s version that the ellipsis found in the Mark 4:21 could not stand, at least in Luke’s 
perception.  His solution involving the repetition of the constant constituent removes the possible 
ambiguity.  This could reasonably be dismissed as conjecture, if it were not for the parallel 
occurrence in Luke 11:33.  Again, comparing the relevant portions of the text, we see the 
following: 
Mark 4:21:  …ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον  τεθῇ  ἢ  ὑπὸ τὴν κλίνην…  
Luke 8:16: …καλύπτει αὐτὸν σκεύει  ἢ  ὑποκάτω κλίνης  τίθησιν… 
Luke 11:33: …εἰς κρύπτην  τίθησιν  
 [οὐδὲ  ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον]… 
Two issues need to be addressed here.  First, it is clear from Luke 8:16 that Luke introduced 
καλύπτει αὐτὸν σκεύει as a replacement for ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον τεθῇ.  That being said, it is highly 
unlikely that he reintroduced ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον in 11:33, with the result that he has both (1) his 
replacement verbal phrase and (2) the original prepositional phrase and a form of the original 
verb in parallel.  It seems far more likely that this was introduced into the text later for the 
purpose of harmonization.   
Regardless, though, of whether one accepts or rejects the questionable material included 
by NA28, we see in the version preserved in 11:33 that there is a clearer parallel between the 
prepositional phrases before ἀλλά, and that, more in keeping with the Marcan version, both 
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prepositional phrases are able to modify the one verb explicitly present: namely, τίθησιν.  Under 
these conditions, the preceding constituents to be rejected (εἰς κρύπτην and ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον) and 
the following constituent being proffered as a replacement (ἐπὶ τὴν λυχνίαν) are clear.  Further, 
the context provides clearer indication of which constant constituent is to be supplied implicitly 
following ἀλλά, such that ellipsis of τίθησιν is again possible without the concern of possible 
ambiguity.  
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Mark and Luke Only 
Mark 12:14//Luke 20:21 
I will examine these parallel Marcan and Lucan occurrences of ἀλλά together.  I will also 
include the Matthean parallel, which does not contain ἀλλά, as it is quite similar in some ways to 
the Marcan version.  The parallel texts, with their corresponding constituents aligned, are as 
follows: 
 
Matthew 22:16 Mark 12:14 Luke 20:21 
καὶ ἀποστέλλουσιν αὐτῷ τοὺς 
μαθητὰς αὐτῶν μετὰ τῶν 
Ἡρῳδιανῶν λέγοντες·  
καὶ ἐλθόντες  
 
λέγουσιν αὐτῷ·  
καὶ ἐπηρώτησαν αὐτὸν  
 
λέγοντες·  
διδάσκαλε, οἴδαμεν ὅτι  
ἀληθὴς εἶ  
καὶ  
τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ 
διδάσκεις καὶ  
διδάσκαλε, οἴδαμεν ὅτι  
ἀληθὴς εἶ  
καὶ  
 
 
διδάσκαλε, οἴδαμεν ὅτι  
ὀρθῶς λέγεις  
καὶ  
 
διδάσκεις καὶ 
οὐ μέλει σοι περὶ οὐδενός· οὐ μέλει σοι περὶ οὐδενός·  
οὐ γὰρ βλέπεις εἰς πρόσωπον 
ἀνθρώπων, 
οὐ γὰρ βλέπεις εἰς πρόσωπον 
ἀνθρώπων,  
οὐ λαμβάνεις πρόσωπον,  
 
 ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀληθείας τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ 
θεοῦ διδάσκεις·  
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀληθείας τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ 
θεοῦ διδάσκεις· 
  
17  εἰπὲ οὖν ἡμῖν τί σοι δοκεῖ·    
ἔξεστιν δοῦναι κῆνσον Καίσαρι  ἔξεστιν δοῦναι κῆνσον Καίσαρι  22  ἔξεστιν ἡμᾶς Καίσαρι φόρον 
δοῦναι  
ἢ οὔ; ἢ οὔ; ἢ οὔ; 
 δῶμεν ἢ μὴ δῶμεν;  
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Let us focus our attention on the conjuncts within the οὐ...ἀλλά construction, noting both 
the first conjuncts,  
Matt 22:16 οὐ γὰρ  βλέπεις  εἰς  πρόσωπον  ἀνθρώπων, 
Mark 12:14 οὐ γὰρ  βλέπεις  εἰς  πρόσωπον  ἀνθρώπων,  
Luke 20:21 καὶ  οὐ  λαμβάνεις  πρόσωπον,  
as well as the second ones,  
Mark 12:14  ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀληθείας τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ θεοῦ διδάσκεις· 
Luke 20:21  ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀληθείας τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ θεοῦ διδάσκεις· 
Matthew’s version does include the negation and the first conjunct from Mark 12:14, but does 
not include ἀλλά followed by the proposition of the second conjunct.  Instead, the material from 
the second conjunct, namely ἐπ᾽ ἀληθείας τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ θεοῦ διδάσκεις, is lightly altered to τὴν 
ὁδὸν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ διδάσκεις, and inserted prior to the οὐ...ἀλλά construction.  The adverbial 
prepositional phrase ἐπ᾽ ἀληθείας is modified slightly to ἐν ἀληθείᾳ.  In addition, the accusative 
object with its genitive modifier, τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, is advanced to the beginning of the verb 
phrase. 
Conversely, Luke’s version appears to combine the sense of the negated clause prior to 
the οὐ...ἀλλά construction, οὐ μέλει σοι περὶ οὐδενός, with that of the negated proposition of the 
first conjunct, namely οὐ … βλέπεις εἰς πρόσωπον ἀνθρώπων, to arrive at the much abbreviated 
result, οὐ λαμβάνεις πρόσωπον.  This latter idiom of “receiving someone’s face” equates to 
240 
 
 
 
respecting a person and their opinions and/or being concerned for their approval based on their 
status, reputation, etc., and appears to be the more frequently used in the LXX and the NT.477   
Now whether the idiom is expressed as βλέπεις εἰς πρόσωπον ἀνθρώπων, as in the Marcan 
version, or λαμβάνεις πρόσωπον, as in the Lucan, the two versions are agreed in their presentation 
that this is being denied with respect to Jesus, and the affirmation that is presented, namely ἐπ᾽ 
ἀληθείας τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ θεοῦ διδάσκεις, is both true of Jesus, and contrasts with the proposition 
negated in the first conjunct.  France succinctly comments that “the essential contrast is between 
the interests of ἄνθρωποι and the ‘way of God’, God’s revealed will; Jesus’ questioners claim to 
recognise him as God’s unprejudiced spokesman.”478  There is no constant constituent present, 
and there is no ellipsis in either conjunct.  As such, we have a contrast between a negated 
utterance, and an affirmed one, and I have classified both the Marcan and Lucan versions as 
instances of Sub-Pattern 2A.  
                                                 
477 Cf. BDAG, βλέπω 4, 178–9; λαμβάνω 9, 584; πρόσωπον 1bα, 888; France, Gospel of 
Mark, 467–8; Stein, Mark, 548; Culy, Parsons, and Stigall, Luke, 629; Decker, Mark 9-16, 117–
8.  Commenting on Mark 12:14, Stein helpfully notes on page 548 that “The idiomatic nature of 
this expression can be seen by such references in the OT as Lev. 19:15; Deut. 10:17; Ps. 82:2; 
Prov. 18:5; Mal. 2:9; and in the NT as Acts 10:34; Rom. 2:11; Eph. 6:9; Col. 3:25; James 2:1, 9.”  
As France also notes, these NT references are to occurrences of either the verb προσωπολημπτέω 
or one of the related nouns προσωπολημψία or προσωπολήμπτης, while BDAG notes (under the 
entry for πρόσωπον) that the Hebrew Bible references include םיִנָפ אָשָנ, which usually translated 
in the LXX as either θαυμάζειν πρόσωπον or λαμβάνειν πρόσωπον. 
478 France, Gospel of Mark, 468. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Representative Occurrences of ἀλλά Found Only in Matthew 
Introduction 
It will be helpful for the reader to consult Appendices 1-3 in conjunction with my 
explanations regarding those occurrences of ἀλλά that appear only in Matthew.  The arrangement 
of my comments in this section follows the patterns identified in Appendix 3, with each pattern 
and sub-pattern being handled in turn, beginning with Pattern 1, and continuing through Pattern 
4.  For those patterns and/or sub-patterns that are based upon several occurrences, I will restrict 
my coverage to a select subset that I feel best represents the whole.   
Following is the breakdown of the thirty-seven occurrences of the various patterns and 
sub-patterns: 
 
 Pattern 1 Total: 20 
o 1A: 6 
 1A1: 6 (4+2 
special cases) 
o 1B: 10 
 1B1: 9 
 1B2: 1 
o 1C: 3 
o 1D: 1 
 
 
 
 Pattern 2 Total: 9 
o 2A: 5 
o 2B: 2 
o 2C: 1 
o 2D: 1 
 Pattern 3 Total: 6 
o 3A: 1 
o 3B: 2 
o 3C: 1 
o 3D: 2 
 Pattern 4 Total: 2 
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Explanation of Observations in Matthew  
Pattern 1 
As noted above, and in Appendix 3, Pattern 1 includes those instances of the ἀλλά 
construction in Matthew in which the constant constituent is explicitly included on one side of 
the relationship marker, and, due to ellipsis, to be implied on the other.   
The most basic form of this pattern, which is seen in Pattern 1B1, is 
 
 
 
Negation Constant  Preceding  ἀλλά   (Constant) Following 
This general form seems to favor both the preceding and following constituents being 
immediately adjacent to ἀλλά, which is reasonable given that this form, also known as stripping, 
is especially used for correction,479 in which the preceding constituent is rejected, and the 
following constituent presented as its replacement.  All other continuous information480 is 
ellipsed, making clear that it is backgrounded and held constant from the first conjunct to the 
second.   
Sub-Pattern 1A1 
As its numbering indicates, Sub-Pattern 1A1 was the first pattern I observed, based upon 
Matt 4:4.481  This sub-pattern in characterized by the separation of the preceding constituent from 
                                                 
479 Repp, Negation in Gapping, 7, 149. 
480 Halliday, Introduction to Functional Grammar, 635. 
481 In my initial investigation of the evidence I identified Matt 19:6 as displaying a now-
rejected sub-pattern which I designated 1A2.  I finally classified this as Sub-Pattern 1B2, and I 
discuss it my treatment of that sub-pattern below. 
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ἀλλά by the constant constituent, effectively fronting the preceding constituent.  The graphical 
analysis of the general form is seen below: 
 
Negation Preceding  Constant ἀλλά   Following (Constant) 
Matthew 7:21 
One example of this arrangement, which is also noted in Appendix 3, is Matt 7:21.   
Οὐ  πᾶς  ὁ λέγων  
μοι· κύριε κύριε,      
εἰσελεύσεται εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν,  
ἀλλ᾽   ὁ ποιῶν  
τὸ θέλημα  
τοῦ πατρός μου  
τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. 
Using graphical analysis, let me make clear how I am classifying the constituents of this 
sentence: 
 
Negation Preceding  Constant  ἀλλά   Following (Constant) 
Οὐ  πᾶς ὁ λέγων… εἰσελεύσεται…  ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ποιῶν… (εἰσελεύσεται…) 
Proceeding on the assumption that the default arrangement of the clause is verb initial, 
and that the default ἀλλά construction calls for the related constituents to be adjacent to ἀλλά, we 
can see that the fronting of πᾶς ὁ λέγων μοι· κύριε κύριε, brings the individual characterized by 
this speaking these words into focus.  The following constituent, ὁ ποιῶν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρός 
μου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, then presents the positive assertion of the one who will in fact enter into 
the kingdom of Heaven.   
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To be clear, it is πᾶς ὁ λέγων… which is being rejected here, not εἰσελεύσεται εἰς τὴν 
βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν.  This latter constituent, in this case the whole predicate of the first 
conjunct, is retained, and is meant to be supplied by the reader ἀπὸ κοινοῦ as the predicate for the 
second conjunct following ἀλλά.  What is being proffered as a replacement for πᾶς ὁ λέγων?  
Another substantival participle, namely ὁ ποιῶν….  One pragmatic signal that this is being 
contrasted with, and proffered as, the replacement for πᾶς ὁ λέγων… is the parallelism of these 
two substantival participles with respect to case, gender, and number. 
The focus in this negation and accompanying rejection and replacement, and indeed in 
the prior and later context, is on the obedience to the teachings of Jesus that manifests itself in 
the doing of the good works (producing of good fruit) that he commands.  Notice that this focus 
continues to the following parable of the wise housebuilder of Matt 7:24-27.  As such, the focus 
is not on the entering into the kingdom of Heaven: it is on the difference between the one who 
honors God with his words and the one who truly hearkens to these words and does them.  This 
latter one, this one characterized by faithful, obedient, active listening to the commands of God, 
will enter into the kingdom. 
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Matthew 19:11 
Again in Matt 19:11 we see a contrast, this time between two groups of people, with the 
preceding constituent fronted before the constant:  
ὁ δὲ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς·  οὐ  πάντες  χωροῦσιν τὸν λόγον [τοῦτον]482   
ἀλλ᾽  οἷς δέδοται. 
The general form would seem to call for the preceding constituent to be adjacent to ἀλλά, and in 
this case that would also allow the verb in the constant to be in the initial position.  However, we 
see πάντες fronted, as the emphasis is on the fact that this teaching, as well as the accompanying 
situation in life that it presents, is not for everyone: not all will be able to take it in, much less 
live it.   
This same idea is picked up again at the end of Matt 19:12, where Jesus says ὁ δυνάμενος 
χωρεῖν χωρείτω, clearly linking back to χωροῦσιν in Matt 19:11.  Jesus’ teaching in Matt 19:3-9 
was shocking even to his own disciples, as seen by their reaction in 19:10.  His answer and 
explanation are almost conciliatory, and he begins, not by addressing the disciples objection, but 
by saying that “not everyone is grasping (or receiving) this word: but (or, perhaps better in this 
case, “except”) those to whom it has been given.”  Runge has this to say about the distinction 
between ἀλλά and εἰ μή: 
Although there are several contrastive or adversative particles, ἀλλά adds the unique 
constraint of correcting some aspect of what precedes. In terms of distinguishing ἀλλά from 
                                                 
482 The bracketing of τοῦτον comes from the NA28 bracketing of the same, indicating that 
“the text enclosed in brackets is dubious.”  I would suspect that the most significant piece of 
evidence which prompted this marking of the text is its omission in B 03 (Vaticanus).  Otherwise 
the support for its inclusion is broad.  Due to the significance of B for textual criticism, I have 
elected to leave τοῦτον marked as “dubious,” as well. 
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εἰ μή, the key is the relation of what follows the particle to what precedes. In the case of εἰ 
μή, the excepted element that replaces what precedes was a potential member of the negated 
set. In the case of ἀλλά, the correcting member was not a member of the original set; it is 
a new element.483 
Here, contra Runge, I would advocate for an overlap in function between ἀλλά and εἰ μή, as the 
second group of individuals is implicitly contained within the first group named: under these 
circumstances, as Runge notes,484 the idea of “except” is appropriate. 
Matthew 16:17 and 22:30 
I have dealt with the two special cases of Pattern 1A1, namely Matt 16:17 and 22:30, in 
Appendix 3.  However, it is worth commenting that for both of these instances, a constituent is 
fronted before the negation/negative content particle, so as to appear outside of the bounds of the 
normal ἀλλά construction.  In Matt 16:17 the fronting of σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα gives the negated element 
prominence that it otherwise would not have had.  The ὅτι introduces the explanation for why 
Jesus declares Peter to be μακάριος: the reason is that, far from it being flesh and blood that had 
revealed Jesus’ identity as the Christ to Peter, it was actually Jesus’ own Heavenly Father.  The 
strong contrast between an earthly, human source for Peter’s knowledge and a Heavenly, divine 
one is striking. 
                                                 
483 Runge, Discourse Grammar, 93. 
484 Ibid., 92.  Runge remarks, “Although ἀλλά and εἰ μή are considered to be 
adversatives, there is little discussion about the functional difference between them—i.e., the 
semantic distinction between them.”  In footnote 27 on page 92, he interacts with Robertson 
regarding this distinction, saying “The distinction concerns whether the replacement belonged to 
the negated set (εἰ μὴ) versus whether it was a brand new item (ἀλλά), and the apparent 
exception that Robertson sees in Matt 20:23 can be accounted for as standard usage of ἀλλά. 
Jesus has said it is not his to grant one to sit on the right or left. The Father is not included in this 
set, but replaces “Jesus” as the authority that can grant this request, hence the use of ἀλλά.”  This 
explanation does not appear to hold for our example in Matt 19:11. 
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In Matt 22:30 the fronting of the peripheral element allows the contrasted preceding and 
following constituents to be adjacent to ἀλλά.  Since this is the only occurrence where a constant 
occurs before the negative content particles, and since this negation is in the form 
οὔτε…οὔτε…ἀλλά as opposed to οὐ... ἀλλά, I am reluctant to assign too much significance to this 
arrangement.  It is quite possible that in fact what I have identified as a constant, namely ἐν τῇ 
ἀναστάσει, is in fact a POD485 and not a constant at all. In that case, this instance would be better 
classified as an example of Pattern 2A. 
Sub-Pattern 1B1 
This sub-pattern for the ἀλλά construction is the one that I observed most frequently 
within Matthew.  In it, the preceding constituent follows the constant constituent: further, as can 
be seen in column 4 of Appendix 3, every instance categorized as Pattern 1B1 has both the 
preceding and following constituents adjacent to ἀλλά.  According to frequency of occurrence, 
the logic of the ἀλλά construction itself, and the consensus of the grammarians and linguists 
surveyed previously, this construction appears to be the most basic, unmarked form of the 
οὐ...ἀλλά construction with a constant constituent in Matthew, if not for the whole NT.   
Usually the constituents being related are roughly parallel, analogous, and relatively short 
(varying from a single word to a short phrase).486  Further, the relationship between the 
preceding and the following can usually be captured by the English “but” or “but rather.”  
Finally, most often the constituents contrasted are either single nouns, noun phrases, or 
                                                 
485 Point of Departure.  Of what type?  Temporal/Spatial?  Situational? 
486 With the exception of Matt 16:12. 
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prepositional phrases.  There may be a notable exception to this, as Runge presents a convincing 
argument regarding Matt 20:28 that runs counter to my analysis.  He states that: 
Matthew 20:28 illustrates that more than one element can be replaced or corrected. In this 
case, two infinitives replace the one that is negated in the first part of the verse, exchanging 
one purpose for the Son of Man’s coming for two other purposes….The same information 
could have been conveyed without using a negative counterpoint, but it would not have 
attracted the same amount of attention to Jesus’ purposes. Stating why he did not come 
creates the expectation that an alternative reason why he did come will be provided. The 
fact that the same verb has been used in both parts (διακονέω “I serve”) heightens the 
contrast even more. The counterpoint uses a passive form of the infinitive (“to be served”) 
compared to the active form (“to serve”) in the point. The conjunction καί adds a second 
purpose to the first: to give his life as a ransom for many.487  
I restricted the following constituent to διακονῆσαι, whereas Runge asserts that it consists of 
διακονῆσαι καὶ δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν.  I had originally considered this 
possibility, but rejected it based upon the close parallel between the single-word preceding and 
following constituents (διακονηθῆναι and διακονῆσαι) and the conformity to the general form that 
sub-pattern 1B1 represents.  Runge’s argument is compelling, and although I am tempted to 
accept it, I will stand by my analysis.  My best alternative explanation is to view the καί as 
ascensive. 
I have previously utilized Matt 5:17 as an example when defining the terms used to 
describe the various constituents within the οὐ...ἀλλά construction. It will be beneficial to briefly 
engage with this text again and discuss both (1) the rejection and replacement signaled by this 
construction, and (2) the ellipsis observed in connection with the same. 
 
                                                 
487 Runge, Discourse Grammar, 97. 
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Matthew 5:17 
Let us first examine our text of interest, with its immediately preceding co-text: 
Μὴ νομίσητε ὅτι  ἦλθον καταλῦσαι    τὸν νόμον ἢ τοὺς προφήτας·  
 οὐκ  ἦλθον καταλῦσαι ἀλλὰ πληρῶσαι. 
As noted previously, the graphical analysis of this text is as follows: 
  Implicit (Elliptical) 
 Negation Constant Preceding  ἀλλά  Following 
οὐκ   ἦλθον   καταλῦσαι   ἀλλὰ   πληρῶσαι 
 *Not  I came  to abolish  but rather to fulfill 
Clearly, the negation here is not an attempt to assert that Jesus did not come at all.  It is first 
apparent that Jesus did not come in order to abolish something, with the use of the infinitive 
indicating the purpose behind the coming, and with the object of the infinitive being supplied by 
the immediately preceding co-text: namely, ὁ νόμος, or Torah.  The rejection of καταλῦσαι opens 
the way for the proposal of the alternative that is proffered as a replacement: namely, πληρῶσαι.  
Note the similarity, the symmetry between the preceding, rejected constituent and the following, 
proffered constituent.   
Notice also that the main verb ἦλθον, which appears explicitly in the first conjunct, has 
been ellipsed in the second conjunct.  It is still to be understood there, however, being supplied 
ἀπὸ κοινοῦ by the listener/reader.  Regarding ellipsis in such a context, both Vicente488 and 
Jasinskaja489 may be profitably consulted, as they each discuss ellipsis in connection with 
correction and adversative particles.  Due to Vicente’s topic of discussion, his coverage is the 
                                                 
488 Vicente, “On the Syntax of Adversative Coordination,” 383, 385, 390–91, 394–403. 
489 Jasinskaja, “Correction,” 1917. 
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more thorough of the two.  Jasinskaja’s insights regarding ellipsis, however, are worthy of our 
consideration here, as she notes the following: 
Concerning ellipsis, the general direction for the solution is to relate ellipsis to information 
structure. I have argued that the question under dispute in corrections is a wh-question, e.g. 
Where did John go? in John didn’t go to Paris, but to Berlin. This is the question with 
respect to which the conjuncts are interpreted exhaustively, and 
this is also precisely the kind of question that should license the deletion of John went in 
John went to Berlin (cf. Vicente, 2010). In contrast, the question under dispute in formal 
contrast uses of but, as in John didn’t go to Paris, but he went/did go to Berlin is a yes/no-
question whether John went to both places, whereas the topic question is a double wh-
yes/no question: where “whether” John went. Neither of these questions licenses the 
deletion of John went. This is why ellipsis gives rise to the correction reading.490 
Jasinskaja’s analysis includes engagement with correction in English, Russian, and, to a 
lesser extent, Japanese: as such, the reader may reasonably question the applicability of her 
insights to our inquiry.  In response I would point out that she is pursuing a generally applicable 
explanation for adversative markers, and in particular for the phenomenon of asymmetric 
correction.491 
There are, of course, differences between the various languages, and a tendency and/or 
explanation that holds in one does not necessarily hold in others, including the Greek of the NT.  
I am hesitant to make too much of the ellipsis encountered in the Greek NT, as the language 
differs from English with respect to the desire for economy of expression, or breviloquence.  
While in English the omission of a verb, object, etc. in the second conjunct might signal a 
particular phenomenon or function, the same omission, or ellipsis, may in fact be the normal 
                                                 
490 Ibid.  Emphasis is Jasinskaja’s.  See pages 1903-4 and 1906-13 for a detailed 
explanation of Jasinskaja’s approach, in which she “suggests that the utterance addresses an 
implicit question…” (Jasinskaja, “Correction by Adversative and Additive Markers,” 1903). 
491 Ibid., 1899–1900. 
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mode of expression for Κοινή Greek. For the purposes of this inquiry, Jasinskaja’s explanation is 
noted, and may prove helpful in explaining what is observed.  I do not regard it, a priori, as 
binding for our reading of the occurrences of ἀλλά, although it may in fact be shown to be 
valuable by the same.   
With respect to Matt 5:17, then, what might the implicit question be, based on the 
context?  One possibility is the following: What did Jesus come to do with respect to τὸν νόμον ἢ 
τοὺς προφήτας?  Is it plausible to think that the context could give rise to such a question in the 
minds of the listeners/readers?  In fact, it is, as noted by J. Meier: 
In his larger redactional composition of 5:17-48, v 17 acts as an explanation and warning 
to the disciples hearing the Sermon on the Mount.  They are about to be exposed to the 
radical teaching of the antitheses (“it was said to the men of old…but I say to you”) in vv 
21-48.  The direct opposition between old and new, the apparent revocation of three 
institutions enshrined in the Mosaic Law (divorce, oaths, legal retaliation), the implicit but 
still daring claim that Jesus effectively stands in the place of Yahweh on Sinai—all this 
could conjure up the mistaken notion that moral law and sanctions are being totally 
rescinded.492 
Meier sees the repetition of ἦλθον in this verse  
Μὴ νομίσητε ὅτι  ἦλθον καταλῦσαι    τὸν νόμον ἢ τοὺς προφήτας·  
   οὐκ  ἦλθον καταλῦσαι ἀλλὰ πληρῶσαι. 
as evidence of redaction: 
Another indication that we are dealing here with Matthew’s redactional hand is that Matt 
5:17 and 10:34 are the only two cases in the Gospels of the full dialectical form of an 
ēlthon-word (“I have come” not to do this but to do that) that repeat the key verb ēlthon (“I 
have come”) in the second main clause (i.e., “do not think that I have come” to do such-
and-such; “I have come” not to do this but to do that).  Thus the overall formulation of Matt 
                                                 
492 Meier, A Marginal Jew, Vol. IV, 70–71n75. 
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5:17 (introductory “do not think” + full dialectical form of an ēlthon-word + repetition of 
the verb ēlthon in the second main clause) is clearly a Matthean creation.493 
The subject of redaction in the Gospels is far beyond the scope of my investigation.  However, I 
would agree with the Meier’s representation above of the sense, in English, of the construction 
οὐκ ἦλθον καταλῦσαι ἀλλὰ πληρῶσαι: namely, “…“I have come” not to do this but to do that….” 
The construction signals that we are not to negate ἦλθον, but rather καταλῦσαι.  It is being 
rejected, and another, symmetrical constituent is proffered as the replacement for it.  
Sub-Pattern 1B2 
It should be noted that, for all of the examples encountered within Matthew, the constant 
constituent appeared explicitly before ἀλλά, and implicitly after it.  In other words, within the 
occurrences in Matthew, I did not find an instance in which both of the following conditions 
were met: (1) there was an explicit constant constituent on only one side of the ἀλλά; and (2) the 
constant constituent occurred explicitly after the ἀλλά and implicitly before it.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
493 Ibid.  Emphasis is Meier’s.  Meier presses further regarding the likelihood of 
redaction, saying “When one adds to this Matthew’s favorite verb plēroō and his emphasis on the 
Law and the prophets, one wonders if there is anything in this verse that is not a Matthean 
creation.” 
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Matthew 19:6 
Please see the full graphical analysis of Matt 19:6 in Appendix 3.  This is the sole 
example in which a constant constituent did occur explicitly after the ἀλλά and implicitly before 
it (meeting criteria 2, above).  As such, I originally proposed another sub-pattern, 1A2, to 
account for this text.   
As proposed, Sub-Pattern 1A2 had the following form:  
 
Negation (Constant) Preceding ἀλλά Constant Following 
where the constant constituent appeared explicitly after ἀλλά and implicitly before it.  Upon 
further examination, however, I determined that there were in fact two constant constituents 
occurring on opposite sides of the ἀλλά (thus failing criteria 1, above): 
 
 
Negation Constant1 [Constant2] Preceding ἀλλά [Constant1] Constant2  Following 
οὐκέτι  εἰσὶν  [σὰρξ] δύο  ἀλλὰ  [εἰσὶν] σὰρξ  μία 
 As such, I created sub-pattern 1B2 specifically to provide a categorization for the unusual 
construction observed in this verse.  As I note in Appendix 3, this is a questionable category, at 
best, and I can easily imagine a reader taking exception to implicit repetition of the constant 
constituents on either side of the ἀλλά.  However, even if this category is rejected, one should 
note the unusual arrangement of constituents within this construction.  
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Pattern 2 
Sub-Patterns 2C and 2D 
Matthew 21:21 
Sub-Patterns 2C and 2D represent well-known formulae involving ἀλλά, with 2C 
representing instances of the οὐ μόνον...ἀλλά καί construction, and 2D those having ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον 
joining the two conjuncts.  The text of Matt 21:21, with a rigid translation, follows: 
ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς·  
ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν,  ἐὰν  ἔχητε  πίστιν  
καὶ  
μὴ διακριθῆτε,  
οὐ μόνον τὸ τῆς συκῆς ποιήσετε,  
ἀλλὰ κἂν τῷ ὄρει τούτῳ εἴπητε·  
ἄρθητι καὶ βλήθητι εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν,  
γενήσεται· 
Now Jesus answering said to them: 
Truly I am telling you, If  you have faith 
     and 
    are not doubting, 
     you will do not only the thing related to the fig tree, 
     but if you were also to say to this mountain: 
      be raised up and cast into the sea,  
   [then] it [too] will happen. 
To begin with, Matt 21:21 makes use of the οὐ μόνον...ἀλλά καί construction, which in 
this case includes the crasis form κἂν (καί...ἐάν).  Normally this form, without ἐάν, would be 
adequately rendered as “not only…but also.”  However, BDAG suggests that,494 κἂν represents 
the ascensive use of καί, such that the sense is “even if.”  As such, one translation might be  
                                                 
494 BDAG, 507. 
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“… but even if you were to say to this mountain.”   
Matthew 27:24 
Matt 27:24, makes use of another combination of ἀλλά, this time with μᾶλλον, which 
BDAG notes is a use of μᾶλλον as a “marker of an alternative” to something, and that it is 
“following a negative…that is expressed.”495  We may note that the sense here is that, quite 
contrary to the idea expressed in the preceding constituent, namely that of “accomplishing or 
profiting” something, in the following constituent a “riot was beginning.”  One possible 
translation is that “Pilate, having seen that he was accomplishing nothing, and that quite to the 
contrary (but rather), a riot is beginning….”   
This finishes my coverage of those occurrences arranged according to one of the sub-
patterns of Pattern 2.  I will now turn to Pattern 3, its sub-patterns, and some representative 
examples of each. 
Pattern 3 
The common characteristic shared by all of the occurrences that I have classified under 
Pattern 3 is the explicit repetition of all or part of the constant constituent before and after ἀλλά.  
As I noted in my earlier summary of the patterns and their respective characteristics, Pattern 3 
could be seen as a sub-group under Pattern 1.  The difference between the two patterns is the 
explicit repetition across the relationship marker, as opposed to implicit repetition.  For the 
purpose of this work, I have kept them as separate patterns.   
                                                 
495 Ibid., 614. 
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Nevertheless, there are undeniable similarities between the two patterns, and like Pattern 
1, Pattern 3 exhibits sub-patterns based upon the arrangement of constituent constituents.  
Sub-Pattern 3A 
Matthew 4:4 
A brief note on Sub-Pattern 3A is called for: specifically, some remarks concerning Matt 
4:4.  If the quotation of Deut 8:3 from the LXX in that text had been a full one, then I would 
have classified it under this sub-pattern, namely 3A, as opposed to sub-pattern 1A.496   
Let us briefly compare the two texts: 
Matt 4:4 οὐκ  ἐπ᾽ ἄρτῳ μόνῳ       ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος,  
 ἀλλ᾽  ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήματι ἐκπορευομένῳ διὰ στόματος θεοῦ  [         ] 
Deut 8:3 οὐκ  ἐπ᾽ ἄρτῳ μόνῳ       ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος  
 ἀλλ᾽  ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήματι τῷ ἐκπορευομένῳ διὰ στόματος θεοῦ  ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος 
The negation in both texts is οὐκ.  The preceding constituent in both is the prepositional phrase 
ἐπ᾽ ἄρτῳ μόνῳ, and the following constituents are the prepositional phrases ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήματι 
ἐκπορευομένῳ διὰ στόματος θεοῦ (Matt 4:4) and ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήματι τῷ ἐκπορευομένῳ διὰ στόματος 
θεοῦ (Deut 8:3).497   
Note well the parallel present in the use of the prepositional phrase, which functions 
pragmatically to signal the hearer/reader that these are the constituents being contrasted, with the 
first being rejected as the exhaustive description of that which is necessary for man to live.  The 
                                                 
496 Please refer to the first entry in Appendix 1. 
497 Note that Matt 4:4 does not include the article τῷ present in Deut 8:3.  Otherwise, 
there is complete agreement between the texts. 
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use of μόνῳ signals that what is being rejected is the claim that “man will live by bread alone…,” 
and not that man lives, partially at least, by means of bread.  This is clearly an instance where we 
should see both addition and emphasis in play, with the following effect: “It is not upon bread 
alone that man will live, but even more so upon every word….” 
The constant constituent in both texts is ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος; however, it is present in Matt 
4:4 only before ἀλλά, and not after it.  What Deut 8:3 makes explicit, namely that should be 
understood in both the first utterance and the second utterance, Matt 4:4 leaves to the readers 
understanding, omitting the occurrence of ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος in the second conjunct.   
As I have previously noted, ellipsis is not unusual for Greek.  As such, it is possible to 
understand instances involving explicit repetition of constituents, which could have readily been 
supplied from the context, as unnecessary expansions, unless the author is moving (in the case of 
redaction) from a corrective use of the construction to a contrastive use, or if the original 
speaker/ writer is intending a contrast versus a correction from the beginning.  If contrast is not 
the intention, then the reason for such expansion could be emphasis, or it could be simply to 
remove ambiguity in certain instances.  The context of each instance needs to be examined 
carefully to make a determination based upon the evidence within the texts in question. 
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Matthew 6:13 
Pattern 3D represents that neat conceptual parallelism present in Matt 6:13, as well as the 
somewhat jumbled comparison present in Matt 20:26, with which I engaged in Chapter 4.  
The text of Matt 6:13, with corresponding elements aligned to show the parallelism, 
follows:  
καὶ  μὴ   εἰσενέγκῃς  ἡμᾶς   εἰς  πειρασμόν,   
ἀλλά   ῥῦσαι   ἡμᾶς   ἀπὸ  τοῦ πονηροῦ. 
The only repeated constituent, the constant, is ἡμᾶς.  If this repetition had not been 
present, I would have classified this occurrence under Pattern 2A.  However, these two requests 
are not unrelated by any means: there is substantial parallelism and opposition apparent here.  
The preceding constituent consists of a prefixed subjunctive verbal form, an associated 
preposition, and a negative state of affairs.  The following constituent consists of an imperative 
verbal form, an associated preposition consistent with the sense of the verb, and a negative state 
of affairs.   
The general sense is “May you not bring/lead us into testing/temptation, but rather deliver 
us from evil/the evil one,” or, simply “not toward bad, but away from it.”  The negation of the 
subjunctive has imperatival force,498 strengthening the parallel with the following constituent.  
The prepositional phrase in the last position in each clause corresponds to the expected position 
of the peripheral element per Levinsohn.  In this case, the desire to present a parallel structure 
supersedes the affinity of the construction to have the preceding and following constituents 
adjacent to ἀλλά.  
                                                 
498 Robertson, Grammar, 930–932; BDF, 184; Wallace, Greek Grammar, 469. 
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Pattern 4 
Matt 11:8-9 
My comments on Pattern 4 will be very brief.  There are only two occurrences in 
Matthew that correspond to this usage, and they are located in adjacent verses.  They introduce 
the second and third rhetorical questions that Jesus asks in Matt 11:8 and 11:9, respectively.  
BDAG notes this use,499 as does Smyth in §2785.500  Smyth asserts that  
Ἀλλά is often used when a speaker introduces a supposed objection (either in his own name 
or in that of his opponent) and immediately answers it….So in rapid dialogue objections 
may take the form of questions, in which each ἀλλά after the first may be rendered by or.501 
I would add to this that it is possible translate the successive occurrences as “and another thing,” 
keeping the idea of continuity with what has preceded, but introducing another question that, 
though different, is like the previous question.  Denniston also comments on a similar usage in 
Classical Greek, known as hypophora.  He states that 
The proffering and rejecting of successive suggestions may be done by a single speaker, 
who conducts, as it were, a dialogue with himself.  This stylistic device, known as 
hypophora, is freely used, for liveliness and variety, by the Greek orators.502 
Perhaps rejection may be too strong a word for Jesus’s answers: if anything, Jesus corrects the 
(mis)perceptions of the people, especially with his answer in Matt 11:9.  Note also that, in 
keeping with the idea of “other things,” the first question is not introduced by ἀλλά, whereas the 
successive questions are.
                                                 
499 BDAG, 45. 
500 Smyth, Greek Grammar, 634. 
501 Ibid. 
502 Denniston, Greek Particles, 10–11. 
260 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
Representative Occurrences of ἀλλά Found Only in Mark 
Introduction 
My comments on the occurrences of ἀλλά in Mark will follow much the same pattern as 
that used in the previous section on occurrences within Matthew, with some notable exceptions, 
which I will shortly make clear.   
Please consult Appendices 1-3 for the textual data upon which my observations and 
explanations in this section are based.  The arrangement of my comments in this section follows 
the patterns identified in Appendix 3, with each pattern and sub-pattern being handled in turn, 
beginning with Pattern 1, and continuing through Pattern 6.  However, in this section I will be 
introducing some new patterns, namely Patterns 5 and 6, to account for the data contained within 
Mark.  I will explain each of these patterns in greater detail in the body of this section. 
The reason for this is that I formed my original set of categories and sub-categories, 
which I have referred to as patterns and sub-patterns, respectively, based upon the data present in 
Matthew.  In some cases, I found that the proposals based upon the Matthean data were 
inadequate to explain some of the occurrences found in Mark.   
As may be expected, I will call special attention to these new additions, making some 
observations about possible pragmatic effects arising from these alternate arrangements.  As in 
my earlier section on Matthew, I will only be able to engage a subset of the data available.  
Although I will not be able to provide an exhaustive commentary on the occurrences, I will 
endeavor to make it a representative one.  As such, where patterns and/or sub-patterns are based 
upon several occurrences, my coverage will be limited to those occurrences that most clearly 
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demonstrate the essential, distinguishing characteristic(s) of each of these categories. Here is the 
breakdown of the forty-five occurrences in Mark, according to pattern and sub-pattern: 
 
 Pattern 1 Total:14 
o 1A: 5 
 1A1: 5 
o 1B: 8 
 1B1: 7 
 1B2: 1 
o 1C: 1  
 Pattern 2 Total: 16 
o 2A: 14 
o 2B: 1 
o 2D: 1 
 Pattern 3 Total:6 
o 3A: 1 
o 3B: 2 
o 3C: 2 
o 3D: 1 
 Pattern 4 Total: 5 
 Pattern 5 Total: 1 
 Pattern 6 Total: 3 
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Explanation of Observations in Mark 
Pattern 1 
Based upon my observations within Mark, thirteen of the forty-five occurrences 
(approximately 28%) belong to Pattern 1.  Within this pattern, Sub-Pattern 1B1 has the best 
representation with seven occurrences.503  Based upon my observations in Matthew, I concluded 
that this was the most basic, unmarked arrangement of the elements.  Further, I concluded that, 
when this basic form is used by the author, with the preceding and following constituents being 
immediately adjacent to ἀλλά, the purpose appears to be to show clearly that the preceding 
constituent in the text is being corrected or replaced by the following constituent.  As a reminder 
to the reader, I have identified the basic form of the construction, when a constant constituent is 
present, as the following: 
Negation + Constant + Preceding  ἀλλά   Following 
There is nothing in the data from Mark that would cause me to move away from this conclusion, 
although I should make clear that this assumes the presence of a constant constituent, which is 
one of the defining characteristics for Pattern 1.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
503 The most frequently appearing sub-pattern, overall, is Sub-Pattern 2A, with 13 
occurrences.  Please see my treatment of this sub-pattern in the appropriate following section. 
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Sub-Pattern 1A1 
Mark 7:5 
In Mark 7:5, we find the Pharisees and the scribes asking Jesus 
διὰ τί  οὐ    περιπατοῦσιν  οἱ μαθηταί σου  
κατὰ τὴν παράδοσιν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων,  
ἀλλὰ κοιναῖς χερσὶν  ἐσθίουσιν  τὸν ἄρτον;  
The contrasted constituents here are, in simplest form, the two finite verbs περιπατοῦσιν and 
ἐσθίουσιν. The presupposition of the questioners, which is fairly clearly communicated by their 
question, is that the disciples are not “walking,” or comporting themselves “in compliance with 
the traditions of the elders: instead, they are “with common (unclean/defiled) hands” eating the 
food.  To be clear, the question is not whether or not the disciples are walking according to the 
tradition of the elders.  Rather, the question seeks a reason, a justification, if you will, for the 
fact that they are not walking according the tradition of the elders. 
The author has prepared the reader for what exactly “τὴν παράδοσιν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων” 
refers to in this context by his previous comments in 7:2-3, where he first presents the actions of 
the disciples, followed by the actions of the Pharisees and all the Jews.  It is important to note the 
reason given for their refusal to eat unless they washed their hands: it is due to, or the result of, 
their holding to (κρατοῦντες) “τὴν παράδοσιν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων.”   
Having provided the reader with relevant narrative concerning the disciples, as well as 
the necessary explanation of the usual practice of the Pharisees in accordance with their received 
tradition, the author is able to simply mention “τὴν παράδοσιν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων,” and reasonably 
264 
 
 
 
expect the reader to fill in this reference with the value of “eating food having washed, therefore 
having clean/undefiled hands.”  
So we see that, based on the full context of the Marcan version of this passage, it is these 
actions, “eating after washing” versus “eating without having washed the hands,” which are 
actually being contrasted.  However, the question, as recorded, is far more rhetorically charged 
by referring to the first practice, which the disciples were not doing, as the one that was in 
compliance with what the elders passed down and, as such, what should have been authoritative 
for the disciples. 
Mark 9:37 
The next text for our consideration is Mark 9:37, in which Jesus presents the full 
implications of receiving/welcoming someone, in this case a child, in his name. 
ὃς ἂν ἓν τῶν τοιούτων παιδίων δέξηται ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματί μου, ἐμὲ δέχεται·  
καὶ ὃς ἂν ἐμὲ δέχηται, οὐκ ἐμὲ δέχεται ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με. 
The logical flow is that whoever may, at some indeterminate time, receive one of these children 
in the name of Jesus will (actually) be receiving Jesus himself.  Further, whoever will receive 
Jesus, will not be receiving Jesus but rather(?) the one having sent him. Interestingly, in the first 
sentence, there is a parallel concept that it expressed in positive form, rather than the negative 
form used in the second sentence.  Consider the following hypothetical sentence, in which the 
thrust of the first utterance is expressed using the form of the second: 
*ὃς ἂν ἓν τῶν τοιούτων παιδίων δέχηται,  
οὐκ ἓν τῶν τοιούτων παιδίων δέχεται ἀλλὰ ἐμὲ δέχεται. 
*whoever is receiving one of these children in my name, 
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is not receiving one of these children but instead is receiving me. 
The relationship between the clauses in the first positive utterance is not, however, so nicely 
detailed: we look for a conjunction to signal how these clauses relate, but instead we find 
asyndeton.   
In the second utterance, the relationship between the two clauses is provided, but even a 
casual examination confirms that explaining the relationship expressed by the conjunction as 
[+adversative] simply will not do without generating a contradiction.  Given the full context, 
both [+replacement] and [+alternative] fail to explain fully what relationship is being signaled.  
The use of ἀλλά in which the ideas of “not so much X as Y,” as generally advanced and 
particularly applied to this verse by both Zerwick and BDF,504 as well by R. Gundry,505 also 
seems to miss the mark here.  However, Gundry’s comments on this text are helpful for 
understanding both what he is observing, and how he interprets the same: 
Twice, the forward position of ἐμέ, “me,” stresses the receiving of Jesus.  A third forward 
position of ἐμέ but this time following οὐκ, “not,” plus the strongly adversative ἀλλά, 
“rather,” and the ellipsis of “he receives” in the ἀλλά-clause stresses the sender of Jesus as 
the one received.  Thus this subsection of the pericope reaches a preliminary climax in the 
receiving of Jesus by the receiving of a child, and an ultimate climax in the receiving of 
God by the receiving of Jesus.  “Not … rather” is an emphatic way of saying “not … so 
much as.”506 
Contra Gundry and others, there does not appear to be any diminishing of the reception of Jesus 
(which is reflected in the translation “not so much”), but rather a rejection of that being all that is 
                                                 
504 Blass and Debrunner, BDF, 233; Zerwick, Biblical Greek, 150. 
505 Gundry, Mark, 509. 
506 Ibid. 
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happening.  We are reminded of one of Horn’s observations concerning metalinguistic negation 
which is particularly relevant in this case: 
In general, the effect of metalinguistic negation is either the rejection of a previous 
utterance (on any grounds whatever, as we have seen), or the rhetorical demolition of some 
feature of one’s own utterance, often after considerable effort has been made precisely to 
set up that feature.507 
This building up of an expectation, and then correcting something about it by means of a 
negation for rhetorical purposes, is precisely what we observe in this occurrence.   
I propose that a better representation of the sense communicated by the construction is 
“not only X, but even more Y in addition to X.”  This idea can also be expressed by οὐ μόνον... 
ἀλλὰ καί, in which the first item is not being negated.  On the other hand, the idea of the first 
element, X in isolation, is being rejected in favor of the alternative, which is the idea expressed 
as X+Y.  So the feature [+alternative] does provide a partial explanation of the relationship 
signaled by ἀλλά.  But there is also the presence of the feature [+addition/accumulation], which 
signals that the Y, which follows the conjunction, is to be added to X, which preceded the 
conjunction.  As such, the conjunction is [+adversative] against X per se, but against X in 
isolation.  The items or items that should be seen together with X are explicitly given as Y. 
Jasinskaja’s insights regarding correction in juxtaposed “utterances,” both with and 
without “connectives” (e.g., conjunctions such as “but”), will serve us well here.508  She provides 
the following explanation regarding correction, with associated illustrative sentences in English: 
                                                 
507 Horn, Natural History of Negation, 391.  Note how this same principle applies to Matt 
10:20, which is another clear instance of metalinguistic negation in the NT.  Please consult my 
coverage of Matt 10:20 and its Marcan parallel, Mark 13:11, in Chapter 5. 
508 Jasinskaja, “Corrective Elaboration.” 
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Coming back to corrections, one should note that the present approach predicts a correction 
reading for (46) … just like it does for (48), and it does not predict any difference in felicity 
or markedness between these examples.  However, (46) is intuitively much more marked 
than (48), whereas the “normal”, unmarked way to express the same idea would be by 
using a not only … (but) also type construction, as in (49). 
 
(46)  John didn’t praise BILL.  He praised BILL and MARY…. 
(48) John didn’t praise BILL.  He praised MARY. 
(49)  John didn’t only praise BILL.  He also praised MARY…. 
 
The difference between (46) and (48) is that in (48) the propositional content is negated 
among other things, i.e. the intended interpretation of the first sentence is consistent with a 
descriptive negation reading.  In (46), however, the speaker only intends the exhaustive 
implicature (i.e. that John didn’t praise Mary, Sue, etc.) to be negated, whereas it remains 
true that John praised Bill.509  
Jasinskaja’s final observation accords with my observations above concerning the rejection of “X 
alone” or, in Jasinkaja’s terminology, of the “exhaustivity” of the expression X: as such, the 
reader’s view, or expectation that X is the exhaustive answer to the implicit question of the 
sentence, in this case, “Who is the one receiving a child in my name receiving?”, is corrected.   
Again, Jasinskaja’s assertions regarding the interpretation of the negation of X in light of 
the conjunction and Y are helpful, in that we see how the earlier element, X, is not negated, even 
though this would appear to be the plain meaning of the negative phrase in isolation from the 
following conjunction and alternative element(s): 
It is widely accepted that the default interpretation of negation is descriptive, which means 
that discourses like (46) garden-path the hearer into the wrong assumption that (in 
accordance with the descriptive reading) it is not the case that John praised Bill, which has 
to be given up after processing the second utterance and the first utterance has to be 
reanalysed [sic] as involving metarepresentational negation.510 
                                                 
509 Ibid., 63–64. 
510 Ibid., 64. 
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Jasinskaja’s observations concerning the cognitive processing of metalinguistic negation seem in 
complete accord with earlier ones made by Horn.  In the context of commenting on a specific 
contemporary example, Horn advances, but does attempt to prove, the following description of 
how metalinguistic negation might be interpreted by the reader/hearer: 
The garden-path effect of this passage, and of the majority of metalinguistic negations 
whose discourse domain does not cross speakers …, is the rule rather than the exception. 
It might even be speculated (although I shall not try to support this speculation here) that 
there is an inherent ordering within the processing of metalinguistic negation: the 
addressee, on recognizing that a given negation cannot be coherently read descriptively (as 
denying a given predicate of a given subject or as an internal, predicate term negation), will 
try first to take it as a rejection of the conventional implicata (or presuppositions) associated 
with the negated utterance, then (if that fails) as a rejection of its potential conversational 
implicata, then (if that fails) as a rejection of the formal properties (grammar or phonology) 
of that utterance.511 
Whether one agrees with either Jasinskaja or Horn concerning the particular mechanism by 
which a reader/hearer processes the utterances in the construction, what should not be 
objectionable is that something is negated that was previously explicitly asserted, or at least 
strongly implied, leading to an attempt to resolve what appears to be a contradiction. 
However, a reasonable rebuttal to my use of Jasinskaja’s arguments, and even more so 
these English examples, is that the values given to correct/replace the negated elements either (1) 
explicitly include both X and Y, or (2) signal that X should be brought forward to be combined 
with Y by the use of “not only…but also.”  With reference to the Greek text, we do not observe 
(1) evidence of a corresponding explicit listing of the constituents to be combined: 
{ἓν τῶν τοιούτων παιδίων + ἐμὲ + τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με}  
                                                 
511 Horn, Natural History of Negation, 391. 
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Further, we do not observe (2) the presence of οὐ μόνον...ἀλλὰ καί, which would justify our 
interpretation that the correcting value does indeed include all of the previous constituents.  The 
explicit presence of (2) would remove the requirement to see (1) in order to arrive at our 
interpretation.   
As I have mentioned previously, a reasonable question arises from this discussion: 
namely, “Is the simple expression οὐ...ἀλλά able to convey this sense implicitly, or better, 
elliptically, without the explicit addition of μόνον...καί, such that these latter terms simply serve 
to disambiguate the expression?”  An affirmative answer to this question asserts that, in effect, 
οὐ...ἀλλά can, based upon the context in which it is used, signal both [+alternative] and 
[+addition/accumulation].  
What I have been arguing, based upon the larger context of this verse, is that this is 
exactly the sense that we should be seeing here.  There is no negation of the reception of a child, 
nor is there a denial of the reception of Jesus himself.  Rather, there is a negation of the idea that 
the reception of a child is only the reception of the child, or that reception of a child and Jesus is 
limited to reception of these two together.  Reception of a child is also reception of Jesus himself; 
this is, ultimately and inclusively, reception of the one who sent Jesus. 
Clearly, such a view moves far beyond the simple substitution of “not…but (rather)” for 
occurrences of οὐ...ἀλλά.  My primary concern is not the rendering of a smooth and accurate 
English or other language translation.  On the contrary, my primary concern is understanding 
what is happening in the Greek text, on its own terms, without resorting to other language 
idiom(s), the sense(s) of which are then read back into the Greek text.  I have attempted to take 
seriously both semantics and pragmatics, such that the uncancellable semantic value of ἀλλά, 
270 
 
 
 
namely [+alternative], is seen in concert with the possible, cancellable pragmatic features of 
[+replacement] and/or [+addition/accumulation]. 
In my treatment in Chapter 2 of Horn’s contributions regarding negation in general, and 
metalinguistic negation in particular, I engaged with the proposal by Lehrer and Lehrer512 to 
view some instances of “not … but” as elliptical for “not only … but also,” and Horn’s 
objections to it.  The reader may find it useful to consult the discussion there to see how other 
scholars have answered these objections,513 clearing the way for my advancement of such an 
understanding for some particular occurrences of the οὐ...ἀλλά construction in the NT. 
I have gone far afield in my handling of Mark 9:37, but I do not believe that this leg of 
our journey has been in vain.  It is important that we recognize the flexibility of ἀλλά based upon 
the various contexts, and the various combinations and constructions, in which it is found.  In 
order to better display this flexibility, I have attempted to engage those examples of this pattern 
that are most exemplary or that pose particular difficulties with respect to the function of the 
idiom between the connected clauses. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
512 Lehrer and Lehrer, “Antonymy.” 
513 Geurts, “Mechanisms of Denial”; Pitts, “Exploring a ‘Pragmatic Ambiguity’ of 
Negation.” 
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Sub-Pattern 1B1 
As I noted in the introduction to my treatment of Pattern 1, Sub-Pattern 1B1 is the second 
most frequent arrangement of constituents to be found in Mark’s Gospel after Sub-Pattern 2A.  
Based upon my observations of the occurrences of ἀλλά within Matthew, and to a lesser extent, 
my observations of the same in Mark, I see 1B1 as being the least marked pattern.  However, I 
should qualify this statement by saying that this arrangement of constituents is the most basic, 
unmarked form in situations involving correction.  As I have shown previously, this arrangement 
signals the rejection of a particular constituent in the first conjunct, with the rest of the first 
conjunct remaining as continuous information to be carried forward implicitly to the second 
conjunct, where in fact it is ellipsed, and where the replacement for the rejected constituent will 
be proffered.   
In other words, there is something about the initial proposition (that combination of 
constituents that generally occurs between the initial negation and ἀλλά) that is being corrected 
by the constituents presented after ἀλλά.  This is in accord with comments by (1) Repp 
(regarding stripping),514 (2) Halliday (regarding continuous information and ellipsis),515 (3) 
Jasinskaja (regarding correction with respect to juxtaposed utterances in general),516 and (4) 
Runge (regarding the use of ἀλλά in particular)517 that I have referred to previously in this work.   
However, there are instances in which that the οὐ...ἀλλά construction will be used, not to 
correct an element of the first conjunct, but to reject, or negate the proposition as a whole.  In this 
                                                 
514 Repp, Negation in Gapping, 7, 149. 
515 Halliday, Introduction to Functional Grammar, 635. 
516 Jasinskaja, “Corrective Elaboration,” 51–52. 
517 Runge, Discourse Grammar, 93. 
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case, the propostional content or command present within the first conjunct is negated entirely, 
and the proposition or command present within the second conjunct is proffered as the 
alternative which is being affirmed or presented for acceptance.  This complete rejection of the 
contents of the first, together with the affirmation of the contents of the second, are signaled 
primarily the by the use of the οὐ...ἀλλά combination, which also communicates to the hearer 
that there is some sort of contrast, or difference, to be seen between the information present in 
the first conjunct and that present in the second.    
Based upon my observations in Matthew and Mark, however, I advance the explanation 
that this contrast is also signaled pragmatically by the absence of (1) a constant constituent, 
either explicit or implicit, which is shared by both propositions, and (2) ellipsis of a constituent 
or constituents from the first conjunct.  In this case, the reader/hearer, finding no ellipsis, 
parallelism, analogy, or sharing of elements between the two propositions, interprets the 
utterance in this way.  As I have noted previously in this work, I have categorized such 
occurrences involving negation as Sub-Pattern 2A, and I will address some Marcan examples 
sharing the characteristics of this sub-pattern in the section devoted to it that follows. 
First, thought, there are two examples of Sub-Pattern 1B1 that may be profitably 
considered in brief compass: Mark 7:19 and Mark 12:25. 
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Mark 7:19a 
Mark 7:19a occurs in the context of a dispute between Jesus and his critics over the issue 
of defilement.  I have already introduced this context in my coverage of Mark 7:5 in the section 
on Sub-Pattern 1A1 above, and will not repeat that discussion here.  The narrative has advanced 
to the point that Jesus has left the crowds and critics behind, and is dealing with his disciples 
concerning the meaning of the sayings that he had previously delivered.  Jesus first delivers a 
question in 7:18a that challenges their own lack of understanding, with the implication, as 
indicated by …καὶ ὑμεῖς…, that they share this characteristic of ignorance with the crowds and 
critics who did not comprehend Jesus’s words.  
His next question, which begins in 7:18b and continues through 7:19, provides both the 
explanation for the saying and the reproof for not knowing the explanation themselves (οὐ 
νοεῖτε…).  The first portion of the question asks, rhetorically, whether they know the proposition 
which is introduced by ὅτι: 
οὐ νοεῖτε ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἔξωθεν εἰσπορευόμενον εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ δύναται αὐτὸν κοινῶσαι… 
Don’t you know that everything which is entering into man from the outside is not able to 
defile him… 
The second portion of the question provides the explanation for the proposition by means of 
another proposition: namely, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσπορεύεται αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν καρδίαν ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν. 
The link between the two propositions is the conjunction ὅτι, which signals that the first 
proposition holds, or is true, due to the truth of the second proposition.  The logic of the whole 
response is fairly straightforward: the thing which enters into the man from outside him is not 
able to defile him because it does not enter into his heart, but into his bowels.  There two 
assumptions that should be briefly noted: first, that the καρδίαν and the κοιλίαν are distinct; 
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second, that of these two, the center, or area of concern, with respect to the defilement of person 
is the καρδίαν.   
Our primary interest, however, is in the use of the ἀλλά within this proposition.  What is 
being negated from the first portion of this proposition, εἰσπορεύεται αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν καρδίαν, is the 
prepositional phrase εἰς τὴν καρδίαν, with the proffered replacement being εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν.  The 
emphasis is on the correction of the adverbial prepositional phrase, which tells the reader where 
the external thing does, and does not, enter.   My focus is not on the English sense or rendering, 
but it may be helpful for our purposes here to utilize two of McCawley’s types of contrastive 
negation in order to see the difference in emphasis that I am advancing.   
Consider: 
*It does not enter into his heart, but into his bowels.  
*It enters, not into his heart, but into his bowels.     
The first sentence is similar to McCawley’s short, basic form, while the second sentence 
corresponds to McCawley’s short, anchored form.518  This latter sentence better captures (1) 
which constituent is being corrected (into his heart), (2) which constituent is being proffered as a 
replacement (into his bowels), and (3) which constant constituent the reader is expected to carry 
forward in reading (it enters).  When the exegete is called upon to translate such occurrences, she 
would do well to consider how the receptor language would express such correction and 
replacement of a constituent within a clause, while also signaling that some portion of the first 
clause still retains its relevance. 
                                                 
518 McCawley, “Contrastive Negation and Metalinguistic Negation,” 190. 
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Mark 12:25 
I have elected to briefly address the occurrence of ἀλλά in Mark 12:25 for three reasons: 
(1) it is an interesting variation on the usual οὐ...ἀλλά combination, being instead an 
οὔτε…οὔτε…ἀλλά combination; and (2) the constant constituent that is retained from the first 
proposition (clause between οὐ and ἀλλά) is relatively large (ὅταν…ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναστῶσιν); and (3) 
the reading is slightly more difficult due to the lack of a clear parallel between the constituents to 
be replaced (γαμοῦσιν and γαμίζονται) and the constituent with which they are replaced (εἰσὶν ὡς 
ἄγγελοι ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς).  
This last reason may easily be rejected by some, as the replacing constituent could be 
seen to be simply εἰσὶν without the rest of the verb phrase, thus making the parallelism between 
the replaced and replacing constituents much clearer.  In answer, I would hold that the whole 
verb phrase, not the verb in isolation, is being presented, regardless of the asymmetry of the 
constituents. 
In context, this occurrence is offered within an utterance which appears to serve as the 
substantiation (note the presence of γάρ) for Jesus’s charge in 12:24 that his questioners, in this 
case identified as Σαδδουκαῖοι in 12:18, were ignorant of the Scriptures and the power of God.   
What exactly is being asserted in this utterance?  Taking the constant constituent, and following 
constituent that is presented, we arrive at the following reconstruction: 
ὅταν…ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναστῶσιν…εἰσὶν ὡς ἄγγελοι ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς 
Note the repetition of ὅταν ἀναστῶσιν (linking back to the original question in 12:23) in Jesus’s 
answer.  What, then, is being rejected?  The possibility that, given this resurrection as some 
unspecified time in the future, they either γαμοῦσιν or γαμίζονται.  The rejection of these 
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possibilities has the rhetorical effect of removing the very basis for the question posed by the 
Sadducees in 12:23:  
ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει ὅταν ἀναστῶσιν τίνος αὐτῶν ἔσται γυνή; 
The Sadducees also offer an explanation (signaled by the presence of γάρ) for their question, 
making clear their assumptions about what resurrection of the dead would imply: namely 
continuity between the life lived before death, and life lived after death: 
  οἱ γὰρ ἑπτὰ ἔσχον αὐτὴν γυναῖκα 
Jesus’s answer demonstrates that there is both continuity between the lives lived before, in that 
those raised remain who they were, and discontinuity, in that the particular commitment and 
relationship defined by marriage was neither maintained, nor ever renewed, in the resurrection 
state. 
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Pattern 2 
Please see my general discussion of this pattern above.  As I have classified 13 of the 15 
Pattern 2 occurrences as belong to Sub-Pattern 2A, I will focus my attention on this arrangement 
of constituents. 
Sub-Pattern 2A 
Mark 4:17 
This occurrence is within Jesus’s explanation of the seeds sown on rocky ground from the 
well-known Parable of the Soils.  In Mark’s version of this explanation, which finds its Matthean 
parallel in Matt 13:21, the contrast governed by is between what those sown in the soil (1) do not 
have and (2) what they are.  The Marcan and Matthean versions are very similar, with three 
exceptions: first, the Marcan version’s reference to those sown is plural (with all verbs and 
adjectives inflected appropriately), while the Matthean is singular; second, the Marcan version 
uses the conjunction καί to connect the material in this verse with what has preceded it, while the 
Matthean version uses δέ; finally, the Mark version utilizes the adverb εἶτα to join the first and 
second clauses,519 whereas the Matthean version uses the conjunction δέ.  My comments on the 
Marcan version will hold for the Matthean.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
519 See BDAG, 295, for discussion of this use of εἶτα. 
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Both versions appear below: 
 
Matthew 13:21 Mark 4:17 
οὐκ ἔχει δὲ ῥίζαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ  καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ῥίζαν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς  
ἀλλὰ  ἀλλὰ  
πρόσκαιρός ἐστιν,  πρόσκαιροί εἰσιν,  
γενομένης δὲ θλίψεως ἢ διωγμοῦ διὰ τὸν εἶτα γενομένης θλίψεως ἢ διωγμοῦ διὰ τὸν 
λόγον εὐθὺς σκανδαλίζεται λόγον εὐθὺς σκανδαλίζονται 
Our interest is the asymmetry of the two items contrasted within this construction: 
namely, ἔχουσιν ῥίζαν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς and πρόσκαιροί εἰσιν.  The contrasted ideas are better indicated 
by the second constituent, πρόσκαιροί εἰσιν, from which the reader is able to conclude that the 
issue is whether those being spoken of are able to endure, or are transitory, temporary, without 
endurance.  The inability of those planted to endure is indicated by their lack of root structure, in 
keeping with the thought expressed in the narrative of the parable.  The reader must process what 
it would mean for a plant to not have roots, or sufficient roots, to endure the conditions in which 
it is planted.  Very little processing is needed to conclude that they are unenduring, as the use of 
πρόσκαιροί makes explicit.   
One might almost question why ἀλλά is needed at all.  If verse 17 were being considered 
in isolation, then it is possible to envision this having been expressed as “…they do not have any 
root in themselves: thus they are transitory/temporary.”  But it is not in isolation, as we have an 
expectation arising from the account given in 4:16 of those sown:  
…οἳ   ὅταν ἀκούσωσιν τὸν λόγον  εὐθὺς μετὰ χαρᾶς λαμβάνουσιν αὐτόν 
…who,  whenever they hear the word, immediately with joy are receiving it… 
The expectation of the hearer/reader is that what has started well will continue, and probably 
end, well.  Given the enthusiastic beginning, it seems reasonable to assume a favorable 
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continuation.  This expectation, however, is overturned, as additional information is given within 
the οὐ...ἀλλά construction.  Although they received it initially with joy, they do not have root 
within themselves.  Rather, they are unenduring in their reception, rejoicing, and abiding in the 
word sown. 
Mark 11:23 
This occurrence is fairly straightforward, with the ἀλλά construction occurring in the 
midst of the presentation of the conditions under which one’s command to a mountain to move 
would in fact come to pass.  Clearly the first condition is that one speak to the mountain (εἴπῃ τῷ 
ὄρει τούτῳ), telling it to be taken up and be cast into the sea (ἄρθητι καὶ βλήθητι εἰς τὴν 
θάλασσαν).  The second condition includes a negative element (μὴ διακριθῇ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτου) 
and a positive element (πιστεύῃ ὅτι ὃ λαλεῖ γίνεται), both of which must be fulfilled by the 
speaker, and both of which occur within the ἀλλά construction.   
The contrast is clear: the one speaking must not doubt in his heart.  Rather, he must 
believe that what he is saying is coming to pass.  The preceding and following constituents are 
easily identified.  The only difficulty arises due to the categories and characteristics of these 
categories that I have been using.  Clearly there is no explicit constant constituent present within 
the construction.  However, the possibility that the prepositional phrase ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτου is 
implied in association with the following constituent is worth considering.  The idea of believing 
“in the heart” is seen in the NT (note Rom 10:9), and at times belief and believing in general is 
associated with the heart (Luke 8:12; 24:25; John 14:1; Rom 10:10).  I would reclassify this 
occurrence to Sub-Pattern 1A1 if I concluded that the prepositional phrase was to be read 
elliptically after the following constituent.   
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But why stop there?  If the prepositional phrase can be implied elliptically, are we safe to 
conjecture that the object of the faith, namely ὅτι ὃ λαλεῖ γίνεται, is to be implied elliptically 
following μὴ διακριθῇ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτου?  Under these conditions, this construction would look 
most like Sub-Pattern 1B2.  The sole example of this pattern identified in Matthew was Matt 
19:6,520  so an arrangement of elements in this fashion, while not unprecedented, is uncommon.  
The diagram of this occurrence, assuming this double ellipsis, is as follows: 
 
Implicit (Elliptical)  
μὴ  διακριθῇ  ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ  ἀλλὰ   πιστεύῃ  ὅτι ὃ λαλεῖ γίνεται 
Neg.  Preceding Constant 1  ἀλλά  Following Constant 2 
The hypothetical reading that I am proposing, with the elliptical constant constituents inserted 
and underlined, is as follows: 
*…μὴ  διακριθῇ  ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ  ὅτι ὃ λαλεῖ γίνεται  ἀλλὰ  
πιστεύῃ  ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ  ὅτι ὃ λαλεῖ γίνεται… 
I have reluctantly judged against this due to the rarity of the form, but I would like to keep the 
possibility open for reexamination.   
Before moving forward from this occurrence, it is noteworthy that the parallel account 
found in Matt 21:21, which I discussed in the previous chapter, does include a contrast between 
believing and doubting in the protasis of his conditional statement, but not within an ἀλλά 
construction.  Instead the contrast is presented as …ἐὰν ἔχητε πίστιν καὶ μὴ διακριθῆτε.  The 
positive attribute that is being admonished is presented first, with the negation and the attribute 
                                                 
520 A diagram of this Sub-Pattern can be found in Appendix 3. 
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to be shunned being presented last.  We do see the use of ἀλλά in the apodosis of Matt 21:21, but 
it is in the form of an οὐ μόνον... ἀλλὰ καί construction.  The Matthean version brings together 
what had been done to the tree, and what would be done to the mountain, with greater clarity 
than does the Marcan.  The Matthean emphasis is on the positive attribute of faith and the 
positive effects associated with it.  This had been seen in the great thing that had been done with 
the fig tree, and was seen in the description of the even greater deed that was possible with 
respect the mountain.   The use of the οὐ μόνον... ἀλλὰ καί construction allows the former to be 
retained, while introducing the latter as an extension of the same. 
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Mark 13:11a 
Although the sense of the construction is clear enough, this occurrence presented some 
unique challenges due to the limitations of my classification system.   
Mark 13:11 καὶ ὅταν ἄγωσιν ὑμᾶς παραδιδόντες,  
μὴ  προμεριμνᾶτε  τί λαλήσητε,  
ἀλλ᾽    ὃ ἐὰν δοθῇ ὑμῖν ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ὥρᾳ  
τοῦτο  
λαλεῖτε 
For the purposes of this discussion, it will also be useful to consider the parallel text in Matt 
10:19, which does not include ἀλλά: 
 
Matt 10:19 Mark 13:11a 
ὅταν δὲ παραδῶσιν ὑμᾶς, καὶ ὅταν ἄγωσιν ὑμᾶς παραδιδόντες, 
μὴ μεριμνήσητε μὴ προμεριμνᾶτε 
πῶς ἢ τί   τί 
λαλήσητε· λαλήσητε, 
 ἀλλ᾽ 
δοθήσεται γὰρ ὃ ἐὰν δοθῇ 
ὑμῖν ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ὥρᾳ ὑμῖν ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ὥρᾳ 
 τοῦτο 
τί λαλήσητε· λαλεῖτε· 
We begin by determining what is being rejected or corrected, and identifying the preceding and 
following constituents.  Based on the similarity of the two imperatives, I concluded that the 
preceding constituent was the command to worry, or be anxious about something beforehand 
(προμεριμνᾶτε).  The following constituent, according to this line of thinking, is the command to 
speak (λαλεῖτε).  So, in the simplest form of the ἀλλά construction, we would expect the contrast 
to be as follows: 
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Negation Preceding  ἀλλά   Following 
μὴ   προμεριμνᾶτε …,  ἀλλ᾽    …λαλεῖτε 
But what of the intervening material that occurs before and after ἀλλά?  Of prime importance is 
whether or not we find a constant constituent in this material.  Based upon most of our examples 
that include a constant constituent, the most likely place to find such an element is in the position 
immediately before ἀλλά.  We do find the clause τί λαλήσητε functioning as the object of the 
imperative προμεριμνᾶτε.  Further, within this clause the pronoun is the object of the verb 
λαλήσητε.  In the material following ἀλλά, we find the relative clause ὃ ἐὰν δοθῇ ὑμῖν ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ 
ὥρᾳ, which functions as the object of the verb in the second conjunct, λαλεῖτε.   
Robertson views as τί λαλήσητε an indirect, deliberative question, and not as an instance 
of the interrogative pronoun being used as a relative pronoun.521  His insights regarding the 
possibility that, in certain contexts, τίς could function as a relative pronoun are suggestive: 
Just as ὅς and ὅστις came to be used as interrogatives, so τίς drifted occasionally to a mere 
relative. We have seen (1 Tim. 1:7) how the relative and the interrogative come to be used 
side by side. … The plainest New Testament example of τίς as ὅς appears to be Mk. 14:36 
οὐ τί ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλά τί σύ. Cf. Mt. 26:39 οὐκ ὠς ἐγὼ, ἀλλ’ ὠς σύ. But it is not much more 
so than Mt. 15:32 οὐκ ἔχουσιν τί φάγωσιν (cf. Mk. 8:1 f.) and Mk. 6:36 ἵνα – ἀγοράσωσιν 
ἑαυτοις τί φάγωσιν. ... It is not necessary to bring under this construction οὐ γὰρ ᾔδει τί 
ἀποκριθῇ (Mk. 9:6) nor Mk. 13:11. Here the idiom is really that of indirect question 
(deliberative question). Cf. the direct question in Mt. 6:31 with the indirect in 6:25. So in 
Mt. 10:19 (first example) and see 9. But the second example in Mt. 10:19 (δοθήσεται – τί 
λαλήσητε) may be the relative use.522 
Although I understand why he views this an indirect question, I believe that Robertson’s 
handling of the second portion of the parallel text in Matt 10:19 reveals that this distinction may 
be less than clear in some circumstances.   
                                                 
521 Robertson, Grammar, 738. 
522 Ibid., 737–8. 
284 
 
 
 
Wallace discusses the use of the subjunctive both in indirect questions, and in an 
indefinite relative clause, noting the following concerning this latter use:  
The subjunctive is frequently used after ὅστις (ἄν/ἐάν) or ὅς (δ ᾽) ἄν. The construction 
normally indicates a generic (or sometimes an uncertain) subject (but cf. Luke 9:4; 
John 1:33; Rom 9:15; 2 Cor 11:21); hence, the particle of contingency and the need for a 
subjunctive.523 
But what of the situation in which it is not the subject of the verb, but rather the object that is 
uncertain?  In such a case, the indefinite pronoun is used for the indefinite relative pronoun, with 
the uncertain element being the content of what would be spoken, not whether or not those 
addressed would speak.  It would seem that this is a better explanation for what we observe in 
this text.   
Regardless of whether this explanation is accepted or not, there should be no 
disagreement with the assertion that the content of what would be said in such a situation is the 
referent of both τί λαλήσητε in the first conjunct, and ὃ ἐὰν δοθῇ ὑμῖν ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ὥρᾳ (and τοῦτο) 
in the second.  Matthew’s version strengthens the parallel and makes clear that the reason why 
they are not to worry about “how” or “what[ever] it is you will say/speak,” τί λαλήσητε, in such a 
situation is that “what[ever] it is you will say/speak,” again, τί λαλήσητε, “will be given to you in 
that hour.”  The conjunction used to join these two conjuncts, γάρ, signals that the proposition in 
the second conjunct offers the explanation for the command of the first conjunct.  The Matthean 
version moves away from contrasting the two conjuncts and moves toward presenting the second 
conjunct as the basis for the reasonableness of the first.   
                                                 
523 Wallace, Greek Grammar, 478. 
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The Marcan version, on the other hand, presents two contrasting courses, one that is 
prohibited, and one that is commanded.  Also included in the Marcan version is the pronoun 
τοῦτο, which (1) refers to the contents of the relative clause and (2) functions pleonastically.524  
Expanding upon the graphical representation above, we see the following arrangement of 
components: 
Negation Preceding Object ἀλλά Object1 Object2 Following 
μὴ  προμεριμνᾶτε …, τί… ἀλλ᾽  ὃ ἐὰν… τοῦτο …λαλεῖτε 
Although there is a repetition of the verb before and after ἀλλά, I have rejected my initial 
impulse to see this as a constant constituent due the different functions of the verbs within their 
respective clauses, as I have shown above.   
The first instance, λαλήσητε, occurs within a clause that functions as the object of the 
main verb, in this case the imperative προμεριμνᾶτε.  Based on this, I decided against classifying 
this as one of the Pattern 3 sub-patterns, all of which are characterized by the explicit repetition 
of constant constituents on either side of ἀλλά, opting instead for Sub-Pattern 2A.   
Mark 14:49 
My coverage of this occurrence will be brief.  Robertson cites this text in conjunction 
with his discussion of the brachyology, and his insights, comments, and examples remain 
helpful.  He comments, “Thought moves more rapidly than expression and the words often 
                                                 
524 Ibid., 317, 329–30.   
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crowd together in a compressed way that may be not only terse, but at first obscure.”525  This 
description certainly holds for this occurrence, as can be seen by examining the text itself: 
Mark 14:49 καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἤμην πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ διδάσκων καὶ  
οὐκ ἐκρατήσατέ με· ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα πληρωθῶσιν αἱ γραφαι 
The hearer/reader is left to wonder what exactly happened “in order that the writings might be 
fulfilled.”   
Was it the whole complex of events, including his teaching in the temple and their not 
seizing him?  This appears to be R. Decker’s perspective, as he offers the following in his 
comments on the text: 
Since ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα can be used elliptically in the sense “(but) this happened … in order that” 
(BDF §448.7), it seems likely that Mark intends an historical statement: “it has taken place 
that …” (as Matthew makes explicit: τοῦτο δὲ ὅλον γέγονεν ἵνα πληρωθῶσιν αἱ γραφαὶ ….526 
Decker also notes several scholars who instead “argue for an imperatival ἵνα: “But let the 
Scriptures be fulfilled.”527  Stein advances a similar proposal, asserting that 
The expression “But [let it be] in order that the Scriptures may be fulfilled” (ἀλλ᾿ ἵνα 
πληρωθῶσιν αἱ γραφαί, all’ hina plērōthōsin hai graphai; 14:49b) emphasizes God’s 
sovereign control over what is taking place. Compare T. Naph. 7.1, “These things must be 
fulfilled in their season.” A verb is implied between “But” and “in order that” (Cranfield 
1959: 437; Evans 2001: 426), as Matt. 26:56 indicates.528 
Building on Stein’s proposal that there is an implied, or perhaps better, an ellipsed verb between 
ἀλλά and ἵνα, it is possible that the reader is intended to supply “seize me” elliptically in the 
                                                 
525 Robertson, Grammar, 1203. 
526 Decker, Mark 9-16, 214. 
527 Ibid. 
528 Stein, Mark, 673; C. E. B. Cranfield, The Gospel According to Saint Mark: An 
Introduction and Commentary, CGTC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959); Evans, 
WBC 34B: Mark 8:27-16:20. 
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material following ἀλλά.  If this is the case, then the fulfillment is to be understood as the events 
that are unfolding even as Jesus is speaking the words: namely, that they are, even at that 
moment, in the night, seizing him even though they had been presented ample opportunity to do 
so in public, in the daylight, in the Temple.  Following this line of thinking, my proposed 
reconstruction of this text, with the implicit constituents included, is:  
καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἤμην πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ διδάσκων καὶ οὐκ ἐκρατήσατέ με·  
Daily I was before you in the temple teaching and [yet] you did not seize me: 
ἀλλ᾽ (νῦν κρατεῖτε με) ἵνα πληρωθῶσιν αἱ γραφαί.”   
but now you seize me, in order that the Scriptures may be fulfilled. 
Given the extremely speculative nature of this reconstruction, however, I have rejected this 
proposal, and elected instead to classify this occurrence as Sub-Pattern 2A. 
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Pattern 4 
Mark 3:27 
Pattern 4 captures those instances of ἀλλά in which the particle is used at the beginning of 
an utterance to indicate a rhetorical objection, or to mark another point in a series of points, such 
as we noted in Matt 11:8-9.  We find such an occurrence in Mark 3:27, which opens with ἀλλά, 
and is immediately followed by a conjunct which is negated.  This first conjunct is connected to 
the following two conjuncts by ἐὰν μὴ, which in this case signals that what is stated in the first 
conjunct holds unless the condition set forth in the following conjuncts is true.  The text is as 
follows: 
ἀλλ᾽  
οὐ δύναται οὐδεὶς εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ εἰσελθὼν τὰ σκεύη αὐτοῦ διαρπάσαι,  
ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δήσῃ, καὶ τότε τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ διαρπάσει. 
And another thing, 
No one who enters into the house of the strong man is able to plunder his things, 
unless he first binds the strong man, and [only] then will he plunder his house. 
I have two brief comments regarding this text: one concerns the function of ἀλλά, and 
one concerns the rhetorical impact of the negation followed by the exception.  In context, Jesus is 
responding to the accusation leveled at him by the scribes in Mark 3:22: 
Καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς οἱ ἀπὸ Ἱεροσολύμων καταβάντες ἔλεγον  
ὅτι Βεελζεβοὺλ ἔχει καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἄρχοντι τῶν δαιμονίων ἐκβάλλει τὰ δαιμόνια. 
Now the scribes who came down from Jerusalem were saying 
“He has Beelzebul” and “By the ruler of the demons he is casting out demons.”  
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In Mark 3:23-26, Jesus first refutes this accusation by showing that a kingdom or house divided 
against itself would not be able to endure.  Effectively, no entity from within the group would be 
able to oppose another entity within that group, otherwise the group would fail.  The conclusion 
is that he is not casting out demons either by the power of the demons themselves or their ruler.  
Each verse from 3:24 through 26 begins with καί, as they are all part of the same portion of the 
argument.  In 3:27, however, Jesus moves to another portion of the argument, and introduces it 
with ἀλλά, signaling that while it is another, different thing from what has preceded, it is still part 
of his refutation. 
And what is different about this portion of his argument?  Chiefly that he moves away 
from arguing that some entity associated with, or belonging to, the group could not oppose the 
rest of group without it being destroyed.  That has been clearly established.  Jesus moves to show 
by analogy that the power by which he casts out demons is (1) greater than the demons he is 
casting out, and (2) outside of the group composed of the demons and their ruler(s).  Point (1) is 
clear based upon the repeated “strong man” label for the owner of the house (τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ 
ἰσχυροῦ and τὸν ἰσχυρὸν … τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ), and the description of both binding him and “then 
plundering his house.”   
Point (2) is implied by the context, especially as established by Mark 3:25 and Mark 
3:27.  In 3:25 Jesus rules out the possibility that some part of the “house(hold)” could be divided 
against itself (ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὴν μερισθη) and still be able stand (οὐ δυνήσεται ἡ οἰκία ἐκείνη σταθῆναι).  
So whoever is behind the casting out of the demons is not an “insider,” but an “outsider,” outside 
the group of entities associated with the demons.  In 3:27, we note that the characteristic of the 
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one who would seek to spoil or plunder the strong man’s goods: namely, the one entering the 
house.   
I want to take care not to make too much of the details of the parable, lest we fall into full 
Augustinian allegory; however, if we take seriously that this would-be plunderer enters in (from 
the outside), and that he is not of the household (from 3:25), then we have someone outside the 
group, as noted in Point (2).  The hearers are left only a moment in which to contemplate who 
might be strong enough to cast out demons without either being a demon himself, or their ruler, 
as Jesus quickly moves to warn whoever might blaspheme against the Holy Spirit (βλασφημήσῃ 
εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον). 
Mark 14:36 
The occurrence of ἀλλά in Mark 14:36 warrants some brief comment, not in its own 
right, but by virtue of the change from ἀλλά to πλήν which may be observed in both Matt 26:39 
and Luke 22:42.  In the section of her work devoted to these two texts, M. Thrall posits, 
If in Mark performs its normal function as an eliminating adversative particle, its effect is 
to give the impression of a severe mental conflict.  Since it entirely contradicts what 
precedes, it shows Jesus as acknowledging that the will of God is in direct opposition to 
his human desire to escape suffering.  The conflict is sharply defined.  It is necessary to 
consider the possibility that the use of by the other two Evangelists is intended to modify 
the impression of conflict which is produced by the Marcan version.529 
Thrall continues by engaging with the Lucan and Matthean versions in turn, discussing why the 
change may have been made in each, including an evaluation of each Gospels use of πλήν, other 
                                                 
529 Margaret E. Thrall, Greek Particles in the New Testament: Linguistic and Exegetical 
Studies, NTTS 3 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), 67–8. 
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possible sources behind the versions, and other contexts in which πλήν seems to be equivalent to 
ἀλλά in its function.530 
In his comments on Matt 26:39, Luz observes that Thrall “distinguishes between an 
adversative interpretation of πλήν (= “nevertheless”) and a conditional (= “under condition 
that”),” and asserts that “here the adversative sense dominates.”531  Commenting on the same 
verse, however, D.A. Carson questions Thrall’s distinctions between the two particles.532  
Marshall comments that “Luke’s use of πλήν, par. Mt., avoids the awkward double use of ἀλλά 
in Mk. and heightens the contrast.”533  Nolland comments, “again, if Mark is the source for the 
statement about the will of God, Luke has preferred to link with πλήν, but/only/yet/nevertheless” 
(as often), …”534  but does not offer an explanation for this preference.  
Thrall’s explanation of the change found in Luke, as opposed to her attempt to do the 
same for the change in Matthew, is the more convincing.  In connection with her comments 
quoted above regarding the possibility of the changes being made in order to “modify the 
impression of conflict which is produced by the Marcan version,” Thrall asserts that “in the case 
of the Lucan version … it seems unlikely that such a modification was consciously intended.”535  
She continues by considering both text critical and stylistic evidence in support of this claim, 
determining that “it is plainly impossible to suppose that the Evangelist had any intention of 
                                                 
530 Ibid., 68–70. 
531 Luz, Matthew 21–28, 396 n27. 
532 D. A. Carson, “Matthew,” in Matthew, Mark, Luke, ed. Frank E. Gaebelein, 
Expositor’s Bible Commentary 8 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984), 545 n39. 
533 Marshall, Gospel of Luke, 831. 
534 Nolland, WBC 35C: Luke 18:25-24:53, 1083. 
535 Thrall, Greek Particles in the New Testament, 68. 
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diminishing the effect of conflict which is produced by the account in Mark.”536  Given this 
determination concerning the intent of the modification, and the possibility that a source other 
than Mark lies behind the second part of the verse, she concludes that “it could in any case be 
argued that the Lucan πλήν is simply the equivalent of the Marcan ἀλλά.”537   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
536 Ibid. 
537 Ibid.  As evidence of this, she offers that “There are two clear instances elsewhere in 
Luke where πλήν performs exactly the same function as ἀλλά (xii 31; xxiii 28), and two further 
examples where this is a tenable interpretation of the particle (vi 35; xxii 21).” 
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Pattern 5 
Mark 13:20 
This text presents an unusual arrangement of elements and conjuncts which I could not 
easily classify into any previously-defined category.  However, as I have continued to examine it 
in light of the other occurrences throughout the course of my investigation, I have settled on the 
view that it is best seen as a variant of Pattern 3, the Supplied/Repeated Constant Pattern.  I will 
explain my reasons for holding this view in short order.  First, it will be helpful to examine the 
text itself, which I have arranged below.  For the purposes of my discussion, I have also included 
the parallel text from Matt 24:22, which does not include ἀλλά.   
 
Matt 24:22 Mark 13:20 
καὶ εἰ μὴ καὶ εἰ μὴ 
ἐκολοβώθησαν ἐκολόβωσεν 
 κύριος 
αἱ ἡμέραι ἐκεῖναι, τὰς ἡμέρας, 
οὐκ ἂν ἐσώθη πᾶσα σάρξ· οὐκ ἂν ἐσώθη πᾶσα σάρξ· 
διὰ δὲ ἀλλὰ διὰ 
τοὺς ἐκλεκτοὺς τοὺς ἐκλεκτοὺς 
 οὓς ἐξελέξατο 
κολοβωθήσονται ἐκολόβωσεν 
αἱ ἡμέραι ἐκεῖναι. τὰς ἡμέρας. 
I should note in passing that Matthew’s version has a shift to (divine)538 passive forms of the 
verb, namely, ἐκολοβώθησαν and κολοβωθήσονται, with “those days” (αἱ ἡμέραι ἐκεῖναι) being the 
subject of these verbs.  This contrasts with the Marcan version, with the active ἐκολόβωσεν, in 
which the lord, κύριος, is indicated explicitly as the one who shortened the days.  What initially 
                                                 
538 Davies and Allison, Matthew 19-28, 351; Luz, Matthew 21–28, 198. 
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seemed unusual about both versions is not the fact that there is clearly explicit repetition of a 
constant constituent (ἐκολόβωσεν … τὰς ἡμέρας, ἐκολόβωσεν τὰς ἡμέρας), as that is sometimes 
observed, and usually indicates that a contrast between two different propositions is intended; 
Pattern 3, with its various sub-patterns, captures these instances of explicit constant repetition 
between two conjuncts connected by ἀλλά.  No, what was unusual about this occurrence was that 
the constant first appears explicitly (1) before the negation of the first conjunct (οὐκ ἂν ἐσώθη 
πᾶσα σάρξ), and (2) within a conditional exception clause (εἰ μὴ ἐκολόβωσεν κύριος τὰς ἡμέρας). 
But we have seen another example in Mark 2:22, with parallels in Matt 9:17 and Luke 
5:37-38, in which a conditional exception actually occurs as intervening material after the first 
conjunct, but before the connecting ἀλλά.  I have already discussed these texts in some detail in 
the section devoted to them in Chapter 3, and I will not repeat that treatment here.  Suffice it to 
say that in those examples, an utterance begins with a negative content item and describes an 
action that, it is asserted, is not done.  Then, there is an utterance, introduced with εἰ (δὲ) μή,539 
that describes the undesirable outcome if the first utterance does not hold, or is not the case.  R. 
Decker interprets this combination “after a negative clause” as “otherwise.”540  My preference is 
to expand this a bit to allow us to appreciate the full effect, as I see it: “No one does this … but if 
this is not case (= but if they were to do it), then this is what happens (would happen).”  The 
conjunct following ἀλλά then presents the positive action that should be done, and that avoids the 
consequences just mentioned. 
                                                 
539 Or, in the case of the Matthean and Lucan versions, εἰ (δὲ) μή γε. 
540 Decker, Mark 1-8, 61. 
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Now, with this in mind, it is possible to imagine that in Mark 13:20 the positive 
conditional exception is presented first, with the negative, undesirable effect presented next 
within the first, negated conjunct.  From such a perspective, the conditional exception has been 
advanced to a position prior to the οὐ...ἀλλά construction, presumably for the purpose of 
emphasis.  Continuing along this path for a moment, we can imagine the hypothetical form: 
* καὶ  οὐκ ἂν ἐσώθη πᾶσα σάρξ,  εἰ μὴ   ἐκολόβωσεν κύριος  τὰς ἡμέρας·  
ἀλλὰ διὰ τοὺς ἐκλεκτοὺς οὓς ἐξελέξατο  ἐκολόβωσεν   τὰς ἡμέρας. 
* and   no one would be saved,  unless  the lord shortened  the days: 
 but on account of the elect, whom he elected,        he shortened the days. 
Such a broad negation, followed by a narrow exception the negated proposition, is not at all 
unusual in the Synoptics.  The actual form we encounter, arranged to show the explicit repetition 
of the constant constituent, follows: 
καὶ  εἰ μὴ       
ἐκολόβωσεν κύριος  τὰς ἡμέρας,   
οὐκ  ἂν ἐσώθη πᾶσα σάρξ·  
ἀλλὰ  διὰ τοὺς ἐκλεκτοὺς οὓς ἐξελέξατο  
ἐκολόβωσεν   τὰς ἡμέρας. 
One other option is that ἀλλά actually introduces the utterance as does the initial ἀλλά in Mark 
14:36, with a function similar to πλήν, or as δέ in the Matthean parallel, Matt 24:22.  In such a 
case, the particle is not functioning as part of an οὐ...ἀλλά construction, but rather in the way 
generally captured by my Pattern 4, the Rhetorical/Discourse Pattern. 
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Pattern 6 
Mark 10:27 
 My engagement with Pattern 6 occurrences will be limited to Mark 10:27, which will 
serve as a suitable representative for this questionable category.  It will be helpful for my 
discussion of this occurrence to include the parallel Matthean text. 
Matt 19:26 ἐμβλέψας δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς·  
παρὰ ἀνθρώποις τοῦτο  ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν, παρὰ δὲ θεῷ πάντα δυνατά. 
Mark 10:27 ἐμβλέψας αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς λέγει·  
παρὰ ἀνθρώποις   ἀδύνατον,   ἀλλ᾽ οὐ παρὰ θεῷ·  
πάντα γὰρ δυνατὰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ. 
 
Matt 19:26 Mark 10:27 
ἐμβλέψας ἐμβλέψας 
 αὐτοῖς 
δὲ  
ὁ Ἰησοῦς ὁ Ἰησοῦς 
εἶπεν λέγει· 
αὐτοῖς·  
παρὰ ἀνθρώποις παρὰ ἀνθρώποις 
τοῦτο  
ἀδύνατόν ἀδύνατον, 
ἐστιν,  
… δὲ …† ἀλλ᾽ 
 οὐ παρὰ θεῷ·  
 … γὰρ …† 
 πάντα δυνατὰ 
παρὰ θεῷ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ. 
πάντα δυνατά.  
†I have moved δέ and γάρ from their respective postpositive positions to show more clearly the 
parallels between the texts. 
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The words spoken by Jesus in the Marcan version include no explicit subject, and no 
copular verb.  The first conjunct does have a predicate adjective (ἀδύνατον) which is ellipsed in 
the second conjunct.  Both conjuncts have a prepositional phrase (παρὰ ἀνθρώποις and παρὰ θεῷ) 
which modifies the predicate adjective, and these two together are the contrast pair within this 
construction.  There is ellipsis, which would usually indicate correction in an οὐ...ἀλλά 
construction.  Here however, the first conjunct is affirmed and holds, while it is the second 
conjunct, namely *παρὰ θεῷ [ἀδύνατον], which is negated.  The effect of ἀλλά in combination 
with this negation is “But it is not the case that this [thing] this impossible with God,” or “But 
this [thing] is not impossible with God.”  As with most of the contrasts involving an οὐ...ἀλλά 
construction, so too with this arrangement we find the emphasis being placed on the second 
conjunct. 
The verbless clause which follows is connected by γάρ, indicating that it provides the 
explanation, or the grounds for the immediately preceding negated utterance.  In doing so, it 
provides the answer for the question “Why is this [thing] not impossible with God?”  The 
answer: “Because all things are possible with God.”  By definition then, if all things are possible 
with God, then this thing is possible with God, and cannot be impossible with God, even though 
it is, in fact, impossible with humans.   
Commenting on Matt 19:26, Davies and Allison note that  
Matthew has added τοῦτο … ἐστίν and cut Mark’s longer ‘but not with God, for all things 
are possible with God’. The result is abbreviation and increased (antithetical) parallelism. 
The idea that nothing is impossible ‘with’ God lies behind the commendation of 
omnipotent prayer in 17:20. Here the notion is antithetical to that of human impotence: 
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regarding salvation, only God has strength—just as, with regard to goodness, God and 
human beings belong to different categories (cf. v. 17).541 
In his comments on the same Matthean parallel, Luz notes also notes the omission of ἀλλ᾽ οὐ 
παρὰ θεῷ, and the resulting “balance” which results between the conjuncts which remain.542  I 
would simply add that the Matthean version has the particle δέ joining these two conjuncts, and 
that there is ellipsis of ἐστίν in the second conjunct.  This arrangement results in gapping543 with 
three contrast pairs, namely (παρὰ ἀνθρώποις, παρὰ … θεῷ), (τοῦτο, πάντα), and (ἀδύνατόν, 
δυνατά) being present. 
 
  
                                                 
541 Davies and Allison, Matthew 19-28, 53. 
542 Luz, Matthew 21–28, 516. 
543 For more information regarding gapping, including a definition and examples of the 
phenomenon, please consult my engagement with S. Repp’s discussion of gapping and stripping 
in the section devoted to her work in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Representative Occurrences of ἀλλά Found Only in Luke 
Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to occurrences of ἀλλά which are found only in Luke’s Gospel.  
The reader may benefit from consulting Appendices 1-3, paying particular attention to List 3 in 
Appendix 1, and Table 3 in Appendix 2.  Given the number of Lucan texts which I have already 
engaged in this work, I will limit my treatment to a select group of the occurrences which are 
representative of both the general uses of the conjunction within the Synoptics, as well as some 
particular uses which reflect Luke’s own style and perspective on the flexibility of ἀλλά.  As 
such, these occurrences show uses of the conjunction either conforming substantially to a 
particular pattern or sub-pattern, or differing substantially from those already observed in the 
other Synoptics.  As in the previous chapters, I have arranged my treatment of the occurrences 
primarily according to their pattern categorization, and secondarily by their order of appearance 
in the Gospel of Luke.  
I have not introduced any more high-level patterns to explain the occurrences within 
Luke.  However, I did specify a new sub-pattern, Sub-Pattern 3E,544 to account for the inclusion 
and arrangement of elements present in Luke 8:16.  I have discussed this text, along with its 
parallel texts in Luke 11:33 and Matt 5:15, in Chapter 5 within the section devoted to 
occurrences found only in Matthew and Luke.   
 
                                                 
544 Please see Appendix 3 for the a graphical analysis of this pattern as it is found in 
Luke’s Gospel. 
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Following is the breakdown of the thirty-five occurrences in Luke, according to pattern 
and sub-pattern: 
 Pattern 1 Total: 7 
o 1A: 1 
 1A1: 1 
o 1B: 4 
 1B1: 2 
 1B2: 2 
o 1C: 2  
o 1D: 0 
 Pattern 2 Total: 9 
o 2A: 9 
o 2B: 0 
o 2C: 0 
o 2D: 0 
 Pattern 3 Total: 6 
o 3A: 4 
o 3B: 0 
o 3C: 0 
o 3D: 1 
o 3E: 1 
 Pattern 4 Total: 12 
 Pattern 5 Total: 0 
 Pattern 6 Total: 1 
It should be readily apparent that the most frequent arrangement of elements observed 
was Pattern 4, the Rhetorical/Discourse Pattern.  There were relatively few instances of Pattern 
1B1 occurrences, which is quite different from the state of affairs in Matthew’s Gospel.  Also, 
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there were several Pattern 2A occurrences, although the relative frequency in Luke’s Gospel is 
somewhat less than is observed in Mark’s.  I will be comparing various of the relative 
frequencies in greater detail in my Conclusion, which follows this chapter.  
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Explanation of Observations in Luke 
Pattern 1 
Sub-Pattern 1B1 
Luke 8:27 
As noted in Table 3 of Appendix 2, I view Luke 8:27 as a special case of Sub-Pattern 
1B1. The essential characteristic of Pattern 1 holds for this occurrence: in particular, there is a 
constant constituent which occurs explicitly on one side of ἀλλά and elliptically on the other.  
However, the defining characteristic of Sub-Pattern 1B1 is that the constant constituent occurs 
after the preceding constituent in the utterance before ἀλλά.  Examining the text of this example 
and its graphical analysis, we see the following: 
Luke 8:27c …καὶ ἐν οἰκίᾳ οὐκ ἔμενεν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς μνήμασιν 
Logically Follows        Implied/Elliptical 
Conjunction  Preceding Negation Constant ἀλλά Constant Following 
…καὶ  ἐν οἰκίᾳ  οὐκ  ἔμενεν   ἀλλ᾽  [ἔμενεν] ἐν τοῖς μνήμασιν 
The problem with my classification is readily apparent: what I propose to be the preceding 
constituent is not even located within the οὐ...ἀλλά construction.  Some explanation, if not an 
apology, is certainly warranted.   
When I first encountered a similar occurrence in Matt 22:30, I struggled as to whether or 
not another high level pattern, or even a sub-pattern, was called for to explain this occurrence.  
The logic that I employed for deciding on the classification of that occurrence holds here.  The 
prepositional phrase which is fronted before the οὐ...ἀλλά construction proper is, within its 
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associated clause, a peripheral element, and would often follow the verb, subject(s) (if explicitly 
present), and direct object(s).  I see this prepositional phrase primarily as a peripheral element 
with respect to its clause, and secondarily as the preceding constituent which is being rejected 
and replaced within the οὐ...ἀλλά construction.  Although it has been fronted, and it does not 
follow the constant constituent formally, it does follow it logically.  The hypothetical 
reconstruction I am proposing, with the fronted prepositional phrase placed within the οὐ...ἀλλά 
construction, is as follows:  
*…καὶ οὐκ ἔμενεν ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἀλλ᾽ [ἔμενεν] ἐν τοῖς μνήμασιν 
This arrangement clearly corresponds to Sub-Pattern 1B1, or stripping (bare argument 
ellipsis),545 and is appropriate since one constituent in the first conjunct is being replaced with a 
parallel, symmetrical constituent in the second conjunct.  Admittedly this hypothetical 
rearrangement, and my explanation for the fronting of the preceding constituent, is, based upon 
its speculative nature, subject to rebuttal, if not refutation.   
But, if it is correct, we should ask what effect this fronting of the preceding constituent, 
in this case the prepositional phrase (ἐν οἰκίᾳ), might have.  The determination of this effect 
should not be made without also considering the use of the conjunction καί to connect our 
construction and constituent clauses of interest to the immediately preceding material, as well as 
the presence of ἐν τοῖς μνήμασιν in the second conjunct.  There is no doubt that the intended 
contrast pair is (ἐν οἰκίᾳ, ἐν τοῖς μνήμασιν), and their approximate symmetry, together with the 
ellipsis of ἔμενεν in the second conjunct, indicates that correction is in view, and in particular that 
                                                 
545 Please consult my engagement with S. Repp’s discussion of gapping and stripping in 
Chapter 2. 
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the first prepositional phrase is the constituent which is being rejected and replaced by the 
second prepositional phrase.   
As I have noted before, the preceding constituent in the οὐ...ἀλλά construction is usually 
the less emphasized, with the intended focus being on the following constituent.  If the writer felt 
that the construction would not emphasize sufficiently the oddity the demon-possessed man did 
not live in a house, then he may have elected to front it to allow it greater emphasis, though not 
as great at the emphasis which would be placed on the following constituent.  Of course, my 
explanation assumes that the attribute [emphasis] does not have only discrete binary possibilities, 
but rather operates on a continuum, ranging from “no emphasis” (perhaps unmarked) all the way 
to emphasized to a degree beyond the emphasis of anything else in the text or co-text, or “highest 
emphasis.”  M. Culy, M. Parsons, and J. Stigall suggest something similar with respect to Luke’s 
arrangement of the elements: 
ἐν οἰκίᾳ. Locative.  This is yet another marked word order with a spatial modifier preceding 
the verb it modifies, and order Luke uses only sixty-three of 408 times in his gospel…. 
Here, it likely serves to help set up the contrast with ἐν τοῖς μνήμασιν and thus highlight the 
demoniac’s unusual living conditions.546 
I would substantially agree with their remarks, although I would add that I see the movement of 
the peripheral element to a position outside the οὐ...ἀλλά construction is marked, as well, and 
adds to the emphasis placed upon it by the writer. 
We have already seen on several occasions that the οὐ...ἀλλά construction can convey the 
idea of “not only X, but even more so Y.”  An English example may help to convey what I am 
proposing for this particular occurrence. 
                                                 
546 Culy, Parsons, and Stigall, Luke, 275. 
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…καὶ ἐν οἰκίᾳ οὐκ ἔμενεν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς μνήμασιν 
…he was not even living in a house, but rather in the tombs 
Or, perhaps  
…and not only was he not living in a house,  
but beyond that, he was living in the tombs! 
This second over-translation may help the reader to better understand how this might have been 
received by a reader or a hearer.  
The oddity of the man being unclothed and then not living a normal dwelling was strange 
enough.  But where did he dwell, then, in such a state of possession and undress?  Here the 
description departs from the abnormal and distasteful to the horrible and unthinkable, especially 
for a Jewish audience in the Second Temple period.  If this were being read to an audience, it is 
no wild conjecture to imagine that the fronting of the preposition allows for this to be delivered 
with a pregnant pause following ἔμενεν, with the forceful utterance of the final element evoking a 
strong reaction in the audience.  This completes the picture of dark forces, shameful uncovering, 
and defilement arising from proximity to and contact with the dead.  Various commentaries may 
be profitably consulted for further exploration along this trail.547  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
547 Fitzmyer, Luke I-IX, 737–38; Davies and Allison, Matthew 8-18, 76–85; Keener, 
Gospel of Matthew, 281–88. 
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Pattern 2 
Sub-Pattern 2A 
Luke 7:7 
The occurrence of ἀλλά in Luke 7:7 exhibits no constant constituent shared explicitly or 
implicitly by the utterances on either side of the conjunction.  The essential contrast which is 
signaled by ἀλλά is between imperatives: one is negated (a prohibition), and one of them is 
positive.  The prohibition is that Jesus “not trouble [himself]” (μὴ σκύλλου), and it is followed by 
a fairly extensive explanation of the man’s personal unworthiness to receive Jesus (οὐ γὰρ ἱκανός 
εἰμι) into his home, or to even come to Jesus himself (οὐδὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἠξίωσα πρὸς σὲ ἐλθεῖν).  As 
such, both the actions of Jesus’s (1) troubling himself to come to the man, or (2) being bothered 
by the man’s coming to him, are prohibited.   
The alternative imperative proposed by the man is that Jesus “speak a word/say the word” 
(εἰπὲ λόγω).  The final imperative (ἰαθήτω) is clearly to be related to the first, and probably 
implies the result of the first imperative.  Zerwick asserts that this construction “of two impvs 
implying “say … so that he may be healed” belongs to Hebr. idiom rather than Gk.”548  
Robertson, on the other hand, refers to this use of the imperative in his treatment of “implied 
conditions.” He asserts that, in some circumstances, “the apodosis is expressed, while the 
protasis is merely implied by a participle, an imperative or a question. … “The imperative is used 
where a protasis might have been employed.”  In our text, the apodosis, namely the healing of 
the servant, is dependent upon the completion of the action represented by the imperative, which 
                                                 
548 Zerwick and Grosvenor, Grammatical Analysis, 199. 
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may be viewed as the implied condition.549  Culy et al., citing Caragounis, also note this in their 
comments on εἰπέ: “Here, the imperative clause functions much like the protasis of a conditional 
construction.”550 
Luke 12:6-7 
Our texts of interest are Luke 12:6-7, in which we find an οὐ...ἀλλά construction nested 
between a question before, and a prohibition, with a supporting rationale, afterward: 
6    οὐχὶ πέντε στρουθία πωλοῦνται ἀσσαρίων δύο;  
καὶ ἓν ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιλελησμένον ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ. 
7   ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ τρίχες τῆς κεφαλῆς ὑμῶν πᾶσαι ἠρίθμηνται.  
μὴ φοβεῖσθε· πολλῶν στρουθίων διαφέρετε. 
I have included the parallel texts from Matt 10:29-31, which do not make use of ἀλλά, for 
the purpose of comparison. 
 
Matt 10:29-31 Luke 12:6-7 
29  οὐχὶ 6  οὐχὶ 
δύο πέντε 
στρουθία στρουθία 
ἀσσαρίου  
πωλεῖται; πωλοῦνται 
 ἀσσαρίων δύο; 
καὶ ἓν ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ ἓν ἐξ αὐτῶν 
οὐ πεσεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν  οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιλελησμένον  
ἄνευ ἐνώπιον 
τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν. τοῦ θεοῦ. 
                                                 
549 Robertson, Grammar, 1022–3. 
550 Culy, Parsons, and Stigall, Luke, 220; Chrys C. Caragounis, The Development of 
Greek and the New Testament: Morphology, Syntax, Phonology, and Textual Transmission 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), 190. 
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30 … δὲ …† 7  ἀλλὰ 
ὑμῶν  
καὶ αἱ τρίχες τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ αἱ τρίχες τῆς κεφαλῆς 
 ὑμῶν 
πᾶσαι πᾶσαι  
ἠριθμημέναι εἰσίν. ἠρίθμηνται. 
31  … οὖν …†  
μὴ φοβεῖσθε· πολλῶν στρουθίων διαφέρετε  μὴ φοβεῖσθε· πολλῶν στρουθίων διαφέρετε. 
ὑμεῖς.  
†I have moved δέ and οὖν from their respective postpositive positions to show more clearly the 
parallels between the texts. 
In the Lucan version, the opening question regarding the price of sparrows, which 
expects an affirmative answer, establishes that the birds themselves are of little value, at least 
according to human estimation.  Several of them could be purchased for a small amount of 
money.  The next utterance contrasts with the expected conclusion of the question, however, as it 
is asserted that not even one of these sparrows has been forgotten “before” God.  I view ἓν ἐξ 
αὐτῶν as having been advanced to the position prior to the negation for the sake of emphasis.  
Clearly the negation is to be applied to this constituent, i.e., “not one of them (= none of them) 
has been forgotten,” rather than simply the verb, i.e., “one of them has not been forgotten.”  Put 
more precisely, what is being asserted is that “It is not the case that one of them has been 
forgotten before God.” 
Now we come to ἀλλά, and we are faced with the question of whether the particle: (1) 
should be interpreted as joining the second conjunct of an οὐ...ἀλλά construction; or (2) should 
be viewed as introducing another point in the ongoing a fortiori/qal vaḥomer argument being 
developed by the Lucan Jesus, or (3) should be understood as doing both, with the content of 
second conjunct functioning as the next proposition in this ongoing argument.  For the purposes 
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of my own classification system, I have attempted to determine if Pattern 2A, the No Constant 
Pattern, best explains how ἀλλά is functioning here, or if Pattern 4, the Rhetorical Discourse 
Pattern, does.  I have settled on Pattern 2A due mainly to the fact that there is a negated utterance 
immediately preceding the ἀλλά, and the content of the second utterance presents new 
information which is builds upon, but is in contrast to, that of the first utterance.   
The tension presented by this decision is a good reminder that, whether ἀλλά is used to 
introduce an utterance (whether a question, proposition, rhetorical objection, etc.), or is used 
within an οὐ...ἀλλά construction to signal either a correction or a contrast, it does signal an 
alternative—something different from what has come before in some way.  This might be a new 
constituent to replace a rejected one (Pattern 1), a new proposition to contrast with the previous 
one in the construction (Pattern 2), or another proposition, question, or objection within an 
argument (Pattern 4).  I have needed to draw lines between these uses in order for my 
classification system to be functional.  However, the lines are only attempts to demarcate 
boundaries that appear to be, at times, somewhat flexible.  These functions are not separated into 
hermetically-sealed compartments with rigid cell walls: their interfaces are in fact more akin to 
semipermeable membranes, allowing for some of the functional overlapping which we have 
observed. 
Coming back to the a fortiori/ qal vaḥomer argument in progress, we note that the 
proposition introduced by ἀλλά moves to the hearers to a consideration of some of the smallest 
parts of a human—parts which fall away from time to time, and, in the case of some, are lost 
without replacement.  The stress on even (καί) these hairs being numbered, from the context, by 
God himself, sets up the clearly understood, though not explicitly expressed, conclusion: the 
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hearers themselves are not forgotten in the sight of God.  What is explicitly presented is the 
prohibition against fear, or being afraid, and the explanation of the value of the hearers relative to 
the aforementioned sparrows. 
Luke 24:6 
The occurrence in Luke 24:6 is very simple, with the second conjunct consisting of the 
one-word clause ἠγέρθη.  There is a parallel text, Matt 28:6, which does not make use of ἀλλά; I 
have included it here for the sake of comparison. 
Luke 24:6 οὐκ ἔστιν ὧδε,   ἀλλ᾽ ἠγέρθη. 
Matt 28:6a οὐκ ἔστιν ὧδε, ἠγέρθη  γὰρ   καθὼς εἶπεν· 
Both the Matthean and Lucan versions are agreed in their representation of the first conjunct.  
The differences between the two versions arise in the matters of (1) the conjunction connecting 
the first conjunct to the second, and (2) the content of this latter conjunct.  From whatever 
source(s) the versions drew, it appears that at the very least ἠγέρθη was part of the second 
conjunct.   
Although it does not influence my acceptance of the text of Luke 24:6 as presented in 
NA28, it is worth noting that, among the variants presented for this text in the critical apparatus, 
there is one in which there is asyndeton between the first and second utterances.  The variant 
reading is *οὐκ ἔστιν ὧδε· ἠγέρθη.551  If an original context reader were to encounter this text, 
would her interpretation naturally align with the sense conveyed by ἀλλά, by γάρ, or by some 
other conjunction or expression?  In this case, how far apart are these two different expressions?   
                                                 
551 NA28, 287. 
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My impression is that, although the use of ἀλλά in the Lucan version does indeed signal a 
contrast between the two conjuncts, there is also some explanatory function intended for this 
second conjunct, especially given the question which immediately preceded this saying.  What is 
implied in the question, namely that the one they are seeking is “living” (ζῶντα), not one of the 
“dead [ones]” (τῶν νεκρῶν), is made explicit in the second conjunct: he has been raised [from 
among the dead ones] (ἠγέρθη).  Luke 24:6b communicates the admonition to remember what 
Jesus had previously told them, the content of which is related in 24:7, including it being 
necessary for the son to be betrayed (παραδοθῆναι), be crucified (σταυρωθῆναι), and be 
resurrected (ἀναστῆναι).  Note that in the Matthean version, there is no recitation of the content 
of Jesus’s previous prediction—he has simply “been raised, even as he said [he would be] …” 
(ἠγέρθη … καθὼς εἶπεν). 
Pattern 4 
Luke 1:60 
We now turn to an occurrence which I view as a representative example of the use of 
ἀλλά in a Pattern 4 arrangement in Luke.  It is used in concert with a negative answer (here οὐχί) 
to a question, a statement, or perhaps even an action which is implied by the immediate co-text.   
The contrast here is between the name “they were calling him” (ἐκάλουν) and the name which his 
mother asserted he “will be called” (κληθήσεται).  
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We see the following in Luke 1:59-60: 
59   Καὶ  
ἐγένετο ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ ὀγδόῃ   
ἦλθον περιτεμεῖν τὸ παιδίον  
καὶ  
ἐκάλουν  αὐτὸ ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ  Ζαχαρίαν. 
60   καὶ  
ἀποκριθεῖσα ἡ μήτηρ αὐτοῦ εἶπεν·  
οὐχί,   
ἀλλὰ  
κληθήσεται        Ἰωάννης. 
BDF groups the imperfect ἐκάλουν with other instances of the conative use of the 
imperfect, providing the translation “wanted to name”.552  Burton also cites Luke 1:59 as an 
example of the conative imperfect, and in his description of the same comments, “the 
Progressive Imperfect is sometimes used of action attempted, but not accomplished”.553  Culy et 
al. see this differently, and, translate it with an ingressive sense: “On the eighth day they came to 
circumcise the child and began calling him Zechariah, after the name of his father.”554 They 
challenge Fitzmyer’s assertion that the use of the imperfect here is conative,555 instead asserting, 
It is much more likely that the imperfect portrays what they were actually doing before 
Elizabeth corrected them.  Conjoining an imperfect verb to an aorist active verb that has 
the same subject using καί, ... or using an imperfect verb that is modified by a preceding 
aorist participle…, appears to be a common means of pointing to (but not emphasizing) the 
onset of an event that is portrayed as a process, though it does not always function in this 
manner.  When it does, an ingressive translation is appropriate….556 
                                                 
552 BDF, 169. 
553 Burton, Moods and Tenses, 12. 
554 Culy, Parsons, and Stigall, Luke, 47. 
555 Fitzmyer, Luke I-IX, 380. 
556 Culy, Parsons, and Stigall, Luke, 50. 
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I do not see enough indication within the text to support, or disprove, either one of these 
contentions.  There certainly were ways to indicate that someone was “beginning to” or “desired 
to” take an action.  Based on the historical context, we know that this is a time for naming the 
son, and that this naming could often follow some paternal precedent.  Given this, those present 
were, according to the text, calling him by his father’s name, barring any other direction or 
refutation.  Elizabeth orally provides this refutation and positive direction, and Zechariah 
provides the written authentication for the same.  
On the use of ἀλλά, and the effect produced by its collocation and interaction with οὐχί in 
this particular text, Robertson asserts, “Just as ἄλλος (cf. 2 Cor. 11:4) can be used in the sense of 
ἕτερος (when it means 'different,' not merely 'second'), so ἀλλά can mean 'another' in contrast to 
the preceding. With a negative the antithesis is sharp as in Lu. 1:60, οὐχί, ἀλλὰ κληθήσεται 
Ἰωάννης.”557 
So Elizabeth first answers “Oὐχί,” rejecting what they were proposing to do, or were in 
fact already doing.  She then proceeds to offer the alternative, or replacement, for what had just 
been rejected.  Rather than an οὐ...ἀλλά construction, we appear to have an οὐχί...ἀλλά 
construction, where the first conjunct is completely ellipsed, and must be provided from the 
preceding explicit proposition(s) or question(s), or more generally from the context.  In this way, 
the introduction to the first conjunct could be seen as something like a stronger version of the 
combination οὐχ οὕτως, such as is found in Matt 20:26//Mark 10:43, where οὕτως refers to the 
general state of affairs previously described.   
                                                 
557 Robertson, Grammar, 1186–87. 
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Luke 13:3//Luke 13:5 
The final Lucan texts I will be engaging are both found in Luke 13, and both are part of 
the emphatic negative answers and alternative assertions which Jesus provides to his own 
rhetorical questions.   
Both of these texts are arranged below: 
 
Luke 13:3 οὐχί, λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν μὴ μετανοῆτε πάντες  ὁμοίως  ἀπολεῖσθε. 
Luke 13:5 οὐχί, λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν μὴ μετανοῆτε πάντες  ὡσαύτως  ἀπολεῖσθε. 
These texts are in complete agreement save the second to last words in each.  Not surprisingly, 
there are textual variants which show either that both words should be ὁμοίως (𝕻75, D 05, Θ 038), 
or that they should be reversed in order, with ὡσαύτως in 13:3 and ὁμοίως in 13:5 (A 02, K 017, 
N 022, W 032, Γ 036, Δ 037, and Ψ 044).  The strongest witnesses for the texts as presented 
above are א 01, B 03, and L 019.558   
As in Luke 1:60, above, where the first conjunct is ellipsed, and must be supplied from 
the immediately preceding co-text.  In the case of 13:3, Jesus’s emphatic negative response, οὐχί, 
λέγω ὑμῖν, effectively states that “No, I tell you, [it is not the case that the Galileans …].”  On 
this use of οὐχί, Culy et al. comment that “This appears to be the standard form of the negativizer 
when used as a reply, especially when followed by ἀλλά (cf. 1:60; 12:51; 13:5; 16:30; BDAG, 
742.2).”559   
The ἀλλά which follows this denial signals that the alternative to the negated proposition, 
which alternative Jesus actually holds, is forthcoming.  Although it is not the case that the 
                                                 
558 NA28, 242. 
559 Culy, Parsons, and Stigall, Luke, 450. 
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Galileans in focus in 13:2 were worse sinners than others, and suffered accordingly, it is the case 
that Jesus’s hearers would perish, unless they themselves repented.  The powerful rhetorical turn 
is apparent: Jesus is linking those to whom he is speaking with those whom they view as having 
faced judgment for their sins.  They are told that they will perish, as well (same end, not 
necessarily in the same manner) with the only exception being that they repent.560   
Our second occurrence of this saying is found in Luke 13:5, in which Jesus again denies a 
presupposition contained within a rhetorical question he has posed to his hearers in 13:4.  His 
denial effectively states that “it is not the case that those killed in the Siloam tower collapse were 
greater sinners than all [the rest] of the people living in Jerusalem.”  Jesus accomplishes the same 
rhetorical turn here as in 13:3, linking those to whom he is speaking with those whom they view 
as having perished on account of their own sins.  The same declaration concerning their future 
end is made as in 13:3, with the same exception, ἐὰν μὴ μετανοῆτε, again presented.  
                                                 
560 This exception to the assertion is fronted in somewhat the same way as the exceptions 
found in Matt 24:22//Mark 13:20.  Note that in those texts the exceptions are introduced by εἰ μὴ, 
not ἐὰν μὴ, and the verbs are in the indicative, not subjunctive.  My point is that the exception is 
given first position, as the desired behavior, not at the end of a “garden path” assertion that 
reverses course only at the end.  The overall effect is less shocking, but the exception is more 
visible.  This visibility is important in our Lucan text, as it is this behavior—this  response—  
that Jesus seeks to elicit from his hearers.   
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CONCLUSION(S) 
In this work I have attempted to apply the results of my analyses of all the occurrences of 
ἀλλά in the Synoptic Gospels to the exegesis and explanation of particular passages.  The 
movement would best be described as abductive, as I moved from observations of individual 
instances to hypotheses concerning the patterns they represented, and the functions these patterns 
performed.  Throughout the body of this work, I have applied the explanations arising from the 
proposed forms and functions of the various patterns back to the instances from which they were 
derived.  In doing so, I have demonstrated that the general patterns I have proposed do in fact 
have explanatory power for specific instances.   
In this Chapter, I will present the most important results and conclusions from this 
investigation.  It will be helpful for the reader to have an overview of these, and the most 
convenient format for communicating such an overview will be a annotated list of the items.  
The last point within this Summary, specifically my conclusions regarding the observed 
differences in the relative frequency of the patterns across the Synoptic, deserves further 
discussion in its own section following the Summary. 
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Summary of Conclusions 
Negation/Negative Content Items and Ἀλλά 
1. For the Synoptic Gospels considered as a whole, in the overwhelming majority of instances 
where ἀλλά occurs (~87%), there is also some negation or negative content item preceding 
ἀλλά or immediately following it. 
a. This percentage of instances involving negation or a negative content item is not 
representative for the individual Synoptics. The breakdown of percentages by book is 
found in the chart below: 
% with 
Negation 
Matthew Mark Luke 
 Synoptics 
Total 
Occurrences 
37 45 35  117 occurrences 
With 
Negation 
34 40 28  102 occurrences 
Raw 
Percentage 
(in Gospel) 
91.89% 
(34/37) 
88.89% 
(40/45) 
80.00% 
(28/35) 
 
  87.18%  
(102/117) 
Weight 
0.3162 
(37/117) 
0.3846 
(45/117) 
0.2991 
(35/117) 
     1.00 
Weighted 
Percentage 
29.06% 34.19% 23.93% 
Weighted 
Average  
  87.18% (sum of %) 
 
b. I will briefly discuss the differences between these percentages for the Synoptics in this 
summary, and in greater detail later in this Conclusion.  However, one item worthy of 
special notice is the lower percentage for the Gospel of Luke.  In this case, every 
occurrence without a negation or negative content item was categorized as Pattern 4, 
the Rhetorical/Discourse Pattern.  Luke has the highest relative percentage (34.3%) of 
Pattern 4 occurrences of any of the Synoptics.  
c. It is far more likely than not to find negation or a negative content item in association 
with any given occurrence of ἀλλά in the Synoptics. When discussing any specific 
instance of ἀλλά in a particular Synoptic Gospel, the exegete would be well-served by 
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distinguishing whether or not such an item is present in the co-text, and especially in a 
position before a clause or phrase immediately prior to ἀλλά.   
i. The exception (or qualification) to this is Pattern 4, which often either has  
1. no negation/negative content item, or, has  
2. the negation οὐχί, but not in a position before a clause or phrase.  In such 
instances, there is some earlier proposition or assertion to which the 
speaker is responding, but does not repeat.  The effect is “No [ ], but (on 
the contrary) ... Y,” where what is being opposed or negated is supplied 
by the prior co-text, direct or indirect discourse, etc., as opposed to “Not 
X … but (on the contrary) Y.” 
Constituent Correction Versus Whole Utterance Contrast 
2. The Patterns I have identified, particularly Patterns 1 and 2, are associated with particular 
functions in the texts in which they are found.  Pattern 1 is generally used for constituent 
correction, and Pattern 2 is generally used to contrast one utterance with a second, different 
utterance. 
a. As both patterns usually utilize some negation/negative content item and ἀλλά, there 
must be other indicators in the text and co-text which allow the hearer/reader to 
determine which of these two different uses is intended by the speaker/author.   
i. The primary indicators for constituent correction are: 
1. Ellipsis in the second conjunct of some item(s) present in the first 
conjuct.  The items thus ellipsed may be regarded as continuous 
information, or the constant constituents, between the conjuncts. 
2. Parallelism and/or repetition between preceding and following 
consituents in the first and second conjuncts, respectively. 
ii. These completely different functions for what appear to be similar or identical 
οὐ … ἀλλά constructions provide a strong indication that there is a division 
similar to the PA/SN adversative particle distinction I addressed in the survey 
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of secondary literature.561  As such, the answer to the question of whether there 
are “two ἀλλάs” in Κοινή Greek, which of course has been asked for French 
and several other languages,562 is, based on a consideration of ἀλλά alone, in 
the Synoptics, “very probably, yes.”  
1. However, as I have noted in my chart of parallel uses, there are parallel 
texts where Mark or Luke use ἀλλά but Matthew uses δέ.  These 
instances, and the patterns in which the Marcan and Lucan texts are 
arranged, follow: 
a. Matt 17:12//Mark 9:13—Pattern 4 
b. Matt 21:26//Mark 11:3—Pattern 4 
c. Matt 26:32//Mark 14:28—Sub-Pattern 2B 
d. Matt 26:56//Mark 14:49—Sub-Pattern 2A 
e. Matt 10:30//Luke 12:6-7—Sub-Pattern 2A 
2. None of these instances involve Pattern 1 or constituent correction.  In 
each case, the material following ἀλλά is another rhetorical point or 
objection being raised, or is an utterance being affirmed after an 
immediately preceding utterance has been negated.   
3. Based on this information, I would argue that when occurring in a 
Pattern 1 arrangement, ἀλλά corresponds to the SN—or corrective—
category noted in the PA/SN distinction proposal.  On the other hand, 
when is used in either the Pattern 2 or Pattern 4 arrangement, it 
corresponds to the PA—or contrastive—category within the PA/SN 
distinction proposal. 
                                                 
561 Please see my earlier discussion of this important topic in the section devoted to it 
within my engagement of Laurence Horn’s contributions. 
562 Anscombre and Ducrot, “Deux Mais En Français?” 
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Dialectic Negation, Metalinguistic Negation, and “Not Only” 
3. Some occurrences of negation involving ἀλλά are best explained as instances of the linguistic 
phenomenon known as metalinguistic—or metarepresentational—negation as opposed to the 
traditionally proffered “dialectical” or “Semitic” negation. 
a. Two examples from the Synoptics that I have engaged in some detail, Matt 10:20 and 
Mark 9:37, involve metalinguistic negation that targets the scalar implicatures present 
in each instance.   
b. In such instances, explicit οὐ...ἀλλά constructions may be understood as implicit οὐ 
μόνον... ἀλλὰ καί constructions due to pragmatic effects arising from the text and co-
text, and particularly the overturning of the Q-implicature within the text.   
c. The instances in which this occurs are very limited, and such an option should only be 
considered in cases where a speaker/author has advanced propositions that are then 
immediately, and apparently paradoxically, explicitly negated.  Such a move by a 
communicator is highly marked, and usually involves significant cognitive processing 
(a “second pass” on the first conjunct) on the part of the recipient to resolve the apparent 
contradiction. 
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Differences in the Frequency of the Patterns Throughout the Synoptic Gospels 
4. With respect to the relative frequency of patterns utilized, there are some quite noticeable 
differences between each of the Synoptics.   
a. Within Matthew Pattern 1 is the most frequently-used pattern (54.1%), and Sub-Pattern 
1B1 is the most frequently-used sub-pattern (24.3%).  Given the constituent correction 
functions of these arrangements, Matthew’s use of ἀλλά often occurs in association 
with constituent correction (54.1%). 
b. The situation in the Gospel of Mark, on the other hand, is quite different.  In Mark, 
Pattern 2 is the most frequently-used pattern (35.6%), with Pattern 1 running a close 
second (31.1%). Sub-Pattern 2A is the most frequently-used sub-pattern (31.1%).  In 
fact, the utilization of this sub-pattern alone is equal to the total relative frequency of 
Pattern 1 occurrences (31.1%).  Thinking for a moment about the functions associated 
with the various patterns, this means that Mark’s Gospel has as many uses of ἀλλά in 
the context of the rejection and affirmation of whole utterances (namely those instances 
arranged according to Sub-Pattern 2A) as in the context of constituent correction 
(namely those instances arranged according to Pattern 1 and its associated sub-patterns) 
combined (31.1%).  
c. Pattern 4 is the most frequently-used pattern within Luke (34.3%), with Pattern 2 
running a distant second (25.7%).  However, all of the Pattern 2 instances in Luke 
correspond to Sub-Pattern 2A.  Taken together, Pattern 4 and Pattern 2 arrangements 
comprise the majority of the occurrences of ἀλλά in Luke (60.0%). 
This concludes my Summary of Conclusions.  I would like to briefly discuss the final 
point of this Summary in greater detail in the next section.  After this discussion, I will offer a 
few concluding remarks, and ideas for future projects along some of the trajectories I have 
explored in this work. 
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Frequency Distribution of the Patterns Throughout the Synoptic Gospels 
I presented the following chart in the Introduction with little comment or explanation.  
Within this conclusion, however, is the appropriate place for my detailed engagement with two 
items of note in these frequency distributions.  First, the chart as presented previously follows: 
 
 Matthew Mark Luke 
Pattern Designation Raw % Raw % Raw % 
Pattern 1 20 54.1% 14 31.1% 7 20.0% 
1A1 6 16.2% 5 11.1% 1 2.9% 
1B1 9 24.3% 7 15.6% 2 5.7% 
1B2 1 2.7% 1 2.2% 2 5.7% 
1C 3 8.1% 1 2.2% 2 5.7% 
1D 1 2.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Pattern 2 9 24.3% 16 35.6% 9 25.7% 
2A 6 16.2% 14 31.1% 9 25.7% 
2B 2 5.4% 1 2.2% 0 0.0% 
2C 1 2.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
2D 1 2.7% 1 2.2% 0 0.0% 
Pattern 3 6 16.2% 6 13.3% 6 17.1% 
3A 1 2.7% 1 2.2% 4 11.4% 
3B 2 5.4% 2 4.4% 0 0.0% 
3C 1 2.7% 2 4.4% 0 0.0% 
3D 2 5.4% 1 2.2% 1 2.9% 
3E 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 2.9% 
Pattern 4 2 5.4% 5 11.1% 12 34.3% 
Pattern 5 0 0.0% 1 2.2% 0 0.0% 
Pattern 6 0 0.0% 3 6.7% 1 2.9% 
Total 
Occurrences 
37 100% 45 100% 35 100% 
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Here is that same chart with a composite column (far right column), showing the average 
frequency distributions across the Synoptics, added for comparison: 
 
 Matthew Mark Luke Composite 
Pattern 
Designation 
Raw % Raw % Raw % Raw % 
Pattern 1 20 54.1% 14 31.1% 7 20.0% 41 35.0% 
1A1 6 16.2% 5 11.1% 1 2.9% 12 10.3% 
1B1 9 24.3% 7 15.6% 2 5.7% 18 15.4% 
1B2 1 2.7% 1 2.2% 2 5.7% 4 3.4% 
1C 3 8.1% 1 2.2% 2 5.7% 6 5.1% 
1D 1 2.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.9% 
Pattern 2 9 24.3% 16 35.6% 9 25.7% 34 29.1% 
2A 6 16.2% 14 31.1% 9 25.7% 29 24.8% 
2B 2 5.4% 1 2.2% 0 0.0% 3 2.6% 
2C 1 2.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.9% 
2D 1 2.7% 1 2.2% 0 0.0% 2 1.7% 
Pattern 3 6 16.2% 6 13.3% 6 17.1% 18 15.4% 
3A 1 2.7% 1 2.2% 4 11.4% 6 5.1% 
3B 2 5.4% 2 4.4% 0 0.0% 4 3.4% 
3C 1 2.7% 2 4.4% 0 0.0% 3 2.6% 
3D 2 5.4% 1 2.2% 1 2.9% 4 3.4% 
3E 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 2.9% 1 0.9% 
Pattern 4 2 5.4% 5 11.1% 12 34.3% 19 16.2% 
Pattern 5 0 0.0% 1 2.2% 0 0.0% 1 0.9% 
Pattern 6 0 0.0% 3 6.7% 1 2.9% 4 3.4% 
Total 
Occurrences 
37 100% 45 100% 35 100% 117 100% 
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The point of my inclusion of this modified chart is to show that an attempt to discuss any 
particular use of ἀλλά (as represented by the Pattern classifications) in one of the Synoptics by 
an appeal to the frequency of that use, in all of the Synoptics would be misguided.  Such an effort 
would be hampered by both the the variance between the individual Gospels with respect to the 
relative frequency of uses, and, consequently, the variance of each from the “average,” as 
reflected in the Composite column above.   
Simply put, when discussing the uses of ἀλλά, none of the Gospels can be said to 
represent the “average Synoptic Gospel.”    The particular uses within a Gospel are best 
compared to the other uses within that same Gospel.  The Patterns I have identified may aid in 
this examination, at least heuristically, as they serve as a starting point for discussing a particular 
use.  As always, however, the identification of the classification or Pattern to which a particular 
use conforms is not the end, but the rather the means to determining how ἀλλά and the 
constituents with which it interacts in the various constructions are functioning in a particular 
text.   
This commitment to dealing with each of the Gospels and its respective tendencies does 
not preclude a high level comparison of the relative frequencies in the Gospels.  In fact, such a 
comparison actually aids us in establishing the general tendencies for each of the Gospels in 
distinction from the others (e.g., Luke’s use of in a Pattern 1 arrangement versus Matthew’s use 
of the same), and then using these general tendencies of the respective Gospels to examine 
particular occurrences found within them (e.g., examining Matthew’s use of Pattern 1 in one text 
in the light of his use of Pattern 1 throughout the whole of the Gospel).   
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Of special interest to my investigation are the significant differences between the relative 
frequencies with which the various patterns, particularly Pattern 1 and Pattern 4 in the Gospels of 
Matthew and Luke, appear.  I will engage with these two items in brief compass. 
Frequency of Pattern 1, The Supplied/Implied Constant Pattern, in Matthew and Luke 
Probably the most notable difference is between the frequency of Pattern 1 occurrences in 
Matthew versus the same in Luke.  Looking further into those details, however, we find quickly 
that the ratios of the disparities in the percentages are even higher if we focus on Sub-Patterns 
1A1 and 1B1.  Note that the distribution frequencies for Matthew (1A1: 16.2%; 1B1: 24.1%) 
versus those of Luke (1A1: 2.9%; 1B1: 5.7%), result in ratios of approximately five and four, 
respectively.  For example, we could simply say that Matthew’s version employs the particle 
ἀλλά in arrangements corresponding to Sub-Pattern 1B1 eight more times (nine occurrences 
versus one occurrence) than Luke’s does.  Alternatively, we could say that Matthew’s relative 
use of the particle in such an arrangement is approximately four times (24.1% vs. 5.7%) that of 
Luke’s.   Both statements are informative, but in obviously different ways.   
However, we must also note what we are not able to say in connection with these 
numbers.  First, we do not know how many times either version used the arrangement reflected 
in Sub-Pattern 1B1 but used another particle, say δέ, or asyndeton to accomplish nearly the same 
function as ἀλλά.  That study would involve a broader search for antithesis/antithetical 
parallelism, and particular in the form known as stripping, or bare argument ellipsis, and would 
be very helpful for identifying the variety of ways in which this could be, and was, accomplished 
in the Κοινή Greek of the NT. 
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Frequency of Pattern 4, The Rhetorical/Discourse Pattern, in Matthew and Luke 
There is a clear difference between the relative frequency of the appearance of Pattern 4 
arrangements in Matthew as compared to Luke’s Gospel.  On the one hand, in Matthew, we find 
only two instances of this pattern, Matt 11:8 and 11:9, resulting a relative frequency of 5.4%.  
Both of these occurrences introduce rhetorical questions in a series (actually the same rhetorical 
question—τί ἐξήλθατε ἰδεῖν;—asked twice in succession, and with an answer and rebuttal offered 
each time), following an initial question which was not introduced by ἀλλά (τί ἐξήλθατε εἰς τὴν 
ἔρημον θεάσασθαι; with its rhetorically proposed and implicitly rejected answer).  This use is not 
surprising, and conforms to a classical use by which another point in a succession of related 
questions, rhetorical objections, etc. is introduced.  The sense is “… and another thing …” or “… 
and another point ….” 
On the other hand, we find several occurrences conforming to Pattern 4 in Luke, such 
that the relative frequency is approximately six times that found in Matthew (34.3% in Luke 
versus 5.4% in Matthew).  A significant portion of the instances found in Luke involve an 
objection to some utterance recoverable from the previous co-text and utilize οὐχί.563  
                                                 
563 Note Luke 1:60, 12:51, 13:3, 13:5, and 16:30. 
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Final Insights and Future Inquiries 
It is possible that I actually have too many high level patterns, as I have noted in the body 
of this paper.  My instinct is that I actually have too many sub-patterns, and that the distinctions 
between the various sub-patterns may not be as significant as I originally suspected.  And yet 
these patterns and sub-patterns do have at least some heuristic value, as they bring a semblance 
of order to the various constructions which we encounter in our texts.  The presentation of these 
patterns is but one step in the process of developing a better understanding of how ἀλλά interacts 
with other constituents in the text and co-text to produce the various pragmatic effects we 
observe.  It has thus been necessary to move beyond the observation and classification of the 
arrangement of constituents that may be readily seen in the various texts, and move to the 
examination of the pragmatic effects and functions associated with the patterns based on the co-
texts with which and the contexts in which they occur.  The identification and classification of 
the arrangements into the Patterns I have presented were not the ends, but rather the means to the 
end, which is the understanding the ways in which ἀλλά contributes to various constructions, and 
how these contructions then function within texts. 
The consensus of all of the secondary sources that I have consulted, together with my 
observations, is that the uses of ἀλλά are varied, and that the simple English conjunction “but” 
should not be the only possibility we advance to translate ἀλλά in the GNT.  There is no great 
surprise there.  We can neither rely on a simplistic view of the semantic value of ἀλλά, nor 
retreat to an unresolvable semantic ambiguity.  As Louis Basset notes regarding the different 
functions of ἀλλά, 
La variété des emplois de άλλά n'est donc pas la conséquence de variations 
sémantiques qui lui seraient propres, mais des divers objets que cette conjonction 
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relie et des diverses composantes sémantiques qu'elle corrige.564 
Clearly, we are also unable rely on a fixed translation strategy of inserting “but” or “but rather” 
for every appearance of ἀλλά. Rather, we must be sensitive to the pragmatic effects arising from 
the sometimes complex interaction between the word with its co-text and in its context, even 
while we maintain an awareness of such things as the genre of the work in which it is used, the 
relevant socio-rhetorical concerns, the larger historical context, etc.  
With respect to the secondary sources I surveyed, I have substantially agreed with the 
views presented therein; where I have disagreed, I have endeavored to note my reasons for doing 
so.  I have also attempted to interact more with the contributions of Levinsohn and Runge, given 
my exposure to their works in the class that started my own investigation, their attempts to bring 
general linguistic principles to bear in the exegesis of particular NT texts, and the great value of 
the insights and conclusions offered within their respective presentations.  However, there have 
been some places where I perceived that traditional explanations for the uses of the conjunction, 
as well as insights garnered from the text and context, were more helpful in exegesis than the 
discourse explanations offered by Levinsohn and Runge.  In the instances in which this has been 
the case, I have noted my disagreement and my reasons for differing with the discourse 
perspectives offered. 
                                                 
564 Louis Basset, “ἀλλ’ ἐξόλοισθ’ αὐτῶι κοαξ.  Réexamen Des Emplois de ἀλλά à La 
Lumière de L’énonciation Dans Les Grenouilles d’Aristophane,” in New Approaches to Greek 
Particles: Proceedings of the Colloquium Held in Amsterdam, January 4-6, 1996, to Honour 
C.J. Ruijgh on the Occasion of His Retirement, ed. Albert Rijksbaron, Amterdam Studies in 
Classical Philology 7 (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1997), 98. 
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The contribution my investigation makes to this discussion is that the instances of ἀλλά 
occuring throughout the Synoptic Gospels appear in diverse constructions resulting in a variety 
of pragmatic effects.  It is not enough to consider ἀλλά alone: the other constituents with which 
ἀλλά interacts must also be identified, and the function of the construction as a whole, with its 
accompanying pragmatic effects, must be assessed.   
Further, the assertion that ἀλλά can be an adversative conjunction is accurate as a partial 
description.  However, even the idea of adversativity needs to be defined carefully, and 
discussions such as Schwenter’s regarding the relationship between contrast and adversativity 
and the expressions thereof, particularly in Κοινή Greek, need to continue.  Signalling an 
adversative relationship between two conjuncts is indeed one possible function for the particle, 
but it by no means exhausts the possible effects to which it may contribute in different contexts, 
and in association with other negative particles and/or conjunctions.  However, the possible 
effects (observed in this corpus of texts) are not endless. The various uses and their respective 
associated constructions are constrained to a very few patterns, each of which has some notable 
variants, which I have labelled as sub-patterns.   
I reject the general label of “adversative” for ἀλλά, even while acknowledging that, 
dependent upon the construction, the co-text and the context in which it occurs, such an 
adversative relationship may be communicated due to pragmatic effects.  I propose a more 
general, and much more restricted, understanding for the semantic value of the conjunction itself, 
namely that it signals an “alternative” relationship of some sort between the things following and 
preceding it, the details of which must be determined by examination of the pragmatic effects 
arising from the presence of the other constituents with which it interacts.  As I have noted 
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previously, this alternative relationship may consist of correction, contrast, adversativity to a 
greater or lesser degree, or simply the introduction of a rhetorical question or objection in a 
series. 
I would like to address one of these particular relationships, correction, and its associated 
functions, rejection and replacement, in brief compass.  I have purposely avoided presenting 
correction as the rectification of an expectation or a misperception held by the hearer/reader, as 
this assumes that they have such an expectation or misperception to correct.  For some of these 
occurrences that I have addressed within the Synoptics, this is not the case.  In fact, I prefer to 
speak of this relationship in light of the functions, namely “rejection and replacement,” rather 
than the more general term, “correction,” for this very reason. 
For some, both means of expression may appear to be equivalent, raising the suspicion 
that I have introduced a distinction without a meaningful difference.  However, I would counter 
that explicit reference to these functions provides greater detail and aids in understanding exactly 
how ἀλλά contributes to what is communicated by a set of conjoined utterances.  Here again, as 
before, we find Jasinskaja’s description of Type 1 Correction (in her work, correction1) to be 
helpful: 
I use the term ‘correction’ to refer to a discourse relation between an utterance that explicitly 
negates some proposition in the context, e.g. John didn’t praise Bill, and one that 
‘‘replaces’’ the ‘‘wrong’’ part of that proposition by a ‘‘correct’’ element: he praised Mary. 
(1) John didn’t praise BILL. He praised MARY.565 
In this example, there is asyndeton between the two utterances.  However, it is clear that the 
utterances are related, and once the second utterance is processed, the reader reprocesses the first 
                                                 
565 Jasinskaja, “Corrective Elaboration,” 51. 
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to conclude that the negation there was to be applied to “Bill,” not to the VP “did praise.”  The 
reader thus concludes that John did praise someone, and that these utterances together make clear 
who that particular someone was, and who they were not.  Without the conjunction but to join 
these utterances, ellipsis of the verb in the second utterance is not generally acceptable in 
English.  With the conjunction, however, we have “John didn’t praise Bill, but Mary” or “John 
praised, not Bill, but Mary.”  The second form, corresponding to McCawley’s “basic” form,566 is 
not the most likely arrangement to be encountered in English, even though it is less ambiguous.  
With respect to NT Greek, the situation is somewhat similar: the closer the negation is to the 
element negated, the less chance for misinterpretation or misapplication of the negation, as may 
be observed in Mark 5:39 and Luke 8:52.  
On the one hand, in both English and in Greek, the conjunction allows for constituent 
correction, in which the writer advances an utterance, which is to be accepted on the whole, and 
then rejects a particular element of that utterance, offering a replacement for that element alone.  
On the other hand, the writer may advance an utterance which, due to its negation, is to be 
rejected in its entirety, and then advance a completely different utterance which is affirmed and 
thereby effectively replaces the previous rejected one.  In other words, the author is able either to 
(1) focus on a particular element, “surgically” removing and replacing the same (narrow-scope, 
internal, or constituent negation), or (2) more widely engage a set of elements, rejecting one set 
in its entirety and replacing it with another, different set (wide-scope, external or proposition 
negation).  Pragmatic indicators such as repetition, parallelism, and ellipsis must be relied upon 
by the hearer/reader in order to sort out which of these options is in play for particular conjuncts.   
                                                 
566 McCawley, “Contrastive Negation and Metalinguistic Negation,” 190. 
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Although I have not conducted this study on the Pastoral Epistles, as Heckert has, I 
would suspect that in the context of argument and reasoning, constituent correction would appear 
more frequently, as it allows for very targeted, almost “surgically” precise excision of an 
element.  The inclusion of that element results in a meaning that the author rejects.  If that 
element is removed, and another element put in its place, then the author affirms the resultant 
statement.  As such, most of the utterance is retained, with the exception being the rejected and 
replaced element.  For this reason, I prefer my terminology—rejection and replacement.  Of 
course, in the case of whole utterance rejection, such as we observe in Pattern 2 arrangements, 
this rejection is fairly clear, but the idea that what has been rejected is in fact being replaced with 
an affirmed utterance—an alternative—may not be as evident. 
The rejection and replacement of either a constituent with another (Pattern 1 occurrences) 
or the advancement of one proposition or command (usually negated) and the affirmation of an 
alternative one (Pattern 2 occurrences) are but two of the possible functions attributable to 
constructions involving ἀλλά.  I suspect that, just as my initial survey in Matthew, with its 
narrative and discourse texts, produced one picture of ἀλλά, which was then both expanded and 
enhanced by the inclusion of the other Synoptics, so too would a similar exploration which 
focused on the Pastoral Epistles, John, or another book within the NT.  To rely too heavily on a 
representation based solely on any one of these sources, in isolation of the others, could skew our 
view of the possible, varied uses of the conjunction by different authors.   
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But Where Do We Go From Here? 
Given the desirability of a comprehensive view of the uses of ἀλλά, I would like to 
expand the scope of my research to include, first of all, Acts, then John, and finally the whole 
corpus of the NT.  At that point my data set would consist of the full population of the 
occurrences of ἀλλά, and I would be able to compare occurences from various writers, from 
works with differing genres, and from various sub-corpora (Synoptics vs. John’s Gospel, Luke 
vs. Acts, Luke-Acts vs. Johannine, John vs. 1 John, etc.).  Even as I broaden the scope of 
materials examined, I would also like to draw upon additional works from other linguists and 
biblical scholars, combining their insights and observations with those I have already gleaned 
from the fine works of the various discourse linguists, grammarians, and exegetes with which I 
have engaged in this dissertation. 
Eventually, I would like to expand the scope of investigation to include various books of 
the LXX, noting especially the constituents with which and constructions in which it most 
frequently occurs.  In doing so, I would identify the words and/or word combinations from the 
Hebrew Masoretic Text (such as םִא־יִכ, יכ, and even   ו) that ἀλλά is used to translate, whether 
alone or in combinations with other words (including ἀλλ’ ἤ and ὅτι ἀλλ’ ἤ), and examine which 
constructions, parallels, and/or ellipses might be present within the Hebrew text.   
One very recent dissertation by Christopher Fresch will be helpful in this pursuit, as in his 
work he examines the use of ἀλλά and ἀλλ᾽ ἤ as discourse markers in various documentary 
papyri, in the LXX in general, and in The Twelve in particular.567  Several other works dealing 
                                                 
567 Cf. Christopher James Fresch, “Discourse Markers in the Septuagint and Early Koine 
Greek with Special Reference to The Twelve” (PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 2015).  
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with the poetry of the Hebrew Bible and the various types of parallelism found therein present 
themselves as indispensable references to assist in understanding the various instances of parallel 
material and ellipses encountered,.568  In such an examination, I would be (1) searching for the 
presence in the MT of anything analogous to the Patterns I have identified in the Synoptics, and 
particularly Patterns 1 and 2, (2) attempting to discern if the same division between corrective 
and contrastive uses of any such patterns might exist there, and (3) identifying the respective 
characteristics of these patterns, such as the presence of continuous information, ellipsis, and 
parallel between conjuncts.   
Of personal interest to me are those instances of so-called antithetical parallelism found 
within such books as Proverbs, Wisdom of Solomon, and Wisdom of Ben Sira.  I would like to 
explore (1) how such instances present information that is rejected in juxtaposition with 
information that is affirmed, (2) how they further the arguments in which they occur, and (3) 
how they might inform our understanding of both Jewish argumentation in the context of Second 
Temple Judaism.   
                                                 
568 Robert Lowth, Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews, trans. G. Gregory 
(London: S. Chadwick, 1847); C. F. Burney, The Poetry of Our Lord: An Examination of the 
Formal Elements of Hebrew Poetry in the Discourses of Jesus Christ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1925); Adele Berlin, “Grammatical Aspects of Biblical Parallelism,” HUCA 50 (1979): 17–43; 
James L. Kugel, The Idea of Biblical Poetry: Parallelism and Its History (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1981); J. P. Fokkelman, Reading Biblical Poetry: An Introductory 
Guide (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001); Nicholas P. Lunn, Word-Order Variation in 
Biblical Poetry: Differentiating Pragmatics and Poetics, Paternoster Biblical Monographs 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2006); Adele Berlin, The Dynamics of Biblical Parallelism, 
Revised and Expanded. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008); Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical 
Poetry, Revised and Updated. (New York: Basic Books, 2011). 
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Such an understanding would allow us to compare and contrast the argumentation in 
Jesus’s sayings, and particularly his use of antithetical parallelism, with the argumentation 
present in his first century Palestinian context.  Nearly as important as what Jesus chooses to 
affirm in the second conjuncts of the various constructions is what he chooses to reject, negate, 
replace, and/or contrast in the first conjuncts.   
As Runge rightly notes, the second conjunct following “receives more attention than if a 
simple, positive assertion had been used.”569  Of course I am interested in what is being affirmed, 
as it is the “jewel on display,” if you will.  However, I believe that there is also value in 
examining the “velvet pillow” upon which it has been placed for contrast, as it has been selected 
not by accident, but on purpose in order to accentuate the contrast and signal to the hearer/reader 
what is most important to the speaker.  Louis Basset’s insights concerning those cases that I have 
designated as Pattern 1, the Supplied/Implied Constant Pattern, are helpful, as he observes, 
“L’ensemble οὐ P ἀλλά Q constitue un groupe rhématique binaire avec un seul thème 
d’énoncé.”570  Even though a constituent has been rejected and replaced, the negative statement 
with that constituent in place holds, and remains part of what is being said about the theme, or 
the topic of that statement.    
Coming full circle back to Matt 5:17, which I cited as an example in the Introduction, we 
clearly see the rejection of a constituent (καταλῦσαι), and its replacement by another constituent 
(πληρῶσαι). 
                                                 
569 Runge, Discourse Grammar, 93. 
570 Basset, “Réexamen Des Emplois de ἀλλά,” 98.   
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Matt 5:17 
Μὴ νομίσητε ὅτι ἦλθον καταλῦσαι τὸν νόμον ἢ τοὺς προφήτας·  
Do not think that I came to destroy the Torah and the Prophets: 
οὐκ ἦλθον καταλῦσαι ἀλλὰ πληρῶσαι. 
I came not to destroy but to fulfill.  OR  I did not come to destroy but to fulfill. 
However, the negative statement “οὐκ ἦλθον καταλῦσαι” holds, as it were, as an assertion that “it 
is not the case (¬) that I came to destroy.”  Then we see the correction which, with constituents 
supplied ἀπὸ κοινοῦ from the first conjunct, results in a positive assertion: “I came to fulfill….”  
There were nearly infinite negative assertions with other verbs and other direct objects that Jesus 
could have included in this instance (e.g., “to destroy the Temple,” “to defy God,” “to overthrow 
Rome,” “to oppose the fathers/elders,” etc.), but he chose these in this context, and it behooves 
the exegete to examine not only what was advanced as an affirmation in the second conjunct, but 
also what was advanced in the first conjunct to form the negative proposition or assertion. 
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APPENDIX 1 
All Occurrences of ἀλλά in the Synoptic Gospels 
List 1: All Occurrences of ἀλλά in the Gospel of Matthew with Annotations 
(Matthew 4:4)   ὁ δὲ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπεν· γέγραπται· οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἄρτῳ μόνῳ ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος,  
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήματι ἐκπορευομένῳ διὰ στόματος θεοῦ. 
 
Quotation from LXX: Deuteronomy 8:3 
 
Deuteronomy 8:3 καὶ ἐκάκωσέν σε καὶ ἐλιμαγχόνησέν σε καὶ ἐψώμισέν σε τὸ μαννα ὃ οὐκ 
εἴδησαν οἱ πατέρες σου ἵνα ἀναγγείλῃ σοι ὅτι  
οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἄρτῳ μόνῳ       ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος  
ἀλλ᾽  
ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήματι τῷ ἐκπορευομένῳ διὰ στόματος θεοῦ  ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος 
 
Contrast the use in Matt 4:4 with that of Luke 4:4 
 
(Matthew 5:15)  οὐδὲ καίουσιν λύχνον καὶ τιθέασιν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν λυχνίαν, καὶ 
λάμπει πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ. 
 
Parallel use in Luke 8:16 and 11:33; Rhetorical Question construction in Mark 4:21. 
 
(Matthew 5:17)  ¶ Μὴ νομίσητε ὅτι ἦλθον καταλῦσαι τὸν νόμον ἢ τοὺς προφήτας· οὐκ ἦλθον 
καταλῦσαι ἀλλὰ πληρῶσαι. 
 
 (Matthew 5:39)  ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν μὴ ἀντιστῆναι τῷ πονηρῷ· ἀλλ᾽ ὅστις σε ῥαπίζει εἰς τὴν δεξιὰν 
σιαγόνα [σου], στρέψον αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην· 
 
Contrast the use in Luke 6:29. 
 
(Matthew 6:13)  καὶ μὴ εἰσενέγκῃς ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν, ἀλλὰ ῥῦσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ. 
 
No alternative presented in Luke 11:4—simply “καὶ μὴ εἰσενέγκῃς ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν.” 
 
(Matthew 6:18)  ὅπως μὴ φανῇς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις νηστεύων ἀλλὰ τῷ πατρί σου τῷ ἐν τῷ κρυφαίῳ· 
καὶ ὁ πατήρ σου ὁ βλέπων ἐν τῷ κρυφαίῳ ἀποδώσει σοι. 
 
 (Matthew 7:21)  ¶ Οὐ πᾶς ὁ λέγων μοι· κύριε κύριε, εἰσελεύσεται εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν, 
ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ποιῶν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρός μου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. 
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(Matthew 8:4)  καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς· ὅρα μηδενὶ εἴπῃς, ἀλλὰ ὕπαγε σεαυτὸν δεῖξον τῷ ἱερεῖ 
καὶ προσένεγκον τὸ δῶρον ὃ προσέταξεν Μωϋσῆς, εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς. 
 
Parallel use: Mark 1:44 and Luke 5:14 
 
(Matthew 8:8)  καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς ὁ ἑκατόνταρχος ἔφη· κύριε, οὐκ εἰμὶ ἱκανὸς ἵνα μου ὑπὸ τὴν στέγην 
εἰσέλθῃς, ἀλλὰ μόνον εἰπὲ λόγῳ, καὶ ἰαθήσεται ὁ παῖς μου. 
 
Parallel use: Luke 7:7. 
 
(Matthew 9:12)  ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας εἶπεν· οὐ χρείαν ἔχουσιν οἱ ἰσχύοντες ἰατροῦ ἀλλ᾽ οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες. 
 
Parallel use: Mark 2:17, Luke 5:31. 
 
(Matthew 9:13)  πορευθέντες δὲ μάθετε τί ἐστιν· ἔλεος θέλω καὶ οὐ θυσίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἦλθον καλέσαι 
δικαίους ἀλλὰ ἁμαρτωλούς. 
 
Parallel use: Mark 2:17, Luke 5:32. 
 
(Matthew 9:17)  οὐδὲ βάλλουσιν οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς παλαιούς· εἰ δὲ μή γε, ῥήγνυνται οἱ ἀσκοὶ 
καὶ ὁ οἶνος ἐκχεῖται καὶ οἱ ἀσκοὶ ἀπόλλυνται· ἀλλὰ βάλλουσιν οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς καινούς, καὶ 
ἀμφότεροι συντηροῦνται. 
 
Parallel use: Mark 2:22 and Luke 5:38, both without repetition of βάλλουσιν. 
 
(Matthew 9:18)  ¶ Ταῦτα αὐτοῦ λαλοῦντος αὐτοῖς, ἰδοὺ ἄρχων εἷς ἐλθὼν προσεκύνει αὐτῷ λέγων 
ὅτι ἡ θυγάτηρ μου ἄρτι ἐτελεύτησεν· ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν ἐπίθες τὴν χεῖρά σου ἐπ᾽ αὐτήν, καὶ ζήσεται. 
 
Contrast construction found in Mark 5:23. 
 
(Matthew 9:24)  ἔλεγεν· ἀναχωρεῖτε, οὐ γὰρ ἀπέθανεν τὸ κοράσιον ἀλλὰ καθεύδει. καὶ κατεγέλων 
αὐτοῦ. 
 
Parallel Use: Mark 5:39 and Luke 8:52. 
 
(Matthew 10:20)  οὐ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐστε οἱ λαλοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τὸ λαλοῦν ἐν 
ὑμῖν. 
 
Parallel Use: Mark 13:11.  Matthew’s version of this saying adds greater detail, making it 
explicit that the spirit would be “the one speaking” (τὸ λαλοῦν).  However, the sense of 
“ἐν ὑμῖν” could be “by you,” signaling agency, or, as I would prefer, “along with you.”  
See BDAG comments on ἐν: 
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it can serve to introduce persons or things that accompany someone to secure an 
objective: ‘along with’… pers., esp. of a military force, w. blending of associative (s. 4) 
and instrumental idea….571 
 
 
(Matthew 10:34)  ¶ Μὴ νομίσητε ὅτι ἦλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν· οὐκ ἦλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνην 
ἀλλὰ μάχαιραν. 
 
Note the alternative construction and different use in Luke 12:51:   
Luke 12:51 δοκεῖτε ὅτι εἰρήνην παρεγενόμην δοῦναι ἐν τῇ γῇ; οὐχί, λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ 
διαμερισμόν. 
 
 
(Matthew 11:8)  ἀλλὰ τί ἐξήλθατε ἰδεῖν; ἄνθρωπον ἐν μαλακοῖς ἠμφιεσμένον; ἰδοὺ οἱ τὰ μαλακὰ 
φοροῦντες ἐν τοῖς οἴκοις τῶν βασιλέων εἰσίν. 
 
(Matthew 11:9)  ἀλλὰ τί ἐξήλθατε ἰδεῖν; προφήτην; ναὶ λέγω ὑμῖν, καὶ περισσότερον προφήτου. 
 
Matthew 11:7-10 parallel to Luke 7:24-27: Note the first question does not include ἀλλά, 
but the 2nd and 3rd questions do. 
 
(Matthew 13:21)  οὐκ ἔχει δὲ ῥίζαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀλλὰ πρόσκαιρός ἐστιν, γενομένης δὲ θλίψεως ἢ 
διωγμοῦ διὰ τὸν λόγον εὐθὺς σκανδαλίζεται. 
 
Note parallel use in Mark 4:17, and different construction in Luke 8:13. 
 
(Matthew 15:11)  οὐ τὸ εἰσερχόμενον εἰς τὸ στόμα κοινοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκπορευόμενον ἐκ 
τοῦ στόματος τοῦτο κοινοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. 
 
Parallel use in Mark 7:15. 
 
(Matthew 16:12)  τότε συνῆκαν ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν προσέχειν ἀπὸ τῆς ζύμης τῶν ἄρτων ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῆς 
διδαχῆς τῶν Φαρισαίων καὶ Σαδδουκαίων. 
 
 (Matthew 16:17)  ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν αὐτῷ· μακάριος εἶ, Σίμων Βαριωνᾶ, ὅτι σὰρξ καὶ 
αἷμα οὐκ ἀπεκάλυψέν σοι ἀλλ᾽ ὁ πατήρ μου ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. 
  
 (Matthew 16:23)  ὁ δὲ στραφεὶς εἶπεν τῷ Πέτρῳ· ὕπαγε ὀπίσω μου, σατανᾶ· σκάνδαλον εἶ ἐμοῦ, 
ὅτι οὐ φρονεῖς τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀλλὰ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. 
 
Parallel use in Mark 8:33. 
 
                                                 
571 BDAG, 328, ἐν: 5.a. 
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(Matthew 17:12)  λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι Ἠλίας ἤδη ἦλθεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐπέγνωσαν αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ ἐποίησαν ἐν 
αὐτῷ ὅσα ἠθέλησαν· οὕτως καὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέλλει πάσχειν ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν. 
 
Contrast the structure of Mark 9:13, which does include ἀλλά, but as a counterpoint to the 
preceding material of Mark 9:12.   
 
(Matthew 18:22)  λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ Ἰησοῦς· οὐ λέγω σοι ἕως ἑπτάκις ἀλλὰ ἕως ἑβδομηκοντάκις ἑπτά. 
 
 (Matthew 18:30)  ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἤθελεν ἀλλὰ ἀπελθὼν ἔβαλεν αὐτὸν εἰς φυλακὴν ἕως ἀποδῷ τὸ 
ὀφειλόμενον. 
 
(Matthew 19:6)  ὥστε οὐκέτι εἰσὶν δύο ἀλλὰ σὰρξ μία. ὃ οὖν ὁ θεὸς συνέζευξεν ἄνθρωπος μὴ 
χωριζέτω. 
 
Parallel Use: Mark 10:8; but not the difference in placement between the contrasted 
elements in Mark and Matthew.  “ὥστε οὐκέτι εἰσὶν δύο ἀλλὰ μία σάρξ.”  Mark balances 
the elements immediately before and after ἀλλά, while Matthew introduces σάρξ after 
ἀλλά. 
 
(Matthew 19:11)  ὁ δὲ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· οὐ πάντες χωροῦσιν τὸν λόγον [τοῦτον] ἀλλ᾽ οἷς δέδοται. 
 
 (Matthew 20:23)  λέγει αὐτοῖς· τὸ μὲν ποτήριόν μου πίεσθε, τὸ δὲ καθίσαι ἐκ δεξιῶν μου καὶ ἐξ 
εὐωνύμων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμὸν [τοῦτο] δοῦναι, ἀλλ᾽ οἷς ἡτοίμασται ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός μου. 
 
Parallel Use: Mark 10:40. 
 
(Matthew 20:26)  οὐχ οὕτως ἔσται ἐν ὑμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὃς ἐὰν θέλῃ ἐν ὑμῖν μέγας γενέσθαι ἔσται ὑμῶν 
διάκονος, 
 
Parallel Use: Mark 10:43; see also the contrast which is made in Luke 22:26, where an 
alternate state of affairs from that described in 22:25 is presented.   
 
(Matthew 20:28)  ὥσπερ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἦλθεν διακονηθῆναι ἀλλὰ διακονῆσαι καὶ δοῦναι 
τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν. 
 
Parallel use in Mark 10:45; also, note the significant variant to Luke 18:27 in D which 
makes it closer to a parallel statement.  What is contrasted there are the positions of the 
served and server, rather than the verbs to be served and to serve.  Interesting.  It is an 
issue of the actions in Matthew, but of the roles in the variant reading within Luke. 
 
(Matthew 21:21)  ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς· ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἐὰν ἔχητε πίστιν καὶ μὴ 
διακριθῆτε, οὐ μόνον τὸ τῆς συκῆς ποιήσετε, ἀλλὰ κἂν τῷ ὄρει τούτῳ εἴπητε· ἄρθητι καὶ βλήθητι εἰς 
τὴν θάλασσαν, γενήσεται· 
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 “Not only…but also” use here in Matthew.  Also note the presence of κἂν (και...εαν).  
Also, what type of conditional do we have here?  This use of ἀλλά is in the apodosis, and 
within the “not only…but also” construction.  Note the alternate means of expression in 
Mark 11:23, where the distinction is between doubting in the heart and believing that 
what is said will come to pass. 
 
(Matthew 22:30)  ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἀναστάσει οὔτε γαμοῦσιν οὔτε γαμίζονται, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἄγγελοι ἐν τῷ 
οὐρανῷ εἰσιν. 
 
Parallel use in Mark 12:25.  However, note that Luke 20:36 uses γάρ rather than ἀλλά. 
 
(Matthew 22:32)  ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ θεὸς Ἀβραὰμ καὶ ὁ θεὸς Ἰσαὰκ καὶ ὁ θεὸς Ἰακώβ; οὐκ ἔστιν [ὁ] θεὸς 
νεκρῶν ἀλλὰ ζώντων. 
 
Parallel use: Mark 12:27 and Luke 20:38.  Note the balancing of the contrasted elements 
before and after the conjunction in all sources. 
 
(Matthew 24:6)  μελλήσετε δὲ ἀκούειν πολέμους καὶ ἀκοὰς πολέμων· ὁρᾶτε μὴ θροεῖσθε· δεῖ γὰρ 
γενέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὔπω ἐστὶν τὸ τέλος. 
 
Parallel Use: Mark 13:7 and Luke 21:9. 
 
 (Matthew 26:39)  καὶ προελθὼν μικρὸν ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ προσευχόμενος καὶ λέγων· 
πάτερ μου, εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν, παρελθάτω ἀπ᾽ ἐμοῦ τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο· πλὴν οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλ᾽ 
ὡς σύ. 
 
Note the presence here of πλήν οὐχ and then ἀλλά. Parallel uses: Mark 14:36 (both ἀλλά) 
and Luke 22:42 (πλήν μή and ἀλλά). 
 
(Matthew 27:24)  ¶ ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Πιλᾶτος ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον θόρυβος γίνεται, λαβὼν 
ὕδωρ ἀπενίψατο τὰς χεῖρας ἀπέναντι τοῦ ὄχλου λέγων· ἀθῷός εἰμι ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος τούτου· ὑμεῖς 
ὄψεσθε. 
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List 2: All Occurrences of ἀλλά in the Gospel of Mark with Annotations 
(Mark 1:44)  καὶ λέγει αὐτῷ· ὅρα μηδενὶ μηδὲν εἴπῃς, ἀλλὰ ὕπαγε σεαυτὸν δεῖξον τῷ ἱερεῖ καὶ 
προσένεγκε περὶ τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ σου ἃ προσέταξεν Μωϋσῆς, εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς. 
 
(Mark 1:45)  ὁ δὲ ἐξελθὼν ἤρξατο κηρύσσειν πολλὰ καὶ διαφημίζειν τὸν λόγον, ὥστε μηκέτι αὐτὸν 
δύνασθαι φανερῶς εἰς πόλιν εἰσελθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔξω ἐπ᾽ ἐρήμοις τόποις ἦν· καὶ ἤρχοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν 
πάντοθεν. 
 
(Mark 2:17)  καὶ ἀκούσας ὁ Ἰησοῦς λέγει αὐτοῖς [ὅτι] οὐ χρείαν ἔχουσιν οἱ ἰσχύοντες ἰατροῦ ἀλλ᾽ οἱ 
κακῶς ἔχοντες· οὐκ ἦλθον καλέσαι δικαίους ἀλλὰ ἁμαρτωλούς. 
 
(Mark 2:22)  καὶ οὐδεὶς βάλλει οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς παλαιούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ῥήξει ὁ οἶνος τοὺς ἀσκοὺς 
καὶ ὁ οἶνος ἀπόλλυται καὶ οἱ ἀσκοί· ἀλλὰ οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς καινούς. 
 
(Mark 3:26)  καὶ εἰ ὁ σατανᾶς ἀνέστη ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐμερίσθη, οὐ δύναται στῆναι ἀλλὰ τέλος ἔχει. 
 
(Mark 3:27)  ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δύναται οὐδεὶς εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ εἰσελθὼν τὰ σκεύη αὐτοῦ 
διαρπάσαι, ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δήσῃ, καὶ τότε τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ διαρπάσει. 
 
(Mark 3:29)  ὃς δ᾽ ἂν βλασφημήσῃ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, οὐκ ἔχει ἄφεσιν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, ἀλλὰ 
ἔνοχός ἐστιν αἰωνίου ἁμαρτήματος. 
 
(Mark 4:17)  καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ῥίζαν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀλλὰ πρόσκαιροί εἰσιν, εἶτα γενομένης θλίψεως ἢ 
διωγμοῦ διὰ τὸν λόγον εὐθὺς σκανδαλίζονται. 
 
(Mark 4:22)  οὐ γάρ ἐστιν κρυπτὸν ἐὰν μὴ ἵνα φανερωθῇ, οὐδὲ ἐγένετο ἀπόκρυφον ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ἔλθῃ 
εἰς φανερόν. 
 
(Mark 5:19)  καὶ οὐκ ἀφῆκεν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ λέγει αὐτῷ· ὕπαγε εἰς τὸν οἶκόν σου πρὸς τοὺς σοὺς καὶ 
ἀπάγγειλον αὐτοῖς ὅσα ὁ κύριός σοι πεποίηκεν καὶ ἠλέησέν σε. 
 
(Mark 5:26)  καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἰατρῶν καὶ δαπανήσασα τὰ παρ᾽ αὐτῆς πάντα καὶ 
μηδὲν ὠφεληθεῖσα ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς τὸ χεῖρον ἐλθοῦσα, 
 
(Mark 5:39)  καὶ εἰσελθὼν λέγει αὐτοῖς· τί θορυβεῖσθε καὶ κλαίετε; τὸ παιδίον οὐκ ἀπέθανεν ἀλλὰ 
καθεύδει. 
 
(Mark 6:9)  ἀλλὰ ὑποδεδεμένους σανδάλια, καὶ μὴ ἐνδύσησθε δύο χιτῶνας. 
 
(Mark 6:52)  οὐ γὰρ συνῆκαν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄρτοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἦν αὐτῶν ἡ καρδία πεπωρωμένη. 
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(Mark 7:5)  καὶ ἐπερωτῶσιν αὐτὸν οἱ Φαρισαῖοι καὶ οἱ γραμματεῖς· διὰ τί οὐ περιπατοῦσιν οἱ 
μαθηταί σου κατὰ τὴν παράδοσιν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, ἀλλὰ κοιναῖς χερσὶν ἐσθίουσιν τὸν ἄρτον; 
 
(Mark 7:15)  οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔξωθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰσπορευόμενον εἰς αὐτὸν ὃ δύναται κοινῶσαι 
αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐκπορευόμενά ἐστιν τὰ κοινοῦντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον. 
 
(Mark 7:19)  ὅτι οὐκ εἰσπορεύεται αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν καρδίαν ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν, καὶ εἰς τὸν 
ἀφεδρῶνα ἐκπορεύεται, καθαρίζων πάντα τὰ βρώματα; 
 
(Mark 7:25)  ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς ἀκούσασα γυνὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἧς εἶχεν τὸ θυγάτριον αὐτῆς πνεῦμα 
ἀκάθαρτον, ἐλθοῦσα προσέπεσεν πρὸς τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ· 
 
(Mark 8:33)  ὁ δὲ ἐπιστραφεὶς καὶ ἰδὼν τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ ἐπετίμησεν Πέτρῳ καὶ λέγει· ὕπαγε 
ὀπίσω μου, σατανᾶ, ὅτι οὐ φρονεῖς τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀλλὰ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. 
 
(Mark 9:8)  καὶ ἐξάπινα περιβλεψάμενοι οὐκέτι οὐδένα εἶδον ἀλλὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν μόνον μεθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν. 
 
(Mark 9:13)  ἀλλὰ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι καὶ Ἠλίας ἐλήλυθεν, καὶ ἐποίησαν αὐτῷ ὅσα ἤθελον, καθὼς 
γέγραπται ἐπ᾽ αὐτόν. 
 
(Mark 9:22)  καὶ πολλάκις καὶ εἰς πῦρ αὐτὸν ἔβαλεν καὶ εἰς ὕδατα ἵνα ἀπολέσῃ αὐτόν· ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τι 
δύνῃ, βοήθησον ἡμῖν σπλαγχνισθεὶς ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς. 
 
(Mark 9:37)  ὃς ἂν ἓν τῶν τοιούτων παιδίων δέξηται ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματί μου, ἐμὲ δέχεται· καὶ ὃς ἂν 
ἐμὲ δέχηται, οὐκ ἐμὲ δέχεται ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με. 
 
(Mark 10:8)  καὶ ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν· ὥστε οὐκέτι εἰσὶν δύο ἀλλὰ μία σάρξ. 
 
(Mark 10:27)  ἐμβλέψας αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἰησοῦς λέγει· παρὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ παρὰ θεῷ· 
πάντα γὰρ δυνατὰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ. 
 
(Mark 10:40)  τὸ δὲ καθίσαι ἐκ δεξιῶν μου ἢ ἐξ εὐωνύμων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμὸν δοῦναι, ἀλλ᾽ οἷς 
ἡτοίμασται. 
 
(Mark 10:43)  οὐχ οὕτως δέ ἐστιν ἐν ὑμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὃς ἂν θέλῃ μέγας γενέσθαι ἐν ὑμῖν ἔσται ὑμῶν 
διάκονος, 
 
(Mark 10:45)  καὶ γὰρ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἦλθεν διακονηθῆναι ἀλλὰ διακονῆσαι καὶ δοῦναι 
τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν. 
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(Mark 11:23)  ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι ὃς ἂν εἴπῃ τῷ ὄρει τούτῳ· ἄρθητι καὶ βλήθητι εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν, 
καὶ μὴ διακριθῇ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ πιστεύῃ ὅτι ὃ λαλεῖ γίνεται, ἔσται αὐτῷ. 
 
(Mark 11:32)  ἀλλὰ εἴπωμεν· ἐξ ἀνθρώπων;- ἐφοβοῦντο τὸν ὄχλον· ἅπαντες γὰρ εἶχον τὸν Ἰωάννην 
ὄντως ὅτι προφήτης ἦν. 
 
(Mark 12:14)  καὶ ἐλθόντες λέγουσιν αὐτῷ· διδάσκαλε, οἴδαμεν ὅτι ἀληθὴς εἶ καὶ οὐ μέλει σοι περὶ 
οὐδενός· οὐ γὰρ βλέπεις εἰς πρόσωπον ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀληθείας τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ θεοῦ διδάσκεις· 
ἔξεστιν δοῦναι κῆνσον Καίσαρι ἢ οὔ; δῶμεν ἢ μὴ δῶμεν; 
 
(Mark 12:25)  ὅταν γὰρ ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναστῶσιν οὔτε γαμοῦσιν οὔτε γαμίζονται, ἀλλ᾽ εἰσὶν ὡς 
ἄγγελοι ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. 
 
(Mark 12:27)  οὐκ ἔστιν θεὸς νεκρῶν ἀλλὰ ζώντων· πολὺ πλανᾶσθε. 
 
(Mark 13:7)  ὅταν δὲ ἀκούσητε πολέμους καὶ ἀκοὰς πολέμων, μὴ θροεῖσθε· δεῖ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ 
οὔπω τὸ τέλος. 
 
(Mark 13:11)  καὶ ὅταν ἄγωσιν ὑμᾶς παραδιδόντες, μὴ προμεριμνᾶτε τί λαλήσητε, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ ἐὰν δοθῇ 
ὑμῖν ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ὥρᾳ τοῦτο λαλεῖτε· οὐ γάρ ἐστε ὑμεῖς οἱ λαλοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. 
 
(Mark 13:20)  καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐκολόβωσεν κύριος τὰς ἡμέρας, οὐκ ἂν ἐσώθη πᾶσα σάρξ· ἀλλὰ διὰ τοὺς 
ἐκλεκτοὺς οὓς ἐξελέξατο ἐκολόβωσεν τὰς ἡμέρας. 
 
(Mark 13:24)  ¶ Ἀλλὰ ἐν ἐκείναις ταῖς ἡμέραις μετὰ τὴν θλῖψιν ἐκείνην ὁ ἥλιος σκοτισθήσεται, καὶ 
ἡ σελήνη οὐ δώσει τὸ φέγγος αὐτῆς, 
 
(Mark 14:28)  ἀλλὰ μετὰ τὸ ἐγερθῆναί με προάξω ὑμᾶς εἰς τὴν Γαλιλαίαν. 
 
(Mark 14:29)  ὁ δὲ Πέτρος ἔφη αὐτῷ· εἰ καὶ πάντες σκανδαλισθήσονται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐγώ. 
 
(Mark 14:36)  καὶ ἔλεγεν· αββα ὁ πατήρ, πάντα δυνατά σοι· παρένεγκε τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο ἀπ᾽ 
ἐμοῦ· ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τί ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλὰ τί σύ. 
 
(Mark 14:49)  καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἤμην πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ διδάσκων καὶ οὐκ ἐκρατήσατέ με· ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα 
πληρωθῶσιν αἱ γραφαί. 
 
(Mark 16:7)  ἀλλὰ ὑπάγετε εἴπατε τοῖς μαθηταῖς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῷ Πέτρῳ ὅτι προάγει ὑμᾶς εἰς τὴν 
Γαλιλαίαν· ἐκεῖ αὐτὸν ὄψεσθε, καθὼς εἶπεν ὑμῖν. 
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List 3: All Occurrences of ἀλλά in the Gospel of Luke with Annotations 
(Luke 1:60)  καὶ ἀποκριθεῖσα ἡ μήτηρ αὐτοῦ εἶπεν· οὐχί, ἀλλὰ κληθήσεται Ἰωάννης. 
 
(Luke 5:14)  καὶ αὐτὸς παρήγγειλεν αὐτῷ μηδενὶ εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἀπελθὼν δεῖξον σεαυτὸν τῷ ἱερεῖ καὶ 
προσένεγκε περὶ τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ σου καθὼς προσέταξεν Μωϋσῆς, εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς. 
 
(Luke 5:31)  καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν πρὸς αὐτούς· οὐ χρείαν ἔχουσιν οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες ἰατροῦ 
ἀλλὰ οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες· 
 
(Luke 5:32)  οὐκ ἐλήλυθα καλέσαι δικαίους ἀλλὰ ἁμαρτωλοὺς εἰς μετάνοιαν. 
 
(Luke 5:37-38) καὶ οὐδεὶς βάλλει οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς παλαιούς·  
εἰ δὲ μή γε, ῥήξει ὁ οἶνος ὁ νέος τοὺς ἀσκοὺς  
καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκχυθήσεται καὶ οἱ ἀσκοὶ ἀπολοῦνται· 
ἀλλὰ οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς καινοὺς βλητέον. 
 
(Luke 6:27)  ¶ Ἀλλὰ ὑμῖν λέγω τοῖς ἀκούουσιν· ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν, καλῶς ποιεῖτε τοῖς 
μισοῦσιν ὑμᾶς, 
 
(Luke 7:7)  διὸ οὐδὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἠξίωσα πρὸς σὲ ἐλθεῖν· ἀλλὰ εἰπὲ λόγῳ, καὶ ἰαθήτω ὁ παῖς μου. 
 
(Luke 7:25)  ἀλλὰ τί ἐξήλθατε ἰδεῖν; ἄνθρωπον ἐν μαλακοῖς ἱματίοις ἠμφιεσμένον; ἰδοὺ οἱ ἐν 
ἱματισμῷ ἐνδόξῳ καὶ τρυφῇ ὑπάρχοντες ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις εἰσίν. 
 
(Luke 7:26)  ἀλλὰ τί ἐξήλθατε ἰδεῖν; προφήτην; ναὶ λέγω ὑμῖν, καὶ περισσότερον προφήτου. 
 
(Luke 8:16)  ¶ Οὐδεὶς δὲ λύχνον ἅψας καλύπτει αὐτὸν σκεύει ἢ ὑποκάτω κλίνης τίθησιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ 
λυχνίας τίθησιν, ἵνα οἱ εἰσπορευόμενοι βλέπωσιν τὸ φῶς. 
 
(Luke 8:27)  ἐξελθόντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ὑπήντησεν ἀνήρ τις ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἔχων δαιμόνια καὶ 
χρόνῳ ἱκανῷ οὐκ ἐνεδύσατο ἱμάτιον καὶ ἐν οἰκίᾳ οὐκ ἔμενεν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς μνήμασιν. 
 
(Luke 8:52)  ἔκλαιον δὲ πάντες καὶ ἐκόπτοντο αὐτήν. ὁ δὲ εἶπεν· μὴ κλαίετε, οὐ γὰρ ἀπέθανεν 
ἀλλὰ καθεύδει. 
 
(Luke 11:33)  ¶ Οὐδεὶς λύχνον ἅψας εἰς κρύπτην τίθησιν [οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον] ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν 
λυχνίαν, ἵνα οἱ εἰσπορευόμενοι τὸ φῶς βλέπωσιν. 
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(Luke 11:42)  ¶ ἀλλὰ οὐαὶ ὑμῖν τοῖς Φαρισαίοις, ὅτι ἀποδεκατοῦτε τὸ ἡδύοσμον καὶ τὸ πήγανον 
καὶ πᾶν λάχανον καὶ παρέρχεσθε τὴν κρίσιν καὶ τὴν ἀγάπην τοῦ θεοῦ· ταῦτα δὲ ἔδει ποιῆσαι 
κἀκεῖνα μὴ παρεῖναι. 
 
(Luke 12:7)  ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ τρίχες τῆς κεφαλῆς ὑμῶν πᾶσαι ἠρίθμηνται. μὴ φοβεῖσθε· πολλῶν 
στρουθίων διαφέρετε. 
 
(Luke 12:51)  δοκεῖτε ὅτι εἰρήνην παρεγενόμην δοῦναι ἐν τῇ γῇ; οὐχί, λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ 
διαμερισμόν. 
 
(Luke 13:3)  οὐχί, λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν μὴ μετανοῆτε πάντες ὁμοίως ἀπολεῖσθε. 
 
(Luke 13:5)  οὐχί, λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν μὴ μετανοῆτε πάντες ὡσαύτως ἀπολεῖσθε. 
 
(Luke 14:10)  ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν κληθῇς, πορευθεὶς ἀνάπεσε εἰς τὸν ἔσχατον τόπον, ἵνα ὅταν ἔλθῃ ὁ 
κεκληκώς σε ἐρεῖ σοι· φίλε, προσανάβηθι ἀνώτερον· τότε ἔσται σοι δόξα ἐνώπιον πάντων τῶν 
συνανακειμένων σοι. 
 
(Luke 14:13)  ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν δοχὴν ποιῇς, κάλει πτωχούς, ἀναπείρους, χωλούς, τυφλούς· 
 
(Luke 16:21)  καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν χορτασθῆναι ἀπὸ τῶν πιπτόντων ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης τοῦ πλουσίου· 
ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ κύνες ἐρχόμενοι ἐπέλειχον τὰ ἕλκη αὐτοῦ. 
 
(Luke 16:30)  ὁ δὲ εἶπεν· οὐχί, πάτερ Ἀβραάμ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐάν τις ἀπὸ νεκρῶν πορευθῇ πρὸς αὐτοὺς 
μετανοήσουσιν. 
 
(Luke 17:8)  ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ ἐρεῖ αὐτῷ· ἑτοίμασον τί δειπνήσω καὶ περιζωσάμενος διακόνει μοι ἕως 
φάγω καὶ πίω, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα φάγεσαι καὶ πίεσαι σύ; 
 
(Luke 18:13)  ὁ δὲ τελώνης μακρόθεν ἑστὼς οὐκ ἤθελεν οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐπᾶραι εἰς τὸν 
οὐρανόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτυπτεν τὸ στῆθος αὐτοῦ λέγων· ὁ θεός, ἱλάσθητί μοι τῷ ἁμαρτωλῷ. 
 
(Luke 20:21)  καὶ ἐπηρώτησαν αὐτὸν λέγοντες· διδάσκαλε, οἴδαμεν ὅτι ὀρθῶς λέγεις καὶ διδάσκεις 
καὶ οὐ λαμβάνεις πρόσωπον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀληθείας τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ θεοῦ διδάσκεις· 
 
(Luke 20:38)  θεὸς δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν νεκρῶν ἀλλὰ ζώντων, πάντες γὰρ αὐτῷ ζῶσιν. 
 
(Luke 21:9)  ὅταν δὲ ἀκούσητε πολέμους καὶ ἀκαταστασίας, μὴ πτοηθῆτε· δεῖ γὰρ ταῦτα γενέσθαι 
πρῶτον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εὐθέως τὸ τέλος. 
 
(Luke 22:26)  ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μείζων ἐν ὑμῖν γινέσθω ὡς ὁ νεώτερος καὶ ὁ ἡγούμενος ὡς 
ὁ διακονῶν. 
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(Luke 22:36)  εἶπεν δὲ αὐτοῖς· ἀλλὰ νῦν ὁ ἔχων βαλλάντιον ἀράτω, ὁμοίως καὶ πήραν, καὶ ὁ μὴ 
ἔχων πωλησάτω τὸ ἱμάτιον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀγορασάτω μάχαιραν. 
 
(Luke 22:42)  λέγων· πάτερ, εἰ βούλει παρένεγκε τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον ἀπ᾽ ἐμοῦ· πλὴν μὴ τὸ θέλημά 
μου ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν γινέσθω. 
 
(Luke 22:53)  καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ὄντος μου μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ οὐκ ἐξετείνατε τὰς χεῖρας ἐπ᾽ ἐμέ, ἀλλ᾽ 
αὕτη ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ἡ ὥρα καὶ ἡ ἐξουσία τοῦ σκότους. 
 
(Luke 23:15)  ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ Ἡρῴδης, ἀνέπεμψεν γὰρ αὐτὸν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ἰδοὺ οὐδὲν ἄξιον θανάτου 
ἐστὶν πεπραγμένον αὐτῷ· 
 
(Luke 24:6)  οὐκ ἔστιν ὧδε, ἀλλὰ ἠγέρθη. μνήσθητε ὡς ἐλάλησεν ὑμῖν ἔτι ὢν ἐν τῇ Γαλιλαίᾳ 
 
(Luke 24:21)  ἡμεῖς δὲ ἠλπίζομεν ὅτι αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ μέλλων λυτροῦσθαι τὸν Ἰσραήλ· ἀλλά γε καὶ 
σὺν πᾶσιν τούτοις τρίτην ταύτην ἡμέραν ἄγει ἀφ᾽ οὗ ταῦτα ἐγένετο. 
  
(Luke 24:22)  ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκές τινες ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐξέστησαν ἡμᾶς, γενόμεναι ὀρθριναὶ ἐπὶ τὸ 
μνημεῖον, 
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APPENDIX 2 
Table 1: Analyses of components found in ἀλλά constructions in the Gospel of Matthew 
Ref. Negation(s) 
or Other 
Associated 
Elements 
Item(s) Preceding 
ἀλλά 
Items 
adjacent 
to 
ἀλλά?572 
Item(s) Following ἀλλά 
Ellipsis/Implied Repetition or 
[Explicit Repetition] of 
Elements Before and After 
ἀλλά 
Pattern 
ID 
4:4 οὐκ (οὐ) ἐπ᾽ ἄρτῳ μόνῳ F 
ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήματι ἐκπορευομένῳ 
διὰ στόματος θεοῦ 
[ἐπὶ]… ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος 1A1 
5:15 οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον B ἐπὶ τὴν λυχνίαν 
καίουσιν λύχνον καὶ τιθέασιν 
αὐτὸν 
1B1 
5:17 οὐκ (οὐ) καταλῦσαι B πληρῶσαι ἦλθον 1B1 
5:39 μὴ ἀντιστῆναι τῷ πονηρῷ B 
ὅστις σε ῥαπίζει εἰς τὴν δεξιὰν 
σιαγόνα [σου],  
στρέψον αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην 
NONE 2A 
6:13 μὴ 
εἰσενέγκῃς ἡμᾶς εἰς 
πειρασμόν 
B ῥῦσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ [ἡμᾶς] 3D 
6:18 μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις F τῷ πατρί σου τῷ ἐν τῷ κρυφαίῳ φανῇς…νηστεύων 1C 
7:21 Οὐ (οὐ) 
πᾶς ὁ λέγων μοι· κύριε 
κύριε, 
F 
ὁ ποιῶν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρός 
μου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς 
εἰσελεύσεται εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν 
τῶν οὐρανῶν 
1A1 
8:4 μηδενὶ? ὅρα…εἴπῃς B 
ὕπαγε σεαυτὸν  
δεῖξον τῷ ἱερεῖ καὶ  
προσένεγκον τὸ δῶρον  
ὃ προσέταξεν Μωϋσῆς,  
NONE/(εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς)? 2A 
                                                 
572 Abbreviations for Item(s) Being Immediately Adjacent to ἀλλά: P=Previous (Item); B=Both (Items); F=Following (Item); 
N=Neither (Item).  The general formula is: Negation Constant Preceding ἀλλά Following.  
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8:8 οὐκ (οὐ) 
εἰμὶ ἱκανὸς ἵνα μου ὑπὸ 
τὴν στέγην εἰσέλθῃς 
B μόνον εἰπὲ λόγῳ ἰαθήσεται ὁ παῖς μου 2A 
9:12 οὐ (οὐ) οἱ ἰσχύοντες F οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες χρείαν ἔχουσιν…ἰατροῦ 1C 
9:13 οὐ γὰρ (οὐ)  δικαίους B ἁμαρτωλούς ἦλθον καλέσαι 1B1 
9:17 οὐδὲ παλαιούς N καινούς [βάλλουσιν οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς] 3A 
9:18 NONE 
ἡ θυγάτηρ μου ἄρτι 
ἐτελεύτησεν 
B 
ἐλθὼν ἐπίθες τὴν χεῖρά σου  
ἐπ᾽ αὐτήν, καὶ ζήσεται 
NONE 2C 
9:24 οὐ γὰρ (οὐ) ἀπέθανεν F καθεύδει τὸ κοράσιον 1A1 
10:20 οὐ γὰρ(οὐ) ὑμεῖς ἐστε οἱ λαλοῦντες B 
τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν  
τὸ λαλοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν 
NONE 1D 
10:34573 οὐκ (οὐ) εἰρήνην B μάχαιραν ἦλθον βαλεῖν 1B1 
11:8 
Following: 
ἰδοὺ 
NONE N NONE μαλακοῖς/μαλακὰ 4 
11:9 
Following: 
ναὶ 
NONE N NONE 
προφήτην/προφήτου 
 
4 
13:21 οὐκ (οὐ) ἔχει ῥίζαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ B πρόσκαιρός ἐστιν NONE 2A 
15:11 οὐ (οὐ) 
τὸ εἰσερχόμενον  
εἰς τὸ στόμα 
F 
τὸ ἐκπορευόμενον  
ἐκ τοῦ στόματος 
τοῦτο [κοινοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον] 3B 
16:12 οὐκ (οὐ) 
ἀπὸ τῆς ζύμης  
τῶν ἄρτων 
B 
ἀπὸ τῆς διδαχῆς  
τῶν Φαρισαίων καὶ 
Σαδδουκαίων 
εἶπεν προσέχειν [ἀπὸ] 1B1 
16:17 οὐκ (οὐ) σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα F ὁ πατήρ μου ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς ἀπεκάλυψέν σοι 1A1 
16:23 οὐ (οὐ) τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ B τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φρονεῖς 1B1 
17:12 οὐκ (οὐ) ἐπέγνωσαν αὐτὸν B ἐποίησαν ἐν αὐτῷ ὅσα ἠθέλησαν [αὐτὸν/ αὐτῷ] 3B 
18:22 οὐ ἕως ἑπτάκις B ἕως ἑβδομηκοντάκις ἑπτά λέγω σοι [ἕως] 1B1 
18:30 οὐκ (οὐ) ἤθελεν B 
ἀπελθὼν ἔβαλεν αὐτὸν  
εἰς φυλακὴν  
NONE (Perhaps ὁ) 2A 
                                                 
573 Note the similarity in arrangement to Matt 5:17. 
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ἕως ἀποδῷ τὸ ὀφειλόμενον 
19:6 οὐκέτι δύο P μία εἰσὶν...σὰρξ 1B2 
19:11 οὐ (οὐ) πάντες F οἷς δέδοται χωροῦσιν τὸν λόγον τοῦτον 1A1 
20:23 οὐκ (οὐ) ἐμὸν δοῦναι B 
οἷς ἡτοίμασται  
ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός μου 
ἔστιν…τοῦτο 1C 
20:26 οὐχ (οὐ) 
οὕτως (referring back 
to the state of affairs 
in 20:25) ἔσται 
N 
ὃς ἐὰν θέλῃ ἐν ὑμῖν μέγας 
γενέσθαι ἔσται ὑμῶν διάκονος 
[ἔσται…ἐν ὑμῖν/ἐν ὑμῖν…ἔσται] 3D 
20:28 οὐκ (οὐ) διακονηθῆναι B διακονῆσαι ἦλθεν 1B1 
21:21 
οὐ μόνον… 
ἀλλὰ κἂν 
(καὶ ἐάν) 
τὸ τῆς συκῆς ποιήσετε B 
τῷ ὄρει τούτῳ εἴπητε· ἄρθητι 
καὶ βλήθητι εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν, 
γενήσεται 
NONE 2C 
22:30 οὔτε...οὔτε γαμοῦσιν...γαμίζονται Β ὡς ἄγγελοι ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ εἰσιν ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει 1A1 
22:32 οὐκ (οὐ) νεκρῶν Β ζώντων ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς 1B1 
24:6 ἀλλ᾽ οὔπω δεῖ γενέσθαι Β ἐστὶν τὸ τέλος NONE 2C 
26:39 
[πλὴν] οὐχ 
(οὐ) 
ἐγὼ N σύ ὡς…θέλω/(θέλεις) 3C 
27:24 
οὐδὲν… 
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον 
ὠφελεῖ B θόρυβος γίνεται NONE 2D 
 
Involve 
Negation: 
34 
(91.9%) 
 
B=23 
F=8 
P=1 
N=5 
  
Pattern 
Totals: 
P1=20 
P2=9 
P3=6 
P4=2 
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Table 2: Analyses of components found in ἀλλά constructions in the Gospel of Mark 
Ref. Negation(s) 
or Other 
Associated 
Elements 
Item(s) Preceding 
ἀλλά 
Items 
adjacent 
to 
ἀλλά?574 
Item(s) Following ἀλλά 
Ellipsis/Implied Repetition or 
[Explicit Repetition] of 
Elements before and after 
ἀλλά 
Pattern 
ID 
1:44 μηδενὶ μηδὲν ὅρα…εἴπῃς B 
ὕπαγε σεαυτὸν  
δεῖξον τῷ ἱερεῖ καὶ  
προσένεγκε περὶ τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ 
σου ἃ προσέταξεν Μωϋσῆς  
NONE/(εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς)? 2A 
1:45 μηκέτι 
αὐτὸν δύνασθαι 
φανερῶς εἰς πόλιν 
εἰσελθεῖν 
F ἔξω ἐπ᾽ ἐρήμοις τόποις ἦν NONE 2A 
2:17 οὐ οἱ ἰσχύοντες F οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες χρείαν ἔχουσιν…ἰατροῦ 1C 
2:17 οὐκ δικαίους B ἁμαρτωλούς ἦλθον καλέσαι 1B1 
2:22 οὐδεὶς παλαιούς N καινούς βάλλει [οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς] 3A 
3:26 οὐ δύναται στῆναι B τέλος ἔχει NONE 2A 
3:27 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ575 
Following: 
ἐὰν μὴ 
NONE N NONE 
[τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ…αὐτοῦ 
διαρπάσαι]/[τὸν ἰσχυρὸν…τὴν 
οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ διαρπάσει] 
4 
3:29 οὐκ ἔχει ἄφεσιν F ἔνοχός ἐστιν… ἁμαρτήματος [αἰῶνα/αἰωνίου] 3B 
4:17 οὐκ ἔχουσιν ῥίζαν F πρόσκαιροί εἰσιν NONE 2A 
                                                 
574 Abbreviations for Item(s) Being Immediately Adjacent to ἀλλά: P=Previous (Item); B=Both (Items); F=Following (Item); 
N=Neither (Item).  The general formula is: Negation Constant Preceding ἀλλά Following.  
575 This is an interesting use of ἀλλά in combination with οὐ. We find this combination four times in Mark’s Gospel: Mk 3:27; 10:27; 
14:29; and 14:36.  I will discuss it in the section devoted to the Marcan occurrences of ἀλλά.  We do not find any instances of this exact 
combination in Matthew, although Matt 24:6 does have the similar construction, ἀλλ᾽ οὔπω, which is found once in Mark (Mark 13:7). 
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4:22 
οὐδὲ… 
ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα576 
ἐγένετο ἀπόκρυφον B ἔλθῃ εἰς φανερόν NONE 2A 
5:19 οὐκ ἀφῆκεν F λέγει [αὐτόν/αὐτῷ] 3B 
5:26 
μηδὲν… 
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον 
ὠφεληθεῖσα B εἰς τὸ χεῖρον ἐλθοῦσα NONE 2D 
5:39 οὐκ ἀπέθανεν B καθεύδει τὸ παιδίον 1A1 
6:8-9 
μηδὲν… 
(μὴ (x4)) 
αἴρωσιν εἰς ὁδὸν  
εἰ μὴ ῥάβδον μόνον,  
μὴ ἄρτον, μὴ πήραν, 
μὴ εἰς τὴν ζώνην 
χαλκόν 
F ὑποδεδεμένους σανδάλια NONE 2A 
6:52 οὐ συνῆκαν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄρτοις B ἦν αὐτῶν ἡ καρδία πεπωρωμένη NONE 2A 
7:5 οὐ 
περιπατοῦσιν… 
κατὰ τὴν παράδοσιν 
τῶν πρεσβυτέρων 
N 
κοιναῖς χερσὶν ἐσθίουσιν τὸν 
ἄρτον 
οἱ μαθηταί σου 1A1 
7:15 οὐδέν 
ἔξωθεν  
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου 
εἰσπορευόμενον εἰς 
αὐτὸν  
F 
τὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου 
ἐκπορευόμενά  
[τοῦ ἀνθρώπου/τοῦ ἀνθρώπου] 
[ἐστιν…ὃ δύναται κοινῶσαι αὐτόν 
/ἐστιν τὰ κοινοῦντα τὸν 
ἄνθρωπον] 
3C 
7:19 οὐκ εἰς τὴν καρδίαν B εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν εἰσπορεύεται αὐτοῦ 1B1 
7:24-5 
οὐδένα… 
οὐκ 
ἤθελεν γνῶναι, καὶ 
ἠδυνήθη λαθεῖν 
B 
εὐθὺς  
ἀκούσασα γυνὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ,  
ἧς εἶχεν τὸ θυγάτριον αὐτῆς 
πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον,  
ἐλθοῦσα προσέπεσεν πρὸς τοὺς 
πόδας αὐτου 
NONE 2A 
                                                 
576 The particular combination “ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα” occurs in Mark only here and in Mar 14:49.  There are a total of nineteen occurrences in the 
NT, with ten of these being in the Gospel of John. 
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8:33 οὐ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ B τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φρονεῖς 1B1 
9:8 οὐκέτι οὐδένα F τὸν Ἰησοῦν μόνον μεθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν εἶδον 1A1 
9:12- 
9:13 
NONE 
Ἠλίαν δεῖ ἐλθεῖν 
πρῶτον… 
Ἠλίας μὲν ἐλθὼν 
πρῶτον 
N Ἠλίας ἐλήλυθεν 
[Ἠλίαν/ Ἠλίας] 
[ ἐλθεῖν/ ἐλθὼν/ ἐλήλυθεν] 
4 
9:18~ 
9:22 
οὐκ (9:18) 
ἀλλ᾽ (9:22) 
ἴσχυσαν (ἐκβάλωσιν) P εἴ τι δύνῃ, βοήθησον ἡμῖν NONE 2A 
9:37 οὐκ  ἐμὲ F τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με δέχεται 1A1 
10:8 οὐκέτι δύο B μία εἰσὶν… σάρξ 1B2 
10:27 *ἀλλ᾽ οὐ παρὰ ἀνθρώποις F παρὰ θεῷ ἀδύνατον ?(6?) 
10:40 οὐκ ἐμὸν δοῦναι Β οἷς ἡτοίμασται ἔστιν 1B1 
10:43 οὐχ 
οὕτως (referring back 
to the state of affairs 
in 10:42) 
B 
ὃς ἂν θέλῃ μέγας γενέσθαι ἐν 
ὑμῖν ἔσται ὑμῶν διάκονος… 
ὃς ἂν θέλῃ ἐν ὑμῖν εἶναι πρῶτος 
ἔσται πάντων δοῦλος 
[ἐστιν ἐν ὑμῖν/ἐν ὑμῖν ἔσται] 3D 
10:45 οὐκ διακονηθῆναι B 
διακονῆσαι… 
δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον 
ἀντὶ πολλῶν 
ἦλθεν 1B1 
11:23 μὴ διακριθῇ F πιστεύῃ NONE/(ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ)? 2A/(1A) 
11:32 ἐὰν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ N ἐξ ἀνθρώπων [ εἴπωμεν/εἴπωμεν] 4 
12:14 οὐ 
βλέπεις  
εἰς πρόσωπον 
ἀνθρώπων 
B 
ἐπ᾽ ἀληθείας τὴν ὁδὸν  
τοῦ θεοῦ  
διδάσκεις 
NONE 2A 
12:25 οὔτε… οὔτε γαμοῦσιν…γαμίζονται B εἰσὶν ὡς ἄγγελοι ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς ὅταν…ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναστῶσιν 1B1 
12:27 οὐκ νεκρῶν B ζώντων ἔστιν θεὸς 1B1 
13:7 ἀλλ᾽ οὔπω δεῖ γενέσθαι B οὔπω τὸ τέλος NONE ?(6?) 
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13:11577 μὴ προμεριμνᾶτε N λαλεῖτε 
τί λαλήσητε/ 
ὃ ἐὰν…τοῦτο λαλεῖτε 
2A 
13:11 οὐ ὑμεῖς F τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐστε…οἱ λαλοῦντες 1A1 
13:20 εἰ μή…οὐκ 
ἐκολόβωσεν κύριος τὰς 
ἡμέρας 
N ἐκολόβωσεν τὰς ἡμέρας 
[ἐκολόβωσεν] κύριος  
[τὰς ἡμέρας] 
?(5?) 
13:24 NONE NONE N NONE NONE 4? 
14:28 NONE 
πάντες 
σκανδαλισθήσεσθε 
N προάξω ὑμᾶς NONE 2B 
14:29 
εἰ καὶ… 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ 
πάντες F ἐγώ σκανδαλισθήσονται ?(6?) 
14:36 NONE NONE N NONE NONE 4 
14:36 οὐ ἐγὼ N σύ [τί]…θέλω/[τί] (θέλεις) 3C 
14:49 
οὐκ… 
ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα578 
καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἤμην πρὸς 
ὑμᾶς ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ 
διδάσκων 
F NONE (νῦν)? ἐκρατήσατέ με/(κρατεῖτε με) 2A 
16:7 μὴ ἐκθαμβεῖσθε F ὑπάγετε…εἴπατε  NONE 2A 
 
Involve 
Negation: 
40 
(88.9%) 
 
B=18 
F=14 
P=1 
N=12 
Total=45 
  
P1=14 
P2=16 
P3=6 
P4=5 
P5=1 
P6=3 
                                                 
577 The analysis of this verse presented some difficulty with respect to categorization based on my criteria.  The main reason for this is 
that there are inflected forms of the same verbal root explicitly repeated before and after ἀλλά.  If these are part of the constant constituents 
then they would, by the descriptions I have been using, also be part of the preceding and following constituents, respectively.  I engage with 
this occurrence in the section addressing Sub-Pattern 2A occurrences within Mark. 
578 I will discuss this unusual occurrence further in the section of this work addressing the Marcan occurrences of ἀλλά. 
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Table 3: Analyses of components found in ἀλλά constructions in the Gospel of Luke 
Ref. Negation(s) 
or Other 
Associated 
Elements 
Item(s) Preceding 
ἀλλά 
Items 
adjacent 
to 
ἀλλά?579 
Item(s) Following ἀλλά 
Ellipsis/Implied Repetition or 
[Explicit Repetition] of 
Elements before and after 
ἀλλά 
Pattern 
ID 
1:60 
οὐχί 
None in construction 
proper;  
by context from 1:59: 
ἐκάλουν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ τῷ 
ὀνόματι τοῦ πατρὸς 
αὐτοῦ Ζαχαρίαν 
F κληθήσεται Ἰωάννης [ἐκάλουν]/[κληθήσεται] 4 
5:14580 
μηδενὶ εἰπεῖν B 
ἀπελθὼν  
δεῖξον σεαυτὸν τῷ ἱερεῖ καὶ 
προσένεγκε περὶ τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ 
σου καθὼς προσέταξεν Μωϋσῆς 
NONE/(εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς)? 2A 
5:31 οὐ οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες F οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες χρείαν ἔχουσιν…ἰατροῦ 1C 
5:32 οὐκ δικαίους B ἁμαρτωλοὺς ἐλήλυθα καλέσαι…εἰς μετάνοιαν 1B2 
5:38581 
οὐδεὶς παλαιούς N καινοὺς 
βάλλει [οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς]/ 
[οἶνον νέον εἰς 
ἀσκοὺς]…βλητέον582 
3A 
6:27 NONE NONE N NONE NONE 4 
                                                 
579 Abbreviations for Item(s) Being Immediately Adjacent to ἀλλά: P=Previous (Item); B=Both (Items); F=Following (Item); 
N=Neither (Item).  The general formula is: Negation Constant Preceding ἀλλά Following.  
580 See treatment of Matt 8:4 and Mark 1:44 in the preceding analysis charts. 
581 See treatment of Matt 9:17 and Mark 2:22 in the preceding analysis charts. 
582 In the entry for βλητέος on page 179, BDAG notes that this occurrence is “the only verbal adj. in-τέος in NT.”  I consider this to be 
explicit repetition of the verbal idea expressed by βάλλει in the first proposition, albeit in a unique (with respect to the NT) form. 
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7:6-7 
μὴ…οὐ…οὐδὲ 
σκύλλου… 
ἱκανός εἰμι ἵνα  
ὑπὸ τὴν στέγην μου 
εἰσέλθῃς… 
ἐμαυτὸν ἠξίωσα  
πρὸς σὲ ἐλθεῖν 
N 
εἰπὲ λόγῳ,  
καὶ ἰαθήτω ὁ παῖς μου 
NONE 2A 
7:25583 Following: 
ἰδοὺ 
NONE N NONE [ἱματίοις]/[ἱματισμῷ] 4 
7:26584 Following: 
ναὶ 
NONE N NONE [προφήτην]/[προφήτου] 4 
8:16585 
Οὐδεὶς 
καλύπτει αὐτὸν σκεύει 
ἢ  
ὑποκάτω κλίνης586 
F ἐπὶ λυχνίας 
λύχνον ἅψας… 
[τίθησιν]/[τίθησιν] 
3E? 
8:27 οὐκ ἐν οἰκίᾳ F ἐν τοῖς μνήμασιν ἔμενεν 1B1587 
8:52 οὐ ἀπέθανεν B καθεύδει NONE 2A 
11:33 
Οὐδεὶς… οὐδὲ 
εἰς κρύπτην… 
ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον 
B ἐπὶ τὴν λυχνίαν λύχνον ἅψας…τίθησιν 1C 
11:42 NONE NONE N NONE NONE 4 
                                                 
583 See treatment of Matt 11:8 in earlier chart. 
584 See treatment of Matt 11:9 in earlier chart. 
585 Compare the elements included here, and their arrangement with those present in 11:33 and their arrangement.  
586 This is the first instance found within the Synoptics in which there are two preceding constituents joined by ἤ.  I address this 
occurrence in the section devoted to Sub-Pattern 3E.  In that section I also touch on the differences between this occurrence and the one found 
in Matt 5:15. 
587 I view this as a special case of Sub-Pattern 1B1, much like Matt 22:30 was a special case of Sup-Pattern 1A1.  Please see Appendix 
3 for the graphical analysis of these Sub-Patterns, and the relevant section in Chapter 8 for my treatment of Luke 8:27. 
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12:6-7 
οὐκ 
ἓν ἐξ αὐτῶν…ἔστιν 
ἐπιλελησμένον ἐνώπιον 
τοῦ θεοῦ 
N 
καὶ αἱ τρίχες τῆς κεφαλῆς ὑμῶν 
πᾶσαι ἠρίθμηνται 
NONE 2A 
12:51 οὐχί… 
ἀλλ᾽ ἢ588 
εἰρήνην F διαμερισμόν παρεγενόμην δοῦναι ἐν τῇ γῇ 4 
13:3 οὐχί NONE N NONE NONE 4 
13:5 οὐχί NONE N NONE NONE 4 
14:8-10 
μὴ (14:8) 
κατακλιθῇς  
εἰς τὴν πρωτοκλισίαν 
N 
πορευθεὶς ἀνάπεσε  
εἰς τὸν ἔσχατον τόπον 
[ὅταν κληθῇς]  
ὑπό τινος εἰς γάμους/ 
[ὅταν κληθῇς] 
3A 
14:13 
μὴ (14:12) 
μηδὲ (x3) 
τοὺς φίλους σου… 
τοὺς ἀδελφούς σου… 
τοὺς συγγενεῖς σου… 
γείτονας πλουσίους 
N 
πτωχούς,  
ἀναπείρους,  
χωλούς,  
τυφλούς 
[ὅταν ποιῇς]/[ὅταν…ποιῇς] 
(ἄριστον ἢ δεῖπνον/δοχὴν) 
(φώνει/κάλει) 
3A589 
16:21 No Negation 
ἀλλὰ καί 
NONE N NONE NONE 4 
16:30 οὐχί NONE N NONE NONE 4 
17:8 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ 
εὐθέως  
παρελθὼν ἀνάπεσε 
P 
ἑτοίμασον τί δειπνήσω  
καὶ περιζωσάμενος διακόνει μοι  
ἕως φάγω καὶ πίω,  
[ἐρεῖ αὐτῷ]/[ἐρεῖ αὐτῷ] 3A590 
                                                 
588 One of only two occurrences of ἀλλά with ἤ (ἀλλ’ ἤ) in the NT.  The other instance is in 2 Cor 1:13, where it is part of another ἀλλά 
construction. 
589 This is a special case of Sub-Pattern 3A in which a peripheral element, in this case the a temporal/circumstantial adverbial clause 
ὅταν ποιῇς, has been fronted to a position before the negation.  I discuss this and other similar examples in my coverage of the occurrences of 
Pattern 3 in Luke.  I call the reader’s attention to the charts in Appendix 3 of very similar special cases for Sub-Pattern 1A1. 
590 The repetition of a constant constituent identifies this a Pattern 3, and the position of the constant constituents before the preceding 
and following constituents further identifies it as Sub-Pattern 3A.  The variation from the usual construction expected is due to the contrast 
being made in the form of a question.  This also accounts for the presence of ἀλλά and οὐκί, which anticipates an answer in the affirmative. 
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καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα  
φάγεσαι καὶ πίεσαι συ 
18:13 
οὐκ…οὐδὲ 
ἤθελεν οὐδὲ τοὺς 
ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐπᾶραι εἰς 
τὸν οὐρανόν 
B ἔτυπτεν τὸ στῆθος αὐτοῦ NONE 2A 
20:21 
οὐ λαμβάνεις πρόσωπον B 
ἐπ᾽ ἀληθείας τὴν ὁδὸν τοῦ θεοῦ 
διδάσκεις 
NONE 2A 
20:38 οὐκ νεκρῶν B ζώντων ἔστιν 1B1 
21:9 (μὴ?) 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ 
δεῖ… 
ταῦτα γενέσθαι πρῶτον 
B εὐθέως τὸ τέλος NONE 6 
22:26591 
οὐχ 
οὕτως (referring back 
to the state of affairs 
in 22:25) 
B 
ὁ μείζων ἐν ὑμῖν γινέσθω  
ὡς ὁ νεώτερος καὶ  
ὁ ἡγούμενος  
ὡς ὁ διακονῶν 
NONE 2A 
22:36 μή…οὐθενός… 
(from 22:35) 
ἀλλὰ νῦν 
ἀπέστειλα ὑμᾶς ἄτερ…  
μή τινος ὑστερήσατε 
B ὁ ἔχων…ἀράτω 
[βαλλαντίου]/[βαλλάντιον] 
[πήρας]/[πήραν] 
3D?(4?) 
22:42592 
(πλὴν) μὴ μου P σὸν 
τὸ θέλημά  
(referred to by τὸ σὸν) 
γινέσθω 
1B2 
22:53593 
οὐκ 
ἐξετείνατε τὰς χεῖρας 
ἐπ᾽ ἐμέ 
B 
αὕτη ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ἡ ὥρα καὶ  
ἡ ἐξουσία τοῦ σκότους 
NONE 2A 
23:15 
οὐθὲν… 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ 
ἐγὼ F Ἡρῴδης 
εὗρον/(εὗρεν) 
ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τούτῳ αἴτιον  
ὧν κατηγορεῖτε κατ᾽ αὐτου 
1A1 
                                                 
591 See the treatment of Matt 20:25-26 and Mark 10:42-43 in the preceding analysis charts. 
592 See treatment of Matt 26:39 and Mark 14:36 in the preceding analysis charts. 
593 See especially the treatment of Mark 14:49. 
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24:6 οὐκ ἔστιν ὧδε B ἠγέρθη NONE 2A 
24:21 No Negation 
ἀλλά γε 
NONE N NONE NONE 4 
24:22 No Negation 
ἀλλὰ καὶ 
NONE N NONE NONE 4 
 
Involve 
Negation: 
28 
(80.0%) 
 
B=12 
F=6 
P=2 
N=15 
  
Pattern 
Totals: 
P1=7 
P2=9 
P3=6 
P4=12 
P5=0 
P6=1 
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APPENDIX 3 
General ἀλλά Construction Patterns Identified in Matthew 
Pattern 1:  Supplied/Implied Constant Pattern--Implicit Constant Constituent--Ellipsis 
(19 Total Instances in Category) 
 
Pattern 1A1: Preceding Constituent Occurs Before the Constant Constituent, Which is Before the ἀλλά.  
(4 Clear Instances: Matt 4:4; 7:21; 9:24; 19:11)   
           Implicit (Elliptical) 
Negation Preceding Constant   ἀλλά    Following [Constant] 
Example: Matt 7:21 
Neg. Preceding        Constant        
Οὐ  πᾶς ὁ λέγων μοι· κύριε κύριε,      εἰσελεύσεται εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν,     
ἀλλά  Following            Implicit (Elliptical) 
ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ποιῶν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρός μου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. [       ] 
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Special Cases: Some Element Is Fronted Before the Negation (2 Instances: Matt 16:17; 22:30) 
Matt 16:17: The preceding constituent is fronted before the negation. 
 
 
 Preceding  Negation   Constant   ἀλλά  Following 
ὅτι  σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα  οὐκ     ἀπεκάλυψέν σοι   ἀλλ᾽   ὁ πατήρ μου ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς 
Matt 22:30: The constant constituent is fronted Before the negation, but logically follows the preceding constituent as a peripheral element.   
This classification may be challenged and an argument made instead for Sub-Pattern 1B1.  Either way, this belongs in Pattern 1. 
 
       Logically Follows   Implicit (Elliptical) 
 Constant   Negation Preceding   ἀλλά   Following 
ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἀναστάσει  οὔτε γαμοῦσιν οὔτε γαμίζονται,   ἀλλ᾽    ὡς ἄγγελοι ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ εἰσιν 
 
Pattern 1B1: Preceding Constituent Occurs After the Constant Constituent.  Also known as Stripping.  Generally Signals Constituent 
Correction. 
*This is the most common construction observed.* 
(9 Clear Instances: Matt 5:15; 5:17; 9:13; 10:34; 16:12; 16:23; 18:22; 20:28; 22:32)  
      Implicit (Elliptical) 
   Negation Constant Preceding   ἀλλά    Following 
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Pattern 1B2: Preceding Constituent Occurs After the Constant Constituent, but there are explicit Constant Constituents both before and after the 
ἀλλά. 
Sole Example: Matt 19:6—This category is questionable, especially concerning the implicit repetition of the constant constituent following 
the ἀλλά.  Even if this is rejected, this arrangement is quite different from any of the other examples in Matthew.  
 
 
   Negation Constant Preceding   ἀλλά  Constant  Following 
Matt 19:6   οὐκέτι  εἰσὶν   δύο     ἀλλὰ   σὰρξ   μία 
Pattern 1C: Split Constant Constituent (3 Instances: Matt 6:18; 9:12; 20:23) 
  Negation Constant  Preceding Constant  ἀλλά  Following 
 
Matt 9:12  οὐ   χρείαν ἔχουσιν  οἱ ἰσχύοντες  ἰατροῦ  ἀλλ᾽   οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες 
 
Matt 20:23 οὐκ   ἔστιν    ἐμὸν   [τοῦτο]  δοῦναι,  ἀλλ᾽  οἷς ἡτοίμασται ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός μου 
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Pattern 1D: Two or More Preceding Constituents, with Corresponding Explicit Following Constituents.   
Ellipsis of the Constant from First Conjunct in the Second Conjunct.  Also Known as Gapping. (Sole Instance: Matt 10:20) 
          Implicit 
Negation Preceding1 Constant Preceding2  ἀλλά  Following1     Constant Following2 
οὐ γὰρ  ὑμεῖς   ἐστε   οἱ λαλοῦντες  ἀλλὰ  τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν  [ἔστιν] τὸ λαλοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν.  
 
Pattern 2:  No Constant Pattern--No Explicit or Implicit Constant Constituent 
Parallel Clauses On Either Side of ἀλλά-- With or without Negation 
The clauses may be informational, or in the form of commands/requests. (9 Total Instances in Category) 
Pattern 2A: Negation may be οὐ or μή or negative content item such as μηδενί. (6 Instances: Matt 5:39; 8:4; 8:8; 13:21; 18:30) 
Negation Preceding Statement/Command/Request  ἀλλά  Following Statement/Command/Request 
Pattern 2B: No Negation—Parallel Clauses (2 Instances: Matt 9:18; 24:6) 
  Ø Negation Preceding Statement/Command/Request  ἀλλά  Following Statement/Command/Request 
Pattern 2C: Not Only…But Also Construction: (οὐ μόνον…ἀλλὰ καί).  In this case we see crasis occurring between καί and ἐάν => κἂν. 
Matt 21:21 οὐ μόνον τὸ τῆς συκῆς ποιήσετε,  ἀλλὰ κἂν τῷ ὄρει τούτῳ εἴπητε·… 
Pattern 2D: ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Construction—Beginning with Negative Content Item. 
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Matt 27:24 οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ     ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον θόρυβος γίνεται 
 
Pattern 3:  Supplied/Repeated Constant Pattern--Explicit Repetition of Constant Constituent 
All or Part of the Constant Construct Appears Explicitly Repeated Before and After the ἀλλά. (6 Total Instances in Category) 
 
Pattern 3A: Constant Appearing Before and After the ἀλλά. Begins with negative conjunction.  Some intervening material.  
Preceding and Following Constituents occur After the Constant Constituents, similar to 1B1. 
(Sole Example: Matt 9:17) Pattern:  Negative Content  Constant  Preceding … ἀλλά Constant  Following  
Negative Content  Constant      Preceding   Other   
οὐδὲ     βάλλουσιν οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς   παλαιούς    … 
ἀλλά    Constant     Following 
ἀλλὰ     βάλλουσιν οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς   καινούς 
 
Pattern 3B: Constant Appearing Before and After the ἀλλά. Begins with negation.  
Preceding and Following constituents occur Before the Constant Constituents, similar to 1A1.   
(2 Instances: Matt 15:11; 17:12) 
 
General Pattern: Negation Preceding Constant ἀλλά   Following  Constant 
 
  Negation Preceding     Constant    ἀλλά   
Matt 15:11: οὐ   τὸ εἰσερχόμενον εἰς τὸ στόμα   κοινοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον,   ἀλλὰ 
 
Following      Constant 
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τὸ ἐκπορευόμενον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος  τοῦτο κοινοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον 
Pattern 3C: Split Constant before ἀλλά, with part explicitly repeated after ἀλλά, and part implied. Note also the use of πλὴν as a connective from 
the previous request.  (Sole Example: Matt 26:39) 
       Explicit 
Negation Constant1 Preceding Constant2 ἀλλά  Constant1  Following  [[Constant2]] 
          Implicit 
πλὴν     οὐχ        ὡς      ἐγὼ     θέλω  ἀλλ᾽       ὡς       σύ  [[θέλεις]] 
 
 
Pattern 3D: Constant Appearing Before and After the ἀλλά. Begins with negation. Split Preceding Constituent before ἀλλά, with split Following 
Constituent after ἀλλά, and part implied.  (2 Instances: Matt 6:13; 20:26594) 
 
          Explicit 
Negation Preceding Constant Preceding  ἀλλά   Following  Constant Following 
καὶ  μὴ   εἰσενέγκῃς  ἡμᾶς   εἰς πειρασμόν,  ἀλλὰ   ῥῦσαι   ἡμᾶς   ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ. 
 
 
Pattern 4:  Rhetorical/Discourse Pattern--Ἀλλά In Initial Position in Rhetorical Objection 
                                                 
594 Note that the Following constituent is split by the Constant constituent: ἀλλ᾽ ὃς ἐὰν θέλῃ ἐν ὑμῖν μέγας γενέσθαι ἔσται ὑμῶν διάκονος. 
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(2 Instances: Matt 11:8 and 11:9). 
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General ἀλλά Construction Patterns Identified in Mark 
Pattern 1:  Supplied/Implied Constant Pattern--Implicit Constant Constituent--Ellipsis 
(14 Total Instances in Category) 
 
Pattern 1A1: Preceding Constituent Occurs Before the Constant Constituent, Which is Before the ἀλλά.  
(5 Clear Instances: Mark 5:39; 7:5; 9:8; 9:37; 13:11)   
           Implicit (Elliptical) 
Negation Preceding Constant   ἀλλά    Following [Constant] 
 
Pattern 1B1: Preceding Constituent Occurs After the Constant Constituent 
(7 Clear Instances: Mark 2:17; 7:19; 8:33; 10:40; 10:45; 12:25; 12:27)  
      Implicit (Elliptical) 
   Negation Constant Preceding   ἀλλά    Following 
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Pattern 1B2: Preceding Constituent Occurs After the Constant Constituent, but there are Constant Constituents both before and after the ἀλλά. 
Sole Example: Mark 10:8, which parallels Matt 19:6—This category is questionable, especially concerning the implicit 
repetition of the constant constituent following the ἀλλά.  Even if rejected, the arrangement is different from any of the other 
examples in Matthew or Mark.  
 
 
   Negation Constant1 Preceding   ἀλλά  Constant2  Following 
Matt 19:6   οὐκέτι  εἰσὶν   δύο     ἀλλὰ   σὰρξ   μία 
Mark 10:8  οὐκέτι  εἰσὶν   δύο     ἀλλὰ   μία   σάρξ 
   Negation Constant1 Preceding   ἀλλά  Following Constant2 
 
 
 
Pattern 1C: Split Constant Constituent (1 Instance: Mark 2:17, which parallels Matt 9:12) 
  Negation Constant  Preceding Constant  ἀλλά  Following 
 
Mark 2:17  οὐ   χρείαν ἔχουσιν  οἱ ἰσχύοντες  ἰατροῦ  ἀλλ᾽   οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες 
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Pattern 2:  No Constant Pattern--No Explicit or Implicit Constant Constituent 
Parallel Clauses On Either Side of ἀλλά-- With or without Negation 
The clauses may be informational, or in the form of commands/requests. (16 Total Instances in Category) 
Pattern 2A: Negation may be οὐ or μή or negative content item such as μηδενί. *This is the most common construction observed in Mark.* 
(14 Instances: Mark 1:44; 1:45; 3:26; 4:17; 4:22; 6:8-9; 6:52; 7:24-25; 9:18~22; 11:23; 12:14; 13:11; 14:49; 16:7) 
Negation Preceding Statement/Command/Request  ἀλλά  Following Statement/Command/Request 
Pattern 2B: No Negation—Parallel Clauses (1 Instance: Mark 14:28) 
  Ø Negation Preceding Statement/Command/Request  ἀλλά  Following Statement/Command/Request 
Pattern 2D: ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Construction—Beginning with Negative Content Item. (1 Instance: Mark 5:26) 
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Pattern 3:  Supplied/Repeated Constant Pattern--Explicit Repetition of Constant Constituent 
All or Part of the Constant Construct Appears Explicitly Repeated Before and After the ἀλλά. (6 Total Instances in Category) 
 
Pattern 3A: Constant Appearing Before and After the ἀλλά. Begins with negative conjunction.  Some intervening material. Some ellipsis. 
Preceding and Following Constituents occur After the Constant Constituents, similar to 1B1. 
(Sole Example: Mark 2:22, which is the parallel to Matt 9:17, the sole example of Sub-Pattern 3A in Matthew)  
 
General Pattern:  Negative Content   Constant  Preceding … ἀλλά  Constant  Following  
 
Mark 2:22 
Negative Content Constant   Preceding  Other   
καὶ οὐδεὶς βάλλει    οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς παλαιούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ῥήξει ὁ οἶνος τοὺς ἀσκοὺς  
       καὶ ὁ οἶνος ἀπόλλυται καὶ οἱ ἀσκοί· 
ἀλλά Constant  Following 
ἀλλ᾽ [βάλλει] οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς καινούς. 
 
Pattern 3B: Constant Appearing Before and After the ἀλλά. Begins with explicit negation.  
Preceding and Following Constituents occur Before the Constant Constituents, similar to 1A1.   
(2 Instances: Mark 3:29 and 5:19) 
 
General Pattern: Negation Preceding Constant ἀλλά   Following  Constant 
 
  Negation Preceding Constant ἀλλά  Following  Constant 
Mark 5:19 καὶ οὐκ  ἀφῆκεν  αὐτόν,  ἀλλὰ   λέγει   αὐτῷ 
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Pattern 3C: Split Constant before ἀλλά, with part explicitly repeated after ἀλλά, and part implied.  (2 Instances: Mark 7:15 and 14:36) 
       Explicit 
Negation Constant1 Preceding Constant2 ἀλλά   Constant1  Following  [[Constant2]] 
          Implicit 
οὐ   τί   ἐγὼ   θέλω   ἀλλὰ   τί   συ  [[θέλεις]] 
 
Pattern 3D: Constant Appearing Before and After the ἀλλά. Begins with negation. Split Preceding Constituent before ἀλλά, with split Following 
Constituent after ἀλλά, and part implied.  (Sole Instance: Mark 10:43) 
          Explicit 
Negation Preceding1 Constant Preceding2  ἀλλά   Following1  Constant Following2 
 
Pattern 4:  Rhetorical/Discourse Pattern--Ἀλλά In Initial Position in Rhetorical Objection 
(5 Instances: Mark 3:27; 9:12-13; 11:32; 13:24; 14:36). 
Pattern 5:  Conditional Negation Pattern 
 (Sole Instance: Mark 13:20) 
 
καὶ  εἰ μὴ  ἐκολόβωσεν κύριος τὰς ἡμέρας,   
οὐκ ἂν ἐσώθη πᾶσα σάρξ·  
ἀλλὰ διὰ τοὺς ἐκλεκτοὺς οὓς ἐξελέξατο  
ἐκολόβωσεν   τὰς ἡμέρας. 
Pattern 6:  Alternative Negation Pattern—A But Not B 
(3 Instances: Mark 10:27; 13:7; 14:29)
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General ἀλλά Construction Patterns Identified in Luke 
Pattern 1:  Supplied/Implied Constant Pattern--Implicit Constant Constituent--Ellipsis 
(7 Total Instances in Category) 
 
Pattern 1A1: Preceding Constituent Occurs Before the Constant Constituent, Which is Before the ἀλλά.  
(Sole Instance: Luke 23:15)   
           Implicit (Elliptical) 
Negation Preceding Constant   ἀλλά    Following [Constant] 
 
Pattern 1B1: Preceding Constituent Occurs After the Constant Constituent 
(2 Instances: Luke 8:27 and 20:38)  
      Implicit (Elliptical) 
   Negation Constant Preceding   ἀλλά    Following 
 
Pattern 1B2: Preceding Constituent Occurs After the Constant Constituent, but there are Constant Constituents both before and after the ἀλλά. 
(2 Instances: Luke 5:32 and 22:42) 
 
 
Negation Constant1  Preceding ἀλλά  Following Constant2 
Luke 5:32 οὐκ   ἐλήλυθα καλέσαι  δικαίους  ἀλλ᾽   ἁμαρτωλοὺς  εἰς μετάνοιαν 
Luke 22:42 μὴ   τὸ θέλημά   μου   ἀλλὰ   τὸ σὸν  γινέσθω 
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Pattern 1C: Split Constant Constituent  
(2 Instances: Luke 5:31 and 11:33) 
  Negation Constant  Preceding Constant  ἀλλά  Following 
 
οὐ   χρείαν ἔχουσιν  οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες ἰατροῦ  ἀλλ᾽   οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες 
 
Pattern 2:  No Constant Pattern--No Explicit or Implicit Constant Constituent 
Parallel Clauses On Either Side of ἀλλά-- With or without Negation 
The clauses may be informational, or in the form of commands/requests. (10 Total Instances in Category) 
Pattern 2A: Negation may be οὐ or μή or negative content item such as μηδενί. *This is the most common construction observed in Mark.* 
(9 Instances: Luke 5:14; 7:6-7; 8:52; 12:6-7; 18:13; 20:21; 22:26; 22:53; 24:6) 
Negation Preceding Statement/Command/Request  ἀλλά  Following Statement/Command/Request 
 
 
Pattern 3:  Supplied/Repeated Constant Pattern--Explicit Repetition of Constant Constituent 
All or Part of the Constant Construct Appears Explicitly Repeated Before and After the ἀλλά. (6 Total Instances in Category) 
 
Pattern 3A: Constant Appearing Before and After the ἀλλά. Begins with negative conjunction.  Some intervening material. Some ellipsis. 
Preceding and Following Constituents occur After the Constant Constituents, similar to 1B1. 
(4 Instances: Luke 5:38; 14:8-10; 14:13; 17:8)  
 
General Pattern:  Negative Content   Constant  Preceding … ἀλλά  Constant  Following 
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Pattern 3D: Constant Appearing Before and After the ἀλλά. Begins with negation.  
Split Preceding Constituent before ἀλλά, with split Following Constituent after ἀλλά, and part implied.   
(Sole Instance: Luke 22:36; An argument could easily be made to reclassify this occurrence as Pattern 4) 
 
Pattern 3E: Constant Appearing Explicitly Before and After the ἀλλά. Begins with negative content item.  One item which is clearly a preceding 
constituent is joined to another which is less clearly so.  Note the parallel prepositional phrases, identifying the preceding and 
following constituents.   
 
Negative Content    Preceding1(?)   Preceding2  Constant 
Οὐδεὶς δὲ   λύχνον ἅψας  καλύπτει αὐτὸν σκεύει ἢ  ὑποκάτω κλίνης  τίθησιν,  
 
ἀλλά          Following  Constant 
ἀλλ᾽           ἐπὶ λυχνίας   τίθησιν,   
 
ἵνα οἱ εἰσπορευόμενοι βλέπωσιν τὸ φῶς. 
 
Pattern 4:  Rhetorical/Discourse Pattern--Ἀλλά In Initial Position in Rhetorical Objection 
(12 Instances: Luke 1:60; 6:27; 7:25; 7:26; 11:42; 12:51; 13:3; 13:5; 16:21; 16:30; 24:21; 24:22). 
 
Pattern 6:  Alternative Negation Pattern—A But Not B 
(Sole Instance: Luke 21:9) 
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APPENDIX 4 
Singular and Parallel Uses of ἀλλά Within the Synoptic Gospels 
“cf.” and italics reference(s) indicate that there are parallel statements in which ἀλλά either (1) 
does not appear, with another word (e.g., δέ, γάρ) or word combination (e.g., εἰ μή) being used to 
perform its function, or (2) does appear, but in a significantly altered arrangement from the 
occurrence in focus. 
Table 1:  Occurrences in Matthew 
Matthean Occurrence Marcan Parallel Lucan Parallel 
4:4   
5:15 cf. 4:21 Rhetorical Question 8:16 and 11:33 
5:17   
5:39  cf. 6:27-29  
6:13  cf. 11:4 
6:18   
7:21   
8:4 1:44 5:14 
8:8  7:7 
9:12 2:17 5:31 
9:13 2:17 5:32 
9:17 2:22 5:38 
9:18 cf. 5:23 => ἵνα 
Subjunctive vs. Imperative 
 
9:24 5:39 8:52 
10:20 13:11  
10:34  12:51 
11:8  7:25 
11:9  7:26 
13:21 4:17 cf. 18:13 
15:11 7:15  
16:12   
16:17   
16:23 8:33  
17:12 9:12-13  
18:22   
18:30   
19:6 10:8  
19:11   
20:23 10:40  
20:26 10:43 22:26 
20:28 10:45 cf. 18:27 & v.l. in D 
21:21 cf. 11:23 Alternate Contrast  
22:30 12:25 cf. 20:36 γάρ 
22:32 12:27 20:38 
24:6 13:7 21:9 
26:39 14:36 22:42 
27:24   
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Table 2:  Occurrences in Mark 
Matthean Parallel Marcan Occurrence Lucan Parallel 
8:4 1:44 5:14 
 1:45 cf. 5:16 => δέ 
9:12 2:17 5:31 
9:13 2:17 5:32 
9:17 2:22 5:38 
cf.12:26 Rhetorical Question 3:26 cf. 11:18 Rhetorical Question 
cf.12:27 Rhetorical Question 3:27 cf. 11:21-22 
cf.12:32 => οὐκ...οὔτε...οὔτε 3:29  
13:21 4:17  
 4:22  
 5:19  
 5:26  
9:24 5:39 8:52 
 6:8-9  
 6:52  
cf. 15:2 => γάρ 7:5  
15:11 7:15  
 7:19  
 7:24-5  
16:23 8:33  
cf. 17:8 => εἰ μή 9:8  
cf. 17:12 => δέ 9:12-9:13  
 9:18~9:22  
 9:37  
19:6 10:8  
 10:27  
20:23 10:40  
20:26 10:43 22:26 
20:28 10:45 cf. 22:27 Rhetorical Question 
=> οὐχί...δέ 
cf. 21:21 Alternate Contrast 11:23  
cf. 21:26 => δέ 11:32 cf. 20:6 
cf. 22:16 No Contrast 12:14 20:21 
22:30 12:25  
22:32 12:27 20:38 
24:6 13:7 21:9 
cf. 10:19 => γάρ 13:11  
10:20 13:11  
cf. 24:22 => γάρ 13:20  
 13:24  
cf. 26:32 => δέ 14:28  
cf. 26:33 =>...ἐγώ οὐδέποτε... 14:29  ...ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐγώ.  
cf. 26:39 => πλήν οὐκ ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω... 14:36 ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τί ἐγὼ θέλω… cf. 22:42 => πλήν μὴ τὸ θέλημά 
μου...γινέσθω 
26:39 14:36 22:42 
cf. 26:56 => δέ 14:49  
cf. 28:7 => καί 16:7  
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Table 3:  Occurrences in Luke 
Matthean Parallel Marcan Parallel Lucan Occurrence 
  1:60 
8:4 1:44 5:14 
9:12 2:17 5:31 
9:13 2:17 5:32 
9:17 2:22 5:38 
  6:27 
cf. 8:8   7:6-7 
11:8  7:25 
11:9  7:26 
5:15  8:16 
  8:27 
9:24 5:39 8:52 
5:15  11:33 
cf. 23:23  11:42 
cf. 10:30 => δέ  12:6-7 
10:34  12:51 
  13:3 
  13:5 
  14:8-10 
  14:13 
  16:21 
  16:30 
  17:8 
  18:13 
cf. 22:16 No Contrast 12:14 20:21 
22:32 12:27 20:38 
24:6 13:7 21:9 
20:26 10:43 22:26 
  22:36 
26:39 14:36 22:42 
  22:53 
  23:15 
cf. 28:6 => γάρ  24:6 
  24:21 
  24:22 
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Table 4:  Summary Statistics 
 
 Matthean 
Occurrences 
Marcan 
Occurrences 
Lucan 
Occurrences 
  
Raw 
% 
of 
Total 
Raw 
% 
of 
Total 
Raw 
% 
of 
Total 
Total Occurrences 37 100% 45 100% 35 100% 
Singular Occurrences 15 41% 27 60% 20 57% 
Shared Uses Across All Synoptics 9 24% 9 20% 9 26% 
Shared Uses With Matthew Only N/A N/A 8 18% 5 14% 
Shared Uses With Mark Only 8 22% N/A N/A 1 3% 
Shared Uses With Luke Only 5 14% 1 2% N/A N/A 
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APPENDIX 5 
The Synoptic Problem 
While the resolution of the “Synoptic Problem” is not the aim of, nor within the scope of 
this work, it will be helpful to state my positions on at least some of the related questions, and 
the impact of these positions on the present work.  Most notable among the various issues 
discussed which are relevant to my investigation are the following: (1) the question of Marcan or 
Matthean priority; (2) the existence of various hypothetical sources, both oral and written, 
purportedly behind the gospels, including (but certainly not limited to) Q (or S, as asserted by 
Bacon),595 M, L, etc.; (3) the dependencies and interdependencies of said sources; and (4) the 
interdependence or independence of Matthew and Luke.  There are, of course, other important 
issues and related discussions ongoing, but this listing, and my brief comment on each of these 
issues, should suffice to give the reader a clear good overview of my working assumptions.  In 
my comments to follow, I will refer to the numbers appearing in the list immediately preceding. 
First, regarding (1), above, I hold, albeit lightly, to Marcan priority.  With respect to (2), I 
would readily acknowledge (a) that there is a body of material, mostly sayings material, which is 
shared by Matthew and Luke, and to which I would apply the well-known label Q; and (b) that 
both of these gospels seem to have information which the other does not include, either because 
the other writer did not have access to it, or because, having had access to it, the writer did not 
elect to include it based on his own compositional/redactional desire.  With respect to Q, I have 
found both J. Meier’s perspective on this, as well as his advice to scholars engaging with Q.  In 
                                                 
595 Benjamin Wisner Bacon, Studies in Matthew (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1930), xii; France, Matthew: Evangelist and Teacher, 24. 
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the second volume of his Marginal Jew series, in his “Excursus on the Q Document,” Meier says 
that “I feel obligated to begin my treatment by stressing that the existence of the Q document 
during the first two Christian generations is a hypothesis, and only a hypothesis.”596  With his 
reservations thus noted from the beginning, he continues, by acknowledging both the 
perspectives of scholars who reject, not only Q, but also Marcan priority (which he asserts is the 
“sine qua non of any argument in favor of the existence of Q”), as well of those who accept 
Marcan priority but nonetheless reject Q.597  He continues: 
While I appreciate the objections these scholars raise against the Q hypothesis, it still seems 
to me that the existence of the Q document is the theory that best explains the data found 
in Matthew and Luke.  These data raise a basic question: if we grant that Mark was the first 
Gospel to be written, that Matthew and Luke both used Mark, and that Matthew and Luke 
did not know each other’s Gospels, how do we explain the fact that Matthew and Luke 
contain blocks of common material not derived from Mark?  The simplest answer remains 
the Q document.598 
Meier then presents those arguments which he sees as supporting the likelihood, though not 
certainty, of the existence of Q.599  Further, the existence of Q as a “single written source” does 
not exclude the possibility of “additional contributions from stray oral traditions or written 
sources known to both Matthew and Luke....”600   
Meier is far less confident about the ability of scholars to know more about Q, and 
especially to support some of the more speculative assertions made concerning it, and in fact 
offers the following now (in) famous “advice” to fellow practitioners: 
                                                 
596 John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, Volume II: Mentor, 
Message, and Miracles (New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press, 1994), 177. 
597 Ibid. 
598 Ibid. 
599 Ibid., 177–8. 
600 Ibid., 178. 
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I cannot help thinking that biblical scholarship would be greatly advanced if every morning 
all exegetes would repeat as a mantra: “Q is a hypothetical document whose exact 
extension, wording, originating community, strata, and stages of redaction cannot be 
known.”  This daily devotion might save us flights of fancy that are destined, in my view, 
to end in skepticism.601 
Whether or not the reader decides to add this recitation to their morning “quiet time” or not, it is 
my position that I have been well served in my own studies, and in this investigation, by regular 
meditation on the content of this liturgy. 
Regarding issues (3) and (4), above, my position is fairly simple: there seem to be at least 
two independent sources for Matthew and Luke, namely Mark and S/Q, with other sources, such 
as M and L, possible.  I have used the S/Q label in deference to Bacon’s insights, to which 
France helpfully draws attention,602 and with which, in this instance, I agree: 
Q is not an illusion but a real discovery, and vitally important.  But Q is not S. Q does 
represent a factor of common material by which Mt and Lk have independently 
supplemented the deficiencies of Mk on the side of teaching. It would be of much greater 
value to gospel critics and students of the Life of Christ if freed from the preconceptions 
of scholars eager to find ancient testimony to support their views. Unfortunately the 
temptation has proved in many cases too great. Papias was put upon the rack and a meaning 
he would not admit has been forced from his words. In reality nothing whatever is known 
of the authorship, character, or contents of S beyond what critics may derive, directly or 
indirectly, from Q.603 
                                                 
601 Ibid.   
602 R. T. France, Matthew: Evangelist & Teacher, 1989; Repr. (Eugene, Ore.: Wipf & 
Stock, 2004), 24 n26. 
603 Benjamin Wisner Bacon, Studies in Matthew (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1930), xii.  On page ix, Bacon distinguishes three classes of material, namely P, Q, and R, from 
the two sources, Mark and S.  P refers to “material peculiar to Mt or Luke” (viii) and is also 
subdivided into Pmt for Matthean material (= “M”) and Plk for Lucan material (= “L”).  R refers 
to editorial (redaction) material (xiii), and O is used for “elements taken up from current oral 
tradition” (xiii). 
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On the one hand, the independence of Mark and S/Q seems at the very least highly probable.  
The interdependence or independence of Matthew and Luke seems far more tenuous, and is open 
to debate up to the present day.   
I have already cited works which stake out quite different positions regarding these 
issues, with each of these being carefully researched and argued.  I hold to the independence of 
these Matthew and Luke, while acknowledging that there are some agreements which seem to 
argue for some sort of interdependence, although the direction and extent of this 
inter/dependence is also open to debate.  If the reader will allow, I will extrapolate from the 
defense a senior scholar regarding his reluctance to declare with certainty the direction of 
dependence between Mark and Matthew, and apply it carefully to my position regarding 
Matthew and Luke.   
In context, R.T. France is responding to the insinuation by G.N. Stanton that a study of 
Matthew’s gospel without “recourse to source critical hypothesis” would be severely hampered:  
…the loss of certainty about the nature and direction of literary dependence may not in fact 
be so disastrous for the study of the theology and purpose of the evangelists as Stanton’s 
words quoted above might suggest.  To approach Matthew without a firm conviction either 
of the priority of Mark or that of Matthew does not prevent one from listening to his gospel 
as a whole, allowing it to make its own distinctive impact through its structure, its selection 
of themes, and its recurrent paraphrases.  Nor does a suspension of judgment on the 
question of literary relationships prevent one from comparing Matthew fruitfully with each 
of the other gospels, not in terms of one of them ‘using’, ‘following’ or ‘changing’ another, 
but in order to see where the differences lie.  To be unwilling to say that at this point 
Matthew has altered Mark’s text (or vice versa) in a particular way does not disqualify one 
from noticing that they present the same story or the same teaching in difference ways, and 
from drawing the appropriate conclusions as to their distinctive theological interests.  That 
is what I shall be trying to do in much of this book.604 
                                                 
604 France, Matthew: Evangelist and Teacher, 48. 
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Clearly, France is discussing an issue of primary importance, one which goes beyond an 
assertion of which gospel, Matthew or Mark, was written first.  The decision as to which one was 
written first, and thus available as a source to another gospel writer or writers, impacts how one 
views the redactional choices of the writer(s) of the dependent gospel account(s).  The 
perspective on a writer’s redactional choices likewise guides the determination of a writer’s 
theology and persuasive intent.   
If this is true, and I believe it to be so, then Stanton’s critique must be taken seriously.  
Indeed, more could be said by France if he simply took a position, either position, at the 
beginning.  The problem with such a course is well known.  The assertions made based on 
presupposition P cannot be more reliable than presupposition P itself.  Each conjecture or 
speculation made which is based upon P has at best the same likelihood, and in most cases a 
lower likelihood, of being correct than P itself.  The accumulation of such probabilities quickly 
render conjectures based upon other conjectures rather unlikely, and in any case totally 
dependent upon the base, or root, presupposition. 
Given his view of the state of the still-ongoing discussion Marcan/Matthean priority, and 
the relative uncertainty of the outcome of that same discussion, France pursued the better course 
by prescinding from a final, certain judgment regarding these issues, and thus from drawing 
conclusions about redactional changes by a writer, the direction of these changes, and the 
theology or persuasive intent revealed thereby.  On this course, of the greatest importance is the 
material the writer did include, not the manner in which the writer redacted his putative source 
material. 
It should be clear to the reader by this point that I see a broader application for these 
arguments.  In distinction from France, I am holding to Marcan priority, and I do see the 
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differences in Matthew and/or Luke as changes from the Marcan source of their material.  
However, I am extremely reluctant to speculate on the interdependence, if any, between Matthew 
and Luke, and even more reluctant to speculate on the direction of any dependence of one on the 
other.  However, I do not see this as a particular hindrance to the pursuit of this work, as my 
primary interests are not dependent upon a prior resolution of the Matthean/Lucan 
interdependence question. 
